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SUl;]}lARY
This thesis analyses the development of oil and natural gas in
the Soviet Union and Faatezn European full members of the Council
for Futual Economic Assistance (Comecon) from the end of the
Second \lorld \larto 1975 and assesses the likely role of hydro-
carbon fuels in the Comecon energy balance to 1980. Tne major
part of the thesis is concerned with developments in the 1971-
1975 period, when the Soviet Union, the bloc's principal producer
and supplier, experienced a number of technicalmd economic
difficulties in the oil and gas industries and when world prices
of oil showed a fivefold increase, which was reflected in turn
in increasing prices of other energy raw materials. The object-
ives of the study are therefore to identify the problems faced in
utilising Comecon oil and gas resources, to~sess their impact on
energy developments in the bloc and on the pattern of Soviet trade
in oil and gas, and on.relations with other hydrocarbon producers
in the changing world market.
There exists a number of \lestern studies of Comecon energy develop-
ments, published in the early to mid-sixtiec, come of which
suggested th~.t the era of Comecon energy autarchy would corneto
an end and that the group might become increasingly involved in
th7 world market as a competitive purchaser. This view was main-
ta~ned in some quarters after the Organis~tion of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed SUbstantial increases in the
selling prices of their crude oil in October 1973 and subsequently.
However study of Soviet and Fast European techno-economic material
has revealed that before the aforementioned nrice rises Comecon
planners wer·:;assessing the possibili ties of 4 adjusting enerfY
policy to cope with these difficulties, with the objectives of at
least maintaining the export surplus of oil and of developing
export trade in gas. Such theories of an impending "Comecon energy
crisis" are re-examined, taking intorocount the capacity of the
logistic system to allow planners to re-assess the relationship
of oil to coal, gas and other fuels. The examination suggests
that although considerable difficulties are known and acknowledged
to exist in the Comecon oil and gas industries, the bloc has the
opportunity of retaining self-sufficiency in hydrocarbon energy
to 1980 and that current policy is directed to the attainment of
this objective.
The thesis is written almost entirely from Soviet and P~st European
technical and economic sources. Official Comecon ::tatistical
rnaterial, supplemented by Ii~ECt OBeD and United Hations publications,
have been used to provide basic data. The metric system has been
adopted throughout the thesis.
ix
NOTES
A. Measures and Conversion Factors
The metric system has been adopted throughout this thesis.
'Tonnes' is used in preference to 'tons' or 'metric tons'.
One billion equals 1,000 million.
Soviet energy statistics are often recorded in 'tonnes of
standard fuel equivalent' (taf), 1 tonne containing 7000
calories per kilogramme. The conversion factors for Soviet
data are as follows:
Crude Oil: 1 tonne = 1.430·tsf
Natural Gas: 1 billion
cubic metres = 1.190 t8f
Hard Coal: 1 tonne = 0.820 tsf"
Brown Coal: 1 tonne = 0.420 tsf
Oil Shale: 1 tonne = 0.325 tsf
Puelwood: 1 tonne = 0.249 tof
Peat (to 1960~: 1 tonne = 0.400 tsf(from 1960 : 0.325 tsf
(tfter 1970 this fie,ure is 0.780)
The following corresponding factors are used for Eastern Europe2n
countries:
Country Natural Gas Crude Oil Hard Coal Brown Coal
Bulgaria 1.20 1.40 0.59 0.29
Hungary 1.20 1.40 0.71 0.50
GDR 0.47 1.40 0.71 0.30
Poland 1.21 1.40 O.GO 0.29
Romania 1.36 1.40 0.71 0.36
Czechoslovakia 1.26 1.40 0.80 0.48
(other factors, as for USSR)
Sources for the derivation of these factors arr given in
J Bethkenhagen "Bedeutung und L6g1!chkei ten des Ost-Hest-:Iandels
m!t Energierohstoffen" (Deutsches Insti tut fUr l,Virtschaftsforschung,
Sonderheft 104) BerLin: Duncker & Humb10t 1975, p.l02 and R E Ebel
"Communist Trade in Oil and Gas" Hew York: Frae{{er 1970 p.xix.
xB. Transliteration.
The cyrillic transliteration scheme adopted by the British Fuseum
and British Lending Library has been used, but the following
exceptions have been made: finalH~ is 'ii', f'Lr.a.L biV1 is 'yi';
U{ in Bule;a.rianis 'shch'; "b in Bulgarian is '0', as the hard sign
in Russian is represented by ". iVhere an a1:thor's name appears
in a language other than his own it is represented in that Language
or transliterated in accordance with the scheme. Instances of this
are few.
c. The Bibliogra.phy.
Material used in the thesis is incorporated into a separate biblio-
graphy. However this contains a number of works which have not
been attested in the thesis, due either to their non-a.vailability
via inter-library loans or to the incorporation of their content
into later pUblications. In order to~s1st further research in the
field and to~ve a more accurate indication of the nature and
extent of material relevant to the subject as defined, it was agreed
that such works should be included. Attention is drawn to the
excellent bibliographies relating to the administrative structure
and technological levels of the Soviet fuels industries to be
found in Campbell (1968) and Sh1rnkin (1962), both cited in this
bibliograp~y. 1;fuerethe content of certain articles is not evi-
dent from the title a short precis is included.
1Chapter 1. The Development of the World Petroleum market to
1975. and the Scope of this Study.
In the period from 1960 to 1975 the world petroleum market
underwent substantial change, particularly after 1970. During
this time North American, Japanese and West European industry
enjoyed a high rate of growth, due to a great extent to the
availability of low-cost oil mainly through imports from tve
Middle East, and at a later stage in the USA and Western Europe
to indigenous production of natural gas. The apparent ease with
which a small number of highly integrated companies controlled
exploration and production and to a degree processing and distri-
bution contributed to the mood of confidence that pervaded
government and industrial circles of these growing economies in
the probability of continued availability of cheap hydrocarbon
energy. During this time those countries in which the integrated
multinational companies operated brought to fruition a policy
intended to curtail activities whioh they believed to be against
their long-term interests. Such activities included the rapid
development of oil (and in some cases gas) reserves at a rate
whioh led to a marked decline in oil prices and revenue per barrel
to the producer countries throughout the sixties and the oil
companies engaged in keen competition for an increasing share of
the expanding markets, primarily ot Japan and Western Europe.
However the oil-producing countries gradually accumulated economic
2and politioa1 strength from the time of the formation of the
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960.
This oulminated in the attainment of two of their prime objectives
in the latter part of 1973 and the first few months of 1914 in
independently raising the selling prioe of their oil and in
deoiding on produotion policy. The nature of the decision-making
process and the extent of its impact confirmed a fundamental
shift in the power structure of the world petroleum market from
the oil companies to the producer governments acting through OPEC.
Almost four years have passed since the Tom Kippur war and the
"oil crisis" and the power of OPEC shows no sign of waning.
During this period the Soviet Union might seem to have
remained insulated from the events that shaped the development of
the world market. Once the immediate problems of post-war recon-
struction were over, the Soviet Union, exhibiting an impressive
rate of economic growth, regained her self-sufficiency in energy
and became once more an exporter of oil, regaining the position
enjoyed in the thirties. The rapid rise in demand for oil in the
relatively conveniently located markets of Western Europe coin-
oided with the Soviet Union's development of her SUbstantial
reserves of coal and natural gas, the latter at a relatively late
stage by world standards, in addition to the exploitation of the
prolific Volga-Ural oilfields. Exports of oil and refined
products showed steady growth from the early sixties, and it
seemed likely that the Soviet Union would be well plaoed to
continue to satisfy her own demand for energy, to accelerate the
3trend from coal to hydrocarbon fuels within the domestic energy
balance, to meet growing demand in the member-countries of
*Comeoon, who, with the exoeption of Romania, were and remain
poorly endowed with hydrooarbon reserves, and to continue to take
advantage of opportunities for hydrocarbon exports to the hard-
ourrency markets.
However by the late sixties there arose some measure of
doubt as to the Soviet Union's ability to maintain the rate of
hydrooarbon development that had been aohieved in the late
fifties and early sixties. The view was expressed in a number of
quarters that the Comeoon bloo might beoome a competitive bidder
for oil produced by the Arab-American oil companies, whose
internal relations were becoming increasingly unstable.
The development of the world petroleum market can be viewed
as being dependent on the interaction of 4 major spheres of
influence, which at times coalesce or conflict. Firstly there
are the large international companies, whose prime objective is
long-term profit maximisation and who operate across national
boundaries, optimiSing within international legal and economic
constraints; secondly the home governments of these companies,
who have become energy importers and one of whose objectives is
to secure energy supply at least cost to the national economy,
having regard for the international political and economic impact
*Throughout this study 'Comecon' denotes the USSR, plus Poland,
Romania, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.
4of decisions in energy policy, since they are historically the
major participants in the international financial and political
institutions; thirdly the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), which seeks to secure through their ownership
of a single vital commodity the emergence of member-countries
from economic baokwardness and, in the Hght of deteriorating
socio-political relations in the Middle East, the foundation of a
new order in whioh such countries enjoy a greater measure of
influenoe, and fourthly the Soviet Union, self-sufficient in
energy but facing a number of problems as the economy develops
that might be solved only by increasing trade and cooperation
with the West, but nonetheless committed to a policy of (at least)
containing the spread of influence of an essentially alien system.
The international oil market is dominated by seven large
integrated companies.1 These companies often joined together in
exploration and production activity in the Middle East and
negotiated conoessions with the government on whose territory
their operations were to be sited. Although accounting for the
majority of the non-Communist world's oil production the major
oompanies have been subject to inoreasing competition, attracted
1These consist of 5 American companies; Exxon, based in New
York and trading for the most part under the Esso name, Standard
Oil of New York (Mobiloil), Gulf Oil, based in Pittsburgh, The
Texas Oil Company (Texaco), one of the prime movers in the
development of the domestic oil industry but less involved in
international trade than the aforementioned companies, and
Standard Oil of California, trading under the 'Chevron' name:
to these are added the British Petroleum Company, 49 per cent
state-owned, and the Shell International Petroleum Company, 60
per cent Dutch- and 40 per oent British-owned.
5in the first instance by the comparatively high profitability of
the industry. From 1953 to 1972 over 300 private and 50 state
organisations either entered the international oil industry or
expanded their existing operations.2
The world oil market, which given the self-sufficiency of
the Comecon bloc and the effect of oil import quotas in the USA3
meant essentially Western Europe and Japan, was highly competitive
during the sixties. This, coupled with the re-emergence of the
Soviet Union as an oil exporter and the discovery of natural gas
in the Dutoh Groningen field in 1959, led both to the decline of
the European coal industry and to a high level of dependenoe in
Western Europe on imported energy.4 The attractiveness of the
Western European market and its competitive nature gave rise to
deolining profitability in the operations of tne major companies.
This latter fact generated some doubt as to the oapaoity of the
Western oil industry for continued self-finance, and led to the
formation in 1968 of the London Oil Policy Group.5
2A recent detailed and objective analysis of the development
of the oompetitive prooess in the international oil industry is
given by Neil H Jacoby, in ''Multinational Oil" New York:
Macmillan 1914, pp.12D-142.
'USA policy stipulated that imports of crude oil and petroleum
products should be restricted to a maximum of 10 per cent of
demand. This figure proved unenforceable and was subject to
revision before being finally abolished in mid-1973.
4A detailed analysis of the decline of the Western European
coal industry is given in Richard L Gordon "The Evolution of
Energy Policy in Western Europe: The Reluctant Retreat from Coal"
New York: Praeger 1970.
5p R Odell "The Western European Energy Economy" Leiden:
Stenfert Kroese 1976, p.18.
6This body oonsisted of representatives of the major oil
oompanies and met fortnightly. It drew up a strategy based on
the oontinued free availability of oil from the Middle East at a
prioe whioh would rise gradually relative to the general
commodity price level in Western Europe, where the market for oil
and refined produots was planned to grow in an orderly and
predictable manner. Aooordingly the prioe rises imposed by
Libya's Colonel Gadafy in 1910, the agreements of OPEC in Tehran
and Tripoli in 1911 and in Geneva in 1912 were neither against
the interests of the oompanies nor against their wishes. On the
assumption of an expanding market the major oompanie~ oontinued
their investment programme, expanding their facilities and gearing
its level and timing to antioipated improvements in the finanoial
quality of their operations. At no stage did the oompanies
envisage relinquishing oontrol over deoisions determining prioe
and produotion levels.
This strategy was undermined as a result of opm's assumption
of oontrol accomplishing in a few months what the oil oompanies
sought to aocomp~ish through the joint strategy in a period of
years. However higher prioes for OPEC oil, imposed at a time when
no ready substitute existed, reduoed the medium-term demand for
refined products as a result of their worsening the eoonomio
depression of oonsumer oountries and of stimulating consumer
governments to impose restriotions on the use of oil in order to
offset potentially serious deterioration in their balanoe of
payments.
1The structure of the international oil industry underwent
marked ohanges in the postwar period. Profit attraoted
oompetition and the industry passed from that of a highly con-
centrated process involving less than ten partioipants, to a
state of moderate diffusion, in which fifty or more integrated
and, by world industrial standards, large oompanies interacted,
cooperated and competed.6 The seven major oil companies, whilst
maintaining impressive rates of growth, lost market share at the
hands of the competitors their success had attracted, the
deoline being reflected differently in eaoh sphere of aotivity in
whioh newoomers to the industry saw the best opportunities for
return on their partioular resources. The changing pattern is
outlined in table 1.1. Analysis of the foreign oapital expendi-
ture of the major oompanies oompared with the others, presented
in table 1.2., indicates the ohanging pattern of the industry's
finanoial struoture.
The competitive prooess was curtailed because the USA market
for orude oil and refined produots was subjeot to restriotion in
the form of import quotas. Therefore the oompanies' oommeroial
opportunities were found mainly in Western Europe and Japan. One
outoome of oompetition for the Western European market was that
prioes for refined products deolined markedly during the sixties,
as detailed in table 1.3., with the result that Western European
industry enjoyed an advantage in world markets afforded by
relatively low energy oost. Pressure was brought to bear on the
6Jaooby op.oit. pp.172-212 gives an analysis of the struotural
ohange in the international oil industry to 1972.
8TABLE 1.1 Analysis of Struotural Change in the International
Petroleum Industry 195' and 1972.
SEhere of Aotivitz .l2ll 1m.
1 Majors Others 1 Majors Others
Concession Areas 64 36 24 76
Proven Reserves 92 8 67 33
Production 87 13 71 29
Refining Capacity 73 27 49 51
Tanker Capacity 29 71 19 81
Produot Marketing 72 28 54 46
Source: N H Jaooby "Multinational Oil" New York: Macmillan
1914, E.211.
9TABLE 1.2 Total Foreign Capital Expenditure of Capitalist Oil
Companies 1948-1912 (S billion, % of total)
!!!£ 7 Majors 22 Others 22 Total
1948 1.2 15.0 0.4 25.0 1.6
1950 0.1 46.0 0.8 54.0 1.5
1955 1.1 31.9 1.8 62.1 2.9
1960 1.1 32.1 3.6 61.9 5.3
1961 1.1 32.1 3.6 61.9 5.3
1962 1.9 35.2 3.5 64.8 5.4
1963 2.0 35.1 3.1 64.9 5.1
1964 2.3 31.1 3.9 62.9 6.2
1965 2.8 41.2 4.0 58.8 6.8
1966 2.9 38.2 4.1 61.8 1.6
1961 3.1 39.2 4.8 60.8 1.9
1968 3.5 36.5 6.1 63.5 9.6
1969 3.8 31.3 6.4 62.1 10.2
1910 4.1 34.5 1.8 65.5 11.9
1911 5.1 35.2 9.4 64.8 14.5
1912 4.6 28.9 11.3 11.1 15.9
Souroe: Jaooby op.oit. p.250.
10
~I r- If) .:.:t If) .:.:t enN 0 N to If) CV)CV) .:.:t CV) CV) CV) CV)
~I to N en CV) N 0..-I ..-I .:.:t en r- co. . .CV) .:.:t CV) N CV) CV)
0
e--
en ~I ..-I 0 N CV) N to..-I co ..-I co en 0 NIe- N .:.:t N N CV) CV)
If)
0)
r-i..
(I) ~I r- N r-- co en ..-I+-' 0 N CV) .:.:t N toV . · ·
~
CV) .:t CV) CV) CV) CV)
~
~ ~i .-I .:.:t e-- e-- en If)v en to to co .:t 00.. · ·0 N .:.:t CV) N CV) CV)
M
;:l
~
+-'
~I(I) e- 0 en CV) ..-I NV If) en en CV) to N=::: CV) .:.:t CV) CV) CV) .:.:t
>.:
•.-i
(I)
+-'
~IH If) N CV) If) CV) If)0 r- en rl .:.:t If) 0~ · · ·CV) .:.:t .:t CV) CV) .:.:t
H
+-'o
;:l
'0 ~I to ..-I CV) If) en .:.:t0 0 en CV) N to If)M · · ·p.. .:.:t .:.:t .:.:t .:.:t ('I') .:.:t
'Cl
V
~
•.-i
lH ~I If) I/') N I/') If) If)V .:.:t CV) N 0 0 top::; . · . ·.:.:t I/') .:.:t [' .:.:t .:t
lH
0
(I)
Vo §I ..-I ..-I ::I N to If)•.-i ..-I N N to If) enM . · . · (Y)p.. If) I/') If) to I/') I/') N.
..-1-
!T.I..-I
;:l f,S M< !T.I
.Q
<1.1 0bOM
!T.I <1.1
M 0.. >.
<1.1
>Ul '2<:.....,
~
o
(I) !T.I
~
'Cl >J
(Y) ~.
..-I 9 ~ ~ <1.1V
~
'.-i o ~ <1.1
o
bO ~ +-' .s:: · ~
~
..-I !T.I (I) !T.I +-' :..:;
v H v +-' <1.1 · 0E-< co 1.1.4 =::: H :z; !iii) Ul
11
USA government to enoourage the oil oompanies to negotiate oil
prioe rises.7 Odell argues that this constituted an "unholy
alliance" between the USA government, the major oil companies
and the OPEC Secretariat to undermine the success of Western
European industry.8 Philip Windsor expresses the view that an
"alliance" was struck between OPEC and the oil companies to
transfer the process of profit generation from the oil-producing
states to the consuming countries.9 One might attempt to justi-
fy these oonolusions on the grounds that OPEC has been streng-
thened and the long-term profit potential of the oil industry
enhanoed as a result of post-1970 events at the expense of
Western European industrial consumers. However analysis of any
alliance and of the role of the oil companies oan easily over-
look the fact that planned rise in the price of OPEC oil during
the seventies was not intended to have so severe an effect: the
essential point is that for political reasons oil was used as a
(highly effeotive) element in a long-lasting oonfliot probably
without appreoiation of the long-term effeot of suoh a policy.
Though it would be difficult to deny that neither OPEC nor the
major oil oompanies sustained eoonomio loss as a result of oil
7As did, for example, James E Akins, then Adviser on Oil
Affairs to the us State Department, at a meeting of OAPEC in
1972. Odell (op.oit. p.20) makes the point that Amerioan
industry was "fed up" with the advantage enjoyed by European
manufaoturers as a result of higher energy costs in the USA
following the government's deoision to maintain import quotas.
80dell op.olt. p.21.
9Philip Windsor "Oil: A Plain Man's Guide to the Energy
Crisis" London: Temple Smith 1975. p.103.
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polioy in the seventies, "alliance theory" must be tempered by
oonsideration of the faotors that diminished the companies'
influenoe.
The significanoe of the Libyan price rise of 1970 was that
it was imposed unilaterally by Gadafy and not via the negotiating
prooess set up by the London Oil Policy Group. As Edith Penrose
has indicated,10 Gada.f'y'saction "forced a settlement on the
oompanies that irrevooably broke the pattern of the past". The
possibility of isolating Libya within OPEC for the sake of
maintaining the effectiveness of the Group was not open, since
demand was high and, unlike in 1967, there was insufficient
flexibility in the tanker market to cope eoonomically with the
loss of Libyan sUPply.11
Thenoeforward the Group's effeotiveness in the market waned,
although the trend in OPEC's pricing policy was not oounter to
the Group's interests initially. Casting further doubt on the
"alliance" hypothesis, Penrose points to one particular resolu-
tion of the OPEC meeting held in Caraoas in Deoember 1970, in
whioh minimum aooeptable terms for inoreases in the wellhead
prices of oil within an inflexible time scale were laid down.
The terms also provided for enforced oompliance by means of
united aotion should negotiations with the companies prove
10Edith T Penrose "The Develo:pnent of Crisis" Iaedalus
Vol. 104, No.4. (Fall 1975), p.41.
11For an analysis of the oiroumstanoes leading to the 011
oompanies' loss of operating flexibility see J D Park "OPEC
and the Superpowers: An Interpretation" Co-existenoe April
1976, pp.49-64.
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ineffeotive.12 In the aftermath of the prioe rises of 1973 and
1974, she argues, oompanies became passive participants, having
learned "to accept defeat •••and to roll with the punches".13
It is not an objective of this study to examine in depth the
"alliance" and "conflict" theories of relations between companies
and host governments: suffice it to note from the foregoing
analysis that although the companies have maintained their
financial well-being their influence has been markedly diminished
and their dependence on an inseoure souroe of supply has prompted
greater interest in exploration and development in areas other
than the Middle East and South America. These include the Soviet
Union.
The USA government can be said to be the most directly
involved in international oil in that it is the home government
of five of the seven major companies. Britain is the home base
of BP and the centre of the world coordination of Shell, despite
the latter's remaining under predominantly Dutch influence.
Governmental aims can usefully be viewed as those of
securing availability of low-cost energy supplies, of minimising
the negative impact of energy imports on the balance of payments
and particularly in the case of the USA on foreign policy options
that self-sufficiency or differing levels of dependence might
afford. There has been a marked growth in dependence on the part
12Resolution XXI.120 of the OPEC meeting, Caracas, December
1970, recorded in Penrose op.cit. p.42.
13ibid• p.53.
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of each of the major economio powers with the exception of the
Soviet Union. as detailed in table 1.4.
TABLE 1.4. Dependence of Major Economic Powers on Imported
Energy (%)
.lli2 1960 .12§1 .121Q 121!
EEC (9) 19 ;0 46 59 62
Japan 23 41 65 84 88.5
USSR
USA 1 6 1 8 19
Source: D F Cooper "Energy: A Matter of Interdependence",
Conference paper, Institute of Purchasing and Supply
1976, p.'.
Japan has been dependent on imported energy for well over
the 25 years represented in the table. Domestic production has
been severely limited by lack of resources and the 'economic
miracle' has been substantially facilitated by low-cost imports.
Table 1.5 shows the extent of Japanese dependence on external
TABLE 1.5. Japanese Oil Production and Consumption 1968-1975
(M tonnes)
1968 12§.2. .121Q .12ll 1.21£ 1m. 1.21! .lm.
Prodn. 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.6
Cons. 142.7 169.0 199.1 219.7 234.4 269.1 258.9 244.0
Souroe: BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry 1976,
pp.1St 20.
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souroes of oil in the period up to 1915. In the aftermath of the
1973-1914 price rises Japan was quiok to oblige industry to export
to the newly-rich OPEC bloo and to take steps towards developing
trade links with non-OPEC oil produoers, notably the Soviet
Union and China. At the same time a government report stressed
the need for the Japanese oil industry, till then confined to
refining and distribution, to integrate increasingly into
exploration and produotion on the grounds that widening the
soope of the industry might strengthen the oountry's negotiating
position opposite OPEC in seouring supply.14 The immediate
effeot of the oil orisis on Japan was that in a year of 11 per
oent growth the fourth ("orieis") quarter showed only 1 per oent
growth. The Japanese Economio Planning Agenoy estimated a
maximum of 2.5 per oent growth for 1914, this following a twenty-
year period in whioh Japanese GNP grew at between 8 and 12 per
oent per year, energy oonsumption by a total of 500 per oent and
oil oonsumption by 2300 per oent.15 Despite the country's
soaring demand for oil the Japanese government was able to devise
a short-term energy policy which within two years of the 1973
orisis had minimised the impaot of the prioe rises, as shown in
table 1.6. In 1973 Japan had reached the point at whioh oil
accounted for over 70 per oent of energy requirement and 99 per
cent was imported. Some 75 per oent of refined produots were
14This is disoussed by Y Tsumuri in "Japan" Iaedalus Vol.104
No.4. (Fall 1975), pp.125-126.
15petroleum Economist June 1974, p.215.
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*TABLE 1.6 Japanese Oil Consumption in Fiscal Tears 1971-1975
!ill. 121.4. 1ill. ~~a) 1ill.1st ~
Crude Oil Imports 1814.6 1160.0 805.1 866.9 1672.0
(million barrels)
%Change +17.2 -3.0 -9.9 +0.1 -5.0
Cost (S million) 8673 19997 9400 10600a 20000a
% Change +108.8 +130.6 -5.5 +5.4 no change
*Fiscal 1973 ends 31 March 1974, etc.
aEstimates, excluding October 1975 OPEC price rise
consumed by industry.16 Given the extent to which the country's
industry is dependent on oil, Japanese technical and financial
involvement in oil developments currently extends to Canada,
West Africa, the Middle East, Australasia, the North Sea, China
and the Soviet Union.17 In the case of deliveries from China,
the first sale consisted of 1 million tonnes of crude oil from
the Taching field in 1973, which led to the conolusion of a
contract in February 1974 for the delivery of 1.5 million tonnes
in that year.18
The origins of the USA's energy problems are complex. Since
1~sumuri op.cit. p.113.
17For a description of Japanese involvement in these areas see
R P Sinha "Japan and the Oil Crisis" The World Today August
1974, pp.339-341.
18ibid• p.339.
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1970 oil production has declined whilst demand has grown rapidly,
as outlined in table 1.7. With the exception of Alaska, which
has however not yet played a significant part in production,
discoveries of new oil reserves have been unimpressive. The
refining sector has been operating at near capacity and produc-
tion of natural gas, whilst increasing, has not kept pace with
growth in demand. In 1967, when the Arab members of OPEC declared
an embargo on deliveries to the USA, there was scope for diverting
Middle East oil to other destinations and re-exporting refined
products. There was also the opportunity of substituting oil
from certain non-participants in the embargo, notably from Iran,
to counteract the loss. At the time under-utilised refinery
capaoity provided the flexibility required to cope with
differences in oil processing characteristics, where these
occurred.
By 1970 this flexibility had been lost. The first problem
to manifest itself was a shortage of fuel oil. In the first six
months of 1970 demand for ruel oil was 14.9 per cent above that
for the corresponding period in 1969~9 The inability of the gas
industry to compensate had been impaired by the maintenance by
the government of artificially low "ceiling prices" for gas,
which had discouraged investment in the industry. Gae consump-
tion was olose to production capacity and demand for gas was
expected to remain high eince the effect of rising costs in the
domestic oil industry and of the oil import quota system was to
force up prices of refined products. One analyst has put forward
19petroleum Press Service November 1970. p.402.
18
1.0
r- 1.0 01 0 01 01 01
01 r- ,
r-i 01 1.0 co (T) 1.0 r-i
I r-i r-i L.() r- to to
0 =t =t e-
toen
r-i
=t co 01 r- ID 1.0.. r-- , , ,
~ 01 to 01 to N (T)
U) r-i (T) 1.0 en co lO
::> =t =t e--
<!l
..c:: (T) r-- O 0 =t+-I (T)
t"- , , , ,
~ 01 r- r-i 01 co (T) 0 0OM r-i 1.0 ID r-i r-i lO N N
=t L.() 0)
00
..
"d co <Xl'8 r-i r-iN r-i r-i N co co
IJi e-- ,'M 01 0 N N 1.0 0)
....:I r-I r- to (T) e-- lO
=t 1.0 e--
OO
~
r-I 01 r-i 0 C") r--
r-I r- ,
I'll 01 01 0 0 01 (T)~ r-I lO to C") r-I r--
;:l =t 1.0 e-- +-I
+-I (/l
I'll ;:l
Z '0
0 to 01 1.0 to =t ~
"d r-- , , , , H
~
01 0) 0) e-- =t t--
r-I e-- 1.0 (T) 01 r- r-I
=t 1.0 to OM
r-I 0
'M
0 '0
1.0 ID ID N 0 1.0 r-I
4-i ID • ~
0 01 r-- (T) r-I 01 <Xl 0
r-I <Xl .::t C") .::t t"- :>t
~ (T) =t 1.0
0 <!l'M ..c::
+' +-I
~
0 (T) 0) r-I 0 N
to . . 4-i
01 0 C") =t (T) r-i 0
(/l r-I 1.0 C") 0) t"- O)
§ (T) (T) .::t ~<!l
CJ 'M
'0
>
§ &
r-I~--- 100 00 r-I --- 0'M <!l 'M ~ 'M
+-I ~ 0 '-' +-I() ~ (f.)
;:l 0 <!l r-i 'M
"O+' '0 I'll +'
0 ~
....:t +' ..-. al 10~::c t') 0 al +-Ip..,._, U Z ~ '-' 4-i U)0 p..,
§ § ctP alt"- 'M, 'M +-I mr-I +'
~
<!l0
~ .g ~
0
(/l ~
~ ~ § . 0~ p.., u u en
19
the view that ceiling prices were imposed in order to "protect
consumers against exploitation at the hands of the natural gas
(pipeline) companies".20 What however is more likely is that
there has been a politically influential lobby of gas consumers
enjoying a relatively low-cost fuel, who favour maintenance of
21such prices. The USA gas industry therefore experienced low
profitability, an absence of investment incentive and falling
reserves. Companies involved in the production and distribution
of gas were prompted to seek additional supplies from outside the
USA, including the Soviet Unio~.22 This is not however expected
to make any impact on the short-term position in the USA gas
industry. Even if the Soviet-American joint projects currently
under discussion do come to fruition, their contribution to the
USA's energy supply will not be felt before the early eighties.
Table 1.8 shows the development of the ua~gas industry from 1950
to 1975.
Accustomed to near self-sufficiency in energy, to continuous
economic growth and to the role of economic and political
20Richard B Mancke "Genesis of the US Oil Crisis" in J S
Szyliowics, B E O'Neill (eds.) "The Energy Crisis and US Foreign
Policy" New York: Praeger 1975, p.59.
21Park op.cit. p.56; Petroleum Economist March 1976, pp.84-86•
22American companies are currently discussing possible imports
of gas from Canada, Alaska, Venezuela, Trinidad, Ecuador, Algeria.,
Nigeria, Australia, Indonesia and East and West Siberia. See
Patricia E Starratt, Robert M Spann "Alternative Strategies for
Dealing with the Natural Gas Shortage in the United Sta.tes", in
E 'vi Erickson, L Wa.verma.n(eds.) "The Energy Question: An Inter-
national Failure of Policy" Toronto: University of Toronto Press
1974. Vol. 2, p.'9.
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TABLE 1.8 The USA natural Gas Industry 1950-1975
(billion oubio feet)
!!.!!: Marketed Im;eorts Consum;etion Proved ReservesProduotion (Tear end)
1950 6282 6026 148585
1955 9405 11 9070' . 222483
1960 12771 156 12509 2()2326
1965 16040 456 16033 286469
1970 21921 821 22046 290746a
1971 22493 935 22677 278806a
1972 22532 1019 23009 266085a
1973 22648 1033 22966 249950a
1974 21600 959 22111 237132a
1975 20100 995 n.a. n.a.
aInoluding Alaska (26000 billion).
Source: Petroleum Economist March 12161 E.8~.
superpower, the US government launched 'Projeot Independence
1980' in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 Middle East crisis.
The objeotive was to regain self-auffioienoy by the stated year:
some two years later it was estimated that by 1980 approximately
40 per cent of the USA's oil demand would be met by imports from
the Middle Eaat and North Afrioa.23 It was eventually admitted by
the Direotor of the US Federal Energy Administration that the
eoonomio loss in attempting to fulfil the requirements of 'Projeot
Independenoe' was aoknowledged to be more severe than potential
23a El Mallakh "American-Arab Relations: Conflict or Coopera-
tion?" Energy Policy SeEtember 1215, E.172.
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disruption of supply.24 In the oil sector, as in gas but for
different reasons, diversification of source of supply had become
a pressing issue.
Cheap energy was the base on which Western European industry
grew in the fifties and sixties. This was mainly in the form of
imported oil, the price of which declined substantially through
the sixties. As early as 1972 Odell stressed Europe's vulner-
ability in the face of increased taxes imposed on the oil
companies, the companies' ability and intention to pass these on
to consumers and the possible disruption of supply in the event
of negot.iating difficulties.25 These difficulties would be
considerable, he argues, if the price of OPEC oil were to rise
to 4 dollars per barrel by 1975.26 At this time also the Chairman
of the British National Coal Board, Derek Ezra, sensing the
growing difficulties that might be caused by the lack of cohesion
in US energy policy, drew attention to the possibtlity of the USA
and Western Europe's competition for oil that could be subject
to supply restrict!ons.21 Ezra outlines how Western Europe's
dependence on energy imports greatly exceeded that of the USA and
were likely to grow more rapidly, given the higher general rate
24F G Zarb "US Energy Policy" The World Today January 1976,
.E.!..1..
25p R Odell "Europe's Oil" National Westminster Bank Quarterly
Review August 1912, p.6.
26ibid. p.12.
21nerek Ezra "Possibilities of a World Energy Crisis"
National Westminster Bank Qaarterly Review November 1972, p.31.
22
of industrial growth compared with the USA.28 Bearing in mind
also the increasing demands of Japan and the Third World, Ezra,
like Odell, argues the case for Europe's reducing her dependence
on imported energy, advocating (understandably) investment in the
coal industry on the grounds that coal would be fully competitive
with oil and gas in the eighties.29
In contrast Odell argues the case for a Western European
energy economy based on indigenous gas, there being in his view
no opportunity in the short term to exploit oil reserves at a
level Bufficient to have a marked effect on the energy balance.30
He notes that as long as Middle East oil production costs remain
at around 25 cents per barrel there is scope for OPEC to revise
prices downwards and to increase output.31 Ris suggestion,
based on the argument of the American energy economist M A
Adelman that there is no physical or economic factor which might
rule out such a possibility,32 as to government reaction if
faced with this problem, is simply that they should "avoid •••
further entanglement with suoh insecure oil" and "leave it for
28ibid•
29ibid• pp.32-33.
30p R Odell "European Alternatives to Oil Imports from OP~
Countries", in F A M Alting von Geusau (ed.) 'Energy in the
European Communities' Leiden: Sijthoff 1975. p.65. Note also
that prior to the OPEC price rises of 1973-1974 Odell argued the
case for European self-sufficiency based on North Sea gas. See
"Indigenous Oil and Gas and Western Europe's Energy Options"
EnergY Policy June 197'. pp,47-64.
310dell "European Alternatives •••" (1975), p~11.
3~ A Adelman "Is the Oil Shortage Real?" Foreign Poliol
No.9 (Winter 1972-73), pp.69-107.
23
the poor, oil-importing oountries of the ~ird World, where •••
cheap energy is much more important for ensuring development". 33
Bearing in mind the pressures brought to bear on the US govem-
ment by energy-intensive industry to ease import oontrols when
faoed with inoreasing oompeti tion in world markets, it is hardly
likely that a West European government would impose other than a
temporary tariff or quota system, sinoe, as the USA oame to
disoover, the overall eoonomio loss from suoh a polioy oan be
great.34
An OECD report, published in 1974,35 re-assessed the
Organisation's forward energy requirement in the light of the
1973-1974 oil supply orisis, underlining the eoonomic difficul-
ties that a policy aimed at self-sufficienoy would cause. The
direotion of investment into developing energy reserves possessed
by certain OECD members would, the report indioates,36 limit the
member-countries' prospeots for eoonomio growth.
The problem faoed by the EEC and OECD in attempting to
determine a oommon energy policy is the intrinsic disparity of
330dell "EurOpean Alternatives •••" (1975), p.71.
34"Had the (European Economio) Community oonfronted the issue,
it would have realised that the prioe paid for inoreased security
would be the inoreased domestio produotion of energy - an expen-
sive polioy. The United States was already paying this prioe,
but the European ooal lobby was too weak to impose it •••" A Prodi,
R Clo "Europe", in I8edalus Vol.104. No.4 (Fall 1975), p.105.
350EeD "Energy Prospeots to 1985" Paris: OECD 1974 (2 Vols.)
36ibid• Vol.1, p.4.
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objeotives and opportunities amongst their members. For example
Britain seeks to maximise the benefits of North Sea oil and gas
in relation to her balance of payments problems and the govern-
ment, at times in conflict with the industry, wishes to retain a
measure of independence from EEC and OEeD bodies in determining
depletion and trade polioy. France seeks to achieve as high a
level of energy autarohy as possible, to the extent of non-
partioipation in the 1974 Washington energy oonferenoe.31 One
feature which the EEC member-oountries now have in common is
sUbstantial over-capacity in oil refining, whose expansion was
undertaken prior to the 1973-1974 orisis, when it was antioipated
that demand for refined produots in Western Europe would oontinue
to grow at the same rate as had been reoorded in the sixties.
Therefore one of the prime objeotives of the oil oompanies
operating in Western Europe is to employ these faoilities more
fully_38 The possibility that the Soviet Union might prove to be
an alternative to OPEC prompted several approaches by Western
ooncerns.
The third major influence in the world petroleum market is
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). From
its inauguration in 1960 "as a defensive mechanism to form a.
oommoh front vis-a.-vis expatriate oil firms and major oil-
37The diversity of objeotives in EEC is discussed by G FRay,
A Dean "Possible Approaches to a. Common European Energy Policy"
in Alting von Geusau (ed.) op.cit. pp.167, 169.
38The baokground to Western European overcapacity is summarised
in Petroleum F~onomist September 1976, pp.340-342.
25
importing countries",39 with as its objective "not regional
integration of members' eoonomies and societies, but mainly the
coordination of members' policies in one oommodity, petroleum,
and solely in the export market",40 OPEC sought throughout the
sixties to maintain oil prioes "with due regard to the interests
of securing a steady income to the producing countries, an
efficient, economic and regular supply of this souroe of energy
to consuming nations and a fair return on capital to those
investing in the petroleum industrytl.41 It has been pointed out
that relations between OPEC, the oil companies and their
domestic governments a~e most appropriately regarded as the
result of a bargaining process rather than of trade and commer-
cial competition.42 Study of the changing role of OPEC in the
world market shows the shift in emphasis from preoccupation with
prices in 1960 to desire for self-determined growth via oomplete
ownership and oontrol over output and pricing decisions.43 The
39z l'Iikdashi "The Community of Oil-Exporting Countries: A
Study in Governmental Cooperation" London: Allen and Unwin
1972, p.69.
40ibid.
41Resolution 1.1 of the Baghdad Conference of OPEC, held from
10-14 September 1960, recorded in M S AI-Otaiba "OPEC and the
Petroleum Industry" London: Croom Helm 1975, p.58.
42Edith T Penrose "The Large International Firm in Developing
Countries: The International Petroleum Industry" London: Allen
and Unwin 1968, p.260.
43" itt•••c rcums ances have changed, and nowhere do governmen s
accept the role of a sleeping partner. They want to have a
direct role in the management and the exploitation of national
resources, so as to get know-how and to develop national
expertise in the Produotion and marketing of oil." N AI-Pachachi
(then Secretary-General of OPEC) in The Times 9 November 1971, p.21.
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event that confirmed the turning point in the bargaining process
was the successful imposition by Libya's Colonel Gadafy of
production outbacks, increased port charges at Libyan terminals
and, effective from 1st September 1970, an increase of 30 cents
on the current price of S2-23 per barrel, plus increased royalty
rates.44
In response to Gadaty's unilateral success an extraordinary
meeting of OPEC, held in Tehran in February 1971, imposed price
rises averaging 33 oents per barrel on orude oil delivered from
the Persian Gulf.45 The following month at a further meeting
prices for crude oil delivered from Mediterranean terminals were
raised proportionally to the Gulf prices.46 Subsequent meetings
of OPEC in January 1972 and June 1973 led to further price
rises to compensate for the devaluation of the US dollar.47
Despite these price rises demand for Middle East oil continued
to grow and investment decisions were made by the oil companies
that provided for the expansion of refining and distribution
in Western Europe.
Prior to October 1973 there were genuine negotiations
between the producer oountries and the operating companies,
though Western inflation and the falling value of the dollar
strained the agreements concluded. The Yom Kippur War quickly
4~he background to the Libyan price rise is given in Edith T
Penrose "The ~velopment of Crisis" •••, pp.41-42. See also
Petroleum Press Service January 1971, p.10.
45petroleum Press Service March 1971, pp.82-83.
46Petroleum Press Service May 1971, pp.162-163.
47Penrose "I'he Development of Crisis" .... pp.44, 46.
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fused the economic and political dimension of international oil
trade, as OPEC abandoned the will to negotiate and exercised
the oligopolistic power it had gradually acquired.48
The effects of the OPEC price rises, in addition to the
aforementioned impact on demand in consuming countries, were
those of confirming OPEC as the driving force in the world
petroleum market and of bringing about a radical shift in world
distribution of wealth largely at the expense of industrialised
nations, though this did work to the disadvantage of the oil-
importing developing countries. It is not an objective of the
present study to analyse the international financial impact of
this transfer: its relevance is that it confers on OPEC members
a substantial level of flexibility, which has no~ escaped the
notice of Soviet policymakers. Whilst there has been some
optimism that the international system oan be brought into
balance again by recirculating oil revenues through Western
financial institutions, thus easing currency transfer problems
and providing through OPEC's increased purchasing power the
means by which the health of Western economies can be preserved,
it has been pointed out that many of the OPEC member-countries
do not need high levels of Western capital, since they are not
4~ote that the discussions on the first doubling of prices
took place in OAPEC and not OPEC meetings. Likewise disoussions
on the possible use of embargo. It was the Arab members who
carried through these measures: some producers were hesitant.
See Z Mikdashi "The OPEC Process" Daedalus Vol.104, No.4 (Fall
1975), p.208.
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experiencing a revolution of rising expectations.49 The Soviet
response to OPEC's enhanoed financial power has been to sound
repeated warnings that the petrodollar re-oyc1ing process merely
contributes to the oapacity of oertain Western countries to
support the Israeli cause. A recent feature of discussions
between the Middle Eastern member-countries of OPEC and the
Soviet Union has been the negotiation of dollar loans out of
surplus oil inoome and the possibility of Arab investment in the
Soviet b10c.50 This may become gradually more attractive to the
Soviet Union, given the questions surrounding Soviet and East
European indebtedness being posed in some quarters of the
Eurocurrency market.
As long as OPEC maintains its solidarity it enjoys the
status of superpower in the eoonomic sense. Granted, there are
differing objectives within OPEC. On the one hand the
"industrialising" members, suoh as Iran, Iraq and to a lesser
extent Nigeria and Algeria, have an interest in acquiring
quickly hard currencies that can be used to purchase goods and
services to faoilitate economic growth: their preferred strategy
is to maximise the short-term inflow of suoh currencies. On the
other hand the "desert state" members, where the majority of oil
and gas reserves are looated, have small populations, few oppor-
tunities for industrialisation, apart from petrochemicals, and a
49p R Odell "The World of Oil Power in 1915" The World
Today July 1975, p.276.
5~ C Kaser "Oil and the Broader Partioipation of lBEC"
International Currency Review 1974 No.6. p.25.
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strong interest in the maintenance of political influence as
long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unsolved: their
strategy is to secure long-term consumption of oil by avoiding
a pricing policy that would lead to an undesirably high level
of development of alternative energy sources.51 It is admitted
by the Saudi Minister of Petroleum that OPEC has difficulty in
determining and sustaining a unified po1icy.52 However member-
countries realise that unity confers strength: the strength of
OPEC is the breadth of its choice of strategy.
This study is concerned with the development of oil and gas
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, this being the fourth
influence on the world petroleum market. The trend from coal to
hydrocarbon fuels took place at a later stage in Comecon than
elsewhere in the industrialised world. The expansion of the oil
industry commenced in the fifties, that of the gas industry in
the sixties. During this time the Soviet Union resumed exports
of oil and commenoed exports of gas not only within Comecon but
also in world markets.
The ninth Soviet Five-Tear Plan for the oil and gas
industries had to take into account that reserves were
510PEC does encourage the consumer countries to diversity
into alternative energy sources (See esp. Sheikh Tamani, Saudi
Minister of Petroleum, in E J Mitchell (ed.) "Dialogue on World
Oil" Washin on DC: American Enter rise Institute for Public
Polic Research 1 • 3. The point is that OPEC as a group
now has and uses power to influence decisions on substitution
levels.
52ibid. p.99.
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predominantly located in Eastern areas. The same is true, though
to a lesser extent, in the coal sector. According to a Soviet
estimate published in 1975 some 90 per cent of total energy
reserves are located East of the Urals, whereas 70 per cent of
consumption is in European Russia.53
It was intended at the outset of the ninth Plan that Siberia
would account for the major part of the increase in Soviet oil
production: in fact Siberian operations had to overfulfil their
original objectives in order to compensate for production short-
falls elsewhere. In the gas industry production increases were
scheduled for each area, including the sUbstantial expansion of
Siberian operations. As a result of a general shortfall against
the original Plan the Siberian share of Soviet production recorded
in 1975 was as envisaged i~ 1971.
With the exception of Romania the Easterr. European countries
are poorly endowed with oil and gas reserves and have hitherto
been dependent on the Soviet Union as almost the sole supplier of
each. The trend to hydrocarbon fuels in Eastern Europe, Romania
again excepted, took place at a later stage than in the Soviet
Union and accelerated during the sixties. However in the late
sixties it was suggested that the Soviet Union was beginning to
face problems in the oil and gas industries, which might result
in her being unable to meet Comeoon requirements, if rates of
53The Siberian share of total Soviet energy reserves was put
at 65 per cent in 1968 (A E Probst (ed.) "Razvi tie toplivnoi
oozy raionov SSSR" Moscow Nedra 1968, p.3S), and at 90 per cent
in 1975 (Editorial to Planovoe khozyaistvo 1975 No.2, p.S).
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growth in oonsumption recorded in the sixties were to continue.54
At this time each country negotiated with OPEC producers a
number of small oil supply conn-acts, largel;r on the basis of
barter trade.
The Soviet Union enjoys substantial earnings from trade in
oil and gas. In view of the apparent need of the Soviet Union
to import goods from the developed capitalist world the marked
increase in energy prices has worked to Soviet advantage. How-
ever this has coincided with increasing economic and logistic
problems in the Soviet oil and gas industries, necessitating a
difficult choice between the opportunities presented by the
Western countries' need for energy and the desirability of
maintaining the economic oohesion of Comeoon, whose hard currency
reserves are believed to be limited, as is the capaoity of the
Eastern European members to expand bilateral trade with non-
Soviet hydrooarbon producers.
The Soviet Plan for 1976-1980 was formulated in the light of
shortfalls in the previous Plan in both the oil and gas
industries, rising demand in Comeoon and a muoh-increased import
price for OPEC oil. Given that the development of Siberia is now
regarded as the basis of Soviet oil and gas development, there
exist considerable economio and technical problems in raising
54(i} J G Polaoh "The Development of Energy in East Europe",
in 'Eoonomic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe'
Washington DC: US Government, Joint Economic Committee 1970,
PP. 348-41' .
(ii S. Waso'Wski "The Fuel Situation in Eastern Europe"
Soviet Studies July 1969. pp.35-51.
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produotion. Soviet oil and gas produotion and transportation is
subjeot to inoreasing oosts. Cohsequently their role in the
domestio energy balanoe and as export oommodities in relation to
alternative energy souroes has been re-assessed.
If Comeoon oan remain self-suffioient in energy, then the
rising world price for oil and gas and the desire of the
developed Western oountries to diversify their souroes of supply
work to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Thus OPEC's pricing
polioy would deserve active support. If on the other hand
inoreased imports are inevitable, then Soviet interests might
have been better served by attempting to dissuade OPEC from
raising prices. Alternatively if the Soviet Union felt power-
less to influence OPEC on the question, then, recognising the
inevitable, she might have to re-adjust the domestic energy
balanoe in relation to restricted ability to import and enhanced
opportunity for export. These issues are complioated by the
faot that the prinoipal oil producing area., the Middle East, has
been an arena of superpower rivalry long before domestio energy
questions oould have been thought to influence the foreign
policy of either.
The objective of this study is to examine the development of
the oil and gas industries in Comecon, primarily in the 1970-1980
period, having regard for questions of energy provision within
the bloo, of oonstraints and opportunities in hydrocarbon trade
and of Soviet aotion and reaotion in the world market.
Aooordingly the seoond ohapter, dealing with the development
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of hydrocarbon production and trade from the Second World War to
1970, has been kept short: however an appreciation of the major
trends is essential for understanding the issues that have
influenced policy in the seventies. A number of Western pub1i-
cations deal with this period. The analysis of Demetri B
Shimkin55 traces the development of Soviet fuels production from
1928 to 1958 and provides in a number of statistical tables the
trends in output, employment and labour productivity. Robert E
Ebel's work entitled "The Petroleum Industry of the Soviet
Unionn56 is essentially a report of a visit to the Soviet Union
made in 1960 by a delegation from the US petroleum industry and
government officials. It provides particularly detailed informa-
tion on refining and production, but the interest of the work is
technical rather than economic. The major analytical work of
the pre-1970 period is that of Robert W Campbell, published in
1968.57 This provides a detailed account of the economics and
technology of the Soviet oil and gas industries, tracing their
development to 1967. The work contains an excellent bibliography
of Soviet pUblications dealing with development in the fifties
and sixties, some of which is included in the present study.
The growth, decline and re-emergence of the Soviet Union as an
oil trader and the commencement of gas trade is outlined in a
55n B Shimkin "The Soviet Mineral-Fuels Industries 1928-1958"
Washington DC: US Departmen t of Commerce 1962.
56R E Ebe1 "The Petroleum Industry of the Soviet Union" !!!:!
York: American Petroleum Institute 1961.
57R W Campbell "The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas"
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1968.
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further work of Ebel, published in 1910.58 This work covers the
period from the origins of the Russian oil industry in the late
nineteenth century to 1967. Chapter 2 of the present study
relies on the aforementioned publications.
I F Elliot's study of the development of Soviet energy,59
published in 1974, gives a detailed historical exposition of
each of the Soviet fuel industries to 1913, and includes some
60data on fuel consumption patterns. A further work of Campbell
advanoes the analysis of his 1968 work and provides a valuable
assessment of the factors whioh have led a number of Western
observers to conclude that the Soviet Union now faces an "energy
crisis". Western analysis of the energy position in Eastern
Europe is somewhat sparse, and confined to a few short artioles
oited in the text of the present study.
61The work of Jochen Bethkenhagen, published in 1915, gives
a detailed account of growth and prospeots in Soviet trade in
ooal, oil and gas, oovering the period from 1960 to 1980. How-
ever the most recent data on whioh the work Is based are for
early 1913. Consequently the impaot of OPEC's action of 1913-
1974 is not discussed. Bethkenhagen's work has nonetheless been
58R E Ebel "Communist Trade in Oil and Gas" New York:
Praeger 1970.
59! F Elliot "The Soviet Energy Balance" New York: Praeger
1914.
60R W Campbell "Trends in the Soviet Oil and Gas Industry"
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 1916.
61Jochen Bethkenhagen "Bedeutung und J¥l8glichkeiten des Ost-
West-Handels mit Energierohstoffen" (Deutsches !nstitut rur
Wirtachaftsforschung, Sonderheft 104) Berlin: Duncker &
Bumblot 1972.
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a useful basis for chapter 6 of the present study.
There is now a substantial amount of published work on
Soviet~ddle East relations, some of which includes analysis of
the energy question in relation to Soviet policy in the area.
The work of Jeremy Russell,62 published in 1976, seeks to
establish whether there is a link between domestic energy
problems and the conduct of foreign policy. Valuable though the
work ie as a general historical account of trade developments,
it overlooks the single important factor determining the recent
changes in the world market and international energy relations,
namely the enhanced power of OPEC and its ability to influence
not only energy policy but also economic and political relations
between the established superpowers. This work, along with
other publications of the late sixties and early seventies, is
examined and re-assessed in chapter 7 of the present study. The
Soviet response to developments by non-Middle East hydrocarbon
producers, particularly Norway, is also discussed.
Two significant aspects of hydrocarbon development in
Comeoon have been omitted, namely the questions of labour supply
in the development of remotely-located resources and of infra-
structure development. The aforementioned works allude to these
issues: however in the light of the author's unsuccessful
application to study at the Institute of Economics and Organisa-
tion of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk it was agreed to
62Jeremy Russell "Energy as a Faotor in Soviet Foreign
Policy" Farnborough: Saxon House 1976.
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abandon this line of enquiry. Nevertheless some suggestions as
to basic material and possible further researoh on these topics
are given in Appendix D.
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Chapter 2. The Postwar Development of the Soviet Oil and Gas
Industries to 1970.
It is convenient to divide the years from 1945 to 1970 into
two periods in examining the development of the Soviet oil and
gas industries. The first dates from 1945 to 1955 in which the
oil industry recovered from the severe decline experienced in
the Second World War, regaining its status as a net exporter,
the second dating from 1955 to 1970, in which the oil industry
expanded steadily, providing the bulk of the Soviet Union's
growing energy requirement and forming the basis of the Soviet
chemicalisation drive initiated by Khrushchev. During this
period also the potential of the gas industry was realised and
decisions were taken concerning its rapid development. Towards
the end of this latter period there arose a number of problems
in the oil industry which caused doubt in some quarters as to
the future role of oil within the Soviet energy balance and as a
leading export commodity and which obliged Soviet planners to
reconsider the relative importance of oil against coal and gas
and the possibility of the emergence of natural gas as an export
fuel.
During the Second World War the problems of a declining
rate of growth in output of crude oil experienced since the mid-
thirties were intensified as the Krasnodar oilfields were lost
to the advancing Germans and operations in Groznyi, though not
entirely lost, were closed down. Between 1941 and 1945 there
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was a decline in actual output of crude oil from ~, to 19.4
million tonnes.1 Through the Lend-Lease system the USA came to
the aid of the Soviet Union in providing supplies of refined
products, primarily aviation gasoline, and these shipments were
continued in 1946 and 1947. Table 2.1. shows the pattern of
Soviet production and imports from 1942 to 1945.
The concentration of production in Caucasian fields proved
to be a liability during the War (the geographical distribution
of Soviet oil production is outlined in Table 2.2.), since the
Northern fields were eventually overrun. However this fact in
itself prompted the Soviet Union into undertaking exploratory
work in the Volga-Ural area, though it was not until late in 1946
that a substantial discovery, that of the Tuymazy field, was
made.2
The potential of the Volga-Ural area had been appreciated
during the thirties, and championed by the geologist I M Gubkin.3
However even the modest targets set for oil production in this
area during the thirties were underfulfilled. In his study of
1The circumstances leading to the decline in crude oil produc-
tion are outlined in:
(i) R E Ebel "The Petroleum Industry of the Soviet Union"
Washington D et American Petroleum Institute 1961, pp.62-65.
(ii) R W Campbell "The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas"
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1968, p.122.
(iii) R E Ebel "Communist Trade in Oil and Gas" New York:
Praeger 1970, pp.28-29.
2Ebel "Communist Trade •••" (1970), p.21.
'CamPbell op.cit. p.126.
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TABLE 2.1. Soviet Oil Production and Imports from the USA
1941-1945. (M tonnes)
Year Production Index Imports
1941 33.0 100 0.301
1942 22.0 66.7 0.149
1943 18.0 54.5 0.362
1944 18.3 55.5 0.609
1945 19.4 58.8 0.539
Source: R E Ebel "Communist Trade in Oil and Gas" New York:
Praeger 1970, pp.28-29.
TABLE 2.2. Regional Ddstribution of Soviet Oil Production at
End of 1940.
Region Production % of Total
{M tonnesl
Caucasus 27.05 87.1
(Baku and Groznyi)
Volga-Ural 1.85 6.0
Kazakhstan and 1.50 4.8
Central Asia
Others (Ukraine, 0.70 2.1
North, Far East)
Total 31.10 100.0
Source: M M Brenner "Ekonomika neftyanoi promyshlennosti"
Moscow Nedra 1962. p.51.
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the development of the Soviet oil and gas industries written in
1968 Robert Campbell attributes this delay in appreoiation and
exploitation of the Volga-Ural fields to disbelief on the part
of Soviet oentral administrators of the extent of reserves, lack
of confidenoe in available drilling teohnology and, above all,
the sheer inflexibility of planners' attitudes, all of which, in
his view, needed the catalysing effect of the Second World War
to evoke real interest.4 There may have been some rationale in
the planners' policy of non-development of the Volga-Ural fields
during the thirties on technical grounds. For example it is
known that at this time the absence of appropriate technology to
maintain wellhead pressures resulted in very low extraction
rates for individual wel1s.5 It is also recorded that in 1937
only 8207 out of a total of 12623 wells drilled in the Soviet
Union were operational, the remainder being under repair or
awaiting refurbishment.6 By 1940 output per well had dropped,
as had labour productivity.7 Given this, the risk of ohannelling
valuable material and labour resources into the Volga-Ural area
was judged too high.
4ibid• pp.127-128.
5v M Baryshev, in Azerbaidzhanskoe neftyanoe khozyaistvo
1938 No.12, p.a.
6I M Gubkin "Zadaohi neftyanoi geologii na Yuzhno-vostoohnom
Kavkaze v tret'ei pyatiletke" Azerbaidzhanskoe neftyanoe
khozyaistvo 1938 No.12, p.12.
7n B Shimkin "The Soviet Mineral-Fuels Industries 1928-19581
A Statistioal Survey" Washington n C: US Government Printing
Office 1962, p.41.
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The development of the Volga-Ural fields gathered pace in
the immediate postwar period, facilitated by the availability of
improved and in some cases imported technology. By 1955 the
requirement in number of wells in a given unit area had been
reduced to one-sixth of the prewar leve18 and depths of 1400
metres were attained in production drilling, this giving aOoess
to the major oil-bearing layers of the area. As Campbell has
indioated,9 the nature of Volga-Ural crude oil posed considerable
problems in the refining industry: the majority of the oils
were found to be heavy, of high sulphur and paraffin wax content
and the gasoline fractions derived therefrom tended to be of
low octane rating, needing further processing to bring them to
the requited standard. According to a Soviet source of the late
fifties the capital oosts for oil refining at that time rose
with the sulphur content of the oil, such that by taking the
index of refining oost of oil with a sulphur oontent of less
than 0.5 per oent as 100 the oorresponding index for oil with a
sulphur content of 0.6 to 1.9 per cent was 150 to 200 and that
10for oil with a sulphur oontent of 2.0 and over 220 to 300.
Despite the fact that the majority of Volga-Ural orude oils
belonged to the latter category the economics of scale in
8V A Ka1amkarov "Rezervy dak'nego razvitiya neftyanoi
pramysh1ennosti" Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1955 No.5. p.2.
9Campbell op.oit. p.126.
10V P Sukhanov "Put! razvitiya neftepererabatyvayushohei
promysh1ennosti v SSSR" Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1958 No.9, p.2.
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produotion eventually outweighed the additional refining cost,
espeoially after the development of the Romashkino field in the
Tatar republic, discovered in 1948 and brought fully on stream
in the early fifties, at whioh time it was thought to be the
world's largest single field.
The Romashkino field accounted for the rapid expansion of
output and growth in the Volga-Ural region's share of Soviet
11produotion to 29 per cent in 1950 and 58 per oent in 1955.
The other major area for expansion in oil produotion between 1946
and 1955 was the Bashkir ASSR, and the Azerbaidzhan republic
had gone some way by 1955 towards regaining its prewar peak
production level of 21.4 million tonnes, recorded in 1937. The
pattern of Soviet oil produotion by region from 1945 to 1955 is
detailed in table 2.3. The (by world standards) low level of
sophistioation of refinery teohnology gave rise to a pattern of
product output and final oonsumption which had to be reversed
from the latter part of the eighth Five-Tear Plan. During the
fifties Soviet refineries were designed and geared to maximal
output of fuel oil. As a result the initial oonversion of the
Soviet rail network from coal was to fuel oil rather than to
diesel oil, whilst at the same time the quality of Soviet motor
fuel was particularly low, ranging from 50 to 70 ootane.
Writing in 1962, the Amerioan analyst Demetri Shimkin notes
that the structure of Soviet fuel output ohanged very little
11Ebe1 "The Petroleum Industry •••" (1961), p.65.
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TABLE 2.3. Soviet Oil Production by Region 1945-1955.
('000 tonnes)
lli.l ll2Q !ill.
Soviet Total 19436 37878 70793
RSFSR 5675 18231 49263
Volga-Ural 2833 10990 41220
Tatar ASSR 10 1020 14600
Bashkir ASSR 1300 5250 14200
Kuybyshrv oblast' 1020 3480 1250
Stalingrad oblast' n.a. n.a. 2300
Saratov oblast' n.a. 440 1900
Orenburg oblast' n.a. n.a. 510
Perm oblasti 190 300 570
West Siberia
North Cauoasus n.a. 6310 6540
Krasnodar krai 100 3000 3890
Chechen-Ingush ASSR 890 2500 2120
Dagestan ASSR 550 920 520
Stavropol krai n.a. neg.
Sa.kh&l1n n.a. 620 950
Komi ASSR n.a. 330 550
Belorussia
Ukraine 250 293 531
Turkmenia 629 2021 3162
Fergana Valley (Uzbekistan) 511 1409 1128
Georgia 36 43 43
Kazakhstan 188 1059 1397
(- = zero, neg. = negligible, n.a. a not available)
Souroe I R W Campbell "The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas"
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1968, p.124.
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between 1928 and 1958. He expresses the view that such a rigid
policy placed considerable strain on the economy as a whole,
and in the transportation sector in particular, preventing sub-
stantial savings in conversion from steam to internal combustion
engines and from large wood-fired to oil-fired furnaces. This
occurred despite cost-price relations that strongly favoured the
12use of oil and gas in preference to coal and other solid fuels.
As Alec Nove has indicated,13 the system of planning by
material balances was based inevitably on past experience,
ignoring the often substantial effect of change in the period
immediately preceding the Plan legislation and the need to make
adjustments in the short term in the light of further changed
oircumstances. Speoifically in the case of energy planning the
Stalinist system applied in the postwar period operated on the
.
basis of the extrapolation of a simple energy to NMP coefficient,
the result being translated into standard fuel units and subse-
quently into physical units in accordance with unchanging
relativities between fuels. Not only was there a substantial
economic loss in the fuel economy, but also a delay in the
development of the Soviet chemioal and petrochemical industries.
Irrational fuel prices served only to complicate the issues
further. Shimkin's analysis points to the fact that in 1955
delivered prices for hard and brown ooal oovered only 71 and 91
12Shimkin op.oit. p.45.
13A Nove "An Economic History of the USSR" Harmondsworth:
Penguin 1912, pp.315-316.
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per cent of costs respectively, whereas the average selling
price of petroleum products was some 90 per cent above cost, but
included substantial price discrimination between consumers.14
Shimkin does however note that the "uneconomic outlook" of
planners became modified after 1950.15
On the question of the difficulties encountered in deter-
mining an optimal energy balance Campbell expresses the view
that the planning system "has erected too many partitions within
the problem, and hampered joint consideration of interrelated
16problems". Though indeed the plans for economic growth during
the period of Soviet reoonstruction were broadly fulfilled in
the quantitative sense, the energy eoonomy was far from healthy,
and was oharacterised by relatively inefficient oonversion
processes, reflected in high levels of energy consumption com-
pared with final output.
By the time of the sixth Five-Tear Plan it was evident that
considerable rethinking had taken place concerning the role of
oil and gas within the Soviet energy economy. In an article
14In fact the coal industry failed to break even until the
price reform of 1961 (see Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR 1968, p.74S,
1970, p.70S). On the question of prices for oil products,
industrial consumers, for example, paid 393 rubles per tonne for
lighting kerosene, general consumers 782: the Oil Ministry
charged its own transport network 40 per cent less than other
consumers for all types of fuel and lubricant.
Shimkin op.cit. p.44.
15ibid• p.45.
16CamPbell op.cit. p.18.
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published in Maroh 1956 the Soviet analysts Agukin and
Shakhmatov indioate the need to expand the use of oil and gas
in preferenoe to other energy souroes.17 They indicate that in
1955 the average produotion cost of 1 tonne of standard fuel
in the form of oil was less than one quarter of that of ooal,
one eighth of that of shale and one twelfth of that of peat.
Production of 1 tonne of naphtha from oil is stated to be almost
three times cheaper than by the liquefaction and hydrogenation
18of coal. Gas is stated to have even greater advantages, the
average production cost being on a standard fuel basis one
twelfth of that of Moscow ooal and shale, one seventh of that
of peat and less than half that of oil.19
Despite these advantages, which it is reasonable to suppose
must have been appreciated earlier, the gas industry was
comparatively underdeveloped. Agukin and Shakhmatov point to
inadequate prospecting and delays in the oonstruction of produc-
tion centres when useful deposits were in fact found.20 Accord-
ingly the directives of the sixth Plan refleoted a sharp rise in
the produotion of gas, envisaging a 3.9-fold inorease on the
1955 production level and reaohing 35 billion oubio metres in
1960. At the same time the target for disoovery of new reserves
17p Agukin, A Shakhmatov "Neftyanaya i gazovaya promyshlen-
nost' v shestom pya tiletii tt : n.noyoe khozyaistvo 1956 No.3.
p.32.
18ibid•
19ibid• p.40.
20ibid•
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in the A+B+Cl categories represented an increase of 85 to 90 per
cent for the five-year period.21
It is not within the scope of this study to explore the
reasons for the abandonment of the sixth Plan or for the non-
acceptance of the seventh: suffice it to note, as Nove has
indicated,22 that a major reason given for the preparation of a
Plan covering the seven-year period from 1959 to 1965 was the
discovery of new fuel reserves and Khrushchev's desire to
develop rapidly the chemical and petrochemical industries. It
is interesting to note that the gas production figure for 1958
was 29.9 billion cubic metres and rose to 45.3 billion in 1960,
this latter figure being well in excess of the level envisaged
by Agukin and Shakhmatov when the sixth Plan was current.23
The discovery and development of the Volga-Ural oilfields
prior to the Seven-Year Plan facilitated the rapid growth of the
production of oil in the Soviet Union to 1965. As Campbell has
noted,24 the earliest fields to be exploited in the Volga-Ural
area were comparatively large and concentration of effort in
exploration meant that by 1959 some 80 per cent of Soviet oil
reserves in the A+B categories were reckoned to be located in the
area. Additionally the oilfields were located close to one
21ibid• p.41.
22Nove op.cit. pp.352-353.
23ibid• p.'53; Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR 1975. p.204;
Aguk1n, Shakhmatov op.cit. p.41.
24campbell op.cit. p.125.
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another, enabling a rapid rate of reserve accumulation to be
attained at relatively low cost, and the output per well proved
to be initially higher than the national average, minimising the
cost of production drilling.25
There was also a shift in the regional pattern of gas produc-
tion. The major part of the 9 billion cubic metres of gas
produced in the Soviet Union in 1955 came from fields located
in European Russia and the Ukraine. During the Seven-Tear Plan
the priority areas were the Volga fields, the North Caucasus,
the Ukraine and Central Asia.26 As Ian Elliot has indicated in
his study· of the historical development of the Soviet energy
balance written in 1974,27 the storage of gas is considerably
more complicated and expensive than that of other conventional
fuels and consequently early Soviet production policy provided
for the exploitation of fields located close to potential
consumers, even when the reserves of individual deposits were
comparatively limited. The benefit of developing natural gas
very rapidly during the sixties is illustrated by the fact that
the coal and oil industries provided a return of 48 tonnes of
standard fuel per thousand rubles invested, compared with 296
tonnes in the gas industry. Output per worker in the coal
industry in the late sixties was 38 tonnes of standard fuel
25M M Brenner "Ekonomika neftyanoi i gazovoi promyshlennosti"
Moscow Nedra 1968, p.31.
261bid• p.36.
27I F Elliot "The Soviet Energy Balance" New York: Praeger
1970, pp.36-37.
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annually compared with 330 tonnes in the oil industry and 2100
28tonnes in the gas industry.
During the Seven-Year Plan the oil industry fulfilled its
objectives, recording a production level of 243 million tonnes
in 1965 against a Plan of 230-240 million. However the gas
industry underfulfilled its objective, reaching a level of 129
billion cubic metres against Plan of 150. This tightening in
the supply of hydrocarbon energy was exacerbated by the under-
fulfilment of Plan by the coal industry, necessitating periodic
revisions of annual targets.29 This was compounded by a
declining rate of growth in output of the major fuels during the
eighth Plan, when the average annual rate was approximately 5.5
per cent compared with 1.3 per cent between 1961 and 1965.
Rising demand for energy and depletion of conveniently located
reserves, resulting in the need to develop more remote deposits,
especially of oil and gas, caused stagnation in oil exports and
gave rise to the commencement of gas imports. In 1969 the
lowest annual rate of increase in oil production (6.1%) since
the Seoond World War was recorded: this was however reotified
in 1910 when the rate was 1.6 per cent, bringing total produo-
tion to 353 million tonnes. In 1969 gas production totalled
28A V Aleksandrov "Osnovnye tendentsii nauchno-tekhnicheskogo
progressa v gazovoi promyshlennosti" Gazovaya prom,yshlennost'
1970 No.1, pp.25-26; Elliot op.cit. p.31.
29Nove op.cit. p.353; see also J Russell "Energy as a
Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy" Farnborough: Saxon House 1976,
.E.:l!.
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181 billion cubic metres, a shortfall against Plan of 3
billion, this constituting a 1.2 per cent increase on the
previous year. As a result the initial target for 1910 of 200
billion cubic metres was lowered to 196, which was 'fulfilled',
the final figure being 198 billion, a 9.4 per cent increase on
1969.30
By the start of the eighth Plan the importance of Siberian
reserves of oil and gas,for the development of the Soviet
energy economy was appreciated, though the inevitability of
their exploitation had been accepted some ten years earlier.31
The 23rd Party Congress, held in 1966 decreed that a major
economic complex would eventually be created in Siberia on the
basis of oil, gas and timber resources and that the effect of
the development of oil and gas would be felt by the end of the
ninth Plan.32
Table 2.4. details the growth of fuel production in the
Soviet Union between 1955 and 1910, showing the steady increase
in production of each of the major fuels and the expanding
share of the production balance held by oil and gas at the
3°An analysis of the performance of the Soviet oil and gas
industries during the eighth Plan is given by J R Lee in "The
Fuels Industries", in 'Economic Performance and the Military
Burden in the Soviet Union' Washington D C: US Congress, Joint
Economic Committee 1970. pp.33-37.
31Agukin, Shakhmatov op.cit. p.35.
32Reported in V S Varlamov "Problemy transportnogo osvoeniya
Zapadno-Sibirskoi nizmennosti v svyazi s formirovaniem na ee
territorii novogo narodnokhozyaistvennogo kompleksa" Izvestiya
AN SSSR, Sere geograficheskaya 1967 No.3. p.48.
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expense of other primary energy sources. Writing in 1970, the
American analyst J R Lee points to the decline in production of
coal in 1961 compared with 1960 and in 1968 compared with
1967." IIowever he omits to mention that the shortfall was
recorded only in the production of brown coal, whose calorific
value is roughly half of that of hard coal, whose production
rose throughout the sixties. Soviet statistics of the changing
production balance, expressed in units of standard fuel, present
a more accurate picture, and are presented in table 2.4.B.
However this is not to deny that the Soviet coal industry
faced a number of difficulties in the eighth Plan. There were
considerable delays in the commissioning of new productive
capacity. Lee indicates that in 1968 only 12 million tonnes of
new capacity was provided, compared with an average of 17
million tonnes per year between 1961 and 1967, but adds the
proviso that refurbishment of the industry in the latter half
of the eighth Plan should render the 1970 production target of
618 million tonnes readily attainable.34 In the event this
target was exceeded by just over 6 million tonnes.
In 1968 oil replaced coal as the major fuel produced in the
Soviet Union, its share of the production balance having risen
from 21.1 per cent in 1955 to 39.2 per cent. In 1970 this
share had risen to 41.1 per cent. Between 1955 and 1970 the
share of gas in the production balance rose from 2.4 to 19.1 per
33Lee op.cit. p.35.
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cent. Production of oil by individual republic is detailed in
table 2.5., showing the predominance of the RSFSR, which
includes the Volga-Ural fields and the emerging West Siberian
deposits, which began to contribute in the latter years of the
eighth Plan. The trend in the older areas, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaidzhan and Turkmenia, shows a plateau in production after
1965, this being counterbalanced by steadY growth in the
Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenia.
The corresponding pattern of gas production is given in
table 2.6., and evidences continuous growth in each republic.
The share of the RSFSR WaS provided by the Krasnodar and
Stavropol krais and the Volgograd and Saratov oblasts, supple-
mented by the contribution of the Tyumen' oblast' after 1967.
However, as Elliot has indicated,35 it was appreciated that in
all but the Tyumen' and Volgograd oblasts the rate of discovery
of new reserves in the eighth Plan did not keep pace with the
increase in production, signif,ying the likelihood of falling
production after 1970 in areas so affected.
Table 2.7. details the development of the Soviet energy
balance to 1970, reflecting the effect of changes in the produc-
tion of major fuels on consumption and illustrating the
emergence of hydrocarbon energy after 1950. The rates of
development of the oil and gas industries gave planners cause
for confidence that despite the problems encountered towards the
35Elliot op.cit. p.47.
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end of the eighth Plan oil and gas would be the prime contri-
butors to incremental energy demand in the following decade,
potentially aocounting for over 60 per cent of the Soviet fuel
and energy balanoe by 1980.36
The Development of Oil and Gas Trade.
Robert E Ebel's "Communist Trade in Oil and Gas", published
in 1970, provides a detailed history of the Soviet Union as
exporter and importer of oil and gas from the pre-Revolutionary
origins of the oil industry to the development of the oil and
gas industries in the 1960s, and contains detailed statistical
information up to and including 1968. The material contained in
this section is derived to a great extent from Ebel's, but the
prime purpose of the present analysis is to outline the back-
ground to Soviet export polioy as a study in action and reaotion
within the oontext of the world petroleum market, so as to
illustrate the nature of the Soviet commitment and its impaot
on forward trade polioy.
As indicated previously, imports of certain oil products
were essential during the Seoond World War as part of the Soviet
oil industry fell into enemy hands. Exports reoommenced in 1946
but these were oounterbalanced by oontinuing imports of 011 and
produots, such that trade served primarily to optimise the
refiniQg balance within Comecon. The Soviet Union imported
3~ V Mel'nikov "Voprosy razvitiya. toplivnoi promyshlennosti"
Voprosyekonomiki 1969 No.1, p.17.
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kerosene and middle distillate fuels from Romania and East
Germany. Though it was not until 1954 that the role of foreign
trade was re-evaluated in the process of de-Stalinisation and
in the gradual easing of the 'Cccom embargo, exports of oil
and products to Western countries were resumed in 1951,37
directed predominantly to Italy and Finland.
By 1954 Sweden had become an importer of Soviet oil under
terms which were to become characteristic of the Soviet Union's
commercial strategy during the sixties. Sweden was one of the
first countries to appreoiate the potential vulnerability of
high dependenoe on Middle East oil. As Odell has pointed
out,38 Sweden faoed a short-lived supply crisis in 1951 as a
result of production shortfalls in Iran during that country's
nationalisation of part of the assets of the British Petroleum
Company. Sweden was able to offer what the Soviet Union
needed at that time, namely large-diameter steel pipe to develop
the oil delivery system. Unenoumbered by membership of NATO,
whioh disapproved of the sale by any of its members of steel
pipe to the Comeoon bloc, and impervious to pressure from
neighbouring European states, Sweden built up her barter trade
with the Soviet Union to the extent of becoming dependent on
her for some 15 per cent of oil supplies by the mid-fifties.
The Soviet oil trade balanoe between 1946 and 1955 is detailed
37Ebel op.cit. p.".
38p R Odell "Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil
Crisis" Harmondsworth: Penggin 1975 (4th edit.), p.52.
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in table 2.8., showing the emergence of the Soviet Union as a
net exporter, though still importing some refined products to
compensate for the technological baokwardness of domestio
refineries in relation to the changing pattern of demand.
In the latter half of the fifties the Soviet Union was
able to oompound her initial success in export trade with
reorientation towards an optimal refining balance, reducing
the need to import refined products. As the Volga-Ural fields
were brought into produotion the need to import crude oil
likewise declined. The revival of Comecon coinoided with the
Soviet Union's resumption of oil exports, and trade within the
bloc was re-evaluated, to the extent of canoelling Polish
indebtedness on certain credits and the extension of new credit
facilities to eaoh of the Eastern European countries, the
termination of postwar reparations from East Germany in 1954
and the agreement in principle to base future trade in all
commodities on prioes relating to those in world markets.39
Henoeforward as demand for oil grew in Eastern Europe the
Soviet Union beoame the major supplier to all oountries exoept
Romania, who was also a net exporter of oil and refined
produots.
The period from 1956 to 1965 saw the expansion of Soviet
oil deliveries to the West at a time when, after the reopening
of the Suez Canal and the restoration of produotion in the
39Disoussed in some detail in Nove op.oit. pp.348-'50.
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Middle East to previous levels, there arose a substantial
surplus of oil on the open market. This resulted in the
commenoement of a downward trend in oil and refined product
prices in Western Europe, which, ooupled with the inoreasing
presenoe of Soviet oil, oaused some measure of oonoern. Italy
was in the forefront of negotiations with the Soviet Union.
The Italian government disoovered that by allowing the state
oil oompany ENI to negotiate freely for supply of orude oil
Soviet oil oould be obtained as a delivered cost well below
that of Middle East oil supplied. through the production and
distribution system of the major oil companies. The Soviet
Union was p~epared in principle to offer an outlet for Italian
manufactured goods, and the negotiations eventually led to a
large-scale bilateral agreement in 1963, which provided for
the delivery of 25 million tonnes of Soviet oil over a five-
year period in return for steel pipe and later the materials
and know-how to build an automobile factory.
However no export agreement concluded at this time was as
dramatic as that negotiated with Cuba shortly after Castro's
assumption of power in 1959. At that time CUba's oil and
petroleum products were supplied by three of the major oil
companies from their operations in Venezuela. Castro queried
the high delivered cost of S3 per barrel in relation to the
f.o.b. cost in Venezuela of S2. Castro gained Khrushohev's
agreement to supply one-third of Cuba's requirement at a
delivered cost of S2.10 per barrel. When the oil companies
(Shell, Esso and Texaoo) exeroised their legal right to refuse
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to refine and distribute any oil other than that produced by
their own affiliates, Castro succeeded in negotiating with
Khrushchev for 100 per cent Soviet supply. Following a direc-
tive from Castro to the refineries to process Soviet oil, the
companies withdrew their staff and embargoed deliveries to
Cuba.40 The reasons why the companies chose to act in this way
are obscure. Perhaps they were acting in alliance with the
American government in order to bring pressure to bear on Cuba,
whose path of socio-economic development could scarcely have
been regarded as attractive. On the other hand the companies
might well have underestimated the capacity of the Soviet Union
to supply the whole of Cuba's requirements. Whatever the
reason, the companies and the American government lost in the
outcome.
On a different plane the emergence of Soviet oil in the
world market necessitated a defensive commercial strategy on
the part of the major oil companies. The case of the Soviet
offer to India is a good illustration of this. By 1960, the
end of India's seoond Five-Year Plan, the balance of payments
and the international value of her currency were giving cause
for concern. Limited success had been achieved by the Indian
government in persuading the oil companies operating in India
to import crude oil rather than higher-cost refined products,
but rising demand threatened further drain on an already hard-
40The background to the Soviet Union's trade agreement with
Cuba is given in Odell op.cit. pp.59-62.
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pressed currency. In preference to suppressing demand, investing
in the development of limited domestic hydrocarbon resources or
seeking recourse to further international loans, the Indian
government sought either to import crude oil and refined products
on a barter basis or to negotiate a price reduction for the oil
delivered by the major companies to their affiliates. In mid-
1960 the Soviet Union offered crude oil to India at a price some
25 per cent below that being charged by the oil companies. The
three companies operating in India lowered their price to
counteract the Soviet bid. Since the Soviet Union had just
assumed responsibility for supplying Cuba, the companies wished
to avoid the consequences of yielding further to market
pressure. Additionally the companies were able to convince the
Indian government that they could influence the World Bank and
other financial institutions to view favourably subsequent
approaches by India for aid.41
The presence of the Soviet Union in the world petroleum
market caused some consternation in American circles, culminating
in the pUblication of a somewhat alarmist report in 1962 on the
so-called Soviet "oil export offensive".42 The report concluded
that the Soviet oil export drive had five objectives; protection
41See M Tanzer "The Political
and the Underdeveloped Countries"
p,p.178-193.
42National Petroleum Council of America "The Impact of Oil
Exports from the Soviet Bloc" (2 Vols.) Washington D C:
American Petroleum Institute 1 62. (A supplement to the report
was added in 19 4.
Economy of International Oil
London: Temple Smith 1970,
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of the domestic economy against foreign competition, isolation
of the ourrency from the influenoe of foreign exchange markets,
provision of a strengthening bargaining position opposite
capitalist countries, development of the ability to discriminate
amongst purchasers and' to sell in foreign markets without regard
for normal commeroial considerations or internal oosts and
lastly securing flexibility to adjust trade to serve political
interests.43 The problematic issues were seen to be the last
two perceived objectives. Ebel indicates that price-cutting on
the Soviet part was a feature of strategy, but only to the
extent necessary to secure a contract and that no opportunity
was wasted to maximise the revenue from existing business.44
On the much-publioised question of discriminatory prioing
against Pastern Europe, who during the fifties and early sixties
were paying more in unit ruble values for Soviet oil and refined
produots than Western buyers, Ebel rightly draws attention to
the fact that as the prices of all commodities in intra-Comeoon
trade were being brought into line with those of the world
markets, the declining price of oil was reflected in the prices
oharged during the sixties, when relative prices of many other
goods in intra-Comeoon trade were also being re_evaluated.45
43ibid• Vol.2, p.418.
44For example when the Suez Canal was closed in 1967, result-
ing in disruption in supply from the Middle East and oil
shortages in Western Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union raised
her oil prices in these markets. Ebel "Communist Trade •••"
(1970), p.63.
45ibid. p.64.
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As for the issue of pricing without regard to cost, what Western
company has not at times priced in relation to marginal cost in
order to secure export business? In this sense, as Peter Wiles
has indicated,46 the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry behaves no
differently from the export department of a multi-divisional
oompany. This goes some way towards putting into perspective the
'political' aspect of Soviet oil trade. Political relations are
governed by a set of mutual perceptions of policy. If, for
example, the USA believed that the Soviet offer of oil to Cuba
was made for the purpose of gaining a political foothold, then
American policy towards the Soviet Union may be influenced by
this peroeption, overlooking the fact that the commercial polioy
of the oil companies at that time left Castro no alternative.
In the Italian case, the Soviet Union had by virtue of a different
financial structure of its oil industry and the ability to absorb
Italian goods as part payment a commercial advantage over the
established traders. The subsequent development of such trade
has been limited not so muoh by political considerations, which
might be loosely defined as an attempt to diminish the influence
of the USA in Italy in the form of deoreasing the market share
held by the American oil companies, but by the capacity of the
Soviet Union to absorb what Italian industry was prepared to offer
in barter payment. The outcome is a function of relative
46p J D Wiles "Communist International Economics" Oxford:
Basil Blackwell 1968, p.40.
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competitiveness of bids in the market. The lift~ng of the NATO
embargo in 1966 on deliveries of steel pipe to the Comecon bloc
enabled the Soviet Union to compete more effectively for a share
of the West German petroleum market from the mid-sixties.
In the late sixties there was a fall in deliveries of
Soviet oil to non-Comecon markets, which gave rise to the view
that the Soviet Union's oil export drive was losing momentum.
Much of the slowdown in the growth of net exports was due to a
natural delay before the effect of production shortfalls in oil
and gas prompted planners to adjust the rate and pattern of growth
in domestic demand. It is likely that Soviet oil export policy
was constrained in the late sixties by rising costs of exploration
and production, growing demand both domestically and within
Eastern Europe and falling prices in the world market due to
intense competition between the oil companies. The fear of
Western Europe's possible engulfment in a sea of Soviet oil,
expressed in the American National Petroleum Council's 1962
report had not been realised and the future trend of Soviet oil
exports appeared uncertain.
Table 2.9. details the Soviet trade balance in crude oil
and refined products from 1956 to 1970, showing the declining
import requirement as the Soviet oil production and refining
industries underwent considerable expansion and the peak of
exports as a percentage of production, reached in 1966, and the
slight decline in the latter to 1910.
Despite the consistent failure of the Soviet gas industry
to fulfil Plan targets since 1965 the Soviet Union has taken
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TABLE 2.9. Soviet Oil Trade Balance 1956-1970
CM tonnes, Oil and Refined Products)
Year Production* Exports Imports Net Net Exports as %-Exports of Prodn,
1956 83.8 10.6 5.6 5.0 6.0
1951 98.3 16.3 4.5 11.8 12.0
1958 113.2 18.9 4.6 14.3 12.6
1959 129.6 26.5 4.7 21.8 16.8
1960 147.8 34.5 4.1 29.8 20.2
1961 166.1 42.1 3.8 38.9 23.4
1962 186.2 47.1 3.0 44.0 23.6
1963 206.1 53.1 3.0 50.1 24.3
1964 223.6 58.3 2.3 56.0 25.0
1965 242.9 66.2 2.1 64.1 26.4
1966 265.1 75.6 1.8 73.8 21.8
1961 288.1 81.0 1.5 79.5 27.6
1968 309.2 86.2 1.1 85.1 27.5
1969 328.4 90.8 1.1 89.7 27.3
1910 353.0 95.8 1.1 94.1 26.8
(* inc. gas condensate)
Sources: 1956-1967 R E Ebe1 "Communist Trade in Oil and Gas"
New York: Praeger 1910, p.40.
1968-1910 Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR. 1975. p.240.
Vneshnyaya torgov1ya SSSR 1969. pp.25. 38, and
1970. pp.26, 39.
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advantage of the availability of gas to enter the expanding
market in Eastern Europe. The factors determining the develop-
ment of the Western European gas market were the development of
the Groningen gas field in the Netherlands, which supplied that
country plus West Germany and France, the expansion of Algerian
and Libyan deposits, shipped as liquefied petroleum gas to
Franoe and Italy respectively, and the development of the
Norwegian and British gas reserves in the North Sea, the former
providing fuel and feedstock with the possibility of export,
given Norway's excess of hydrocarbons over demand, the latter
consumed almost entirely domestically.
The first agreement between the Soviet Union and a Western
country for the sale of natural gas was that signed with Austria
in 1968. In return for Austrian steel plate, rolled into pipe
in West Germany, the Soviet Union extended the 'Bratstvo' trunk
pipeline, oompleted in 1961, over the Czech border into Austria
and deliveries of Soviet gas commenoed by the end of 1968.47 The
other Soviet export outlets for gas were Poland and Czeohoslovakia.
Small quantities of liquefied gas had been delivered to Poland
sinoe 1950,48 but a substantial volume was supplied after the
completion of the Northern branch of the 'Bratstvo' pipeline to
Warsaw in 1966. Supply of Soviet gas to Czechoslovakia,
commenoing in 1967, helped to alleviate the strains imposed by
41The background to this agreement is given in Ebel "Communist
Trade •••" (1970), pp.135-137.
48ibid. p.138.
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relatively rapid economic development and a poor indigenous
resource base, which had been supplemented by supplies of Soviet
oil, whose production for export was becoming increasingly
problematic. During the late sixties the Soviet Union opened
negotiations with Italy, West Germany and Japan concerning the
possibility of future supply of gas in return for assistance,
material and financial, in developing Siberian resources.49
There were no deliveries of Soviet gas to these countries prior
to 1970.
At the same time as concluding gas export contracts in
Western and Eastern Europe the Soviet Union undertook to import
gas from Iran and Afghanistan.50 In each case deliveries
constituted repayment for Soviet development aid. Imports from
Afghanistan commenced in 1967 and from Iran in 1970. The gas
trade balance from 1955 to 1970 is detailed in table 2.10.,
showing the movement towards a net import position during the
late sixties. Despite this trend the potential for domestic and
export substitution of gas for coal was not in doubt. As Ebel
indicates,51 imports beyond the quantities stipulated in the
original agreements with Iran and Afghanistan were not foreseen,
and it was expeoted that in the oourse of the ninth Plan the
Soviet Union would again beoome a net exporter.
49ibid• pp.140-142, 149-155.
50ibid. pp.155-16~.
51ibid. p.164.
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TABLE 2.10. Soviet Gas Trade 1955-1970
(Billion cubic metres)
Year Production Exports Imports Net Exports
1955 9.0 0.139 0.139
1960 45.3 0.242 0.242
1965 127.7 0.392 0.392
1966 143.0 0.828 0.828
1967 157.4 1.290 0.207 1.083
1968 169.1 1.729 1.500 0.229
1969 181.1 2.664 2.030 0.634
1970 197.9 3.300 3.551 -0.251
Sources: Table 2.4.A.
R E Ebel "Communist Trade in Oil and Gas"
New York: Praeger 1970, p.138.
Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR 1968, pp.26,213.
1969, pp.26,211.
1970, W.26,215.
Towards the end of the sixties increasing logistic diffi-
culties obliged the Soviet Union to approach Iraq to secure oil
supplies. Such imports could either be delivered via the Black
Sea into the Southern area of the Soviet Union to compensate for
declining production in the Baku area, or directly to established
export markets. The relatively late commencement of the develop-
ment of the Soviet gas industry coincided with the deterioration
of economic, technical and logistio conditions in the oil
industry. Though not without problems of its own the gas industry's
potential enabled planners to make a substantial adjustment in
forward estimates of energy supply and consumption.
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In January 1969 the Soviet Oil Minister, V D Shashin,
declared that because of rising domestic and Eastern European
consumption exports of Soviet oil to non-Communist markets would
not continue to rise significantly.52 In interpreting this
statement much depends on the meaning of the word 'significantly'.
Ebel takes this to indicate that the growth of net Soviet exports
would be very slight in the future.53 However neither Ebel nor
the Soviet Oil Minister discuss the potential impact of gas.
In the aftermath of the Six-Day War of 1967 and the closure
of the Suez Canal the Soviet Union undertook a commitment that
had been common practice in the international oil industry but
which represented a new departure for the Soviet oil export
authority Soyuznefteeksport. Faced with increasing difficulties
in supplying her own oil to established markets in the Far East
and Japan, the Soviet Union negotiated the exchange of oil and
refined products at the Black Sea ports for delivery into the
outlets of the international oil industry in return for an equi-
valent quantity at Persian Gulf ports for delivery to Soviet
customers. The convenience of such arrangements became
increasingly important to the Soviet Union as the distribution of
her own oil grew more costly.
Concluding his study, written in 1968, Robert Campbell notes
that Soviet reserves of oil and gas would not oonstitute a
52Reported in the New York Times, 11 JanuarY 1969, p.C-39.
53Ebel "Communist Trade •••" (1970), p.104.
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constraint on future export levels, but that the prime factor was
cost.54 He identifies the crucial issue, namely that Soviet gas
might prove to be a more advantageous substitute for coal in
the domestic energy balance, freeing oil for export, but he
confines his forward view to stating tpat "success in expanding
gas output •••(was) •••bound to have an important influence on oil
export policy".55 At the outset of the ninth Plan the prospects
for the success of such a policy seemed promising.
54Campbell op.cit. p.251.
55ibid. pp.252-253.
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Chapter 3. Soviet Oil and Gas 1971-1975.
There is a marked difference in the development of the
Soviet energy economy in the ninth (1971-1975) Five-Tear Plan
compared with the previous fifteen year period. From 1955 to
•
1965 the growth in the share of oil and gas in the Soviet energy
balance was brought about by the development of reserves located
in the European part of the USSR, relatively close to centres
of consumption, namely the Volga-Ural region, the North Caucasus
and the Ukraine. From 1955 to 1965 production of oil and gas
condensate in the Soviet Union grew by 192.1 million tonnes, of
which European areas accounted for 150.3 million, 87 per cent
of the total growth. In the same period gas production grew by
118.7 billion cubic metres, over 70 per cent of which was
provided by European operations, mainly in the same areas which
1accounted for the majority of growth in oil production. The
position in the coal industry differed from that of oil and gas
in that between 1955 and 1965 less than half (44 per cent) of
incremental production was derived from 1Uxopean operations.
The overall position was that European Russia's contribution to
total fuel production rose from 66 per cent in 1955 to 12 per
cent in 1965.2
1A E Probst "Puti razvitiya toplivnogo khozyaistva SSSR"
Planovoe khozyaistvo 1971, No.6, p.54.
2ibid•
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Development prospects and plans for the 1971-1975 period show
the increasing importance for the Soviet energy economy of
regions to the East of the Urals. Opportunities for increasing
the production of oil and gas in the European part of the Soviet
Union were seen to be limited by a declining rate of discovery
of new reserves. Th~ objective was therefore to maintain or
increase slightly production levels in fields operational during
the eighth Plan, though in certain areas production was
scheduled to decline. In European Russia the areas that were
scheduled to increase oil production were certain fields in the
Urals, the North~West and new fields in Belorussia. The
European area as a whole was scheduled to provide one fifth of
incremental production during the ninth Plan, with the balancing
four fifths to be provided by operations in West Siberia,4 where
the production level in 1975 was planned to be 120 to 125 million
tonnes.5 Table 3.1. details the planned changes in regional
production of oil (excluding gas condensate) in 1975 compared
with 1970.
The development of the oil industry in the ninth Plan is
paralleled by that of the gas industry. In the course of the
ninth Plan one fifth of the increase in production was scheduled
3ibid•
4ibid., and also 'Gosudarstvennyi pyatiletnii plan razvitiya
narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR na 1971-1975 gody', Moscow: Politika
1972 p.97. (This is referred to hereafter as pyatiletnii plan
1971-197:2.)
5EYatiletnii plan 1971-1975. p.103.
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TABLE 3.1. Changes in the Regional Pattern of Soviet Crude Oil
Production (1975 Plan compared with 1970 Actual)
mg ~ 121:2Pas roMt % share Mt 20 share of 1970
USSR 348.8 100 496 100 142.2
European Area 285.2 81.8 314.5 63.4 110.3plus Urals
of whioh:
Tatar ASsn 101.9 29.2 101 20.4 99.1Bashkir ASsn 39.2 11.2 40 8.1 102Kuybyshev obI. 35 10 35 7.1 100Orenburg ob.l, 7.4 2.1 14 2.8 189.2Perm obI. 16.1 4.6 21.5 4.3 133.5Komi ASSR 5.6 1.6 10 2 178.6
Regions to E 63.6 18.2 181.5 36.6 290of Urals
of whioh:
West Siberia 31.4 9 125 25.2 400Turlanen ASSR 14.4 4.1 22 4.4 152.8Kazakhstan 13.1 3.8 30 6 230
Source: Ryatiletnii plan 1211-1215, p.103.
to be provided by European operations, the balanoe being provided
by \o/estSiberia and Central Asia. The rapid development of gas
fields in the Komi Autonomous Republio and the Orenburg oblast',
discovered and prepared for development during the eighth Plan,
was expeoted to be oounterbalanoed by a deoline in produotion in
other European fields.6 Table 3.2. details the planned ohanges
in regional produotion of gas in 1975 oompared with 1970. The
year-by-year growth pattern planned for the oil and gas industries
6Probst op.oit. p.54, Pyatiletnii plan 1971-1275 p.101.
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TABLE 3.2. Changes Ln the Planned Regional Production of Gas
1915 compared with 1910 (billion cubic metres)
mg ~ 1212P as 26Prodn. 20 share Prodn. ~o share of 1910
USSR 198 100 320 100 161.6
European Area 139 10.2 164.1 51.3 118
plus Urals
of which:
Orenburg obI. 1.3 0.1 26 8.1 X 20
Komi ASSR 6.9 3.5 16.1 5 X 2.3
Regions East 59 29.8 155.9 48.1 X 2.6of Urals
of which:
\1est Siberia 9.3 4.7 44 13.8 X 4.1Turkmen ASSR 13.1 6.6 65.1 20.3 X 5
Source: Pyatiletnii plan 1971-1915,'pp.106-101.
for the term of the ninth Plan is outlined in table 3.3.
In the oil refining industry the objective was to increase
the capacity of individual processing units rather than to
install large-scale new refineries. It is stated in the Plan
that the average capacity of primary distillation unitashould rise
by 62.5 per oent from 3.2 million tonnes per year reoorded in the
eighth Plan to 5.2 million in 1971-1915, of catalytio power-
formers, used to manufacture motor gasoline and petrochemical
feedstook, from an average capacity of 384 thousand tonnes per
year during the eighth Plan to 566 thousand, of hydrofiners,
used to remove sulphur from middle distillate fuels, from 1.12
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TABLE 3.3. Planned Soviet Oil and Gas Production 1911-1975
.1211 1.211 12ll .121! 1m
Oil, excl. gas 371.3 395.1 429 461 496
condensate (M tonnes)
Natural Gas 211 229 250 280 320
(billion cubic metres)
Source: Pyatiletnii Elan 1211-12121 E.2~6.
million to 1.85 million tonnes per year.7 In total oil refining
capacity was scheduled to rise by 40 per cent during the ninth
Plan,8 this requiring an increase in capital investment of 62.1
per cent.9 To achieve these objectives capacities in refineries
operational at the end of the eighth Plan would be increased by
20 per cent, the balance being provided by the construction of
new refineries at Lisichansk (Ukraine), f'10zyr (Belorussia),
Jurkarkas (Lithuania), Arkhangelsk (on the White Sea), Pavlodar
and Chimkent (Kazakhstan), Chardzhou (Turkmenia), Achinsk (West
Siberia) and Khabarovsk (Far East). Given that some 70 per
cent of new capacity was scheduled to be provided by the four
refineries planned for European Russia and around 30 per cent by
the remaining five Asiatic plants, it will be seen that the
European refineries will be some three times larger than the
Asian.10
7Pyatiletnii plan 1211-1275, p.108.
8ibid•-
9ibid•-10'b'd ' U it1 1 • pp.108-109; Economlst Intelligence n
to 1980' London: EIU 1213 p.31.
'Soviet Oil
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The above is complicated by the fact that fuel consump-
tion is centred predominantly in European Russia. Additionally,
as the centre of exploration and production moves Eastwards,
long-range criteria in integrating oil and gas into the total
energy balance may differ from short- and medium-range, and
considerations of minimum financial outlay at the initial stage
of development cannot serve as the sole basis for the evalua-
tion of available alternatives. Factors stated to be taken
into consideration by Soviet planners include estimates of
forward price parities, reliability of supply, feasibility of
demands made by the fuel and energy sectors on related
industries such as machine-manufacturing, civil engineering
and metallurgy, and the impact of energy development on the
. t 11env~ronmen •
However the basic factors that influence the formulation
of energy policy are the discovery of new fuel reserves, judged
on the basis of the best available information to be economic,
and the cost of transporting fuels in processed form to the
point of final consumption. It is known that by the mid-point
of the ninth Plan the targets for the discovery of new oil
12reserves had been underfulfilled by some 50 per cent,
11A Vigdorchik et al. "Netody optimizatsii dolgosrochnogo
razvitiya toplivno-energeticheskogo kompleksa SSSR" Planovoe
khozyaistvo 1975 No.2, p.30.
12Sotsialisticheskaya industriya 29 September 1973, p.2;
PP Galonskii "Bol'shie perspektivy, vazhnye za.dachi"
Neftyanik 1972 No.2. p.2.
82
necessitating some degree of re-thinking on the part of Soviet
planners as to the general future direction of the energy
economy. On another plane, the short-term impact of delays
experienced in exploiting reserves declared to be economically
attractive goes beyond that of causing shortages of a given
fuel. Thus, for example, delays in bringing on stream oil
reserves scheduled for development during the ninth Plan, com-
pounded with a refining policy aimed at maximising the output of
non-substitutable fuels and petrochemical feedstock, not only
causes a shortfall in the availability of residual fuel oil,13
but also stimulates demand on the part of industrial consumers
faced with a fuel shortage for change in the priorities of the
refinery balance. The longer-term impact of the effect of a
delay of this nature is that of obliging planners to direct a
greater proportion of natural gas to fuel end-uses than had been
previously considered optimal, and in so doing tightening the
supply of gas as petrochemical feedstock. Towards the end of
the ninth Plan the problems encountered in the oil industry were
compounded by the commencement of similar short-falls in the
discovery of new reserves of other fuels.14
A recent feature of Soviet development policy has been to
limit the construction and expansion of energy-intensive industry
13M A Styrikovich "Nauchno-tekhnicheskie problemy razvitiya
energetiki SSSR" Izvestiya. AN SSSR, Sere energetika i transport
1914 No.3. p.8.
14A J;Ie1'nikov, V Shelest
SSSR" P1anovoe khozyaistvo
"Toplivno-energeticheskii kompleks
1915 No.2, pp.10-11.
83
in European Hussia and to site such enterprises closer to the
new centres of fuel production, where, according to Gosplan's
Committee for the Study of Productive Resources, fuel can be
delivered to the enterprise at between one fifth and one half
the cost of delivery in European Russia.15 This is gradually
becoming the preferred policy of Gosplan, since it acknowledges
the great difficulties that would be encountered in~tempting
in the short term to eliminate the fuel and energy deficit in
European Ruscia by expanding fuel production there, given the
1 I d ti ' t t' 16 d th I' t' f t rong ea - mes 1n cons ruc 10n an e comp 1ca lng ac 0
of a wide disparity in the delivered cost of fuels, as shown in
table. 3.4. Two leading Soviet energy specialists define the
problem of the Soviet energy economy as being that of the inter-
action of three factors: Soviet policy of concentration of
productive capacity, creating pockets of very high energy demand;
defining and achieving an optimal vaTiant amongst available
fuels; intrinsic inertia and changing capital intensity of the
fuels industries.17 Prior to analysing in det~il the development
of the Soviet oil and gas industries during the ninth flan it is
useful to consider the current system of energy planning as a
whole in order to establish the background to decisions taken in
l5Ji:ditorial "Uskorenno razvivat' toplivno-energetichesh."uyu
bazu strany" Planovoe khozyaistvo 1975 No.2,p.5. The Ministries
of the Chemical andPetrochemical and Metallurgy industries are
criticised for not having advanced this policy.
l~obst oPe cit. p.58.
l7L A Helenttev, A A Makarov "Osobennosti
razvitiya toplivno-energeticheskogo kompleksa"
Sere energetika i transport 1974 No,3. p.12.
optimizatsii
Izvestiya AN SSSH,
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respect of the development of these two industries.
Table 3.5. details the planned fuel production targets for
1971 to 1975 and the results achieved. The targets for
discovery of new fuel reserves were less precise, these being
18planned to rise by 33.7 per cent. The Plan envisaged that the
share of oil and gas in the overall energy balance would rise
from 60.4 per cent in 1970 to 67.4 per cent in 1975.19 Taking
into account the directive to increase the share of open-cast
mined coal from 26.1 to 30.9 per cent of total coal produced,
the result is that Soviet planners expected the use of "economic
fuels" ('ekonomicheskie vidy topliva') to rise from 68 to 15
per cent of fuel consumed in this period.20 Despite a
preference on the Soviet part for increasing the share of oil
and gas within the energy balance, coal has remained a signifi-
cant contributor, particularly in electricity generation and
21preferentially in this end-use in European Russia. In the
Soviet Union as a whole electricity generation accounts for
approximately one-third of energy consumption, and some 60 per
22cent of electricity is generated in coal-fired power stations.
Since the ratio of proved reserves to production is less
favourable for oil than for other conventional fuels and the
18EYatiletnii plan 1971-1975, p.98.
19ibid• p.99.
20ibid•
21M I Rostovtsev, T G Runova "Dobyvayushchaya promyshlennost'
SSSR" Moscow Myel' 1972, p.16.
22Mel'nikov, Shelest op.cit. p.13.
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transportation problems more severe, oil has come to be
regarded as the scarce resource in relation to which the
energy balance as a whole should be optimised. On the one
hand there must be produced a certain quantity of light
fractions for which no ready substitute exists, either in the
technical or economic sense.2} On the other hand there is a
substantial degree of choice amongst boiler and furnace fuels
and the option taken depends on the economic balance between
production, transportation and oonversion costs.24 The
decision-making process by which the final fuel balance is
25determined lies within the remit of the Collegium of Gosplan,
and final demand is worked out by aggregating reported demand
by sector of the economy. Individual departments of Gosplan
are responsible for verifying the sectoral analysis of energy
demand: the Gosplan Collegium aocordingly aggregates sectoral
demand and allocates fuel.26 ~athematical models are used to
plan at three levels, the long-term (i.e. the next Five-Year
Plan), the medium, (i.e. the remainder of the current Plan) and
the annual Plan.27 It appears that the use of linear
23A S Pavlenko, A M Nekrasova (eds.) "Energetika SSSR v
1971-1975 godakh" Moscow Erler!i¥! 1972, p.31.
24ibid• p.32.
25Murray Feschbaoh (Rapporteur) Report of a visit by delega-
tion of US systems analysts to Moscow 1974. Mimeo. pp.5-6.
26Feschbach pp.6-7. Note also that research into the
decision-making process of the Soviet energy sector as a whole
is being carried out by D Wilson and Dr P Hanson of the Centre
for Russian and East European Studies, University of Dirmingham,
UK.
27ibid. P.S.
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programming techniques is a relatively recent feature of Soviet
energy planning and that work on the development of an all-Union
28unified energy supply model is still incomplete.
One of the early detailed works on the Soviet method of
energy planning is that of the German economist Werner Gumpel.29
In this analysis he points to four major difficulties faced by
Soviet planners: firstly the worsening spatial dislocation
between energy reserves, production and consumption, secondly the
changing criteria determining levels of substitutability between
fuels, thirdly the fluctuations in consumption patterns caused
principally by the continental climate and fourthly the long lead-
times for investment projects in the energy industries, which are
often subject to overruns.30 Gumpel sees the last of these
features as the crucial issue. Perhaps the most important issue
however is that of the uncertainty and changeability of the basic
information on which decisions are made.31 During the ninth Plan
it was felt that forward estimates on reserves and production
costs of coal were more reliable than those for oil and gas. More
precisely, Gosplan's information was apparently less firm in
28ibid. p.1.
29W Gumpel "Energiebilanzen als Mittel der Energieplanung in
der UdSSR" Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas, Munich 1912,
Volume 2, pp.295-311.
30ibid. p.296.
31Me1ent'ev, Makarov op.cit. p.13. A particularly pressing
problem is that of forward assumptions of prices in relation to
costs, this allegedly posing difficulties in deriving an optimal
balance.
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respeot of the oomparative oosts of produotion and transportation
of Siberian oil and gas resouroes than that oonoerning the future
exploitation of Kansk-Aohinsk and Kuzbass ooal.32 Thus, as
Melent'ev and Makarov argue,33 it beoomes optimal to favour an
energy balanoe whioh slows the rate of inorease of oil and gas in
relation to ooal, on the grounds of minimum uncertainty. On the
other hand planners have to take into account the economics of
conversion and the foreign trade implications of domestic produc-
tion decisions, the more so after 1973, given the enhanced earning
potential in hard currency markets afforded by the increased world
prioe for oil. This has given rise to greater interest on the
part of Soviet planners in coal and gas as fuels for electricity
generation,34 and in gas partly as fuel and partly as feedstock
for a series of industries.35 Therefore gas and coal can be used
as substitute fuels for oil, and the relative decline in the share
of the refining balance held by fuel oil, permitting a corres-
pondingly higher share of the output of gasoline, naphtha and
middle distillates, for which no ready substitute exists and which
are in greater demand than fuel oil in export markets.
The optimum utilisation of fuel is a further objeotive of
Soviet energy polioy. On the basis of its oonversion characteristics
32ibid. p.15.
33ibid•-
34styrikOvich op.oit. p.8.
35The advantages in conversion efficiency that arise from the
use of natural gas are outlined in I F Elliot "The Soviet Energy
Balance" New York: Praeger 1974 pp.236-243.
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natural gas is the most efficient of the three major primary
energy sources,36 and despite the apparent uncertainty
surrounding reserves in the long term there has been considerable
emphasis on gas as the preferred fuel for domestic and industrial
use in the course of the ninth Plan. The 1975 consumption
balance for gas is outlined in table 3.6. The striking feature
of this balance is the low percentage share of gas directed to
petrochemical manufacture and to export. These are the two
sectors that Soviet planners most wish to develop in the immediate
future. Conversion efficiency in general has become the subject
of some attention in Soviet writing: it is admitted that
despite considerable improvement over the 25 years to 1975
energy conversion efficiency is unacceptably low.38
,
In concluding his study written in 1974 Elliot observes that
the Soviet Union "has no need to fear an absolute energy
shortage".39 Indeed there is no evidence to refute this state-
ment, and the same could be said of a number of the world's
industrialised countries. The point at issue is the nature,
extent and implications of the politico-economic problems that
are known and admitted to exist. Soviet analysts have been at
pains to point out that the Soviet Union does not have an energy
36E Yudin "Effektivnoe ispol'zovanie toplivno-energeticheskikh
resursov strany - obshchegosudarstvennaya zadacha" Planovoe
khozyaistvo 1975 No.6. p.60.
37ibid• p.63.
38V V Mikhailov "Problemy ekonomiki promyshlennogo energo-
potrebleniya" Promyshlennaya energetika 1976 No.1, p.9.
39Elliot op.cit. p.263.
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TABLE 3.6. Natural Gas Consumption by Economic Sector 1975.
Sector
Electricity Generation
Heat Raising
Industrial Manufacturing
Petrochemical Feedstock
Domestic Fuel
Agriculture
Other
Export
% Share
14-15
33
29
7-8
5-6
0.5
1
balance
Source: E Yudin "Effektivnoe ispo1'zovania toplivno-
energeticheskikh resursov strany - obshche-
gosudarstvennaya zadacha" P1anovoe khozyaistvo
1975 No.6. p.61.
supply problem, nor is she affected by the type of 'energy
crisis' that has adversely affected the capitalist world.40 If
the Soviet Union, and even the Comecon bloc as a whole, can remain
economically self-sufficient in energy, and particularly in oil,
then one might expect a different series of economio and
po1itioa1 oonsequences arising from the reoent price rises for
oil imposed by OPEC, and allied rises in the price of other
energy forms that might be imported, from those which would arise
from growing import dependence, including, for example,
constraints on general trade policy and bargaining power in inter-
national relations.
40see esp. P1anovoe khozyaistvo 1975 No.2. p.7, and Tu I
Bokserman "Nekotorye tendentsii dal'neishego razvitiya top1ivnoi
promysh1ennosti" Neftlanik 1975 No.1, p.s.
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As late as June 1913 one Western analyst, Professor Robert
Campbell, was discussing as a major issue in Soviet energy
policy whether the USSR could take advantage of "cheap Middle
East oil", or "allow" Eastern Europe to do so.41 The very
rapidity with which the trading conditions of the world market
changed, and the extent to which the new pricing levels affect
the Soviet and Eastern European view of import possibilities
were such that by 1916 the question was raised in Western
analysis of how Comecon countries would be able to finance the
import of OPEC oil at levels already reached.42 It is the
purpose of the remainder of this chapter to outline and analyse
the major trends in the Soviet oil and gas industries from 1911
to 1915 in relation to set objectives and to the development of
the Soviet energy balance in general.
The Soviet Oil and Gas Industries 1971-1975:
Objectives and Achievements.
The oil industry's objeotive was to raise production of oil
and gas condensate from 353 million tonnes in 1970 to 505 million
in 1915 through maintenanoe of production levels achieved in the
eighth Plan in eXisting operations in the Volga-Ural oil fields
41R W Campbell "Some Issues in Soviet Energy Policy for the
Seventies", in 'Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies'
Washington D C: US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 1973,~.
42J Russell "Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy"
Farnborough:" Saxon House 1916. p.200.
i ;
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and by developing new deposits in West Siberia, the Komi Auto-
nomous Republic, the Northern Caucasus, the Perm and Orenburg
oblasts, the Udmurt Autonomous Republic, the Ukraine, Turkmeni-
stan and the Caspian shelf.43 Of these newly developed deposits
West Siberia was planned to account for a growth of 90 to 100
million tonnes, Kazakhstan approximately 17 million, Turkmenia,
the Orenburg oblast', the Komi ASSR and Belorussia approximately
30 million.44 The eastward shift in explored ('razvedannye')
reserves that influenced the setting of these priorities is
detailed in table 3.7., in which gas reserves are also included.
The question of the extent of Soviet oil reserves and of
success in their discovery is a prime factor in determining
production policy not only in total but also in the regional
distribution of production. Most \vestern analysts have pointed to
the fact that since 1947 information on Soviet oil reserves has
been regarded as a state secret,45 and that Soviet sources are
therefore non-committal about their extent. However there does
exist a number of estimates of size and potential. One estimate
43P. Ga10nskii "Neftyanaya, gazovaya. i neftepererabatyvayu-
shchaya promyshlennost' v 1971-1975 godakh" P1anovoe khozyaistvo
1972 No. 11, p.31.
44ibid• p.32.
45Elliot op.cit. P.SO; Russell op.cit. p.40; J. Bethkenhagen
"Bedeutung und M8glichkeiten des Ost-West-IIandels mit Energie-
rohstoffen" (Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonder-
heft 104) Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1975 p.5S; R. W. Campbell
"The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas" Ba1timore: Johns Hopkins
Press 1 68 .68.
A definition of the Soviet method of classifYing reserves is
given in appendix C.)
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TABLE 3.7.. Geographical Shift in Location of Explored Reserves (%)
~ 1960 .!ill.Oil .9.!.! Oil Gas-
USSR 100 100 100 100
European Russia 96 68.1 51 19.5
Eastern Regions 4 31.9 49 80.5
Source: Tu I Bokserman "Nekotorye tendentsii dal'neishego
razvitiya toplivnoi promyshlennosti" Neftyanik
1975 No.1, s.t.
puts explored reserves at 4.5 billion tonnes,46 another at 3
billion,41 the latter giving a ratio of explored reserves to
production of 10 to 1 at the time of the estimate. One Soviet
source notes that whilst production doubled during the years 1960
to 1968, discovery of explored reserves increased by only 51 per
cent.48 Elliot, writing in 1974, argues that since over 80 per
cent of proved oil reserves lie at depths of less than 2000
metres extraotion oonditions are very favourable.49 Even in the
absenoe of precise data Western analysts agree that the level of
reserves ourrently known to exist and anticipated to be amenable to
46petroleum Press Servioe, August 1969, p.307. .
47R E Ebel "Two Decades of Soviet Oil and Gas" World
Petroleum Vol. 42, No.5, pp.78, 84.
48Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1969 No.1, p.2.
490f total reserves in categories A+B+Cl 15 per cent lie at
less than 1200 metres, 66.4 per cent at 1201-1800 metres, 11.2
per cent at 1801-2400 metres, 5.2 per cent at 2401-3000 metres
and 4.3 per cent at more than 3000 metres. Elliot Ope cit.
pp. 81-82.
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exploitation will not constitute a constraint on the levels of
production envisaged in the short term.50
However as a result of developments in the oil exploration
sector from 1960 to 1975 the location of reserves has undergone a
sUbstantial shift. During this time total oil reserves have
doubled in European Russia, have increased twelvefold in the
Volga-Ural area and fifteenfold in regions to the East of the
Urals. 51 Granted that in the short term the major issue is not
the extent of total reserves, but of economic reserves with
supporting logistic systems, there were still in 1975 significi-
cant reserves in European Russia, with the prospect of total
reserves substantially above likely production levels, but con-
centrated in small fields, in contrast to Siberian reserves,
which are for the most part to be found in extremely large
fields. 52
The importance of the development of West Siberia for the
Soviet economy generally was stressed at the outset of the ninth
Five-Year Plan. It was thought possible that West Siberia could
be developed at a rate that would result in Siberia's providing
as much as 30 per cent of the Soviet Union's energy requirement
in 1980, rising to 40-45 per cent by the year 2000.53 Table 3.8.
50ibid. p.82.
51A E Probst, Ya A f.1a.zover(eds.) "Razvitie i razmeshchenie
toplivnoi promyshlennosti" Moscow Nedra. 1975, p.82.
52ibid.-
53n P Orlov "0 ratsional'nykh metodakh osvoeniya prirodnykh
zapasov v novykh raionakh Sibiri" Ekonomika. i organizatsiya
promyshlennogo proizvodstva 1971 No.2, p.26.
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details the changing importance of established oil-producing
areas for Soviet oil production as a whole, illustrating the
peak and decline of production in the Volga-Ural fields and the
emergence of West Siberia (grouped here with offshore production
around the Mangyshlak peninsula in the Caspian Sea). In
addition to the fact that oilfields discovered to date in West
Siberia have been particularly large, production costs are the
lowest in the Soviet Union, as detailed in table 3.9.54 However
these advantages have been offset to some extent by the diffi-
culties encountered and expense incurred in meeting drilling
targets for new producing wells, especially in the Tomsk and
Tyumen' oblasts, which along with the Middle Ob' area constitute
the major proportion of West Siberian production and potential.55
It has also been pointed out that (in theory) the siting of
refineries and petrochemical plants in West Siberia and onward
transportation of finished products can show capital cost savings
of 12 to 14 per cent compared with siting the same complexes in
56European Russia and transportation there of energy and feedstook.
54The produotion cost in the giant Samotlor oilfield is as low
as 50 per oent of the all-Union average. See V P Maksimov
"Perspektivy i zadachi razvitiya proizvodltel'nykh sil Tyumenskoi
oblasti" Ekonomika i orgapizatslya promyshlennogo prolzvodstva
1972 No.2. p.,8.
55The late Soviet Oil Minister V D Shashin notes in "Puti povy-
sheniya effektivnosti neftyanoi promyshlennosti" Planovoe
khozyaistvo 1973 No.4. p.21 that operations in the important
Northern area of the Tyumen' oblast' have accounted for only 15 per
cent of total drilling in West Siberia. He also notes that over
the recent (unspecified) period not a single new oil field has
been opened in the Tomsk oblast'.
560rlov op.cit. p.26.
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TABLE 3.9. Comparison of Oil Production Costs
(All-Union average = 1)
Zone- Relative Cost
111ropean Russia plus Urals 1.1-1.2
Siberia and Far East 0.7-0.8
Central Asia and Kazakhstan
Source: A E Probst, Ta E ~azover (eds.) op.cit. p.91.
Note that the characteristics of the three energy zones are
stated to be as follows:
(i) European regions plus the Volga-Ural area have high consump-
tion and the main component of the regional fuel balance is
Donetsk, Moscow and Pechora coal, the highest cost fuel in the
Soviet Union. Despite the availability of cheap hydroelectricity
this zone has the highest electricity cost in the country.
(ii) Siberia and the Far East contain at present the majority of
Soviet energy reserves and have very low energy consumption.
(iii) Central Asia and Kazakhstan are self-sufficient in energy,
especially in gas, and are sUbstantial contributors to the energy
supply of zone 1.
Cha.racteristics of these "energy zones" are discussed in
detail in K M Zvyagintseva "0 trekh zonakh toplivno-energetiche-
skogo khozyaistva. Sibiri" Izvestiya SO AN SSSR .Sere obshch. nauk
1974 No.1, pp.19-25.
In an analysis written at the end of 1974 it was acknowledged
that the initial oil production target for 1975 for West Siberia
of 125 million tonnes would probably be exceeded,57 and in the
event it was, the final figure being 148 million.58 Production of
57Probst and Mazover (eds.) op.cit. pp.86-87.
58N Mal'tsev "Neftyanaya promyshlennost' strany v desyatoi
pyatiletke" Neftyanik 1976 No.2. p.1.
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oil in West Siberia in 1910 totalled 31.4 million tonnes.59 The
suooess experienoed in raising production during the ninth Plan
led planners to set a target for the area of 300 to 310 million
tonnes in 1980.60
A further issue affeoting aohievements and prospects in
West Siberia is the faot that the main administrative organisa-
tion, Glavtyumenneftegaz, has to ooordinate the efforts of a
number of production enterprises sited at substantial distance
one from another. The average distanoe from the administrative
oentre in Tyumen' is 300 to 400 kilometres and some fields are as
much as 1000 kilometres apart.61
The size of fields discovered to date in West Siberia and
their relatively low produotion costs are not the only feature
that has prompted their rapid development. The chemical charac-
teristics of the available oils are particularly well suited to
the ohanging priorities of both the Soviet fuel and petroohemioal
industries, in that the majority of West Siberian crude oils are
of light gravity, having a high yield of gasoline, naphtha and
middle distillates.62 Moreover there is no relative loss of
59E A Ogorodnov "Osvoenie mestorozhdenii nefti i gaza v
Zapadnoi Sibiri" Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1971 No.3, p.27.
60Izvestiya 14 December 1915. p.6.
61F G Arzhanov et al. '~ekotorye praktioheskie resheniya po
avtomatizatsii operativnogo upravleniya neftyanoi promyshlen-
nost'yu Zapadnoi Sibiri" Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1974 No.6. p.2.
62M A ~&hchiyan et al. "Nefti sredneobskoi neftegazonosnoi
oblasti Zapadnoi Sibiri" Khimiya i tekhnologiya topliv i masel
1974 No.4. P.,.
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lubricant basestock and bitumen: the relative loss is in the
peroentage yield of fuel oil, which is the most readily
substitutable product.63
However the development of the oil reserves of West Siberia
has not been devoid of problems. In the early part of 1913 there
appeared an article suggesting that Gosplan was unhappy about the
return on investment in Siberia in general and in Tyumen' in
particular.64 The author of the artiole, V Bogachev, emphasises
that Siberian construction costs were running at an average of
30 to~ per cent, and in Tyumen' at 50 to 100 per cent above
original estimates.65 In Dogachev's view the main reason for the
overrun on estimated cost was that all areas to the South of the
60th parallel, including West Siberia, were grouped for the
purposes of cost estimation and budgeting in the same "cost belt"
('poyas') as the Baltic area and European Russia. However in
reality wages and material transportation costs are substantially
above the all-Union average and this results in underbudgeting
for many of the sites, with consequent delays in completion of
projects and cost overruns.66 Bogachev argues that it is
unrealistic not only to include West Siberia in the aforementioned
oost belt, but also to attempt to programme rigidly in advance
63ibid•
64V Bogachev "K voprosu ob intensifikatsii osvoeniya prirod-
nykh bogatstv Sibiri" Kommunist 1973 No.3. pp.89-100.
65ibid• p.91.
66ibid• p.92.
101
levels of investment in individual sectors of the Siberian
development Plan. The question of uncertainty of information is
most pressing in exploratory operation in this area,67 and has
been complicated by the fact that initial achievements in the
Tyumen' oblast' were particularly impressive and in the event
augured excessively favourably for future activity. For example
the rate of discovery of oil reserves per metre of drilling in
Tyumen' in the late sixties was six times the all-Union average.68
However in the course of the ninth Plan the technical difficul-
ties experienced in the development of \vest Siberia were more
severe than had been (and probably could have been) anticipated.
In the Spring of 1969 a conference was held in Tyumen' to
discuss short-term industrial development, with special reference
to the oil industry. Central to the discussion was the question
of determining an optimal oil production level for West Siberia
to 1980. Estimates of this optimal level ranged from that of the
oil industry ministry and management of Glavtyumenneftegaz, who
advanced a figure of 75 to 80 million tonnes, to that of the
Deputy Minister of Geology of the RSFSR, who put forward a figure
of 150 million tonnes.69 The consensus of the conference was
67ibid• p.99. Bogachev argues as follows: U\.Jasit possible to
fix precisely the costs of exploratory drilling in the lower Ob'
area for 1971-19751 All exploration is uncertain and hence it is
impossible to calculate forward costs even in promising areas with
good indications of possible extraction levels."
68I Ognev "Postizhenie otkrytiya" Ekonomika i organizatsiya
prornyshlennogo proizvodstva 1976 No.4, p.174.
69ibid• p.175.
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unclear. On the one hand the report of the conference showed in
the section entitled 'Geological Exploration' an estimated
production level in West Siberia of 150 to 200 million tonnes
by 1975: on the other hand the section entitled 'oil industry'
gave an estimated produotion level of 70 to 100 million tonnes in
1975, rising to 180 to 200 million in 1980.70
The differenoe between these early estimates and the final
performanoe in the ninth Plan and target set for the tenth serve
to put the development of the West Siberian oil industry during
the ninth Plan into perspeotive. Inability to maintain production
levels in European Russia and the Volga-Ural fields during the
ninth Plan necessitated acceleration of the rate of development
of West Siberia to the extent that Siberian operations accounted
for almost the whole of the increment in production.71 The
relative importance of West Siberia to total Soviet production,
and in partioular the oontribution of the Samotlor oilfield, is
outlined in table 3.10. The discovery and development of the
Samotlor oilfield has been one of the prinoipal features of the
oil industry in the nihth Plan, and has been the subjeot of
recent artioles by F G Arzhanov and Tu B Fain,72 and R I
70ibid. p.176. Note that the full report of the oonference
prooeedings was published under the title 'Neft' i gaz Tyumeni v
dokumentakh' Sverdlovsk 1973.
71pyatiletnii plan 1971~1975, p.258; Pravda 1 February 1976,
.E,d.
72F G Arzhanov, Tu D Fain "Samotlor - unikal 'noe neftyanoe
mestorozhdenie" Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1975 No.5, pp.38-44.
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TABLE 3.10. Siberian Contribution to Soviet Oil Production.
1971-1975 (million tonnes).
Production 12ll .1.2.li .12ll 1m. .1212
Total USSR 377 400 429 459 491
\.JestSiberia Plan 44 61 82 104 125
Actual 45 63 88 118 148
Tyumen' oblast' 28 n.a. n.a. 111.4 143.2
Samotlor Oilfield 10.0 21.2 39.0 61.2 86.5
(Figures include gas condensate)
Sources: Narodnoe khoz~aistvo SSSR 121:11]2.18~.
Pravda. 1 Februa!l 12161 ]212.112.
Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva
1276 No.5, ]2.7,and 1276 No. 61 12.80•
Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 12151 No. 51 12.32.
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 1215, No. 12, p.6.
(n.a. = not available)
Kuzovatkin.73 Despite the severe climate and difficult communioa-
tions Samotlor has been developed rapidly, and this has been
achieved through the application of a number of new technologies
suoh as oluster drilling, a process by which several wells can be
drilled simultaneously from a single point, this facilitating
high-speed extraction of the crude oil from the deposit.74
73R I Kuzovatkin "Front i tyl Samotlora" Ekonomika i
or8!Dizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva 1276 No. 61 ]2p.78-87.
74It has been proved possible to sink up to 16 wells from a
single platform. See Arzhanov, Fain OF.cit. p.41 and Kuzovatkin
op.cit. p.80.
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Geologists estimate that the Samotlor field is the Soviet Union's
largest and that it is likely to have a life of at least ten
years. An ultimate production peak of 120 million tonnes per
year is foreseen for this field.15
However this peak will be reached relatively quickly, and
although in 1915 oil from the Tyumen' ob~ast' accounted for some
95 per cent of \vest Siberian production, output from the Middle
Ob' area, including that from Samotlor, is expected to decline in
the near future.16 Consequently during the ninth Plan
exploratory effort had begun to shift to the more remote oil
fields of North Tyumen'. Development of these fields is expected
to be fraught with severe logistic problems and rising costs.11
Cost escalation has been a problem of the oil industry of
Central Asia and Kazakhstan during the ninth Plan. The area is
predominantly one of mature fields, all of which have passed
their production peak and which are expected to decline in the
near future. In Turkmenia the rate of 011 extraction had begun
to exceed the rate of discovery of new reserves as early as
1970,18 but production was nonetheless scheduled to rise from
15.4 million tonnes in 1970 to 22 million in 1915.79 However
15Arzhanov, Fain op.cit. p.44. Also Pravda 11 June 1975. p.3.
16Probst, Mazover (eds.) op.cit. p.90.
71ibid• p.91•
78It is reported that Turkmenneft' and Republican geological
organisations had failed to fulfil annual plans for reserve
discovery "for years". Turkmenskaya iskra 23 May 1970, p.1.
19Turkmenskaya iskra, 5 September 1971, p.2.
105
the oilfields around the ~angyshlak peninsula have become the
major area of importance in Central Asia and Ka~stan during
the ninth Plan. Mangyshlak operations were scheduled to provide
90 per cent of the increase in production sought from Kazakhstan
from 1971 to 1975,80 but by the middle of this period it became
evident that the production association Mangyshlakneft' was
facing difficulties. The 1972 production figure of 15 million
tonnes was below target due to failure on the part of the
construction sector to keep pace with the requirements for
commissioned installations. ~~gyshlakneft' itself was the
source of some of the problems: disparate rates of production
between wells, due to the fact that deposits in this area tend
to be dispersed over a number of geological levels, compounded
with substantial seasonal fluctuations in seasonal production
accounted for the shortfall.81
At the outset of the ninth Plan it was intended to raise
production in the European zones of the Soviet Union,
predominantly in the Ural area (the Udmurt ASSR and the Perm
and Orenburg oblasts), the Komi ASSR and Belorussia in accord-
ance with the data presented in table 3.11. Production in the
Udmurt ASSR commenced in 1969,82 and by 1974 an output of 2.75
80Pravda, 20 October 1972, p.1.
81Kazakhatanskaya pravda, 31 August 197', p.2.
82Editorial "Nekotorye itogi neftedobyvayushchei promyshlen-
nosti v 1969 godu i zadachi na 1970 god". Neftyanoe khozyaistvo
1970 No.2, p.2.
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million tonnes was antlcipated.83 However the Udmurt fields
are particularly difficult to exploit in that they are of
complex, multi-layered structure, the yield per well is low, the
oil is viscous, high in paraffin wax, thus making transportation
in pipelines more difficult, and the major fields lie in marshy
terrain at some distance one from another.84 The Perm oblasti,
one of the oldest producing areas in the Soviet Union, was
scheduled to increase production from some 16 million tonnes in
1910 to 21 million in 1915.85 The 1975 production level turned
out to be 22.3 million tonnes.86 The major problem facing
production teams in the Orenburg oblasti has been that of main-
taining seam pressure in relatively deep layers, a necessary
measure in the extraction of approximately 80 per cent of the
oil.81 The importance of the Komi ASSR rests on the development
of the Timano-Pechora hydrocarbon area. A particular feature of
the oil of this area is its variety: both light and heavY
83Vyshka, 11 June 1974, p.1.
84y I Xudinov "Segodnya i zavtra Udmurtskoi nefti" Neftyanoe
khozyaistvo 1975 NO.7, E.4.
85N A Malltsev "Permskaya oblasti" Neftyanoe khozyaistvo
1971 No.3, pp.33-35.
86S Fedorchenko tiNaput! k novym rubezham" Neftyanik 1976
No.6, p.5.
81To facilitate extraction it is sometimes necessary to main-
tain pressure in the oil-bearing layer by injecting steam or
nitrogen. This process is difficult and adds to operating costs.
Discussed in P D Alekseev "Orenburgneftl v devYatoi pyatiletke"
Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1976 No.1, p.7.
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types of crude oil can be extracted.88 The majority are however
paraffinic-based, have a high yield of light products at
distillation and are low in sulphur content.89 They are, like
the West Siberian crude oils, particularly suitable for the
refinery balance that the Soviet Union began to favour in the
course of the ninth Plan. In the period from 1971 to 1975 the
Komi ASSR produced a total of 53 million tonnes of oil, on the
basis of which it is estimated that a peak output of 25 million
tonnes per year can be achieved by 1980.90 Discovery of new
reserves in the Komi ASSR during the ninth Plan has shown a
threefold increase, this contrasting sharply with the position
in the Soviet Union as a whole.91 Prospecting for oil in Belo-
russia commenced in 1961 and the first oil was struck in August
1964 with the discovery of the Rechitsa field.92 Production has
grown from Bome 40 thousand tonnes in 1965 to just over 8 million
in 1915,93 but significantly higher volumes are not expected.
88Probst, Mazover (eds.) op.cit. p.87.
89Z V Driatskaya et al. "Nefti Komi ASSR" Khimiya. i
tekhnologiya topliv i magel 1975 No.4. p.7.
90N Kochurin "Chtoby vypolnit' zadaniya Partii" Neftyanik
1976 No" 5 , p.6.
91.!E.!!!:.
92For a brief outline of Belorussian oil developments see
Elliot op.cit. p.106.
93G• Topuridze, B Golenishchev "U neftyanikov Poles'ya"
Neftyanik 1976 No.6, p.8.
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During the ninth Plan the Soviet Union came to realise the
growing potential of offshore oil reserves in the Baltic,
Caspian and Sakhalin areas. Whereas exploration in the Baltic
commenced in 1959, so far only 10 fields have been discovered.
Although the deposits are relatively shallow (1500 to 2500
metres), and the oil is almost free of Bulphur, the light
fractions obtained in refining are of disappointingly low
octane.94 Exploratory work carried out during the ninth Plan
indicates that oilfields known to exist in the South-East of
the Baltic off the Latvian and Lithuanian coast may prove
attractive.95 It is however the oilfields of the Caspian Sea
that are judged to be potentially the major contributors to off-
shore developments on the basis of work carried out in the early
seventies.96 Despite the fact that the majority of the Caspian
deposits are at depths in excess of 3500 metres, the fields are
believed to be large enough to offset in potentially low unit
production costs the high cost of drilling.91 Exploration
commenced in the Sakhalin area as early as 1921, and to date it
has remained the sole oil-producing area of the Far ~st Economic
Region. The quality of Sakhalin oil is such that it commands a
9~is is discussed in N Zhmykova et al. "Nefti mestorozhdenii
Priba! tiki" Neftyanik 1916 No.6, p.19.
95A Namestnikovs, Y Bergmanis "Kidas ir Baltijas dzIles?"
Cipa 19 December 1914 p.4.
96yyshka 26 September 197', p.2.
97Y:yshka 22 February 1975, p.2.
110
premium in export markets, since it has a high yield of light
products and its fuel oil fraction is low in sulphur. Middle
distillates and naphtha derived from Sakhalin oils are
exceptionally well suited as feedstock for the emerging petro-
chemical industry of the Far East Region.98 Despite the technical
attractiveness of the crude oil Soviet planners are not providing
for a marked increase in production in Sakhalin. Exploration
and production costs are more than twice the all-Union average,99
but, used locally as feedstock, Sakhalin oils are more economic
h t d ~ th Eur S'b . f' Id 100than t ose ransporte ~rom e opean and ~ er~an ~e s.
However larger-scale exploration and production under joint
schemes with American and Japanese participation could alter
Sakhalin's role in the medium to long term: this is discussed
in Appendix A.
East Siberia is now considered to be an oil-bearing area
of some significance, but in the course of the ninth Plan
activity was confined to geological surveys and exploratory
drilling.101 The oil discovered to date resembles Sakhalin oil
in respect of sulphur content and chemical composition. The
98B N Zykin, N E Podkletnov "0 ratsional'nykh sposobakh
ispol'zovanlya Sakhalinskoi nefti" Izvestiya SO AN SSSR
Sere obshoh. nauk. 1970 No.6, pp.109, 111.
991b1d• p.102·
100Probst, Mazover (eds.) op.cit. p.91.
101A brief history of the development of East Siberia is given
in Elliot op.cit. p.106. An earlier work, V Conolly "East
Siberian Oil" Mizan August 1971, pp.16-21, gives a little more
detail.
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long term potential of East Siberia was a subject of discussion
as early as 1960:102 by 1968 it was thought that East Siberia
could contain almost half of the total fuel and energy reserves
of the Soviet Union.103 However towards the end of the ninth
Plan these estimates had been revised downwards and a more modest
share of total Siberian, and hence of all-Union reserves was
allotted to East Siberia.104 The data on distribution of the
major primary energy reserves of West and East Siberia are given
in table 3.12. As in the case of the development of Sakhalin,
Soviet planners do not anticipate a marked impact on total produc-
tion from East Siberian operations: however Japanese-Soviet
joint projects currently under discussion could alter the status
of the area in the medium term. These issues are likewise
discussed in Appendix A.
It can be calculated from table 3.5. that the cumulative
underfulfilment of the ninth Plan for production of oil and gas
condensate was some 30 million tonnes. 1972 was the first year
of the Plan in which an underfulfilment was recorded, resulting
102In 1960 East Siberia was estimated to contain over half the
hydroelectric potential of the Soviet Union and about 80 per cent
of coal reserves. 'Trudy konferentsii po razvitiyu proizvoditel'-
nykh sil Vostochnoi Sibiri' Moscow: AN SSSR 1960, p.6.
103A E Probst (ed.) "Razvitie toplivnoi bazy raionov SSSR"
Moscow Nedra 1968, p.175.
104x M Zvyagintseva "0 trekb zonakh toplivnogo energeticheskogo
khozyaistva Sibiri" Izvestiya SO AN SSSR Sere obshch. nauk. 1974
No.1, pp.20-21.
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TAJ3LE 3.12. Distribution of Usable Fuel and Energy Reserves in
Siberia (%).
\~est Siberia East Siberia
Hydroelectricity
Coal
15.0
69.3
16.9
16.6
85.0
Total Fuel
Natural Gas
Souroe: K M Zvyagintseva "0 trekh zonakh toplivno-energeti-
oheskogo khozyaistva Sibiri" Izvestiya SO AN SSSR
Sere obshch. nauk, 1914 No.1, p.21.
in a revision of the original 1913 target to 424 million tonnes,
a figure which in its turn was underfulfilled. The original 1914
target of 461 million tonnes was revised to 452 million and was
fulfilled by a narrow margin: the 1915 target was revised from
505 million tonnes to 489, which was 'overfUlfilled' by 2 million.
Table 3.13. summarises the revisions to the original plan targets
and table 3.14. reoords the trend in availability of crude oil
and gas condensate in the Soviet Union from 1911 to 1915.
In addition to the diffioulties encountered in oil explora-
tion and production there have been a number of problems in
associated industries that have contributed to the shortfall in
production against original Plan. There have been periodio
bottleneoks in the supply of equipment both for exploration and
production. Towards the end of the Plan the Soviet Oil Minister
stressed that despite a high level of suocess in developing
improved equipment for the oil industry manufacturers had failed
113
TABLE 3.13. Original and Revised Annual Plans and Performance of
the Soviet Oil Industry 1971-1975 (M tonnes)
121.1 .121£ 1m 1.21.4. l2.ll
Original Plan: Oil 371 395 429 461 496
Condensate n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9
Revised Plan (Oil and
Condensate) 451 489
Actual Production (Oil and
Condensate) 377 401 429 459 491
Sources: Table 3.5.
A Nove in ABSEES July 1974, p.xviii.
(n.a. = not avaiiable)
TABLE 3.14. Availability of Oil in the Soviet Union 1971-1975.CM tonnes, oil and oil products, including gas
condensate)
1211 .121£ 1m 1.21.4. 1lli.
Domestic Availability 377 400 429 459 491
Plus Imports 7 9 15 5 8
Less Exports 105 107 118 116 130
Availability 279 302 326 348 369
Sources: Narodnoe khozlaistvo SSSR 1212. P·202·
Vneshnlala tor~ovlla SSSR 1212. pp.21. ~1.
1914, pp.22. ~~.
1215, pp.2:2. ~o.
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repeatedly to produce and deliver an adequate quantity. In parti-
cular new designs for drilling bits were perfected: few have
reached the production stage. The quality of drill-pipe was
criticised and the under-supply of equipment for low-temperature
exploration was cited as a major reason for difficulties in
meeting targets for exploratory drilling and reserve discovery in
West Siberia.105 The problem of success indicators as a manage-
ment control and assessment has itself caused some of the
problems: for example, the criterion for Plan fulfilment is the
number of metres drilled, with the result that on occasions
drillers experiencing technical difficulties will leave a well
unfinished and commence relatively easy drilling elsewhere so as
to meet their target.106 Difficulties have been encountered in
providing pipeline in the required quantities to support develop-
ment, especially in West Siberia.107 High labour turnover has
been experienced in Mangyshlak,108 and in West Siberia109 despite
the fact that in the case of the latter area significant
105Trud 24 October, 1975. p.2.
106A Dabakuliev "0 sovershenstvovanii planirovaniya i
material'nom stimulirovanii v geologorazvedoohnykh predpriyati-
yakhlt Izvestlya AN Turkmenskoi SSR, Sere obshch. nauk. 1969
No.5. p.52.
107K K Smimov "Dlya blaga rodiny" Stroi tel'stvo trubo-
provodov 1974 No. 11. pp.2-3.
108Labour turnover in Mangyshlak was 93 per cent in 1970 due
allegedly to poor working and living oonditions. Narodnoe
khozyaistvo Kazakhstana 1971 No. 10, pp.45-49.
109R N North "Soviet Northern Development: The Case of
North-West Siberia" Soviet Studies. October 1972. p.188.
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privileges have been granted to oil (and gas) industry workers
based there.110
On 31 March 1975 a conference was convened in Moscow to
111discuss methods of raising efficiency in oil production. In
the opening paper the Soviet Oil Minister, concentrating on the
perennial problem of irrational success indicators, called for
closer integration of effort on the part of the many organisa-
tions involved in the productive process. He cites the instance
* .of waterflooding of oil deposits as an irrational indicator, ~n
110Workers are granted a one-off bonus of 4 times the average
monthly wage in addition to having a regional wage coefficient
of 1.7 times the average in European Russia. Rates of bonus
rewards for fulfilment and overfulfilment of Plan are above the
national average. These bonuses are enhanced as basic salaries
and wages are increased in accordance with length of service.
Paid leave is extended to 1-1t months per year with one free
return ticket to any point in the Soviet Union for each worker
and his family. Data presented in: S A Orudjev, V I Muravlenko
"Integrated Planning for Exploration, Development, Production
and Transportation for Rapid Expansion of Oil Field Operations"
Proceedin s of the th World Petroleum Con ess Barkin:
A lied Science Publishers 1 Vol. Note that North
op.cit. p.188 points out that the bulk of labour turnover is
experienced not in petroleum operations but in support activity,
where the aforementioned benefits are not applicable.
. 111The conference was attended by senior officials of the CPSU
Central Committee, Ministry of the Oil Industry, Ministry of the
Gas Industry, Ministry of Oil and Gas Construction Enterprises,
Trades Unions et al. The main papers are compiled in Ekonomika
neftzanoi promyshlennosti 1975 No.7.
*the injection of water into the oil-bearing layer under
pressure in order to facilitate extraction as natural pressure in
the well declines.
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that performance is judged and rewarded on the basis of volume
injected, which has led to excessive flooding in a number of
fields, causing additional problems in preparing oil for refining.
This indicator has been abolished for the tenth Plan, the sole
criterion being the total amount of oil produced.112 Several
papers in this collection make reference to the delays caused by
inadequate infrastructure development,113 and the recurrent
problem of availability of equipment.114 It is however important
to put these issues into perspective. Russell has rightly
pointed out that complaints in the oil industry were as much a
feature of the sixties, when the oil industry regularly fulfilled
its targets, as of the seventies. In Russell's view the
difference in the seventies has been that such criticism has been
made by the industry's most senior officials, even from the Oil
Minister himself.115 The change in concern at so high a level
probably stems from the fact of higher expenditures in development
and growing technical difficulties in production encountered in
112y D Shashin "Povyshenie effektivnosti neftyanogo
proizvodstva - glavnoe napravlenie razvitiya otrasli" Ekonomika
neftyanoi promyshlennostl 1975 No.7, p.6.
113For example Y I Muravlenko in "0 problemakh razvitiya
neftyanoi promyshlennosti v Zapadnoi Sibiri" Ekonomika neftyanoi
promlshlennosti 1975 No.7. p.13. He adds that even if the
authorities were successful in attracting an adequate number of
people to work in West Siberia the provision of accommodation was
insufficient.
114A A Asan-Nuri "0 nekotorykh problemakh tekhnicheskogo
progressa v oblasti burovykb rabot". Ekonomika neftlanoi
promlshlennosti 1975 No.7, p.19.
115Russell 't 510p.C1 • p. •
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an area as complex logistically as West Siberia. Whereas in the
sixties oilfields were located comparatively favourably in
relation to consuming centres and to each other, such that the
incremental expansion of the logistic systems was straightforward,
in the seventies to bring on stream new productive capacity often
involved the design and installation of substantial lengths of
new pipeline and associated facilities. Considering the extent
to which West Siberia has had to overfulfil its original targets
during the ninth Plan to compensate for failure to meet targets
elsewhere, the final Soviet production figure for 1915 of 491
million tonnes of oil and gas condensate compared with an
original target of 505 million represents at 91.2 per cent
fulfilment a considerable achievement.
The Soviet Gas Industry 1971-1975: Objectives and Achievements
The industry's objective for the ninth Plan was to raise
production of natural gas from 198 billion cubic metres in 1970
to ~20 billion in 1915, primarily through the development of gas
fields in Tyumen' (West Siberia), Turkmenia, the Komi ASSR and
the Orenburg oblast'. It was also planned to reduce wastage of
wellhead gas associated with oil production, with the objective
of securing utilisation of 85 to 81 per cent of such gas by
1975.116 Of the total growth of 122 billion cubic metres, West
Siberia was scheduled to account for 35 billion, Turkmenia 52,
116Pyatiletnii plan 1911-1975, p.106.
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the Komi ASSR 9 and the Orenburg oblastI 25.117 The production
balance in 1975 compared with 1970 was intended to change in
accordance with data given in table 3.15.
Information on the extent and distribution of Soviet gas
reserves is a good deal more abundant than in the case of oil, and
their distribution by location and depth is outlined in table 3.16.
It has proved difficult for Soviet geologists to gauge the
extent of gas reserves since the industry has developed relatively
recently and very quickly. Many of the newly discovered fields
have been amongst the world's largest, resulting in periodic
revisions of reserve estimates as further geological information
on each field is obtained. Authoritative estimates of total
reserves in categories A+B+Cl were raised from 9.4 trillion (1012)
cubic metres in 1969118 to 15.7 trillion at the beginnong of
1971.119 By 1975 a senior specialist of Gosplan, Yu I Bokserman,
indicated that reserves in these categories had increased in the
period from 1969 to 1974 by 13.1 trillion cubic metres to a
total of 22.5 trillion,120 in accordance with data given in
table 3.17. During the eighth Plan the rate of discovery of new
gas reserves in West Siberia, Turkmenia, the Komi ASSR and the
117ibid• pp.106-107.
118yu I Bokserman "Razvitie gazovoi promyshlennosti SSSR"
Neftyanik 1970 No.2, P.S.
119Probst, Mazover (eds.) op.cit. p.49. See also A K
Kortunov "Uspekhi gazovoi promyshlennosti i perspektivy ee
razvitiya" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1971 No.3, p.1.
120yu I Bokserman "Puti povysheniya effektivnosti transporta
topliva" Planovoe khozyaistvo 1975 No.2, p.21.
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Orenburg oblast', though reported to be impressive, was
insufficient to compensate for a shortfall in discovery in areas
close to consumption centres, where targets for reserve
discovery were underfUlfilled.121 IIowever the rate of apprecia-
tion of reserves in the latter part of the eighth Plan and
earlier part of the ninth was highep than the rate of growth in
122production, this being in direct contrast to the situation
prevailing in the oil industry. By 1912 it was established
that Siberian reserves in all categories extended to 12.6
trillion cubic metres, and those of European Russia and Central
Asia to 3.1 trillion each.123 Although this indicated that the
medium and long term development of the gas industry depended on
the utilisation of Siberian resources, there was not the same
urgency as in the oil industry in bringing Siberian operations
on stream, since the ratio of reserves to production in European
Russia was still favourable. However at the outset of the ninth
Plan it was feared that explored reserves in European Russia
were being excessively rapidly exhausted. Approximately 70 to
80 per cent of reserves discovered prior to 1971 had been brought
into production and it was felt that even though European Russia
was likely to maintain production up to 1975, its capacity to do
121Galonskli op.cit. p.3~.
122A K Kortunov "Gazovaya promyshlennost' Sovetskogo Soyuza"
Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1970 No.8, p.2.
123V E Orel, V P Stupakov "Ratsional'no ispol'zovat' zapasy
gaza" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1974 No.3. p.31.
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so beyond that time was somewhat limited.124
During the ninth Plan activity in the exploration sector
was characterised by the need to drill deeper to discover new
reserves. Moreover in three of the areas designated to be of
prime importance in the ninth Plan, Tyumen', the Komi ASSR and
the Orenburg oblast', the incidence of complex, mUlti-component
gas mixtures has become more common, necessitating the
installation of refining and separation facilities at the pro-
duction centre.125
At the outset of the ninth Plan it was estimated that
Siberia contained Borne 60 per cent of the Soviet Union's
discovered reserves of gas in all categories, of which the
substantial majority were located in West Siberia.126 By 1974
it was established that explored reserves in the four principal
gas fields, namely Medvezh'e, Zapolyarnoe, Urengoi and Iamburg,
totalled 9 trillion cubic metres.127 The authoritative
estimate of V S Bulatov of the Tyumen' Gas Research Inetitute,
of the amount of gas that could be extracted from the Tyumen'
fields puts reserves within accessible depths at 40 trillion
cubic metres. Within this figure, estimated reserves in
124 (Probst, Mazover eds.) op.cit. p.50.
125ibid. p.S3. In the Orenburg deposit, for example, ethane,
propane and other heavy hydrocarbons are found along with methane
gas.
126E N Altunin "Gaz i gazosnabzhenie Sibiri" Stroitel'stvo
truboprovodov 1970 No.9, p.6.
127V D Chernyshov et al. "Zadachi osvoeniya gazovykh
mestorozhdenii na severe Tyumenskoi oblasti" Stroitel'stvo
truboprovodov 1974 No.6, p.12.
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'industrial' categories totalled 11.8 trillion cubic metres,
this believed to be one quarter of total world explored reserves
and three fifths of Soviet. Bulatov indicates that the optimal
annual rate of production should be 5 to 6 per cent of reserves
in the aforementioned categories, this being in the case of the
Tyumen' oblast' 600 to 700 billion cubic metres.128 The
increment in proved gas reserves per metre of exploratory
drilling in the Tyumen' oblast' has been.8 times greater than
the all-Union average, and whereas during the eighth Plan only
9 per cent of exploratory drilling was carried out in the area,
it accounted for 10 per cent of the increase in discovery of
reserves.129 The fact that some 75·per cent of West Siberia's
proved reserves of gas are concentrated into the four fields
mentioned above affords the opportunity of centering production
there for 15 to 20 years forward.130 However Bulatov's estimate
of possible production levels rests on the assumption that
commensurate processing and transportation facilities become
.available. Probst and Mazover, taking into acoount problems
already experienced in developing the region, suggest a likely
131peak annual production level of 350 to 450 billion cubio metres.
128V S Bulatov "Analiz faktorov, opredelyayuahohikh uroven'
dobychi prirodnogo gaza na Tyumenskom severe" Izvestiya SO AN
5S5R Sere obshoh. nauk. 1974 No.1, p.12.
129ibid. p.13.
130ibid. p.14.
131Probst, Mazover (eds.) op.cit. pp.60-61.
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The production potential of the Medvezh'e field alone was
estimated at 100 billion cubic metres per year in 1970.132 Pro-
duction commenced in 1972 at a level of 1.5 billion cubic metres,
rising to 8 billion in 1973, destined mainly for the Serov
metallurgical combine and industrial plants of the Sverdlovsk
area.133 The most advanced technology available has been
directed to the Medvezh'e field with the result that it has been
possible to drill wells of greater than average diameter, pro-
ducing by 1974 at a rate of 1.5 to 2 million cubic metres of gas
per day compared with the all-Union average of 200 thousand.134
As a result of development completed in the ninth Plan it is
believed that the Northern gas-bearing area of the Tyurnen'
oblasti ought to contribute 90 to 95 per cent of planned growth
in Soviet gas production.135 However the importance of bringing
on stream the Urengoi field in 1978 is acknowledged to be of
prime importance for the continuing development of the gas
industry in West Siberia.136 During the ninth Plan production
in the Tyumenl oblasti grew from 9.3 billion cubic metres in 1970
132Altunin op.cit. p.6.
133R Saifullin "Medvezh'e - gazovyi promysel" Gazovaya
promyshlennost' 1975 No. 11, p.24.
134E N Altunin "0snovnye voprosy bystreishego osvoeniya
mestorozhdenii Zapadnoi Sibiri" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1974No.8, p.11.
135Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 19/1975, p.6.
136v S Bulatov "Puti povysheniya effektivnosti gazodobychi na
Tyurnenskom severe" Izvestiya SO AN SSSR Sere obshch. nauk 1975
No.6, p.32.
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to 35.5 billion in 1915.131
The gas fields of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were scheduled
to reach peak production during the ninth Plan, which could be
sustained for a few years.138 This is the Soviet Union's oldest
producing area, and the major supplier of gas to the industrialised
central zone. Given the existence of a high-capacity delivery
system from Central Asia to the Centre, exploratory work was
intensified in the neighbouring areas of Turkmenia and Uzbekistan
to provide a substitute for the anticipated decline in production
in the more extensively developed areas. The Turkmen ASSR
contains some 30 gas fields, of which the largest are the Shatlyk,
Naip, Mary and Gugurtli gas fields and the Achak gas and gas
condensate field. The latter field was the first to be discovered
and its development dates from 1966. Uzbekistan possesses the
huge Gazli field, where development commenced in 1959.
The contribution of the Turkmen gas industry has been a
striking feature of the expansion of Soviet gas production during
the ninth Plan. Whereas in 1970 only 2 out of 20 gas deposits
discovered, namely the Achak and Maikop fields, had been brought
into production, with potential output in that year of 11.6 billion
cubic metres, or 88.5 per cent of Turkmen production,139 by 1975
131R D Margulov, E K Sel1khova, I Ta furman "Razvitie gazovoi
promyshlennosti i analiz tekhniko-ekonomicheskikh pokazatelei"
Moscow: Ministerstvo Gazovoi Promyshlennosti 1976, pp.6, 38.
138Probst, Mazover (eds.) op.cit. p.61.
139Report by V Fedorov of a conference on the development of the
oil, gas and petrochemical industries of Turkmenia, Gazovaya
promyshlennost' 1970 No.9. p.49.
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it was thought likely that production would be over 4 times the
1970 level due to the commissioning of newly discovered fields
in the Eastern part of Turkmenia, which in the event accounted
for the bulk of Turkmengazprom's 1975 production of 47 billion
cubic metres.140
The major contributor was the Shatlyk field, which was
believed to contain a total of 1500 billion cubic metres of
recoverable gas.141 This field was brought into production in
1974, at which time Soviet officials predicted a production
level of 35 billion cubic metres for 1975, based on extraction
from 11 wells,142 though this figure was eventually revised
downwards to 32 billion.143 The Naip field had the advantages
of convenient location near the trunk pipeline connecting Central
Asia to the·Central region, which enables the gas to be fed
under natural pressure directly into the delivery system. and
of an absence of sulphurous and carbonic impurities. These
factors prompted the decision to develop the field rapidly,
increasing production from 2 billion cubic metres in 1972 to 15
billion in 1975.144 The Naip field is believed to contain 1800
140A A Annaliev "Turkmengazprom na novorn etape razvitiya
otrasli" Ga.zovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No.3. p.10.
141Turkmenskaya iskra, 29 May 1971! p.1; Kazakhstanska.ya.
pravda 26 March 1972, p.1.
142Turkmenskaya iskra, 1 February 1972, p.2.
143TurkmenSkaya iskra, 3 September 1972, p.2.
144rurkmenskaya iskra, 18 July 1974. p.1.
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billion cubic metres of recoverable gas.145
Gas production in Uzbekistan reached 36.2 billion cubic
metres in 1974, at which time it was estimated that recoverable
reserves ran to 1180 billion cubic metres.146 Continuous
exploratory work in the ninth Plan in Western Kazakhstan
resulted in the discovery of the Zapadno-Teplovskii gas field,
situated very close to the main oil pipeline from Mangyshlak
that joins the central distribution network in the Volga
region.147
Though gas production in European Russia was scheduled to
rise during the ninth Plan, its share of total production was to
148deoline from 70.3 per cent in 1970 to 51.3 per cent in 1975.
The prime oentres of interest were the Orenburg oblasti and the
Komi ASSR. The discovery of extensive reserves of gas and gas
condensate in the Orenburg oblasti has had implications for the
general direction of Soviet eoonomic development, in that towards
the end of the eighth Plan a decision had been taken to centre a
large industrial oomplex there. At the outset of the ninth Plan
a production level for 1975 of 25 to 30 billion cubic metres of
gas was foreseen.149 This estimate was revised to 24 billion
145p 0 Tarakanov "Osvaivaya gazovye bogatstva Turkmenii"
Stroitellstvo truboprovodov 1975 No.4, p.12.
146Editorial "Zadachi razvitiya gazovoi promyshlennosti
Uzbekistana" Gazovaya. promyshlennostl 1974 No.2, p.2.
147IazakhstanSkaya pravda, 15 January 1974, p.2.
148. Galonskii op.cit. p.34.
149G D Margulov "Orenburgskii gazopromyshlennyi kompleks -
vazhnaya stroike devyatol pyatlletki" Stroitellstvo trubo-
Provodov 1971 No.3, p.'7.
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one year later,150 and the actual level achieved in 1975 was
19.6 billion.151 The particular value of Orenburg condensate is
that in addition to providing methane for use as fuel, it is
also possible to derive ethane, sulphur compounds and heavy
hydrocarbons for use as feedstock in the chemical and petro-
chemical industries, which are priority sectors for local
152development. However the first section of the production and
processing complex was completed behind schedule, being finished
in July 1974.153 The delays experienced in commissioning new
capacity in the Orenburg oblast' have contributed to the short-
fall in gas production in the area, and it appears that the
effect will continue to be felt during the first part of the
tenth Plan, since the second stage of development, timed for
completion in August 1975, which would increase the productive
capacity of the area by 25 per cent, was well behind schedule by
the early part of that year,154 and the levels of local
industrial development alone, based on fuel and feedstock from
this deposit, are such that a potential consumption of 60 billion
150Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1972 No.4, pp.5-6.
151~gulov, Selikhova, Furman op.cit. p.35.
152yu V Zaitsev "Orenburgskii gazovyi kompleks 1 ego
perspektivy" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1975 No.3, p.6.
153Vyshka, 11 July 1974, p.1.
154aeport of a conference held on 29 February 1975 concerning
the development of the Orenburg oblast'. ("Orenburgskii gazovyi
kompleks: itogi, problemy, resheniya") Gazovaya promyshlennostt
1975 No.5, p.53.
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cubic metres is envisaged.155 The discovery of the Vuktyl gas
condensate field during the eighth Plan marked the beginning of
the contribution of the Komi ASSR to Soviet gas production. In
the medium term it is anticipated that the area will become
second in importance to West Siberia as a gas-producing region.
Production increased from 6.8 billion cubic metres in 1970 to
18.5 billion in 1975,156 with total production between 1971 and
1975 of 77 billion.157
In the older producing areas, such as the Ukraine, the
Volgograd oblast' and the Stavropol krai, slight increases or
decreases were recorded during the ninth Plan, and their declining
share of Soviet production is expected to continue. However it
should be noted that the Ukraine was still the biggest single
producing area during the ninth Plan, although its share in total
gas output declined from 30.8 per cent in 1970 to 22.3 in 1975.
Its significance lies in the fact that until the completion of
the pipeline from the Orenburg field it will remain the principal
supplier of gas to industrial consumers in the European zones of
the Soviet Union and for export.158
155PrObst, Mazover (eds.) op.cit. p.62 •.
15~gulov, Selikhova, Furman op.cit. p.6.
157Xochurin op.cit. p.6.
158V M Xuzenko et al. "Sostoyanie ispol'zovaniya proizvodst-
vennykh fondov v dobyche gaza i puti ego uluchsheniya
(ob I t edinenie IUkrgazprom t )" Ge.zovaya promyshlennost t 1975
No. 12, p.7.
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The contribution of individual areas to total Soviet pro-
duction in 1975, compared with 1970, is detailed in table 3.18.,
and the performance of the production associations in table 3.19.
TABLE 3.18. Soviet Gas Production by Area 1970 and 1975
121Q 1m.
Total USSR 197.9 289.3(%) (100.0) (100.0)
of which:
Krasnodar krai 16.42 11.37% of total 8.3 4.0
Orenburg oblast' 1.31 20.07% of total 0.66 7.0
Tyumen' oblast' 9.28 35.50
% of total 4.7 12.3
Komi ASSR 6.80 18.50
% of total 3.4 6.4
Saratov oblast' 3.41 1.02
% of total 1.7 0.3
Volgograd oblasti 4.02 2.92
% of total 2.0 1.0
Ukraine 60.87 68.20
% of total 31.0 23.6
Turkmenistan 13.11 52.34
% of total 6.6 18.1
Uzbekistan 32.10 37.13
% of total 16.2 13.0
Azerbaidzhan 5.52 9.26% of total 3.0 3.2
Source: R D Margulov, E JC Selikhova, I Ta Furman "Razvi tie
gazovoi promyshlennosti i analiz tekhniko-ekonomicheskikh
pokazatelei" Moscow: Ministerstvo Gazovoi Promyshlen-
nosti 1976, p.6.
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TABLE 3.19. Soviet Gas Production by Major Association
1970 and 1975 (milliard cubic metres)
121:2as ~
l21Q 1ill. of 1970
Total USSR 197.9 289.3 146
of which: Kubangazprom 22.5 5.8 25
Stavropolgazprom 15.7 10.5 67
Ukrgazprom 55.0 58.5 106
Komigazprom 6.2 17.8 290
Uzbekgazprom 31.5 36.6 120
Turkmengazprom 11.8 47.0 400
Orenburggazprom 0.8 18.4 X 22.2
Tyumengazprom 9.2 3~.5 360
Source: Margulov, Selikhova, Furman °E·cit. EE·6z 22-~8.
An area of activity which has grown in importance during
the ninth Plan is that of production and utilisation of wellhead
gas, found jointly with orude oil. At the outset of the ninth
Plan there was a satisfactory rate of utilisation of this gas in
the older oil-produoing areas, suoh as Azerbaidzhan, the Ukraine,
Tataria and Bashkiria, varying from 85 to 94 per oent of produo-
tion. However in other areas, notably Turkmenia, the vast
majority of wellhead gas was flared due to the lack of processing
and transport faoilities. In 1910 the Soviet oil industry flared
some 14 billion oubio metres.159
159Galonskii op.cit. p.34.
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The directives for the ninth Plan included guidelines for
utilisation of wellhead gas. The percentage of such gas
utilised in 1915 was to rise to 85-81 per cent of production
compared with 61.1 oer cent recorded in 1910.160 Of the 22.9
,
billion cubic metres utilised in 1910, 11.4 billion were
processed by the Ministry of the Gas Industry for fuel and 11.5
directed into the petrochemical industry as feedstock.161 By
1912 an increase in utilisation of 12.1 per cent on the 1910
level was recorded: however it was in the period from 1914 to
1915 that utilisation was to expand substantially when new
capacity was to be cornmissioned.162 At the end of the ninth Plan
utilisation of wellhead gas showed an increase of 5 billion
cubic metres on the 1910 level, reaching over 28 billion.163
Six plants for processing this type of gas were constructed and
commissioned between 1910 and 1915,164 facilitating the develop-
ment of the resources of Turkmenia and West Siberia. In the case
16°Pyatiletnii plan 1911-1975, p.106. In 1970 production of
wellhead gas was 37.5 billion cubic metres, utilisation 22.9
billion. See also V I Baraz "Sostoyanie i osnovnye napravleniya
v ispol'zovanii nefty~nogo gaza" NeftepromY81ovoe delo 1973
No 10, p.3.
161Baraz
162ibid•
OPe cit. p.3.
163V I Baraz "Sostoyanie i osnovnye napravleniya uluchsheniya
ispol'zovaniya neftyanogo gaza" Neftepromyslovoe delo 1976
No 7. p.52.
164These were: (i) Gro~nyi, capacity 3.1 billion cubic metres
per year, (ii) Gnedintsev, 0.42, (iii) Kazakh, 1.0, (iv) Fifth
unit of Minnibaev plant, 0.585, (v) Nizhnevartovsk, plant No 1,
2.0, (vi) Pravdinsk, 0.5. ibid. p.52.
134
of Turkmenia the multi-strata Kotur-Tepe field yielded over 300
cubic metres of wellhead gas per tonne of oil produced,165 and
by the end of the ninth Plan productive capacity had risen to 5
billion cubic metres per year.166 West Siberian development is
centered on the Nizhnevartovsk deposit. The extent of the
availability of wellhead gas here is such that the expansion of
the Tomsk and Tobol'sk petrochemical complexes is being planned
on the basis of Nizhnevartovsk gas as feedstock.167 Though
precise data on levels of utilisation of wellhead gas achieved
in relation to objective during the ninth Plan have not been
disclosed, it appears that in at least ten oil-producing regions
16880 per oent utilisation was obtained, and in the Bashkir oil
fields, which are at an advanced stage of exploitation, utilisa-
tion reached over 90 per cent.169
During the ninth Plan exploratory work has been carried
out in West Siberia (North Tyumen'), East Siberia, offshore in
the Baltic and Caspian Seas, and in Sakhalin. In view of the
rapid discovery of gas reserves towards the end of the eighth
Plan in the North Tyumen' area, the development of East Siberia
is not critical in the short term. Maintenance of exploratory
165p Tarakanov "Ispol'zovanie neftyanogo poputnogo gaza na
mestorozhdenii Kotur-Tepe" Neftyanik 1975 No.3. F.12.
16~raz(1976) p.52.
167G V Tukov et al. "0 resursakh gaza v nefti Samotlorskogo
mestorozhdeniya" Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1975 No.2. p.60.
168Baraz(1973) p.2.
169Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 43/1975, p.16.
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effort has given rise to the Soviet claim that they possess the
world's largest proven reserves of gas (40 per cent of total).110
By 1915 there had been little work carried out in East Siberia.
The first areas to have been explored were the Vilyuisk region
and the Yakut ASSR. Ul t1mate development of the gas reserves of
this area depends on the one hand on decisions concerning the
future level of industrialisation of the area and its concomitant
demand for fuel, and on the other on opportunities for export,
primarily to Japan, via a possible pipeline to the Pacific coast
at Nakhodka.111 (The background to Soviet development of East
Siberia with Japanese and American aid is outlined in Appendix A.)
The total offshore gas-bearing potential area of the Soviet
Union was estimated at 3 million square kilometres in 1970, with
potential reserves of 10 trillion cubic metres off the Soviet
Northern coast and 1 trillion in the Azov Sea.112 There have
been some minor discoveries of offshore gas fields in the Baltic
and Caspian Seas, though the prospeots of disoovery of oil seem
more promising than of gas.
Analysis of performance against original Plan in the gas
industry reveals a substantial shortfall between 1911 and 1915.
Problems similar to those in the oil industry have been
11°Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1974 No 11, p.2. (editorial)
"Prognozirovanie perspektiv gazonosnosti"
111E Dnitriev "Razvitie geologorazvedochnykh rabot na neft'
i gaz v Vostoohnoi Sibiri" Neftyapik 1975 No.4, p.11.
172s I Levin "Trebovaniya k podgotovke stroitel'stva morskikh
truboprovodov" Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1973 No. 12, p.4.
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encountered, namely shortage and poor quality of equipment, high
labour turnover in the less hospitable areas of exploration and
production and poor coordination between the production and
distribution functions.173 Table 3.20. outlines the growing
divergence between Plan and performance from 1971 to 1975. It
will be Been that the industry as a whole underfulfilled its
target in the second year of the Plan and subsequently. The
overall effect was that of creating a gas deficit of 71 billion
cubic metres, or 85 million tonnes of standard fuel, against
original Plan, as calculated from table 3.5. Severe depletion
of reserves has been experienced in a number of producing areas,
particularly the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, in addition to
declining production in some fields, the Krasnodar krai showing
a marked decline from 1971 to 1975. The problem of depletion is
expected to be encountered increasingly in the immediate future
in many of the Central Asian fields. This has meant increased
demands on available capital in order to maintain production
levels in existing operations. Although it will be seen from
table 3.21. that there haa been little change in the proportion
of capital committed to offsetting depletion during the eighth
and ninth Plana, the indication is that planners did not expect
the provision for depletion to be so high latterly, especially
given the anticipated higher processing costs assooiated with
173Russell op.cit. pp.62-66, oatalogues the problems faced
by the gas industry during the ninth Plan.
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TABLE 3.20. Growth Pattern in Soviet Gas Production 1971-1975.
(billion cubic metres)
Year Plan Actual
1971 13.1 14.45
1972 18.0 8.98
1973 21.0 14.94
1974 30.0 24.23
1975 30.0 28.70
1970-1975 123.1 91.4
1970-1975 Annual 24.6 18.3
Average
Sources: pyatiletnii plan 1971-1975, p.346.
Margulov, Selikhova. Furman op.cit. pp.5-6.
TABLE 3.21. Capital Utilisation in the Soviet Gas Industry
1966-1970 and 1911-1975. (million Rubles)
Indicator 1966-1970 1971-1975
Capital Investment Total 1019.1 3139.4
to compensate for depletion 502.2 1591.0
in existing operations
to expand new 516.9 1548.4
production
Source: Margulov, Selikhova, Furman op.ci t. p.21.
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the chemical characteristics of the gas produced in many of the
more recently discovered fields.114 A further important feature
of development in the ninth Plan is that out of a total of 205.8
billion cubic metres' new capacity scheduled for completion some
145 billion, or 10 per cent, was to be concentrated in 6 gas
fields.115 Delays experienced in bringing this new capacity on
stream could not be counterbalanced elsewhere, especially since
the investment Plan for the industry as a whole was fulfilled.
The inability of the gas industry to fulfil the original
targets of the Plan was due not only to the technical problems
experienced in the production process: there have also been
several difficulties encountered in the provision of pipeline
transport, necessary for the integration into existing systems
of projected new production. Study of the logistic support
sector sheds further light on to the development of the oil and
gas industries.
Developments in Transportation and Refining 1971-1975.
The predominant transport mode for Soviet oil and gas has
become the long-distance large-diarneter pipeline. Table 3.22•
outlines the growth in length and load turnover on the system
from 1910 to 1915. There are significant cost advantages in
11~gulov, Selikhova, Furman op.cit. pp.20-21.
115These were Medvezh'e, Shatlyk, Achak, Naip, Vuktyl and
Orenburg. ibid.p.21.
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TABLE 3.22. Installation and Utilisation of Soviet Oil and Gas
Pipelines 1970-1975.
(a) Oil Pipe~ines
Total Len h Installed Deliveries of oil
at Year-End '000 kms and products (Mt)
Load Turnover
CM tonne-kms)
1970 37.4 339.9 281.7
1971 41.0 352.5 328.5
1972 42.9 388.5 375.9
1973 47.2 421.4 439.4
1974 53.0 457.2 533.4
1975 56.9 497.6 665.8
(b) Gas Pipelines
121.Q 1.21l 1m. 12Jl. .!.ill. 1.ill.
Length Installed 67.5 71.5 71.7 83.5 92.1 99.2
at Year-End
('000 kms)
Gas Transmitted 181.5 209.8 219.9 231.1 245.7 279.4
(billion oubic
metres)
Source: Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR 1975, p.474.
transporting oil and gas by pipeline in preference to road, rail
or, where possible, waterway. It was estimated at the beginning
of the ninth Plan that transporting a given volume by pipeline
was some 2 to 3 times oheaper on average than by rail, and 1.5 to
2 times oheaper than by waterway.176 The recoupment period for
176Z S Prutyanova "Tekhniko-ekonomicheskie pokazateli
razvit1ya truboprovodnogo transporta" Ekonomika neftyanoi
promyshlennosti 1970 No. 12, p.i8.
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capital investment is shorter in the case of pipeline installa-
tion than in expanding other forms of transport, this being
achieved normally within 3 to 4 years of commissioning, and the
operation of the pipeline system itself is a good deal less
energy-intensive than the alternatives.177 Throughout the sixties
there was a trend in pipeline construction towards the greater
use of large-diameter pipe: whereas in 1960 the upper limit on
pipeline diameter was 500 millimetres, by 1970 diameters of 1020
and 1200 millimetres were common.178 The fact that Siberia has
become the Soviet Union's principal producing area in the course
of the ninth Plan gas given rise to a fundamental change in the
pattern of interregional oil flows. As early as 1961 it was
foreseen that by the end of the seventies the Western boundary of
Siberia would become the dividing line between Westward and East-
ward oil flows, which was then drawn in the Volga-Ural area.119
The probable distribution for West Siberian oil was seen to be
Siberia itself, the Far East, North Kazakhstan, the Northern part
of European Russia and the Eastern area of the Urals.
The importance of the development of the oil pipeline system
can be judged from the fact that for the period 1971 to 1975 the
177ibid• PP.38-39.
178ibid. p.39.
179V S Varlamov "Problemy transportnogo osvoeniya Zapadno-
Sibirskoi nizmennostl v svyazi s formirovaniem na ee territorii
novogo narodnokhozyaistvennogo kompleksa" Izvestiya AN SSSR
Sere S!0g. 1967 No.3, p.52.
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level of capital investment was, at 3.9 billion rubles, three
times that of the preoeding Plan.180 The rationale behind this
deoision relates to the need to exploit Siberian resouroes. The
West Siberian oil and gas province is twice the size of the next
nearest, the Volga-Ural. Unlike the latter area, whioh already
had an industrial waterway and rail system prior to the commence-
ment of energy developments, Siberia was almost entirely virgin
territory and from the outset planners appreoiated that the
long-term significanoe for the eoonomy as a whole was greater
than the Volga-Ural area had been. The population density is
lower in Siberia than in the Volga-Ural area and the oonstruotion
of a pipeline of given oapaoity is oonsiderably less labour-
intensive than that of a rail system. On aooount of this, the
harsh olimate and diffioulties in maintaining a regular supply of
181materials it was decided to minimise infrastruoture development.
Progress in the oonstruction of oil and gas pipelines is
( 182outlined in Elliot's 1914) work: the state of development at
the end of 1915 is detailed in tables 3.23. (oil) and 3.24. (gas).
During the ninth Plan some 51.2 thousand kilometres of new trunk
oil and gas pipeline were oonstructed in the Soviet Union,
expanding capacity by 50 per cent. In the oil seotor the Usa-
180pyatiletnii plan 1971-1975, p.103.
181Varlamov op.cit. p.54.
182Elliot op.oit. pp.5S-59, and pp.109-117.
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Map 1: The Soviet Oil Industry at end-1975.
Souroe: Ad'lpted from J Bethkenhagen "Bedeutung und
M8g1iohkeiten des Ost-West-Handels mit Energie-
rohstoffen" (Deutsches Institut fttrHirtschafts-
forsohung, Sonderheft 104) Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot 1975, pp.62-63.
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Map 2: The Soviet Natural Gas Industry at end-1915.
Souroe: Adapted from V A Smimov "Gazovaya promyshlennost'"
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Moscow line (1855 kms.), the Samotlor-Al'met'evsk line (2313
kms.), that from Aleksandrovskoe to Irkutsk (1766 kms.), from
Kuybyshev to Novorossiisk (1522 kms.) and from Nizhnevartovsk
to Kuybyshev (1183 kms.) were completed. So too was the second
string of the trans-Comecon 'Druzhba' pipeline, expanding
substantially the Soviet Union's delivery capacity for Comecon
and West European markets.183 However the original Plan called
for an increase in installed length of 30 thousand kilometres;184
hence at 19.5 thousand (table 3.23.) performance was well short
of the objective. In the gas sector the main lines added during
the ninth Plan were over 8 thousand kilometres in the.system
connecting Central Asia with Central Russia, over 5 thousand
kilometres in the Medvezh'e-Central Russia system, approximately
2500 kilometres in the Ukrainian ~stem, over 800 kilometres of
the Orenburg-Pskov line and approximately 600 kilometres as part
185of the second string of the line from Ukhta to Torzhok. Per-
formance in the gas sector showed a parallel, if less serious,
underfulfilment of original Plan than that of the oil sector in
that the original target was to increase the installed length of
gas pipeline by 60 per cent,186 to a total of 108 thousand
kilometres.
183X X Smirnov "Vo imya mogushchestva Velikoi Rodiny"
Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1976 No.2, p.1.
184EYatiletnii plan 1971-1975, pp.103, 216.
185Smirnov "Vo i&a ••:'(1976), p.1.
186pyatiletnii plan 1971-1975, p.204.
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An additional problem that affected the underperformance
of the gas-producing industry was that not all the increased
capacity installed during the ninth Plan could be utilised for
lack of equipment and control systems on the pipelines them-
selves. Thus whereas the pipeline from Medvezh'e to Nadym had
a capacity of 56 billion cubic metres per year, only 40 billion
could be transmitted in 1975, and the delivery system from the
Punga storage complex had a capacity in 1975 of 42 billion cubic
metres; only 30 billion were d!spatched.187 Delays in fully
commissioning major pipelines not only limited delivery capacity
but gave rise to relative over-utilisation of rail transport
with higher transport cost than anticipated. Whereas on average
transport costs constitute 10 per cent of the final cost of
industrial products, in the case of oil and petroleum products
this figure is 25 per cent.188 Of the methods currently under
discussion for lowering the transport cost element, delivery of
oil, saturated with gas, by large-diameter pipeline is thought to
be readily applioable in areas where both oil and gas are produced
in close proximity. The transport cost for oil and gas can be
reduced by up to 20 per cent by using this method, but the scope
of its potential application is further limited by the fact that
187These and other shortfalls in delivery performance against
design capacity are outlined in Margulov, Selikhova, Furman
op.cit. pp.45-46.
188Z S Prutyanova "Rezervy v nefteprovodnom trans porte i
metodika ikh opredeleniya" Ekonomika neftyanoi promyshlennosti
1972 No.3, p.24.
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the point is quickly reached at which the incremental energy
cost incurred in operating the system exceeds the transport cost
saving.189
The refining sector has displayed a number of important
developments during the ninth Plan. Though precise data on
objectives are somewhat sparse, it is possible to discern the
changing trends. It is significant that within the directives to
expand refining capacity greater emphasis was to be put on the
manufacture of motor gasoline, whose output in 1975 was to be
2.3 times that of 1970, low-sulphur distillate fuel, scheduled to
rise in 1975 to 1.4 times the 1970 level, and winter grade diesel
fuel, whose output was to rise 1.75 times.190
European Russia is characterised by a high demand for motor
gasoline and fuel oil in relation to other refined products and
hence the refinery balance is geared to maximum production of
these two product groups. In the Eastern regions the greater part
of demand is for diesel fuel and petrochemical feedstock, the
refineries there seeking minimum output of fuel oil. ~s and
coal, which are available in the latter area, are selected in
preference to fuel oil. It is reported that in 1970 the refining
balance of the Eastern regions showed little difference from that
of European Russia. Relatively small quantities of light
189This issue is discussed, mainly from the technical stand-
point, in P N Uskov "Sovershenstvovanie odnotrubnogo sbora nefti
i gaza" Neftepromyslovoe delo 1912 No.1, pp.31-35.
190Galonskii op.cit. p.36.
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products were transported from European Russia to Central and
Eastern areas, counterbalanced by deliveries of fuel oil from
the latter area to the former.191
In accordance with the directives for the refining sector
the refining balance as a whole was to alter during the ninth
Plan in favour of maximum output of light (non-substitutable)
products based increasingly on West Siberian crude oils, which
are of low sulphur content and have a high yield of light
products.192 However the underfulfilment of Plan by the oil and
gas industries caused a number of problems in oil refining. As
a result of the substantial underfulfilment of the gas industry
and of the inability of the coal industry to compensate by over-
fulfilment the level of fuel oil that had to be produced during
the ninth Plan was excessive, and caused some measure of under-
supply of gasoline, distillate fuels and bitumen stock.193
Furthermore as a result of the suboptimal refining balance
regional product supply was disrupted and undesired cross-hauls
of products were necessitated.194
Siberia was designated a priority area for the refining
industry during the ninth Plan. Demand for all products and
191 (Probst, Mazover eds.) op.cit. p.151.
192The characteristics of West Siberian crude oils are given
in M A Mkhchiyan et al. "Nefti Zapadnoi Sibiri" Neftyanik 1975
No. 12, pp.17-18.
193Editorial "Neftepererabatyvayushchaya i neftekhimicheskaya
promyshlennost' v 1975 godu" Khimiya i tekhnologiya topliv i
masel 1975 No.1, p.6.
19~bst, Mazover (eda.) op.cit. p.151.
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espeoially for gasoline and petroohemioal feedstook was expeoted
to rise. The output of these two produot groups was to be maxi-
mised, using Kansk-Aohinsk ooal or Tyumenl gas looally rather
than fuel oil.195 The development of the Soviet refining
industry has been oharaoterised reoently by growing oonoentration
of oapaoity in a small number of plants. Over the period from
1951 to 1960 the share in total output of refineries whose
oapaoity was 1 million tonnes per year or less fell from 17.5 to
5 per oent. The prooess of produotion oonoentration was parti-
oularly intense in the period from 1961 to 1970, when the average
refinery oapaoity inoreased more than two fold. Current develop-
ment policy favours refineries of oapaoity of at least 6 million
tonnes per year, and in 1972 suoh refineries aooounted for
approximately half the number and three-quarters the capaoi ty in
the Soviet Union.196 In the oase of Siberia the development of
the refining industry was oentred on the Omsk and Angarsk
refineries. By the end of the ninth Plan it was felt that these
refineries had reaohed their optimum size, beyond which any
benefits of economy of soale in refining would be offset by
additional costs of transportation and storage. At that stage a
deoision was taken to expand the Achinsk refinery and to draw up
plans for further plants, timed to ooincide with the expansion of
oil produotion in West Siberia.197
195ibid. p.152.
196ibid. p.167.
191ibid. p.151.
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Central Asia and Kazakhstan are faced with a sUbstantial
gap between productive capacity and consumption levels of
refined products. By the end of 1975 the local refining sector
could satisfy less than 25 per oent of demand in these areas.198
However the availability of gas has done much to alleviate this
regional problem. \European Russia has had adequate refining
capacity throughout the post-war period and there has been an
excess of oapacity in the Volga-Ural area since the commencement
of its development. The rate of expansion of capaci ty in European
Russia during the ninth Plan was lower than in other regions and
was confined to those areas experiencing a local product
shortage.199
In the course of the ninth Plan the major problem affecting
the refining industry was that of phasing in West Siberian crude
oils. Such oils were refined not only in Siberia and the Far East
but also in Bashkiria and the Kuybyshev oblasti. Plans were drawn
up for the supply of West Siberian oils to refineries in Central
and Southern Russia. The low sulphur and salt oontent of West
Siberian oils makes them easier to refine than the standard Volga-
200Ural oils, and consequently puts them at a premium. The latter
factor oompounds the loss incurred in having to overproduce fuel
oil, in that in order to meet a higher demand than antioipated a
198ibid. pp.157-158.
199ibid. pp.158-159.
200trL.imi~ i t 1 1:\~l ~ ekhnologiya topliv i masel 1975 No. ,p.~.
(editorial).
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proportion of products of higher value had to be downgraded into
fuel oil blending. The importance of re-optimising the refinery
balance in the tenth Plan was outlined at an early stage:
refinery production targets for 1976 were geared to lessening
the production of fuel oil relative to gasoline, middle
201distillates and naphtha.
Financial Aspects of Soviet Oil and Gas Development 1971-1975
study of pricing policy for crude oil and refined products
sheds light on the Soviet objectives during the ninth Plan of
optimising the use of oil in relation to coal and gas and of
securing the desired movement of refined products to centres of
consumption. Further objectives were the maintenance of the
financial viability of individual enterprises and narrowing of
price differentials between purchasing enterprises.202 Thus on
1st January 1971 the price of Tyumen' oil was cut by 18 per cent
with the result that consumption increased, as desired, and unit
production costs decreased. At the same time the price of
Bashkir crude oil was raised in order to offset increased produc-
tion costs caused by reserve depletion and the consequent need to
extract from deeper deposits.203 The pricing policy for refined
products has been re-appraised. Whereas up to the late sixties
201Editorial "Povyshenie effektivnosti proizvodstva" Khimiya
i tekhnologiya topliv i masel 1976 No.2, p.3.
202V K Vasil' eva "0 tsenakh na neft ft, Ekonomika neftyanoi
promyshlennosti 1971 No. 11. p.22.
203ibid.
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prices of all refined products were determined an the basis of a
calorific comparison with other fuels, it was decided that such
a policy would apply only in the case of fuel oil. Price
levels for naphtha and middle distillates, and for crude oils
designated for maximum output of these products, would subse-
quently reflect their desired competitiveness agninst altern~tivest
such as natural gas liquids (ethane and propane) as feedstocks as
well aa fuels.204
The pricing of wellhead gas illustrate's the Soviet attempt
to integrate the pricing mechanism with the policy of securing an
optimal fuel balance. Despite directives for the ninth Plan to
increase the utilisation of wellhead gas, no more than 60 per cent
of available gas has been utilised due to lack of processing
et 205capaca y. The bottleneck is caused by the fact that at
current prices for raw wellhead gas and ita derivatives invest-
ment recoupment is well outside the norm and financial returns
during the build-up of productive capacity are unattractive.
Moreover production costs for wellhead gas are expected to rise in
all areas except Tyumen'. Therefore it is suggested that produc-
tion costa should be reckoned separately for oil and wellhead gas,
implying that the latter carries unrealistically high costs,
204V K Vasil'eva "Sovershenstvovanie tsenoobrazovaniya v
otrasli" Elconomika neftyanoi promyshlennosti 1974 No 11, p.S8.
205V K Vasil'eva, N N Kosinov, A Z Kuz'min "Nekotorye voprosy
formirovnniya optovykh teen na neftyanoi gazll Ekonomika neftyanoi
~romyshlennosti 1976 No 2, p.7.
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"subsidising" oil produotion, and that wholesale prioes for well-
head gas be lowered as a temporary adju~ting measure to stimulate
demand. Such prioes could then be readjusted in relation to oil
and natural gas once the desired equilibrium had been attained.206
However the pricing mechanism must reflect above all the
rising average cost of oil production. Even the rapid develop-
ment of Siberia, where production costs in 1972 were some 29 per
cent below the all-Union average, cannot compensate for the upward
trend reoorded in 20 out of 26 oil-produoing areas.207 In the
long term the oil and gas industry recognises that the problem of
rising prime cost of production 'viIIbecome more seve re, The
upward trend in the prime cost of production of oil and gas
compared ,.,ith other raw Ilk"lterialsis detailed in table 3.25.,
where it '''illbe seen that coal is the sole raw material to
exhibit falling costs of production. The position of coal has
been reversed since 1973 as produotion has shifted incrensingly
to more difficult terrain.
The oil induntry is compara.tively c-:,pital-intensive.
Capital allocated to the industry totalled (in 1973 values) 4.05
billion rubles during 1951-1955; by 1961-1965 this figure had
inoreased to 6.7 billion and during the ninth Plan over 14
billion rubles were allocated for oil development, this figure
208approaching 10 per cent of total industrial investment.
206ibid. pp.7-8.
207V K Vasil'eva "Sovershenstvovanie tsenoobrazovaniya •••"
(1974), p.59.
208G D Sokolov "Kapital'noe stroitel'stvo v neftyanoi
promyshlennosti" Moscow Nedra 1973, p.'.; Narodnoe khozyaistvo
SSSR, 1975, p.508.
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TABLE 3.25. Changes in the Prime Cost of Selected Raw Materials.
(2nd half of 1967 = 100)
Material 12§.5. .121Q .!2.U.
Iron Ore 89 106 116
Manganese Ore 92 132 125
Bauxite 78 101 111
Coal 92 97 96
Oil (inc. gas condensate) 74 105 112
Na tural Gas 35 115 127
Apatite Concentrate 116 109 114
Na tural Sulphur 81 102 114
Phosphorus 99 98 119
Source: Tu Takovets "Dvizhenie tsen mineral'nogo syr'ya"
Planovoe khozyaistvo 1975 No.6, p.4.
Although the amount of capital allocated to the oil industry
during the ninth Plan constituted an increase of 60 per cent on
the level of the eighth, the rate of growth of production and
reserve appreciation declined substantially.209 Moreover it
seems that in the latter part of the ninth Plan the original
allocation had to be increased. By mid-1975 it was reported that
the planned investment level for the oil industry had been raised
to 15.5 billion rubles and that the expected uptake by the end of
the Plan could be as high as 16.7 billion.210 More detailed
209G D Sokolov "K voprosu otsenki effektivnosti kapital'nykh
vlozhenii v neftyanuyu promyshlennost'" Ekonomika neftyanoi
promyshlennosti 1974 No. 7, p.~.
210A M Lalayants "0 povyshenii effektivnosti proizvodstva i
ispol'zovanii kapital'nykh vlozhenii v neftyanoi promyshlennosti"
Ekonomika neftyanoi promyshlennosti 1975 No.7, p.31.
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information is available on the structure of capital investment
in the gas industry in the ninth Plan than for oil, and is given
in table 3.26. In this period the level of capital investment
required to secure an additional unit of production and processing
capacity increased by factors of 2.6 and 2.0 respectively.211 The
pattern of capital investment in 1915 compared with 1910 is shown
in table 3.21. and the overall trend in investment in the fuels
industries for the whole of the ninth Plan in table 3.28.
The Soviet Oil and Gas Industries 1971-1975: An Overview.
In the course of the ninth Plan the rate of growth in the
Soviet oil and gas industries showed a decline that was charac-
teristic of many industrial sectors of the economy. Both
industries underfulfilled their original targets and the coal
industry was unable to produce at a compensatory level. In the
case of the oil industry only the intensive development of the
new, remotely located fields could stave off a serious shortfall,
but a faster rate of extraction than originally envisaged gave
rise to a greater need to prove new reserves in the short term,
and this has in itself been a problem area. However the under-
performance of the economy as a whole generated a lower energy
demand than planned. The fact that the Soviet Union was able to
cope with increasing economic and technical difficulties in
exploiting vast but remote reserves of oil and gas, and at the
211Margulov, Selikhova, Furman op.cit. p.18.
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same time to react to the substantial increase in the import
price of Middle East oil without incurring the sort of recession
experienced in the rest of the industrialised world, does at
least illustrate some of the practical flexibility of Soviet
energy planning.
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Chapter 4. The Oil and Gas Industries of Eastern Europe
to 1915.
There is a marked difference in exploration, production and
utilisation of fuel resources in Eastern Europe compared with the
Soviet Union. Some countries are well provided in relation to
domestic needs with reserves of one or more fuels, others are
poorly endowed. This would give rise to different priorities in
energy policy, were each member country of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (Comecon) to pursue independent lines of
development. However a major element of the 1911 Complex Programme
of Economic Development is that of working towards an integrated
energy policy optimal to the bloc as a whole. Central to this
policy is the objective of securing a (relatively belated) shift
from a predominantly coal-based energy economy towards greater
utilisation of oil and gas.
In Eastern Europe the trend towards oil and gas oommenced in
the mid-sixties. This trend was scheduled to gain momentum and
to continue into the seventies.1 In 1910 the share held by oil
and gas in the consumption balance of Eastern Europe was as
follows: the GDR 15.1 per oent, Poland 14.9 per cent, Czeoho-
slovakia 20.5, Hungary 43.1 and Bulgaria 45.8 per oent. Only in
the case of Romania, the sole Eastern European country to possess
1Iu S. Shiryaev, S M Iovohuk (eds.) "Proizvodstvennaya
integra.tsiya stran-chlenov SEV" l-1oscowNauka 1972, pp.129-130.
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substantial reserves of oil and gas, was the major share
accounted for by hydrocarbon fuels, the corresponding figure
2being approximately 72 per cent.
It should be stressed that in the sixties the Eastern
European members of Comecon were not facing the problem of an
absolute energy shortage: the problem was that of securing an
improved fuel and energy balance which would involve all
countries except Romania becoming dependent on external sources
of oil and eventually gas. An additional problem was that the
development of industries using hydrocarbon feedstock was
beginning to generate stronger links between the economies of
the Eastern European countries, though to a different extent in
each case. In the process of coordinating development plans in
the energy sector there arose issues such as the extending of
financial assistance by one oountry to another, optimal size and
looation of energy oonversion plants of varying types and, not
least, the nature of production speoialisation in fuels within
the bloo in the movement towards integration.3 The essenoe of
the aforementioned issues is that an energy policy aimed at
integrated planning of the development of disparate and widely
dispersed resouroes, partioularly when the preferred resouroes
are as flexible as oil and gas, involves shifts in macroeconomio
and geopolitioal relations within the bloo.
2H Ufer "Wachstums- und Strukturprobleme der Energiewirtschaften
der RGW-Llnder" Wirhohaftswissensohaft 1975 No.8, p.1128.
31 D Kozlov, E K Shmakova "Sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV
venergetike" Mosoow Nauka. 1973, pp.14-15.
In the early sixties the debate on problems of energy
provision in Eastern Europe for the period fro~ 1960 to 1980 was
centered on the estimate that in this period aggregate GNP of
the member-countries would increase fivefold and that within this
the output of the industrial sector would increase sixfold.4 The
pattern of energy consumption in Eastern Europe from 1950 to 1910,
together with an estimate for 1980, is given in table 4.1. The
trend towards oil and gas was planned to differ in individual
countries. In the case of Hungary and Bulgaria estimates made in
early 1973 foresaw a share in the total energy balance for oil
and gas of 60 to 65 per cent by 1980, possibly rising to 75 per
cent by the year 2000. In the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland
the share of oil and gas would be significantly lower, in the
range of 30 to 38 per cent in 1980, given each country's access
to indigenous reserves of brown coal (the GDR and Czechoslovakia)
and hard coal (Poland).5
The emergent role of oil and gas in the Eastern European
energy balance during the sixties is shown in table 4.2., and the
developing trend in fuel production in table 4.3. The trend
towards greater use of oil and gas was brought about by the
influence of two factors. Firstly it became evident during the
sixties that the more thermally efficient hydrocarbon fuels
could be supplied to a consumer at a lower delivered cost in
4r V Popov "Sotrudnichestvo sotsiallsticheskikh stran v
oblasti energetiki" Voprosyekonomiki 1963 No. 10. p.111.
5Xozlov, Shmakova op.cit. p.29.
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TABLE 4.3. Production of Major Fuels in Eastern Europe
1960-1970
1960 1.22l .121Q. 1210 as 22of 1960
Hard Coal (million
tonnes)
Bulgaria 0.6 0.6 0.4 67
Hlmgary 2.8 4.4 4.2 150
GDR 2.7 2.2 1.0 37
Poland 104.4 118.8 140.0 134
Romania '3.4 4.7 6.4 188
Czechoslovakia 26.4 27.8 28.2 107
Brown Coal (million
tonnes)
Bulgaria 15.4 24.5 29.0 188
Hungary 2;.7 27.1 24.0 101
Gm 225.5 250.8 261.0 116
Poland 9.3 22.6 33.0 355
Romania 3.4 5.6 14.0 412
Czechoslovakia 57.9 72.3 81.0 140
Oil (million tonnes)
Bulgaria 0.2 0.22 0.33 165
Hungary 1.2 1.80 1.84 153
Gm
Poland 0.19 0.33 0.42 220
Romania 11.5 12.5 13.37 116
Czechoslovakia 0.14 0.18 0.20 143
Natural Gas (billion
cubic metres)
Bulgaria 0.7 0.47
Hungary 0.34 1.1 3.48 X 10
GDR
Poland 0.55 1.3 4.97 X 9
Romania 9.80 16.7 23.9 244
Czechoslovakia 1.44 0.9 1.14 79
Source: Kozlov, Shmakova op.cit. pp.36-31. 48.
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standard fuel units than coal, fUelwood or other energy
materials. This gave rise to a natural process of substitution
that manifested itself in decisions to fuel new productive
capacity with oil and gas and in certain cases to invest in the
conversion of existing coal-burning plant to these fuels.
Secondly the growth of industry needing oil and gas as a feed-
stock compounded the substitution process, the major sectors
being road transport, air freight and the petrochemical industry.
This gave rise to a gradual change in growth rates in production
and utilisation of each energy source and a decline in net
consumption of energy per unit of output.
The fundamental issue affecting energy planning for the bloc
as a whole is the coincidence of Eastern Europe's move from coal
to oil and gas with increasingly difficult economic ·and logistic
problems experienced by the Soviet Union, historically the
bloc's largest supplier and in both the medium and long term
the preferred source. This chapter seeks to outline recent
perceptions of the question of energy provision in Eastern
Europe, to outline the development of the Eastern European oil
and gas industries to 1975 and to examine their part in the
changing Eastern European energy balance.
It has been estimated that in 1970 total East European
reserves of fuel in all categories were150 billion tonnes of
standard fuel, of which Poland possessed 67.5 per cent (101.2
billion), Czechoslovakia 11.6 (17.4), the GDR 8.7 (13.1),
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Romania 3.4 (5.1), Bulgaria 1.4 (2.1) and Hungary 1.2 (1.8).6
One must bear in mind that these figures relate to total
reserves and hence include substantial quantities that will not
be recoverable, and also that the majority of the reserves con-
sist of coal, which is becoming less favoured than oil and gas.
Eastern Europe as a whole, though each country to a different
extent, was thought at the outset of the 1911-1915 Plans to be
facing the problem of increasing dependence on imported energy.
It was estimated that Bulgaria's energy demand would rise from
21.1 million tonnes of standard fuel in 1910 to 41.5 million in
1915, 55.5 million in 1980, 15 million in 1990 and 110-120
million in the year 2000. At the same time it was estimated
that import dependence would rise from 60 per cent in 1960 to 74
per cent in 1980, a level which would be maintained until the
end of the century. In Hungary it was expected that energy
demand would rise from 34.8 million tonnes of standard fuel in
1970 to 45 million in 1980, the corresponding change in import
dependence being from 37 to 50 per cent. Energy demand in the
GDR was a little over 100 million tonnes of standard fuel in 1970
and this was expected to rise to 120 million in 1980, with the
possibility of reaching 140-150 million by the year 2000. It
was estimated that Poland's energy demand would rise from 142.3
6V P Maksakovskii "K voprosu 0 tempakh rosta proizvodstva. i
potrebleniya topliva. v sotsialisticheskikh stranakh" Voprosy
ekonomicheskoi geosrafii, Moscow 1970, p.94, cited in the
author's work "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' sotsialisticheskikh
stran E'vropy" ~1oscow Nedra 1 .22. (The balance of 6.2 per
cent (9.3 billion tonnes is the Yugoslav share.)
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million tonnes of standard fuel in 1970 to 181-183 million in
1980, whereas in the case of Romania the corresponding rise
would be from 78-80 million tonnes to 96-98 million, during
which time her status as a net exporter of energy would be
altered to that of 80 per cent self-sufficiency. Czechoslovakia
was expected to record growth in energy consumption from 90.6
million tonnes of standard fuel in 1970 to 112 million in 1980
with the likelihood that this would reach 149 million in 1990 and
205 million in the year 2000. It was estimated that Czecho-
slovakia's dependence on imported energy would rise from 20 per
cent in 1970 to 40 per cent in 1980.7
In the early seventies Eastern European analysts and
planners anticipated that the trend from oonsumption of solid
fuels and hydroelectrioity towards oil and gas would oontinue to
1980, along with a relatively minor oontribution from nuolear
power. However the anomalous position of Romania, where the
share of the energy balance held by oil and gas was expeoted to
deoline, oalls for oomment. The development of the oil and gas
industries of Romania commenced at a relatively early stage with
the result that by 1950 these two fuels aocounted for some 75 per
7(i) A Alekseev, Tu Savenko "Ekonomioheskaya integratsiya v
razvitii toplivno-energetioheskikh otraslei stran-ohlenov SEV"
Voprosy ekonomiki 1971 No. 12, pp.49-52.
(ii) S M 1isiohkin "Energetloheskie resursy i neftegazovaya
promyshlennost' mira" Mosoow Nedra 1974. pp.58, 64. 70.
(iii) V P Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya prornyshlennost'
sotsiallstioheskikh stran Evropy" Moscow Nedra 1975, pp.23-26.
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8cent of Romanian energy consumption. By 1970 the rate of growth
of production of each fuel had declined, especially that of oil,
whereas plans for the further rapid development of the economy
still required an increasing supply of energy. Accordingly it
was realised that alternative energy resources would have to be
exploited, including the use of nuclear fuels. In addition it
was appreciated that the domestic coal industry would have to
maintain, and even possibly expand, its share of the energy
balance, if necessary supplemented by increased imports.
The formation of energy policy in Comecon is presented by
Soviet and East European analysts as an example of integrated
planning and production specialisation: however because of the
very distribution of energy reserves the Soviet Union plays the
leading role. At the outset of the 1971-1975 Plan period the
problems surrounding the provision of oil and gas in Eastern
Europe were seen to be threefold. Firstly the inevitability of
increased imports by Eastern Europe (Romania excepted) from the
Soviet Union would have to be facilitated by the expansion of
the trans-Comecon 'Druzhba' pipeline, involving the commissioning
of a second line parallel to the original, whose Northern branch
would supply Poland, and the GDR, the Southern branch Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary. Oil deliveries to Bulgaria would continue
to be made by tanker via the Black Sea. It was intended to
increase the share of natural gas in the Eastern European energy
8V P Maksakovskii "Toplivnye resursy sotsialisticheskikh
stran Evropy" Moscow Nedra 1968, p.10.
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balance bY extending the 'Bratstvo' pipeline, by which Poland
and Czechoslovakia had been supplied since 1967. Plans provided
for the extension of this pipeline such that deliveries to the
GDR via the trans-Polish branch and to Hungary and Bulgaria via
a new southern branch could commence in 1974.9
Secondly the Soviet Union was viewed by the Eastern
European countries as the prime agent in assisting them to
develop such resources of oil and gas as they had through the
provision and exchange of technical expertise and, where appro-
10priate, of basic production equipment. In 1969 it was estimated
by the East German analyst W Siegert that by taking into account
trends in economic growth in Eastern Europe the demand for
Soviet oil in each of the Eastern European countries in 1980
(Romania again excepted) would have risen to twice the 1970
11level. A level of production in the Soviet Union of 600 to 700
million tonnes was forecast, and aggregate demand in Eastern
12Europe minus Romania was put at 80 to 100 million tonnes. The
question of the role of gas exports and their substituting
effect on the pattern of oil exports 1s not discussed in Siegert's
analysis: however at the time it was already possible to detect
9E Taeschner "Tendenzen und Probleme der Energiewirtschaft
der ROW-LInder" Zeitschrift f~r den Erdkundeunterricht 1970
No.6, p.218.
10ibid• p.219.
11w Siegert "Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Erd61s sowie
Fragen des Erd6lbedarfs und der Erd6lbereitstellung in den
sozialistischen Llndern Europas" Energieanwendung 1969 No.7.
p.168.
12ibid •............
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a change in attitude on the Soviet part towards developing the
gas industry rapidly not only as a contributor to the domestic
energy balance but also as an export fuel to complement oil and
refined products, given the increasing difficulties of maintain-
ing rates of growth in oil production.
The third problem was seen to be that of optimising the
investment pattern for the bloc's fuel industries, and allied
with this the extension of trading credits and appropriate
bilateral arrangements facilitating Soviet supply. The issue of
investment is regarded as being a problem of scale and length of
the recoupment period.13 Investment plans in the fuel-producing
countries are generally taut, with competition for resources
from a number of enterprises.14 From the Soviet point of view a
funotion of joint investment should be that of spreading the
risk that inevitably accompanies exploration in the fuels
industries, particularly in oil and gas: from the point of view
of the Eastern European oountries the major consideration is the
comparative efficiency of investment in assisting the expansion
of the Soviet fuels industries versus the immediate alternative
of directing available funds into the development of domestic
resources.
A later analysis advocated a three-dimensional approaoh to
energy planning for the bloo aSla whole. Firstly it was suggested
13Kozlov, Shmakova op.oit. p.79.
14A Zubkov "Osobennosti mezhdunarodnoi kontsentratsii
investitsii pri reshenii toplivno-syr'evoi problemy stran SEV"
Voprogy ekonomiki 1972 No.9, p.77.
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that considerable scope existed for improving energy conversion
efficiency; secondly, perhaps recognising the growing diffi-
culties in energy production in the Soviet Union and their long-
term implications, the need to accelerate the development of
indigenous energy reserves was stressed; thirdly it was felt
that the energy-intensity of the Eastern European economies could
be lowered by improvements in inter-branch planning so as to
reduce the material-intensity of production and hence energy
intensity.15 By the end of the 1971-1975 plan period it was
admitted that attempts at securing energy autarchy would not
solve the problem of energy provision: increased trade outside
the bloc would have to be negotiated.16
From the 9th to the 12th of Deoember 1975 a symposium of
energy economists from the member-countries of Comecon was con-
vened in Moscow to discuss the above questions. The broad
conclusions of the symposium were that total energy demand might
be higher than previously estimated. Soviet exports indicated
that an aggregate demand of 780 million tonnes of standard fuel
in the full and associate member-countries (i.e. including Cuba,
Mongolia and Yugoslavia), minus the Soviet Union, was possible
by 1980, rising to over 1 billion by 1990. They advanced the
view that the level of self-sufficiency in the aforementioned
group of countries would decline from 70 per cent in 1975 to
15ufer op.cit. pp.1134-1135, 1131.
16(i) A I Zubkov "SSSR i reshenie toplivno-energeticheskoi
i syr'evoi problemy v stranakh SEV" Istoriya SSSR Jan/Feb
1976, p.58.
(ii) N I 7akhmat-ov, S S Iakushin "Sotrudnicheatvo stran-
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50 per cent by 1990 and that the import of energy resources of
all types would increase threefold.17
The concensus of the symposium on the optimal pattern of
development of the Comecon energy balance was that a rapid
programme of investment in nuclear power ought to be undertak~n,
but accepting that this could not be expected to make a signifi-
cant contribution before the 1980s. Two elements of policy were
highlighted as being particularly relevant to the short-term
problem, namely that a target of 20 per cent improvement in con-
version efficiency over 1975 levels could be achieved
economically and that this process could be supported by a more
critical attitude to the location and expansion of energy-
intensive industry itself in relation to existing and anticipated
18fuel supply. Very significantly, it was felt that the prospects
for increasing imports of oil from OPEC producers to alleviate
the tight supply position were limited: it was concluded that a
maximum of 30 million tonnes of OPEC oil at an estimated cost of
2 billion rubles could be contemplated by 1980.19
The impression gained from studying Soviet and Eastern
European discussions of energy questions is that planners and
analysts admit the existence of a number of interacting problems,
which whilst causing a measure of concern have not reached such
chlenov SEV v reshenii toplivno-syr'evykh problem" Izvestiya AN SSSR
Sere ekon. 1976 No 4, p.158.
11Zakhmatov, Yakushin OPe cit. p.156.
18ibid• pp.157-158.
19ibid• p.158.
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proportions as to constitute a Comecon 'energy crisis'. However
a different range of conclusions emerges from a number of
Western analyses of energy development in Comecon, written in
the late sixties and early seventies.
In a study written in 1969 the American analyst Jaroslav
Polach, taking into account the changing trends in consumption
of individual fuels and in general conversion efficiency, con-
cluded that in 1980 Eastern Europe (in this instance including
Albania and Yugoslavia) would face an energy deficit of 150 to
165 million tonnes of standard fuel, of which oil might account
for 130 million, this being 100 million tonnes' actual produc-
tion. If the Soviet Union were to supply this requirement it
would account for 16 to 18 per cent of production in 1980, this
put by Polach at 550 to 600 million tonnes.20
In Polach's view the supply of this quantity would seriously
impair Soviet plans for economic growth. Therefore the obvious
alternative is considered to be that of increased imports from
other oil producers. This, he maintains, would give rise to two
problems: firstly, it might hinder the overall process of
economic integration within the bloc, which was seen as an
increasingly desirable objective, and secondly the necessity of
paying for such imports partly in hard currencies might
necessitate the liberalisation of trade between Eastern Europe
and the rest of the world, an eventuality which might work to the
20J G Polach "The Development of Energy in East Europe", in
'Economic Problems in Countries of Eastern Europe' Washington
D C: US Congress, Joint Economic Committee 1970, p.411.
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disadvantage of the Soviet Union in that she might then have to
compete for the output of Eastern European industry. Po1ach
advances a further alternative, - in his view the likely one, -
namely that the Soviet Union would seek to strengthen her hold
on the fuel surplus of the Middle East as an interim measure,
until the development of Siberia was further advanced, thus
maintaining control of her fuel exports to Eastern Europe without
having to curtail domestic demand or exports to the West.21
Despite the theoretical logic of such a policy, Po1ach does not
assess its feasibility. At the time of Po1ach's writing the
decision-making process determining price and output of ~~dd1e
East oil was still was still under the control of the major oil
companies, operating in various groupings as producer companies.
At a time when there was still a strong belief in the West that
Soviet 011 policy had as an objective the maintenance of as
high a level of exports as possible in order to gain increasing
influence in the world market, the question of these companies'
willingness to produce on behalf of Arab oountries quantities of
011 which, once under Soviet control, might find their way on to
the Western European market, eroding the prevailing market price,
as had been the case during the sixties when the Soviet Union
sought re-entry into export markets, has been overlooked by
Polach. For reasons already outlined the companies sought to
pursue a strategy aimed at hardening prices in Western Europe.
21ibid. p.412.
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In another article written in 1969 the American analyst Stanislaw
Wasowski addresses himself to the question of the imminent oil
deficit in Eastern Europe.22 Wasowski bases his projection of
energy demand on a projection of an energy/GNP elasticity
coefficient, including an adjustment for the assumed substitution
effect of oil for solid fuels. A further assumption is that
natural gas .would not make any impact on the Eastern European
energy balance. In the case of oil demand he analyses the growth
trend and planned development of those sectors of the economies
in which oil has no ready substitute, citing transport and
*petrochemicals specifically. Wasowski's conclusion is that the
demand for oil in Eastern Europe in 1980 could be expected to
rise to 190 million tonnes.23 He expresses the view that
indigenous production of oil will be insignificant, that nuclear
power will make no contribution by this time and that the
solution will be found in Eastern Europe's negotiating supply on
the basis of barter trade with Middle East producers.24 However
similar constraints would apply in the case of supply to Eastern
Europe as to the Soviet Union.
A somewhat different approach was taken by the German
analyst Werner Brell, writing at about the same time as the
22S Wasowski "The Fuel Situation in Eastern Europe" Soviet
Studies July 1969, pp.35-51.
23ibid• p.41.
24ibid• pp.50-51•
*Note however that the petrochemical industry had been
designated a priority sector for the supply of gas.
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previous two analyses.25 Projecting a calculation of per capita
energy consumption, he arrives at a broadly similar conclusion
to that reached by Wasowski, namely that Eastern Europe will face
an oil deficit of 140 million tonnes by 1980, this representing
demand of 110 million less indigenous production of 30 million.26
In contrast to the aforementioned analyses Br61l does qualify
his estimate by stating that the rapidly developing gas industry
of the Soviet Union, and to a limited extent that of Eastern
Europe itself, could in the medium term alleviate the problems of
energy supply by substituting in certain end-uses for which oil
was currently preferred.21
By 1913 it was realised that extrapolation of trends
relating historical energy consumption to industrial growth rates
or of per capita energy consumption were inaccurate even in the
short term, since there were no signs of an increase in Eastern
Europe's non-Soviet oil imports that might suggest eventual
levels predicted in earlier analyses. However the prevailing view
was that Eastern Europe would face an oil deficit. Writing in
28mid-1913, Sabine Baufeldt took the view that previous analyses
had overestimated energy demand, underestimated supply and ignored
the emergent role of gas, but nonetheless predicted an oil
deficit of 100 million tonnes by 1980, putting demant at 120
25w Br611 "Die energetische Integration des RGW-Raumes"
Osteuropa Wirtschaft March 1968, pp.26-49.
26ibid• p.35.
21ibid• p.39.
28S Baufeldt "Die kttnftige Erd611ucke 1m RG''''vor dem Hinter-
grund des sowjetischen Engagements in Nab-Mittel-Ost"
Osteurope Wirtschaft June 1973. pp.35-54.
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million and indigenous supply at 20 million.29 She likewise
stresses that the capacity of Eastern Europe to increase
indigenous production of oil was limited and that the short-term
solution to the problem was to diversify the source of supply
to include purchases from the Middle East.30
If during the early seventies Western perceptions of Eastern
Europe's need to negotiate for supplies of oil from Middle East
producers differed only in conclusions about the amount that
would be involved, the events of 1973-1974 changed this perspec-
tive considerably. Such is the theme of a Japanese analysis of
the Eastern European energy problem written after the effect of
OPEC's price rises had begun to be felt.31 Kazuo Ogawa points to
the benefits offered by the "energy crisis" and oil price rises
to the energy- and chemical-exporting members of Comecon (the
Soviet Union, Poland and Romania), and contrasts the situation of
other members of the bloc.32 He stresses that whereas the OPEC
price rises afforded the Soviet Union the opportunity of raising
the intra-Comecon prices of crude oil and refined products the
impact on Eastern Europe was to reverse the trend of "weaning"
from the Soviet Union which had commenoed in the late sixties and
whioh was expected in some quarters to continue, and to inject
29ibid. p.44.
30ibid• p.45.
31X Ogawa "Economic Conditions in Eastern Europe and Energy
Problem" Chemical Economy and Engineering Review November 1975,
pp.12-18.
32ibid. pp.14-15.
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greater urgency into Eastern Europe's development of indigenous
reserves.33 Ogawa points to a further aspect of the impact of
the OPEC price rises and the Soviet Union's difficulties in
increasing oil deliveries, namely the re-evaluation and
emergence of natural gas, which could become the Soviet Union's
preferred export fuel for Eastern Europe.34
A somewhat more bleak analysis was carried out by the
Canadian researchers B Korda and I Moravcik in 1976,35 starting
from the standpoint that the prevalent features of Eastern
European energy planning are intrinsic disunity in the bloc36
and the propensity of the economic system itself to cause
wastage of raw materials and energy.37 Korda and Moravcik
prescribe five elements of strategy for dealing with the problem
of energy supply: development of alternative energy forms,
increased intra-Comecon trade in all forms of energy materials,
increased imports from outside Comecon, expansion of indigenous
production and more stringent energy conservation,38 in short a
listing of all the possibilities. The nature of the problem is
viewed as having four distinct features; firstly that
indigenous energy reserves are insufficient even if fully
33ibid• p.18.
34ibid•
35B Korda, I Moravcik "The Energy Problem in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union" Canadian Slavonic Papers 1976. No.3,
pp.1-14.
36ibid• p.2.
37ibid. pp.6-7.
38ibid. p·2·
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developed, secondly that the current energy mix is unfavourable,
thirdly that energy consumption is excessive and fourthly that
Eastern Europe lacks the means of acquiring the hard currencies
that would be necessary for imports of fuels from non-Comecon
sources.39 The authors' view is that political expediency
(undefined) rather than economic effioiency is likely to be the
factor determining the nature of energy development, this being
manifest in the Soviet Union's willingness to sustain economic
loss in order to maintain through the oontinued status ot
principal energy supplier within Comecon her dominance in the
political scene. However no indication is given by the authors
as to how such a policy would be expressed in the resultant fuel
balance and import structure of the bloo.
There has been and remains considerable scope for debate as
to options and likely outcomes of the range of policies
suggested. In order to analyse the contribution of the oil and
gas industries of Eastern Europe to their countries' energy
balance acoount must be taken of the state of development of
these industries at the end of 1975 and to outline the immediate
problems faced by planners at the outset of the 1976-1980 period.
The fundamental features of the development of the Eastern
European energy balanoe are that changes in fuel consumption to
favour use of the more efficient fuels, oil and gas, have taken
place at a later stage than in the Soviet Union in all countries
39ibid. p.14.
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except Romania, and that there has been a widening gulf between
the consumption and production balance. By 1973 production of
oil in Eastern Europe totalled 22.6 million tonnes, of gas 49.5
billion cubic metres, these figures representing 1 and 4 per cent
of world production respectively. In both the oil and gas
industries in Eastern Europe there has been considerable diffi-
culty in proving reserves even though sizable proportions of the
land-mass are considered to be potential oi1- and gas-bearing
areas, as detailed in table 4.4.
During the sixties the rate of discovery of oil reserves in
Hungary enabled planners to conclude that oil production levels
could be maintained. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR the
declining ratio of oil reserves to production prevented plans
for expansion and it was felt from the early seventies that
Romania might also faoe this problem.40 As in the case of the
Soviet Union, data on reserves are sparse. Lisiohkin gives no
indication of the level of reserves in Poland, the GDR and
Bulgaria; however he puts the level of proven oil reserves in
Romania at 130 million tonnes,41 and in the case of Czeohoslovakia
and Hungary confines himself to the statement that reserves are
"insignificant".42 Maksakovskii is more forthcoming with data
4~sakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975),
pp.139-140.
41Note that Lisichkin's classification of reserves might not
conform to the Soviet and Eastern European standard. He uses the
term "validated" ('dostoverennye'), whereas the standard term is
"proven/explored" ('razvedannye'). It is likely that Lisichkin's
figures include reserves in the C2 category.
42Lisichkin op.oit. pp.6" 93, 103.
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TABLE 4.4. Potential Hydrocarbon Bearing Area in Eastern Europe
(thousand square kilometres)
Country Total Area Potential ~drocarbon ~ of Total
Bearing Area !!:!!:.
Poland 312.5 255 81.2
GDR 108.3 63 58.2
Czechoslovakia 127.9 36 28.1
Hungary 93.0 74 79.6
Romania 237.5 150 63.2
Bulgaria 110.9 48 43.3
Total 990.1 626 63.2
Source: V P Maksakovskii "Toplivnye resursy sotsialisticheskikh
stran Evropy" Moscow Nedra 1968, p.21.
on oil reserves, all of which relate to the categories A+B+Cl,
but which are calculated from information compiled in 1967. He
puts Polish reserves at 8 million tonnes, those of the GDR at
1.5 million, of Czechoslovakia at 1.7, Romania at 100 and
Bulgaria at 2.1: his figure for Hungary is that for total
ultimate reserves, and this is put at 36.8 million tonnes.43
Lisichkin is likewise sparing in his data on gas reserves.
He puts the Hungarian total in the categories A+B+Cl at 115
billion cubic metres,44 gives no data for Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Romania and Bulgaria, and views any estimate of reserves in the
GDR as premature due to late commencement of exploration there.45
43Ma.ksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975), p.129.
44Lisichkin op.cit. p.63.
45ibid• p.70.
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For his part Maksakovskii, again relying on 1967 data, puts
Polish gas reserves in the aforementioned categories at 200
billion cubic metres, those of Czechoslovakia at 13 billion
cubic metres, those of Czechoslovakia at 13 billion, with the
likelihood of a further 13 billion in the category C2, of
Hungary at 100 billion and of Romania at 212 billion.46 He
likewise offers no data on gas reserves in Bulgaria and the GDR.
There exists a number of Western estimates of Eastern
European oil and gas reserves, based mainly on United Nations
and OEeD data. The range of estimates made by Western analysts
is detailed in table 4.5. The striking features of these
analyses are the extent of disparity amongst themselves and
their divergence from the aforementioned Soviet estimates.
Polach rightly points to the Comecon practice of evaluating
reserves on the basis of geological surveys and production tech-
nology existing at the time of the evaluation, a method which
ignores the potentially modifying influence of prices of
alternative fuels on production levels.47 Thus what would be
defined as recoverable in a Comecon estimate differs from the
conclusion that would be reached in evaluating the potential of
a western hydrocarbon province, when likely forward trading
prices on the Rotterdam market would be taken into account.
Moreover whereas the former system of estimation is subject to
4~ksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975),
pp.179t 189, 191, 195.
47Polach op.cit. p.379.
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revision only in the light of improvements in survey and produc-
tion techniques, the latter would in addition be influenced by
periodic re-evaluation of the forward price. In short", the
problem presented in Western analysis is that of obscurity of
definition of the basis for evaluation with the result that it
is not possible to gauge the extent of consistency with or
divergence from the standard Comecon system of reserve
classification.
For the purposes of the present study the relevance of the
reserve position is the extent to which its perception by
Comecon planners influences energy planning as a whole and the
development of the indigenous oil and gas industry in particular.
On balance it can be said that the available reserves of
energy, unevenly distributed in Eastern Europe, allow very little
flexibility in planning at a time when the problem of increasing
the contribution of indigenous production to the changing energy
balance has become more urgent.
The Eastern European Oil and Gas Industries to 1975.
Table 4.6. details the produotion of major fuels in Eastern
Europe from 1971 to 1915. Examination of the trends in hydro-
carbon fuels reveals that only in the case of Romanian gas has
there been significant growth during this period, the remainder
of the countries showing minor gains or losses on generally low
levels of production. At the outset of the 1911-1915 plan
period decisions were taken that provided for a growing share of
188
TABLE 4.6. Eastern European Production of l'1a.jorFuels 1971-1975
!i!.h Hard Brown
Country Tear Oil Gas coar Coal(1'Qo0 (MCubic (i(5Q'O (i(5Q'O
tonnes) metres) tonnes) tonnes)
Bulgaria 1971 305 327 389 266201972 249 221 384 26893
1973 190 222 351 26459
1974 144 180 307 23998
1975 122 111 330 27515
Hungary 1971 1955 3705 3941 234841972 1977 4110 3671 22171
1973 1989 4821 3410 23371
1974 1997 5101 3209 22552
1975 2006 5175 3021 21867
GDR 1971 <100 2853 857 2628141972 < 100 5055 815 248416
1973 < 100 7012 753 246245
1914 < 100 1732 594 243468
1915 100 9000 539 246706
Poland 1911 395 5164 145491 345111972 347 5601 150697 38221
1973 392 5811 156630 39215
1974 550 5528 162202 39826
1915 553 5716 171625 39865
Romania 1971 13793 25605 6793 138081972 14128 26552 6612 16541
1973 14287 28005 7172 17679
1974 14486 28852 7109 19189
1975 14590 31510 1320 19111
Czechoslovakia 1911 194 1222 28818 84162
1972 191 1163 21925 84930
1973 171 1042 21779 81249
1974 149 916 21912 82165
1975 142 929 28819 86272
Sources: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV 1976,
pp.77-78.
United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1 .1 1 1 •
GDR oil and gas production, not reported in Comecon
or own statistical yearbook.)
J. Bethkenhagen "Bedeutung und M8g1ichkeiten des Ost-
West-Handels mit Energierohstoffen" (Deutsches Institut
fUr Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft 104) Berlin:
Duncker and Humblot 1975, pp.87, 90.
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oil and gas within the energy balance of each of the member-
countries: however the effect of price rises for oil imported
from the Middle East and, from 1st January 1975 from the Soviet
Union, have prompted Eastern European planners to look more
closely at the possibilities of raising indigenous production of
oil and gas.
BULGARIA
Bulgaria is exceptionally poorly endowed with energy
resources. According to a 1968 estimate some 82 per cent of
energy reserves consist of brown coal, of which two thirds are
concentrated in the Marbak-Iztok area: such reserves of hard
coal as do exist are said to be insignificant.48 The trend anti-
cipated in 1970 for the Bulgarian energy balance to 1980 is
detailed in table 4.7., and is based on the expectation of
increasing imports of oil and gas. It was estimated that demand
for oil would rise to 18-20 million tonnes and, calculations from
data in table 4.8. suggest that gas demand in 1980 would be of
the order of 8 billion cubic metres.49
The first significant discovery of oil in Bulgaria waS that
of the Tyulen field in 1954. Its reserves, estimated at ~.5
million tonnes, were exploited rapidly and the field reached peak
production in 1957, since when it has showed a gradual decline.
48T Khristov "Novi tendentsii v razvitieto na energetikata v
Bolgariya" Geografiya (So£11a) 1970, No.8, p.1.
49ibid• p.2.
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TABLE 4.7. Bulgarian Energy Ba1anoe 1960-1980 Estimated
in 1970 (%)
Fuel
Other (Hydro & Nuo1ear) 1.1
Solid Fuel, All Types 81.6
16.0Oil
Gas
Source: T I<hristov "Novi tendentsii v razvitieto na
energetika.ta v Bo1ga.riya" Geografiya (Sofiya)
1970 No.8, p.2.
In the early sixties the Gigen and Dolnyi-D,ybnik fields
were discovered, the former yielding a heavy, viscous orude oil,
the latter a light type. By the late sixties the Gornyi-D,ybnik
field had been added, and a single gas condensate field, the
Chiren, was disoovered in 1963.50 Oil refining beoame ooncen-
trated in two complexes, at P1even and Burgas. The crude oil
distillation capacity at Burgas in 1971 was 7 million tonnes per
annum, and this was sohedu1ed to rise to 12-13 million by 1975,
50(i) Maksakovskii "Toplivnye resursy •••" (1968), pp.135-137.
(ii) Lisichkin op.cit. pp.60-61.
The two major crude oils available in Bulgaria, Tyu1en and
Do1no-D,ybin, balance each other conveniently. Tyu1en is a heavy,
viscous oil of low sulphur content, and used primarily for the
production of fuel oil, bitumen and lubricants. Dolno-D,ybin is
light, and yields gasoline, kerosene, middle distillates and
naphtha. See V VJarinov IfRazvitie na nashata neftodobivna i
neftoprerabotvashcha promishlenost" P1anovo stopanstvo 1968
No.7, p.56.
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with the prospect of further expansion to 18-20 million by 1980.51
The relative scarcity of domestic reserves of oil prompted
Bulgarian planners to consider critically the uses to which
refined products were put. In particular evaluation of the role
of fuel oil in relation to coal illustrates planners' apprecia-
tion of the importance of maximising the output of light
products. Up to the early sixties practically all of Bulgaria's
gasoline and kerosene requirement was imported, mainly from the
USSR and to a lesser extent from Romania. The bulk of the output
of domestic refineries consisted of middle distillates and fuel
oil. By the late sixties it was intended to raise the produc-
tion of gasoline within total refinery output from zero (1958) to
20.5 per oent by 1975 and middle distillates from 22.5 to 28.2
per cent in the same period, counterbalanced by a fall in the
fuel oil share from 51.8 to 45.8 per cent. Balancing imports of
refined products would evidence a relative decline in two former
product groups and increase in the latter, but within a smaller
total product import requirement.52
Discovery in the early fifties of five gasfields during
exploration for oil gave some cause for optimism about further
development in Bulgaria. However the Chiren gas condensate
deposit was not brought into production until 1965. Chiren gas
was found to have a particularly high methane content (92 per
51X F Schappelwein "Die Energiewirtschaft der VR Bulgarien"
Osteuropa Wirtschaft 1974 No.1, p.52.
52Marinov op.cit. pp.78-80.
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cent), little impurity and an associated yield of 50 cubic
centimetres of low octane condensate per thousand cubic metres'
gas production, usable either in the manufacture of gasoline or
as petrochemical feedstock.53 On the basis of the availability
of methand and condensate from the Chiren deposit it was
decided to construct a petrochemical complex at Vratsa. In 1969
the Devetash gas field was discovered. Its gas was found to
contain 60-80 per cent methane, with an associated yield of 150
cubic centimetres of condensate per thousand cubic metres of
gas. As a result of this discovery it was estimated that
reserves in the categories A+B+Cl could be expected. to rise to
between 10 and 15 billion cubic metres by 1975, and that a
production level of 1 billion cubic metres could be sustained,
resulting in an increasing share of indigenous gas in the energy
balance. It was thought likely in 1970 that oil and gas,
accounting for 42 per cent of the Bulgarian energy balance in
1968, would rise to 60 per cent in 1975, with the prospect of
attaining 65-70 per cent in 1980.54 However the Bulgarian gas
industry has experienced rapid depletion during the 1971-1975
period, reflected in turn in declining production, and the long-
term position of gas in the energy balance is acknowledged to
depend on supply from the Soviet Union, facilitated by Bulgarian
provision of equipment and manpower in joint projects.
53G Pavlov "Gazovaya promyshlennost' Bolgarii" Gazovaya
promyshlennost' 1970 No.5, p.7.
54ibid• p.8.
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The effect of increased availability of gas has been that
of hastening the move away from fuel oil and of complementing
the use of coal in energy-intensive industries such as metallurgy
and power generation.55 During the 1971-1915 Bulgarian Plan
indigenous coal was directed for the most part into the fuelling
of power stations, this sector accounting for approximately 75
per cent of coal consumption, and it was felt at the end of the
Plan that reserves were still adequate to increase coal utilisa-
tion in this outlet.56 In contrast the discovery of new reserves
of oil and gas in this period was well behind the increase in
their consumption, and in view of the declining production of
each, increased import dependency was acknowledged as
inevitable.57 The balance between indigenous production of oil
and gas and quantities supplied for consumption from 1971 to
1975 is detailed in table 4.8. It can be seen that the total
available for 1975 is below that for 1974, evidencing the effect
of conservation measures introduced after the Soviet Union's
doubling of oil prices in February 1915, and reflecting a
generally pessimistio outlook for the oil and gas industries.
55ibid• p·2·
56I Kondov et al. "Razshiryavaneto na energiinata baza i
rastezhot na neinata efektivnost" Planovo stopanstvo 1916 No.2,~.
57ibid• p.37.
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TABLE 4.8. Availability of Oil and Natural Gas in Bulgaria
1971-1975
A. Oil ('000 tonnes)
.1.lli 12E 1m. .1.2H .1.212.
(
Indigenous ProdUction 305 249 190 144 122
Imports 7547 8279 9652 10629 10459
Availability 7842 8518 9742 10763 10581
Import Dependency (%) 96.2 97.2 99.1 98.8 98.8
Source: Statisticheskii ezhe~odnik stran-chlenov SEV 1216.
;e;e·18•2:2~·
B. Gas (M cubic metres)
121.l !.ill. 12ll .121.4. .1271
Indigenous Production 327 221 222 180 111
Imports 307 1185
Availability 327 221 222 487 1296
Import Dependenoy (%) 63.0 91.4
Souroes: Statieticheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV 1916.
p.78.
Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR 1915, p.121.
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HUNGARY
It is revealing to compare two estimates of the development
of the Hungarian energy balance, one written in July 1910, the
other in October 1916. Despite the substantial increases in the
\
price of imported oil between the times of the estimates, and the
logistic difficulties faced by the Soviet Union, Hungary's
principal oil supplier, the two estimates assign only slightly
differing shares to each fuel, as shown in table 4.9.
One of the factors that influences this is that Hungary,
whilst having no prolific reserves of anyone fuel, has limited
reserves of each, enabling planners to enjoy some measure of short-
term flexibility. Lisichkin estimates that Hungary would have 55
per cent self-sufficiency in energy in 1915 and that this would
be not less than 50 per cent in 1980.58
In the sixties there were a number of discoveries of oil and
gas in Hungary, including the relatively large Aldyo field, whose
annual production of 1 million tonnes of oil and 2 billion cubic
metres of gas was felt to be sustainable for 20 to ;0 years. In
1974 there was a total of 34 producing oilfields in Hungary.59 In
1970 there were 5 refineries in operation, the most complex being
the integrated petroleum and petrochemical plant at Sazhalombatta,
whose capacity was planned to reach 6 million tonnes per annum in
1975. The other major refinery is situated at Leninvaros, where
capacity of 6 million tonnes per year is planned for 1980. Total
58Lisichkin op.cit. p.65.
59ibid. p.66.
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Hungarian capacity is scheduled to rise from 10 million tonnes
per annum in 1915 to 16 million in 1980.60
On the other hand the Hungarian gas industry has shown a
\sUbstantial degree of growth during the 1911-1975 Plan, when an
increase of 49 per cent was recorded in 1915 over the 1970
level. The additional presence of the Soviet Union as a gas
supplier will be felt after 1918, when the major pipeline from
the Orenburg gas field is extended into Hungary. The availability
of oil and gas in Hungary in the period from 1971 to 1975 is
detailed in table 4.10.
Despite continued direction of capital and human resources
into exploratory work in the oil and gas sectors the prevailing
view at the outset of the 1971-1975 Plan was that Hungarian oil
production 'would peak at around 2 million tonnes per annum and
gas production at a little over 6 billion cubic metres, and that
without further discoveries of the size of the Aldyo field
production of each might start to decline by 1980. At the same
time however forward estimates for 1975 demand indicated a
requirement of 10 million tonnes of oil and 7 billion cubic
metres of gas, with the expectation that the rising trend would
61continue.
A significant feature of the Hungarian oil and gas industries
is that a level of capital investment in oil and gas development
6°Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975),
pp.165-166.
61V Bese "Hungary's Mineral Oil and Gas Industry" }'Ia.rketing
in Hungary 1971 No.4. p.10.
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TABLE 4.10. Availability of Oil and Natural Gas in Hungary
1971-1915
A. Oil ,(t 000 tonnes)
121.1. 1m. 1m !21! .!.ill
Indigenous Production 1955 1971 1989 1991 2006
Imports 4892 6065 6555 6811 8432
Availability 6847 8042 8544 8814 10438
Import Dependency (%) 11.4 15.4 76.1 71.3 80.8
B. Gas (M cubic metres)
zzzi .12.li 1m .121! 1212
Indigenous Production 3705 4110 4821 5101 5175
Imports 208 200 200 200 806
Availability 3913 4310 5021 5301 5981
Import Dependency (%) 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.8 13.5
Source: statisticheskii ezhe dnik stran-chlenov SEV 1 6
pp.78t 3 ~.
199
some 23 billion forints (60 per cent) higher in 1971-1975 than in
the previous five year period did not avert a decline in oil
62production, but brought about a rapid rise in gas production.
,The gas industry has therefore come to be regarded as the most
promising of the fuels industries for future development.
The inevitability of increasing imports of oil not only from
the Soviet Union but from OPEC producers prompted Hungary to
agree to collaborate with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the
'Adria' pipeline project (see Appendix A) faci.litating the supply
of oil from Kuwait. The agreement was reached before the price
rises of 1973-1974, when it was envisaged that OPEC oil might
account for 10-12 per cent of Hungary's oil demand.63 So high a
level is now thought unlikely, and Hungary came to view the Soviet
Union as much preferred supplier.64 Additionally it was decided
towards the end of the 1971-1975 Plan to attempt to arrest the
deolining trend in domestic production of coal,65 this helping to
compensate for the likelihood of static oil production at approxi-
mately 2 million tonnes per annum during the 1976-1980 period,
66of which half would be provided by a single field, the Aldyo.
As in the Soviet Union the relatively late development of
the gas industry and prospects for its further development have
62Lisichkin op.cit. p.67.
63NepszabadSag 10 January 1974, p.1.
6A__, ,'Nepszabadsag 8 February 1974, p.4.
65 " "Nepszabadsag 19 March 1975. pp.6-7.
6~ksakovskii
;pp.150-151.
"Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975),
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meant that there was some scope for alleviating the worsening
balance of supply and demand for oil. In 1970 it was estimated
that demand for gas would rise to 8-9 billion cubic metres by
1980.6~ Bearing in mind increasing domestic production and
greater delivery capacity for Soviet gaB, scheduled to become
operational in 1978, this figure could well be exceeded. Whereas
during the sixties gas was directed to the petrochemical sector
and to selected branches of industry, its UBe as a domestic
fuel increased during the 1971-1975 period, and this trend is
expected to continue.68 According to a recent Hungarian source
the emergence of gas within the energy balance from 1971 to 1975
has had the effect of substituting for the import of some 600
thousand tonnes of oil.69
The GDR
The energy sector of the GDR economy has been and remains
predominantly based on production and utilisation of brown coal.
Ultimate reserves of this fuel are put at 49 billion tonnes, of
which 25 billion are amenable to open-cast mining. Some 60 per
cent of brown coal reserves are concentrated in deposits whose
individual potential runs to over 200 million tonnes. The basic
disadvantages of brown coal are its low calorific value by
67T Garai "Razvitie gazovoi promyshlennosti Vengrii"
Gazovaya promlshlennostt 1970 No.5. p.10.
68r.1a.ksakovskii "Toplivnaya promlshlennostt ••• " (1975) I
pp.193-194.
69Ma.rketing in Hunga.;t"Y1917 No.3, p.2.
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weight (on average 2000 to 2800 kilocalories per tonne, or
approximately half that of hard coal), and high moisture content,
ranging from 45 to 65 per cent. Reserves of hard coal in the
-GDR total approximately 50 million tonnes, and are concentrated
in a single deposit at Zwickau. Production of hard coal in the
GDR has made a small and declining contribution to the energy
balance in the seventies.70
Exploratory work for oil and gas took place during the
sixties with limited success in the gas sector, where discoveries
were made in the Magdeburg area. However this find proved to be
disappointing, since the gas showed only a 30 per cent methane
content,71 this lowering the calorific value of the gas and
necessitating investment in further processing facilities.
The 1971-1975 Plan for the GDR, approved and adopted in
December 1971, provided for the allocation of some 30 per cent of
total industrial investment to the fuels and energy industries.
Output of brown ooal was scheduled to rise to 255 million tonnes
per year by 1975. Oil refining capacity was to rise from 10.6
million tonnes per year in 1970 to 18 million in 1975, by which
time it was also anticipated that deliveries of Soviet gas would
have commenced.72 Not only did GDR planners wish to bring about
70Lisichkin op.cit. p.69.
71H Wambutt "Planm!ssige Entwicklung der Energiewlrtschaft
der DDR" Einheit 1974 No.6, p.706. (The international average
is 60-80 per cent.)
72K Siebold "Die Aufgaben der Energiewirtschaft der DDR bei
der ErfUllung der Hauptaufgabe des FUnfjahrplanes" Energietechnik
1972 No. 12, p.534.
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greater use of oil and gas for reasons of energy efficiency, and
as the basis of the further development bf the petrochemical
industry, but they also anticipated growing problems in the
indigenous coal industry, not the least of which were that the
ratio of over-burden to recovered coal was estimated to be likely
to increase from 3.5:1 at the end of 1911 to over 5:1 by 1980,
and that consequent demand for water-cleansing facilities would
rise to undesirable levels.
During the 1911-1915 period oil production in the GDR
remained at a very low level in relation to imports and consump-
tion. The majority of supply was provided by the Soviet Union,
supplemented by small quantities from ~~ddle East producers. The
availability of oil in the GDR in this period is detailed in table
4.11. Whereas during the sixties the hydrogenation of brown coal
to produce petroleum products yielded about 1 million tonnes per
year, the process was abandoned as uneconomic by 1910.13 The
sole producing oilfield in the GDR is the Reinkenhagen, near the
Baltic coast, and the geology of this field has prompted the
commencement of offshore exploratory drilling.74 However
indigenous production of oil is not expected to make a significant
contribution to energy demand in the GDR in the short or long term.
In contrast the emergent though limited contribution and
potential of the indigenous gas industry, supplemented increasingly
by imports from the Soviet Union, has generated the major course
73petroleum Press Service, September 1973. p.337.
141isichkin op.cit. p.71.
203
TABLE 4.11. Availability of Oil and Natural Gas in the GDR
1911-1915.
A. Oil ('000 tonnes)
!2ll .1.2E 1.2ll 1.2l! .1m.
Indigenous Production neg. neg. neg. neg. 100
Imports 10919 14858 16045 16434 16991
Availability 10919 14858 16045 16434 11091
Import Dependency (%) 100 100 100 100 99.5
(neg. = negligible)
Source: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV 1916, p.371.
B. Gas (M cubic metres) .!2ll
Indigenous Production 2853
Imports 110
Availability 2963
Import Dependency (%) 3.1
5055 1012 1732 9000
5 160 2841 3226
5060 1112 10513 12226
0.1 9.8 26.9 26.4
Sources: Table 4.6.
Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV 1976, p.371.
V P Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' sotsiali-
sticheskikh stran Evropy" Moscow Nedra 1975. p.187.
203Q.
of change in the development of the GDR energy balance from 1911
to 1975, and is likely to make an increasing contribution in the
immediate future. Table 4.11. also details the availability of
gas in the GDR from 1911 to 1915. The most awkward problem faced
in utilisation of indigenous gas is that of extracting the
substantial quantities of nitrogen found in association with
methane. However despite this there are still savings to be
obtained from the use of gas, since in certain processes, for
example metal processing and glass manufacture, gas is up to 25
per cent more efficient as a fuel than brown coal, and there are
usually additional savings made in that gas-fuelled processes
are generally the least labour-intensive.15
Towards the end of the 1911-1915 period one East German
analyst pointed to two major considerations affecting the
development of the energy balance; firstly the increasing need
to reduce dependence on hitherto the major energy source,
indigenous brown coal, by expanding the use of natural gas, and
secondly inevitably increasing dependence on imports in order to
achieve greater efficiency in energy utilisation.76
An analysis of the GDR energy balance from 1960 to 1975 is
given in table 4.12., showing the increasing share of oil and gas.
Though between 1910 and 1975 the increase in percentage share is
similar for each, it should be borne in mind that the share of
75Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975), p.187.
76wambutt op.cit. pp.706-707.
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TAJ3LE 4.12. GDR Enersy Balance 1960-1975 (%)
Fuel Type 1960 .1.2§.2 121Q 1m
Solid Fuel 96.8 93.0 85.7 70.9
(of which, brown coal) (87.5) (84.2) (78.2) (65.0)
Oil 2.5 6.4 13.1 20.1
Gas 0.7 7.5
Nuclear 0.2 1.3
Other 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.2
Source: H Wambutt "Planmltssige Entwicklung der Energiewirtschaft
der DDR" Einheit 1974 No.6, p.706.
gas showed the majority of its increase between 1974 and 1975,
when deliveries commenced from the Soviet Union. The poor hydro-
carbon resource base has necessitated the use of oil and gas only
in those processes in which there is a substantial advantage
over coal. Thus, for example, some 83 per cent of electricity
generated in 1973 was fired on brown coa177 and it is intended to
continue the use of brown coal in such basic processes as power
generation and general industrial steam-raising. However there
are limits to the applicability of this policy in the medium term,
since the majority of reserves of brown coal are concentrated in
the Cottbus district (58 per cent), around Leipzig (25 per cent)
and Halle (12 per cent). Considerations of the impact on the
environment arising from further development of open-cast mining,
77G• Schirmer, J Wartenberg "Zur Rolle der Energiewirtschaft
im volkswirtschaftlichen Reproduktionsprozess - einige ausgewlthlte
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together with the expeotation of rising oosts of produotion are
gaining inoreasing influenoe amongst policymakers.78
It is nonetheless intended to arrest the decline in produc-
tion of brown coal and to attempt to maintain its produotion at
least at the 1975 level during the 1976-1980 Plan.79 The contri-
bution of nuclear power to the GDR energy balance during 1971-1975
was minimal: no substantial inorease is expeoted by 1980 on the
basis of developments carried out to 1975.
POLAND
By virtue of its extensive reserves of hard and brown ooal
and a highly developed mining industry Poland has & net energy
surplus, and is an established trader in ooal in Comecon and the
world market. Total explored reserves of hard coal are put at
200 billion tonnes, of whioh oategories A+B+Cl aooount for some
80 billion.80 The dominant role of ooal in the Polish energy
balance in the period 1961 to 1975 is detailed in table 4.13.
\
Consumption of oil and gas inoreased throughout the sixties as a
result of exploitation of indigenous reserves in the Central
Probleme" Wirtsohaftswissensohaft 1975 No.4. p.540.
7~yambutt op.cit. p.710.
79K Siebold "Effektiver Einsatz der Investitionen - ein
entsoheidender Faktor bei der Intensivierung der Kohle- und
Energiewirtschaft" !lergietechnik 1975 No.7. p.294.
80Lisichkin op.cit. p.87.
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TABLE 4.1}. The Polish Energy Balance 1961-1975 (ro)
~ 12.21 1.2§.l 12ZQ .1272
Coal 90.7 88.2 81.4 77.9
Oil 4.4 6.4 9.7 14.9
Natural Gas 1.4 2.3 6.3 6.7
Peat and Wood 3.4 3.0 2.0
Hydroelectricity 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5
Nuclear
Sources: (i) S M Lisichkin "Energeticheskie resursy i nefte-
gazovaya promyshlennost' mira" Moscow Nedra
1974. p.88.
(ii) J Bethkenhagen ~Die Zusammenarbeit der RGW-L!nder
auf dem Energiesektor" Osteuropa 'vIirtschaft1971
No.2, p.77.
Carpathian basin, but more significantly on account of imports
from the Soviet Union. Production of oil in Poland has grown
from 1971 to 1975, but still makes a relatively small contribution
to total energy supply. The dispersion of hydrocarbon resouroes
in Poland is given in table 4.14.
Exploratory work carried out during the 1911-1975 Plan was
oentred on the Carpathian basin. Greater suooess was gained in
the gas sector than in oil, and this prompted planners to favour a
81oonservationist policy in depletion of domestic oil reserves.
However the OPEC price rises, compounded by the Soviet price rise,
81Ma.ksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975),
pp.139-140.
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TABLE 4.14. Distribution of Polish Hydrocarbon Reserves
(Categories A+B+Cl) (%)
Na tural Gas
Polish Lowlands
Pre carpathian
Carpathian 2.2
Source: J Pilch "Stan i perspektywy rozwoju gOrnictwa
naftowego" Wiadomosci naftowe 1973 No.3, p.55.
neoessitated some re-thinking of this polioy. As far as the
internal logistic system permitted, it proved possible to raise
domestic production during the latter half of the 1971-1975
~lan. The Poles faced a similar problem to the Soviet Union in
seeking to raise oil production, namely that of underperformance
in the disoovery of new reserves,82 and also of high cost of
exploiting domestic oil, which on a standard fuel basis proves
to be ten times that of natural gas.83 The resultant
availability of oil and natural gas in Poland from 1971 to 1975
is detailed in table 4.15.
The growth of natural gas within the Polish energy balance,
both as a result of development of indigenous reserves and of
imports from the Soviet Union, has been only slight in comparison
82ibid. p.151.
83ibid. p.122.
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TABLE 4.15. Availability of Oil and Natural Gas in Poland
1911-1915
A. Oil ('000 tonnes)
1211 .1lli. .12ll !2l.4. 1..2ll
Indigenous Production 395 341 392 550 553
Imports 1894 9703 11140 10582 13306
Availability 8289 10050 11532 11132 13859
Import Dependency (%) 95.2 96.5 96.6 95.1 96.0
B. Gas (M cubic metres)
1211 .1lli. 12ll .1ru. 1212
Indigenous Production 5164 5601 5811 5528 5716
Imports 1493 1505 1715 2123 2516
Availability 6657 1106 7526 1651 8292
"..
Import Dependency (%) 22.4 ~1.2 22.8 21.7 30.3
Souroe: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV 1976,
pp.78, 386.
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with other Eastern European countries. At the outset of the
1911-1915 Plan it was estimated that the share of natural gas in
the energy balance would rise from 6 per cent in 1910 to 9 per
cent in 191584 out of a total energy demand rising from 132.8
million tonnes of standard fuel in 1970 to 146 million in 1915.85
The geographical distribution of planned production is given in
Table 4.16. The major influence on underfulfilment of the oil
production plan was that deeper drilling than originally
envisaged proved necessary in order to discover new fields and to
bring existing deposits into production, resulting in delays. In
the gas sector certain of the additional discoveries were found
to contain gas with a lower methane content than originally
anticipated. Gas from the Sudeten lowlands was found to have a
particularly high nitrogen content, and the correspondingly lower
level of methane extraction than anticipated has accounted for
a recorded shortfall against plan for gas production also.87
Only the desirability of and facilities for extraction of helium,
also present in Sudeten gas, renders exploitation of this field
economic. In view of the fact that availability of gas was lower
84ya Zhytka "Perspektivy razvitiya gazovoi promyshlennosti
Pol'shi" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1970 No.5, p.20.
85Lisichkin op.cit. pp.86, 88. (Note that the figure for
energy consumption in 1915 is given as 183 million tsf on p.86.
This is probably a misprint: the figure of 146 Mtsf is given on
p.88, where the figure of 183 Mtsf is shown as being that for 1980.)
86J Molenda "Rola gazu ziemnego w gospodarce Polski"
Wiadomosci naftowe 1913 No. 10, p.218.
81"Prospects for Polish Natural Gas 1975-1980" Gas World July
1974. pp.384-385.
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TABLE 4.16. Geographical Distribution of Planned Gas Production
in Poland, 1971-1975. (billicn cubic metres)
Region 1211. 1m.. 121l 1.21! 1.ill..
Carpa thians and 4.9 5.0 5.14 5.14 5.2
Carpathian Foothills
Sub-Sudeten Monocline 0.1 0.6 2.10 3.38 5.2
Other Lowlands 0.20 0.6
Total 5.0 5.6 7.24 8.72 11.0
Source: G.'3..S World Jul:! 121~1 E.28~.
than planned between 1971 and 1975, preferential allocation was
made to the petrochemical industry, where it was estimated that
some 3~74 billion cubic metres would be directed in 1975.88
The attractiveness of indigenous gas against oil is that
its production costs are on average substantially below those for
oil on a standard fuel basis.89 However in the aftermath of the
oil price rises there was a resurgence of interest in the
development of indigenous resources, the area thought most likely
to yield new oil and gas deposits being the Baltic oontinental
shelf. On 24 November 1975 a joint prospecting agreement was
signed by Poland, the GDR and the Soviet Union, under the terms
of which an organisation headquartered in Gdansk would coordinate
88Molenda 0E. cit. p.221.
89Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya Eromyshlenncst' ..." (1215), p.152.
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exploration in the Baltic Sea.90
Refinery capacity in Poland has shown an increase from 9
million tonnes per year in 1970 to 13.5 million in 1975, which
fully met Poland's need for refined products.91 At the end of
1975 there were 9 refineries in Poland, the largest being at
Plock, fed with Soviet oil, and at Gdansk, constructed specifi-
cally to process Middle East oil. The latter has been running at
below design capacity since it was commissioned prior to the
price rises of 1973/1974 when projections of future imports of
oil were based on considerably lower buying prices. During
1971-1975 the Polish refinery balance showed a predominance of
fuel oil, though its share during this period declined and given
the tightening balance between supply and demand for oil,
increasing motorisation within the economy and the growing need
for oil-derived feedstock for the petrochemical industry, the
trend towards maximising the production of gasoline, naphtha and
middle distillates that commenced in the early seventies is now
expected to intensify.92
Between 1971 and 1975 Poland did not face the problem of an
energy shortage: however there have been difficulties in the
domestic oil and gas industries which have been compounded by the
Soviet Union's inability to increase supply of oil and gas above
contractual commitments due to her own technical and logistic
90S10wo powszechne 27 November 1975, p.2.
91Lisiohkin op.cit. p.92.
92L Bednarz "Nowe perspektywy rozwoju przerobki ropy naftowej
w Polsce" Nafta (Krakow) 1973 No.5, p.193.
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problems. Poland faced particular difficulties at the time of the
1973 "oil crisis" and subsequently in that she was unable to
compensate for the immediate shortcomings by increasing imports
substantially from OPEC producers, and hence in the latter part of
the Plan was obliged to introduce measures for fuel, and
especially oil, conservation.
ROMANIA
Romania is particularly well provided with energy resources.
Total coal reserves are put at 6 billion tonnes, of which 3.7
billion consist of brown coal. Approximately 90 per cent of these
reserves are 'concentrated in the South-West of Romania in Oltenia.
This simplifies transportation, but poses increasingly difficult
problems of environmental deterioration. In 1970 open-cast mining
provided 33.8 per oent of ooal production. Brown coal is
predominantly used in electricity generation, and it was estimated
in 1974 that some 70 per cent of production during 1971-1975
would be directed to this use.93 Moreover in contrast with the
remainder of Eastern Europe the Romanian energy balance was based
largely on oil and gas from an early stage. From 1950 to 1965
indigenous oil and gas accounted together for over 70 per cent of
Romanian energy consumption.94 In the period from 1950 to 1970
93Lisichkin op.cit. p.93.
94ibid• 3.95. Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••"
(1975), pp._3-_4.
The early development of the Romanian oil industry is
covered in detail in M Pearton "Oil and the Romanian State
1895-1948" Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971. A brief analysis of
the development of the Romanian gas industry is given by F W
Carter "Natural Gas in Romania" GeographY April 1970, pp.214-220.
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investment in the oil and gas industries totalled 64 billion lei,
this being some 19 per cent of overall industrial investment.95
Total oil reserves are put at 100-130 million tonnes;96 reserves
of gas in the categories A+B+Cl at 212 billion cubic metres.91
During the sixties indigenous production of oil exceeded
domestic demand, and Romania was able to develop export trade in
refined petroleum products. However during the 1911-1915 period
production of oil did not increase significantly whereas demand
for refined products did. Moreover on the basis of expanding
exports of refined products and the anticipation that the pre-
crisis price for OPEC oil of 2-3 dollars per barrel would be
maintained in real terms, decisions were made to expand Romanian
refining capacity to 25 million tonnes per year in 1915.98
Extraction of natural and wellhead gas in Romania continued to
rise, recording a 31.6 per cent increase between 1910 and 1975.
The value of Romanian natural gas as a fuel is enhanced by its
exceptionally high metPane content, at 98 to 99.5 per cent the
highest in Comecon.99
95G Pacoste "Produc~ia ~Ii utilizarea ~i
naturale 'in RomB.nia't Ener tica Bucharest
96Lisichkin op.cit. 3,;30, Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya
prom;t:shlennostt..." (197J _ P. 129.
91Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya prom;t:shlennost'•••" (1915), p.195.
98petroleum Economist February 1917, p.73.
99(i) Carter op.cit. p.218.
(ii) M. Valais, M Durand "L'Industrle du Gaz dans Ie Monde"
Paris: Editions Technip 1975 (2nd edit.), pp.I-63.
(iii) f'lJ8.ksakovskii:'Toplivnaya.promyshlennost' ..." (1975),
p.19:2•
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Energy consumption in Romania rose from 22.8 million tonnes
of standard fuel in 1958 to 38.7 in 1965, with the expectation
that it would reach 78-80 million in 1980.100 The relative
importance of individual fuels in the energy balance from 1950 to
1970 is shown in table 4.17. The declining share of oil is
atypical of Comecon and is due to the fact that as a result of a
deteriorating ratio of reserves to production and of inability to
increase imports of oil from OPEC much beyond counterbalancing
exports of petroleum products, greater significance is now
assigned to gas. The pattern of supply of crude oil in Romania
is detailed in table 4.1ff.
The major part of Romanian development effort is being
directed towards the application of improved technology. which
can increase economically the amount of oil recovered from a
single field. By the end of 1975 the national average level of
recovery had reached 30 per cent of oil in place, the resultant
production level just covering domestic need. However in view of
depletion and a probable decline in the number of deposits
being worked it is estimated that a recovery level of 42 per
cent must be attained in the near future.101
For the most part Romanian oil is of the light, paraffinic
variety, suitable for maximum output of gasoline, naphtha and
100Lisichkin op.cit. p.94.
101G Pacoste, G Aldea "Preocupari pentru cre~terea factorului
final de recuperare la zacamintele de tifei din RS Romania"
Mine, Petrole pi Gaze 1975 No.4, pp.168-169.
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TABLE 4.17. The Romanian Energy Balance 1950-1970 (%)
Fuel l22Q l2..22 1960 llli 121Q
Coal 14.9 11.3 12.1 12.7 16.7
Oil 47.8 54.0 48.7 41.6 20.5
Gas 26.4 26.9 34.0 41.0 55.6
I'lood 9.5 6.4 4.1 3.1 1.6
Hydroelectricity 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.6 4.4
Sources: P W Carter "Natural Gas in Romania" GeoB!a,eh;y:A12rill~nO.12.220.
( vI V Herescu "Cre~terea economica pi consumul de
energie" Revista economica 2~L121~1 E.12.
TABLE 4.18. Availability of Oil in Romania 1971-1975 ('000 tonnes)
12ll .!.2li l2.ll 121! .!..211
Indigenous Production 13793 14128 14287 14486 14590
Imports 2858 2873 4143 4538 5085
Availability 15651 17101 18330 18924 19675
Import Dependency (%) 18.3 16.8 22.6 24.0 25.8
Source: Statisticheskii ezhe~dnik stran-ch1enov SEV 1216.
EE.181 2~1.
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102middle distillates. Planners' preference for a slowdown in
the rate of growth in consumption of oil as fuel so as to
facilitate its increased use as petrochemical feedstock was a
directing influence in setting the original targets for produc-
tion to 1975. It was intended that production in 1975 should be
13.1 to 13.5 million tonnes, or 98.5 to 101.5 per cent of the
1970 level, the rising demand for fuel being met by gas and coal.
However this target was raised prior to the ratification of the
1971-1975 Plan, which set the 1975 target at 14.5 million tonnes,
a figure which in the event was exceeded.103 Discussions on
energy policy prior to the formulation of the Plan for 1976-1980
indicated a similar preference for a low growth rate in oil
production. In 1974 the optimal level for oil production in 1980
was put at 15.5 million tonnes.104
Changes in the pattern of oil refining date from the early
sixties, when the Romanian petrochemical industry began to grow
and when the ratio of proven reserves to production commenced
its decline. From 1963 the refinery at Brazi underwent
considerable expansion, adding cracking and hydro fining capacity
and a powerforming unit providing greater output of high ootane
gasolines and naphtha. The refinery at Ploiesti was likewise~
expanded and modified such that output was similar to that of the
Brazi oomplex. A new refinery was built at Pite~ti, designed to
102Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975), p.140.
103ibid• p.145.
104Sctnteia 3 August 1974, p.2.
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process imported oil, whose sulphur levels were higher than
indigenous varieties.105 The resultant change in output of
refined products, in particular the substantial growth of middle
distillate production, is detailed in table 4.19. The demands
of the ohemioa1 and petroohemical industries have also been
instrumental in prompting the further rapid development of the
gas industry. The tenth Congress of the Romanian Communist
Party, held in 1969, foresaw a level of output in the chemical
industry in 1975 some 82-92 per cent above the 1965 level, and a
level of production of natural gas commensurate with the
\
expansion of this sector and with growth in demand for energy
generally in the range of 22-24 billion cubic metres, supple-
106mented by some 5 billion cubic metres of wellhead gas. In
fact domestic production of natural and wellhead gas showed a
growth of 7.6 billion cubic metres between 1910 and 1975, rising
from 24 billion to 31.6.107 There were no imports.
Though Romania has been able to pursue a policy of energy
autarchy up to 1975, the short-term position is one of tightening
supply, especially in the oil industry. Thus when OPEC increased
the price of oil in 1973 and 1974 Romania's decision to impose
conservation measures was prompted not by the threat of an energy
shortage, nor for reasons of an immediate currency drain in
105Pacoste "Produciia si utilizarea •••" (1971), p.258.,
106B Popa, T Mihailescu "Aspecte din dezvoltarea exploatarii
gazului metan 1n Romania" Petrol ,i gaze 1972 No.1, p.59.
107statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV 1976, p.78.
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TABLE 4.19. Changes in the Romanian Refinery Balance 1950-1970
('000 tonnes)
~ 1960 12.1Q
Gasoline 1502 2792 2786
Middle Distillates 731 2376 4979
Fuel Oil 1681 3824 4249
Lubricants 125 311 546
Bitumen 92 249 537
LPG 12 77 207
Aromatics 0.5 358
Source: G Pacoste "Producfia ~~ utilizarea -yijeiului ~i a
gazelor naturale 1n Romania" Energetica (Bucharest)
1971 No.6, p.229.
maintaining imports, since the cost of these was largely recouped
by the export of refined products. The point at issue was the
need to conserve domestic resources whilst the long-term impact
of higher Middle East oil price on future energy and chemical
trade policy was fully evaluated.108 Planners are conscious of
the fact that from 1960 to 1967 hydrocarbon discoveries were
believed to constitute some 86 per cent of reserves which
according to best available geological information were known to
exist,109 and the rehabilitation of coal has become a feature of
108V 'Boescu "Consumuri ctt mai reduse de combustibili pi
energie pe unitatea de produs" Revista economicS. 12/1975, pp.9-10.
109Maksakovskii "Toplivnaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975), p.150.
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Romanian energy planning which is likely to affect the short term
increasingly. It is felt that domestic reserves of coal are
sufficient to sustain a higher production level than the present,
and that the possibilities of joint developments in coal
production, both within and outside Comecon, will go some way
towards alleviating the difficulties that have arisen in the oil
110industry. The development of the Romanian energy balance
between 1970 and 1975 is outlined in table 4.20.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Czechoslovakia faces considerable problems in the short
term in energy policy. Reserves of each conventional fuel are
very limited, the basic one being coal, whose total reserves are
put at 13.7 billion tonnes at depths up to 1800 metres, including
6.5 billion below 1200 metres. The brown coal element of the
former figure is 8.2 billion tonnes, and it is felt that proven
reserves are sufficient to sustain anticipated production for
111several decades. Reserves of oil and gas are said to be
insignificant.112 The development of the Czech energy balance
110The Romanian government has gone so far as to enter into a
preliminary agreement with the American Occidental Petroleum
Company Ltd. to invest S50 million in developing a high grade
coal mine in Virginia USA. Possible output is 1 million tonnes
per year by 1980, by which time Romania would be entitled to one-
third of the output, with the option of buying a further one-
third. Petroleum Economist August 1975. p.313.
111Lisichkin op.cit. p.102.
112ibid• p.110.
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TABLE 4.20. The Romanian Energy Balance 1970-1975 (%)
Fuel-
Coal 21.1 21.0 20.8
Oil
Other 2.2
Gas
Source: J Bethkenhagen "Die Zusammenarbeit der RGW-Llnder •••"(1977), p.77.
between 1960 and 1970 is detailed in table 4.21., during which
time total consumption of energy rose from 61.9 million tonnes
of standard fuel to 90.6 million.113
Oil production in Czechoslovakia consists of the combined
output of a number of small fields, whose operations exhibit
high costs. Although oil is the highest cost fuel to be produced
in Czechoslovakia, its conversion efficiency in many industrial
114processes justifies its production. Following the opening of
the 'Friendship' pipeline in 1964 Czech imports of Soviet oil
grew rapidly, and throughout the 1971-1915 Plan Czechoslovakia
was the Soviet Union's largest purchaser of oil. Small
113KoZlov, Shmakova op.cit. p.2S.
11~sakovskii "Topliwaya promyshlennost' •••" (1975), p.1S,.
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TABLE 4.21. The Czeohoslovak Energy Balanoe 1960-1970 (%)
Solid Fuel 74.9
17 .8Oil
89.1
6.2
2.6Gas
Other 2.1
Souroe: /' '" "-' ,. '"K Houdek "Palivoenergetioka. z8.kladna CSSR v pate
petiletoe" Pla.novane hospodarstv! 1972 No.1, p.12.
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quantities were purohased from OPEC producers and during this
period Czechoslovakia agreed to oooperate with Hungary and
Yugoslavia in the development of the 'Adria' pipeline (see
Appendix A). The availability of oil in Czeohoslovakia is
detailed in table 4.22. There appears to be no prospeot of
inoreasing domestio production of oil in the short term: even
ourrent produotion might oontinue to deoline. Refinery oapaoity
in 1975 is put at 17 million tonnes per year, of whioh
refineries at Bratislava and Zaluzi account for the major part.
Gasoline and naphtha have beoome the priority produots.115
Produotion of natural gas in Czeohoslovakia has fluotuated
around an annual level of 1 billion oubio metres since the early
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TABLE 4.22. Availability of Oil and Natural Gas in Czechoslovakia
1971-1975
A. Oil ('000 tonnes)
l2ll l.2.R 121l lill. l2ll
Indigenous Production 194 191 171 149 1~2
Imports 11505 12571 14176 14665 15839
Availability 11699 12762 14347 14814 15981
Import Dependency (Cl) 98.3 98.5 98.8 99.0 99.1;0
lB. Gas Cr.I cubic metres)
1971 l.2.R 12ll lill. 12.7.2
Indip,-enousProduction 1222 1163 1042 976 929
Imports 1660 1957 - 2385 3256 3821
Availability 2882 3120 3421 4232 4750
Import Dependency (%) 57.6 62.1 69.6 83.3 80.4
Source: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran-ch1enov S}iJ'{ 1976,
PP. 78, 405.
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sixties, and now exhibits a declining trend. Imports from the
Soviet Union have increased during the 1971-1975 Plan and these
will rise substantially after 1978, when the pipeline from the
Orenburg field is scheduled for completion. The supply of gas
from 1971 to 1975 is also detailed in table 4.22. As in the case
of the oil industry, it is difficult to see how any increase in
indigenous production can be expected in the near future. During
the 1971-1975 Plan gas had the lowest production cost of any
domestic fuel: unfortunately the poor ratio of reserves to pro-
t' 116duc lon prevents further expansion.
In a recent work published in Canada the Czech emigre
economist B Korda points to the economic mechanism itself as the
root cause of Czechoslovakia's energy problems.117 Korda draws
attention to the fact that the level of primary energy consump-
tion is high in relation to final consumption, that is to say
that the economy exhibits low conversion efficiency in the major
118energy-intensive processes. He attributes this to excessive
reliance in the past on domestic coal, a policy which in his view
was motivated by Stalin's desire to decrease Czechoslovakia's
trade with the capitalist world, which included imports of
relatively cheap West German hard coal.119 He argues that since
116ibid. p.189.
117B Korda "Economic Policies and the Ener
slovakia" The ACES Bulletin Vol.XLVII No.2
pp,3-26.
118ibid• e.s.
119ibid• p.~.
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neither the Soviet Union nor the rest of Comecon could replace
the West as a trading partner, Czechoslovakia had no option but
to develop domestic coal regardless of cost, given the limita-
tions on oil and gas supply from the Soviet Union. Even ~hen
the Soviet export surplus returned in the late fifties, he
argues, contract quantities were insufficient to meet potential
demand, and hence Czechoslovakia retained a coal-based energy
economy.
The price rises imposed by OPEC and the Soviet Union had a
particularly strong impact on Czechoslovakia, and the need to
cut plans for the import of oil from the former source was
120acknowledged by a Czech energy planner in 1914. Imposition of
energy conservation measures had some immediate effect in
improving conversion efficiency through elimination of the more
obvious wasteful practices, but the main effect of the price
rises, particularly those imposed by OPEC, was that of engendering
greater interest on the Czech part in joint development of Soviet
resouroes, and in nuclear power, which Korda sees as the best
and most likely solution in the long term.121 However in the
short term the problem is particularly severe, and in order to
meet rising energy demand there is no alternative to the further
development of the domestio coal industry, despite increasing
production costs and implications for the environment entailed
120 'v , /1914J Kures in Hospodarske noviny 50,
121Xorda op.cit. p.21.
p.15.
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. t .. 1221n open-cas m1nlng.
The development of the Czech energy bnlance from 1970 to
1980 is outlined in table 4.23. The difference between the share
of oil anticipated in 1972 and the final share highlights the
effect of the price rises: however- the percentages understate
the absolute decline, in that a lower total energy consumption
than envisaged was recorded. The low share of gas reflects the
difficulties experienced in domestic production and the inability
of the Soviet Union to deliver in excess of contracted quantities
due to her own difficulties in gas production.
Oil and Gas in E'lstern Europe to 1975: An Overview
Eastern Europe is facing considerable dirficulty in gearing
supply and demand for oil and gas within the energy balance,
though each country experiences this to a different extent and
has varying opportunities for solving the problem. Between 1971
and 1975 they have been able to do little to counter the effect
of the OPEC and Soviet oil price rises and this WaS a~gravated by
the Soviet Union's inability to raise production and exports· subs-
tantially to E.<tsternEurope after the opse rises. As suggested by
Korda and Moravcik,123 a policy of modernising productive capacity,
such that industrial output might be increased by improving the
efficiency of existing facilities r-rther than by the installation
122K Houdek "Uspory energie jako predpoklad rozvoje
" , V! ' , " v .f' 1974 N 8 27 28narodnlho hospodarstv" Planovane hospodarstv~ 0 ,pp.- .•
123Korda, Moravcik OPe cit. pp.13-14.
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TABLE 4.2;. Czechoslovak Energy Balance 1910-1975
Fuel .1.21Q 12ll 1212 Antici- .!212.pated Actual
Coal 14.9 68.; 6;.1 65.9
Oil 17.8 2;.9 26.8 24.6
Gas 3.3 4.6 5.4 5.9
Other 4.0 ;.2 4.1 3.6
Sources: (1970 and 1975 Antici12ated) K Houdek "Palivo-
energeticka zakladna dSSR v pate petiletce" Planovana
'11 !hospodarstv 1212 No.1, p.12.
(1913 and 1915 Actual) J Bethkenhagen "Die Zusammen-
arbeit der RGW-utnder •••" (1977), p.77.
of further energy-intensive processes, may be the best option to
counteract tightening supply an4 rising prices. However if such
a policy were adopted, it would have little effect on the short-
term position. Whereas Eastern Europe has sustained a serious
blow from the price rises of October 191; to February 1975, on
balance the economic impact has been measurably less serious than
on industrialised countries elsewhere. In accepting a greater
commitment of resources to the development of Soviet energy
reserves Eastern Europe does at least have the opportunity of
securing a high level of self-sufficiency in the medium term.
The acceptance of credits from the Soviet Union will help
to offset the effect of the oil price rise. Though this puts the
Eastern European countries in a more dependent position opposite
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the Soviet Union the policy is less harsh than dealing with OPEC.
Writing in 1974 the American analyst J R Lee indicates that the
import of 50 million tonnes of OPEC oil at then current prices
would impose a bill of S2.5 billion on Eastern Europe.124 He
suggests that a limit of 20 million tonnes can be expected, this
125level necessitating negotiation of substantial trading credits.
The question of the options open to Eastern European energy
planners is addressed in the following two chapters.
124J R Lee "Petroleum Supply Problems in Eastern Europe", in
'Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of
Eastern Europe' Washington D C: US Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, 1974, p.417.
125ibid.
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Chapter 5. The Comecon Oil and Gas Industries 1976-1980
The energy economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
entered a period of substantial change in the course of their
1911-1975 Plans. The Soviet Union maintained discovery of
substantial reserves of coal and gas but although ultimate
reserves of oil are believed to be extensive, there are clear
indications that reserves in the categories A, B and Cl are not
being discovered and upgraded sufficiently rapidly. Reserves
of energy resources in these categories are now located
predominantly in the Arctic North and in Siberia, and almost all
growth in production in the 1916 to 1980 period is scheduled to
be provided by operations located in these areas, this posing
increasingly severe problems in exploration, transportation and
storage due to the inhospitable nature of the terrain and
climate. In 1975 the Soviet Union exported 130 million tonnes
of crude 011 and refined products, and the trend over the period
from 1971 to 1975 shows a steady increase in deliveries to
Comecon and the world market. Large-scale export contracts for
natural gas were negotiated during this period and the build-up
of gas trade is seen in the last two years of the ninth Plan.
The Soviet Union benefited from the increased world market price
for oil in the aftermath of the events of 191~ and 1974 when
there seemed to be some doubt as to the future of Soviet
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produotion and export oapacity. Soviet energy consumption grew
at some 5 per oent per year during the ninth Plan and the
majority of the inorease in demand was met by oil and parti-
oularly gas.
Eastern European oountries reoriented their energy economies
from predominant reliance on coal to imported oil and gas at a
time when their buying prices from the Soviet Union and other
suppliers inoreased substantially. Though prices for imports
from the Soviet Union are still below the world price, they will
move closer to the latter under the terms of a revised pricing
formula for intra-Comecon deliveries of raw materials negotiated
in 1915. Total energy consumption in Eastern Europe grew by some
4 per cent from 1971 to 1975, but within this trend demand for
oil and gas grew at a rate of 10 per cent.
The demands imposed on the energy industries relate to the
rate of development of the Comecon economies as a whole. The
striking feature of the Soviet Plan for 1916-1980 is the general
slowdown in rates of growth in most sectors. The industrial
growth rates are the lowest recorded, but this is counter-
balanoed by ambitious (and necessary) plans for reoovery in the
agrioultural sector. The general direction of the Soviet Plan
for 1916-1980 is given in table 5.1., and of the fuels industries
in table 5.2. At first sight it appeared that without improve-
ments in energy oonversion efficiencies necessary to decelerate
further the rate of increase in demand for fuels, especially
oil, not only in the Soviet Union but also in Eastern Europe,
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TABLE 5.1. The Framework of the Ninth and Tenth Soviet
Five-Year Plans
1971-1975 Plan 1976-1980 Plan
Sector (1970 = 100) (1975 = 100)
Plan Actual
National Income 138.6 128 126
Industrial Output 147.0 143 137Producer Goods 146.3 145 140
Consumer Goods 148.6(1) 138(1) 131(1)Agricultural Output 121.7 113 116
Total Investment 141.6(1) 139(1) 125(1)
Sources: A Nove The Times 5 January 1976 p.14.
J D Park, R A Clarke ABSEES (Special Section)
July 1976 p. (i).
(1)Quinquennium as % of previous quinquennium.
TABLE 5.2. Direction of Soviet Fuel and Energy Production
1970 to 1980
353 505 491 620-
640
139.1
1980P as %
of 1975A
131.0(1)
128.3(1)
Electricity
(billion kWh)
Oil and Gas
Condensate
(million tonnes)
Natural Gas
(billion cubic
metres)
Coal
(million tonnes)
121Q. 1975P 1975A 1980P 1975Aas %
of 1970
740 1065 1038 1340- 140.2
1380
198 320 289 400-
435
144.5
624 695 701 790-
810
112.3
Source: Park, Clarke op.cit. p. (ii).
(1)percentage calculations based on mid-point of range.
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growth in Soviet exports of oil and refined products to the West
would be unlikely and that apparent opportunities for increasing
earnings of hard currencies would have to be foregone.1
In Eastern Europe the 1911-1915 Plans for growth of net
material product were fulfilled or exceeded. However the case
of the aggregate industrial Plan of Bulgaria is an exception,
where an underfulfilment is recorded. Generally in Eastern
Europe domestic production of energy fell short of Plan targets
and overall growth rates were below those attained in the sixties.
An actual decline in production of oil and gas was experienced
in some oountries, resulting in the need to utilise more coal
than initially envisaged in order to maintain deliveries of oil
and gas feedstocks to the petrochemical industry. During 1915
the annual rate of growth in all Comecon countries showed a
decline over the previous year: the growth rate of aggregate
net material product in Eastern Europe declined from 8.3 per
oent in 1914 to 1 per cent in 1975. The major indicators of
economic development in Eastern Europe for 1971 to 1975 together
with targets for 1980 are detailed in table 5.3., and evidence
slower rates of growth in the period from 1916 to 1980 in all
countries except Bulgaria.
The need for energy conservation Is highlighted in the Plans
of all countries, reflecting the poor prospects for increased
indigenous production of energy throughout the bloc. In view of
1A Nove, in 'The Times' 2 January 1976, p.14.
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the enhanced opportunities for earnings from the export of fuels
and the increasing need of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
to import \1estern technology, energy conservation might have
become a feature of economic development in Comecon even without
the difficulties experienced in production between 1911 and 1915.
The American analyst M Slocum, writing at the end of 1914,
goes so far as to state that "the energy situation in the Soviet
Union poses a serious dilemma: in order to sustain planned
economic growth, the Soviet Union will have to progressively
increase the imports of oil and gas from the ~liddle East area,
will have to import technology, and will have to obtain immense
investment credits".2 She goes on to contend that "the demand
for fuel and energy has been greater than supply for a number of
years",3 and that this has resulted in "skyrocketing energy
shortages in•••industrialised areas".4 Moreover the difficulties
encountered by the Soviet Union in energy development are said
to have prompted the Soviet executive into "trying desperately
to penetrate Western trade barriers", which would "unquestionably
give the West added bargaining power in the negotiation of trade
agreements with the Soviets and provide a basis for requiring
assurance of alternative modes for the repayment of loans by the
Soviet Union".5
2Narianna Slocum "Soviet Energy: An Internal Assessment"
Technology Review October/November 1974, p.17.
3ibid• E·2~.
4ibid• E·22·
5ibid• :2:2.22. ~2.
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A somewhat different and less categorical analysis was
written in 1976 by the British economist Phi~ip Hanson.6 The
object of his enquiry is to discover why "in the past few years •••
the Soviet energy balance has begun to seem precarious".7 He
stresses that towards the end of the ninth Soviet Plan energy
policy shifted to favour the rehabilitation of coal, facilitated
by sUbstantial development effort in the Ekibastuz and Kansk-
Achinsk ooalfields, and to include a nuclear power station
construction programme for European Russia and the Ural region
that provides for a nuclear component of 13-15 million kilowatts
out of a total of 67-10 million kilowatts scheduled for
completion during the tenth Plan.8 This, coupled with a general
slowdown in rates of economic growth in the tenth Plan compared
with the ninth, he sees as being calculated to ease the pressure
that has built up in the oil sector. His conclusion is that
the planned increase of energy supply is adequate to sustain the
economic growth rates in the tenth Plan, though there will be a
shift to less efficient fuels, incurrence of very high costs
in developing Siberia and perhaps the import of significant
(unquantified) amounts of Middle East oil, but that the energy
problems of the Soviet Union and the West "are not sufficiently
awful to ensure peace and goodwill between Moscow and Washington". 9
6p Hanson "The Soviet Energy Balance" Nature, 6 fJf.ay1976,
pp.3-5.
7ibid• p.3.
8ibid. pp.3-4.
9ibid. p.S.
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A further Western perspective is that of the American
analysts E E Jack, J R Lee and IIH Lent.10 They point out that
the Soviet Union is the sole industrialised nation in the world
to have self-sufficiency in energy and that this position is
likely to be maintained "for the foreseeable future".11 The
authors feel that the 1980 production target for coal can
probably be met without great difficulty, whereas the "ambitious"
targets for oil and gas production are not likely to be achieved,
this resulting in a shortfall of 2 to 5 per cent of planned
energy production and necessitating the imposition of energy
conservation me~sures or adjustment in foreign trade.12 Alter-
natively they suggest that in the event of lags in the Soviet
economy as a whole the overall supply and demand balance in the
energy sector could be maintained.13
A report of the American Central Intelligence Agency con-
cerned specifically with future oil production was published in
April 1911.14 The report concludes that as a result of techno-
logical baokwardness the point at which the Soviet Union can prove
sufficient reserves to offset depletion and to add to existing
10Einily E Jack, J Richard Lee, Harold H Lent "Outlook for
Soviet Energy" in 'The Soviet Economy in a New Perspective'
Washin ton D Cl US Con ess Joint Economic Committee 1 6
pp.4 0-418.
11ibid. pp.460-461.
12ibid. p.472.
13ibid• p.473.
14Central Intelligenoe Agency of the USA "Prospects for Soviet
Oil Production" \vashington: CIA April 1977 (9pp.).
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production has been passed and that production of oil and gas
condensate will peak "possibly as early as next year (1978) and
certainly not later than the early 1980s".15 This, the report
argues, will result in the Soviet Union's entry into the world
petroleum market as a competitive purchaser of OPEC oil, since
the effect of fuel substitution will be minimal in the short
16term.
It will be seen from the aforementioned analyses that there
exists a considerable range of opinion on the prospects for
Soviet energy development in the tenth Plan not only in relation
to growth targets but to future trade patterns. The question of
trade is dealt with in Chapter 6 of this thesis: the purpose
of the present chapter is to examine the above analyses in the
light of the Soviet and Eastern European perception of the energy
problem in general and the oil and gas industries in particular,
considering the likely development of the Comecon energy balance
to 1980 as suggested by the performance of the fuels industries
up to mid-1977.
A detailed study of the methodology of energy planning in
the Soviet Union was produced in 1973 by the Energy Institute of
17the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk.
Though the work is concerned primarily with alternative methods
of energy analysis and planning, involving the use of complex
15ibid• p.9.
16ibid•
17A A Makarov, L A Melent'ev "Metody issledovaniya i optimiza-
tsii energeticheskogo khozyaistva" Novosibirsk Nauka 1973.
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linear programming techniques, the authors do offer some perspec-
tive of the short-term trend in the Soviet energy balance. They
stress that there exists a substantial differenoe between energy
demand in European Russia and the Eastern regions. The former
accounts for the majority of hydrocarbon consumption: the share
of coal in the European area's energy balance in 1910 was 20 per
cent and this is expected to fall to 5-1 per cent by the end of
the century, assuming successful development of the nuclear
power programme. In contrast Siberia and the Trans-Baikal areas
have 60 per cent of energy consumption in the form of coal and
a further 10-15 per cent in the form of fuelwood, with the
likelihood that this will be maintained. The authors argue that
smaller consumers will utilise natural gas, distillate fuels and
fuel oil, since they do not enjoy the same economies of scale
in conversion of coal as, for example, power stations. In the
long (unspecified) term, the authors state, oil and gas will be
produced from deposits in the Lena-Vilyuy area and the Irkutsk
oblast', that is to say, they view the development of East
Siberian oil and gas as essential to support the long-term
18development plans envisaged during the ninth Five-Tear Plan.
A later Soviet analysis of the energy balanoe points to its
intrinsic tautness, and outlines the extent to which conserva-
tion measures in electrioity generation have contributed to a
more rational use of fuel.19 On a different plane it is
18ibid. pp.30-31.
19p Neporozhnii "Perspektivy Sovetskoi energetiki" Planovoe
khozyaistvo 1975 No.8, pp.42-49. Neporozhnii stresses that at
the outset of the ninth Plan generation of 1 kWh of electricity
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suggested that attempts to determine an optimal energy balance
are subject to a number of factors that are not only essentially
difficult to predict but which also exhibit a tendency to
fluctuate, such as export prices. The criterion of comparative
initial financial outlay must also be tempered by consideration
of the effect of change in the various branches of the economy
on demand for individual fuels.20 This analysis concludes that
in view of the tightening balance between supply and demand the
prime objective should be that of securing maximum flexibility
in the choice of fuel amongst the larger users, for example
power stations, to the extent that a short-term interfuel switch
becomes possible, suggesting that such a policy could be
initiated in the Volga-Ural region, where coal, natural gas and
fuel oil are freelyavailable.21
However despite the Soviet planners' preference for securing
as flexible an energy policy as possible the scope that exists in
the technical sense is somewhat limited when the economic
dimension is considered. Soviet planners bear in mind that
whereas the long-term delivered cost of Siberian oil and gas is
expected to be lower than alternative conventional fuels in
needed an input of 366 grammes of standard fuel. The target for
1974 was 345 groa., which was achieved. An input of 341 gros.was
anticipated by the end of 1975.
20A Vlgdorchik et al. "Metody optimizatsii dolgosrochnogo
razvitiya topllvno-energeticheskogo kompleksa SSSR" Planovoe
khozyaistvo 1975 No.2, pp.29-37.
21ibid• p.37.
2~9
22European Russia, the potential for export earnings, primarily
in \{estern Europe, has had a substantial influence on decisions
as to the rate at which Siberian resources have been developed,
since the long-term policy is to depress demand for conventional
fuel in European Russia through the expansion of nuclear
power.23 Whereas a relatively minor role has been assigned to
nuclear power in the short term, nonetheless assumptions oon-
cerning the level and timing of its contribution have a marked
influenoe on short-term decisions ooncerning production and
utilisation of conventional fuels. It is likely that the effect
of nuclear development in the Soviet Union will not be felt
before the mid-eighties, when nuclear power could account for 25
per oent of electrioity produced.24 Therefore a policy of
relatively rapid depletion' of coal, and to a lesser extent of
gas reserves can be undertaken. However the high initial cost
of such a polioy can, it seems, only be offset by inoreased
assistanoe, human, material and financial, from interested
outsiders, fellow members of Comeoon, Japan and the USA.
22V A Shelest indicates that oil and gas production oosts will
eventually be 2 to 4 times and coal 6 to 8 times lower in Siberia
than in European Russia. "Regional'nye, energoekonomicheskie
problemy SSSR" Moscow Nauka 1975. p.205.
23Makarov, Melent'ev op.cit. p.24.
24Development and plans for Soviet nuolear power generation
are outlined by A Albonetti "La Situation Energetique et
Nucleaire en Union Sovi'tique", in 'Round Table on the Exploita-
tion of Siberia's Natural Resources' Brussels: NATO 1974.
pp.113-120. See also P R Pryde "Nuolear Energy Development in
the Soviet Union", paper presented to a Conference on Soviet and
FAst European energy problems, University of Alberta, MAy 1977.
13pp. !1imeo.
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Oil Developments in the Soviet Union 1976-1980
The initial target for oil production in the Soviet Union
in 1980 was given in the basic outlines for the tenth Five-Year
)
Plan released in December 1975, and it was put at 620 to 640
million tonnes.25 The final target was subsequently confirmed
at 640 million.26 Other data relating to the oil industry were
that time spent in proving new wells was to be cut by 25 to 30
per oent, utilisation of wellhead gas was to be raised to 43-45
billion cubio metres and primary refining capacity increased by
25 to 30 per cent, with increasing emphasis on the production
of high octane gasoline, aviation fuel and low-sulphur
distillates.27
The target for oil production in West Siberia in 1980 was
set at 300 to 310 million tonnes,28 this meaning that Siberia
would account for the total net increase in production. At the
outset of the tenth Plan the Soviet Oil Minister, V D Shashin,
called for a substantial transfer of exploratory effort to West
Siberia and the Baltic and Caspian offshore areas.29 He pointed
out that during the ninth Plan the Samotlor oilfield in West
Siberia accounted for an average increase in production of 16
million tonnes and that a corresponding figure of 8 million was
25pravda 14 December 1975, p.2.
26Izvestila 28 October 1976, p.,.
27Pravda 14 December 1975. p.2.
28ibid• p.6.
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anticipated during the tenth Plan,30 hence discovery of fields
of the size of Samotlor would be necessary in order to offset
depletion. To complement production developments in West Siberia
the Timan-Pechora area of the Komi ASSR was scheduled to contri-
bute some 25 million tonnes in 1980 and in the Perm oblast' a
f
1980 production level of 30 million tonnes was foreseen, this
latter figure representing a 7 million tonne increase on 1975.31
The role of oil in the energy balance was reappraised in
the light of problems encountered during the ninth Plan. Since
reserves of coal exceed those of oil and to a lesser extent gas,
it was decided to give preference to the use of coal as a boiler
and furnace fuel, saving oil for maximum production of gasoline
and naphtha and gas for use as fuel in highly critical processes
and as petrochemical feedstock. Accordingly it was intended
that the share of oil in the energy balance should remain at the
level reached in 1975, perhaps even showing a slight fall,
through to 1980.32 Conservation of hydrocarbon fuels had thus
become a guiding principle.
Whereas the average annual growth rate of oil production in
the Soviet Union between 1966 and 1970 had been 7.5 per oent,
the rate decreased to 6.8 per cent between 1971 and 1975. To
meet the final 1980 production target of 640 million tonnes an
average annual growth rate of 5.4 per cent is required. Moreover
30EkonomicheSkaya gazeta 22/1976, p.4.
311J!g.
32I Ta Vainer "Neftyanaya promyshlennost' v desyatoi pyati-
letke" Neftyanik 1976 No.5, p.2.
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the rate of growth required to meet the target for 1916 was 5.9
per cent on the 1915 figure. Therefore lower annual growth
rates are anticipated by the end of the tenth Plan.
The problem of depletion in oilfields looated in the Western
\ areas has oomplioated the planning prooess, in that West Siberia
is now being developed at a rate well in excess of that whioh
had been previously judged optimal. Towards the end of the ninth
Plan Soviet geologists foreoast an optimal production level of
230 to 260 million tonnes per year from West Siberian operations
by 1980, and oil industry planners gave their estimates of
optimal levels as 210 million tonnes in 1980, rising to 330 in
1990 and to 360-380 by the year 2000.33 The target finally
adopted for 1980 has long-term implications for produotion which
require action during the tenth Plan. It is thought that growth
rates for West Siberia in the tenth Plan, if aohieved or
exoeeded, are unlikely to be soaled down subsequently. Therefore
inoreased exploratory effort will be required up to 1980 in order
to ensure the oontinued oapacity of West Siberian operations to
provide the higher produotion levels that are likely to be planned
in the eighties.}4 The implioation of the target set for West
Siberia in the tenth Plan, in the Soviet view, is that a produc-
tion level of 500 million tonnes per year will be reaohed by 1990
33Z Ibragimova "Tyumenskii kompleks i ego budushchee"
Ekonomika i orgapizatsila Eromyshlennogo proizvodstva 1976 No.5,~.
34ibid• p.9.
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with a consequent and commensurate requirement for logistic
development.35
The dislocating effect of the rapid development of West
Siberia is well illustrated in the case of the Samotlor oilfield.
The production target originally envisaged for 1975 was 60.6
million tonnes: however as a result of production shortfalls
elsewhere in the Soviet Union during the ninth Plan the final
level in Samotlor was 86.5 million.36 This 34 per cent over-
fulfilment was reflected in a capital requirement some 12 per
cent above Plan and necessitated the application of temporary
measures to boost production, including a higher level of water-
flooding than anticipated and resulting in a deteriorating
ratio of recovered oil to water.37 The rate of depletion of the
Samotlor oilfield is one of the most decisive factors
influencing plans for production beyond 1980. Newly discovered
fields in West Siberia are so far proving to be .considerably
smaller than the Samotlor field, and it is estimated that in
the course of the tenth Plan it will be necessary to bring on
stream seven new fields per year. including the discovery of at
least one field of the size of Samotlor, compared with a total of
sixteen fields in the ten years to 1975.38 The scale of the
35ibid• p.20.
36R I Kuzovatkin "Front i tyl Samotlora" Ekonomika i organi-
zatsiya pro~shlennogo proizvodstva 1976 No.6, PP.78t 80.
37ibid• p.81.
38Pravda 11 June 1975, p.3.
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problem is such that some two thirds of a target increase in
production capacity of 100 million tonnes per year between 1976
and 1980 will serve to offset the effects of depletion in
existing operations.39 This has prompted Soviet planners to
consider more seriously than hitherto the production potential
of East Siberia. Whilst small quantities of oil and gas have
been produced in East Siberia since the early sixties, the true
potential of the region is unknown: however geologists are
apparently more confident of finding further oilfields of the
size of Samotlor in East rather than in West Siberia.40 It is
thought that offshore exploratory activity in the Baltic and
Caspian Seas, stated to be a priority for the tenth Plan, will
not begin to provide additional quantities above current levels
before 1980. Lack of appropriate drilling equipment is the
principal problem. For example in Caspian offshore operations
drilling equipment is adequate to probe only up to 60 metres
below the sea bed, whereas the major deposits of oil are to be
found between 60 and 200 metres. This has meant that approximately
half of the exploratory wells sunk so far have had to be
abandoned due to the inadequacy of production technology.41 The
extent of the problems faced in offshore drilling technology is
highlighted by consideration of the efforts devoted to extracting
oil from wells previously abandoned as uneconomic. For example a
39Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 22/1976, p.4.
40Sotsialisticheskaya industriya 13 September 1974, p.2.
41Vyshka 16 January 1976, p.2.
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novel method of oil extraction has been developed in order to
re-work some of the oilfields in the Baku area. This process
involves the excavation of underground caverns and the installa-
tion of drilling and pumping equipment, such that crude oil can
be 'mined', stored temporarily underground and then pumped to
the surface through conventional pipelines.42 Further examples
of the re-working of abandoned wells are to be found in the
Caucasus area, Central Asia and Kazakhstan.43
The question of exploration and utilisation of gas condensate
is recognised as being of increasing importance during the tenth
Plan. When the Urengai field comes into full production in 1978
substantial amounts of condensate will be available. At the
moment its role is not fully defined by Soviet planners. During
the ninth Plan production remained at a relatively low level and
was not increased towards the end of the Plan to counteract
underperformance in the oil and gas industries. The immediate
benefit of gas condensate is that apart from its high calorific
value it needs little processing before it can be used either in
the manufaoture of gasoline or as petrochemical feedstock, and
requires considerably lower incremental investment than that
needed to derive the same final product from orude oil.44 The
42Sotsialisticheskaya industriya 29 July 1976, p.2.
43N A Mal'tsev "Itogi i zadachi" Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1977
No.3, P.j.
44Pravda 12 June 1975. p.;. A recent Soviet paper on the
development of gas condensate states that reserves are
sufficient to permit a "sharp increase" in production in the
availability of condensate will alleviate slightly the pressure
on demand for oil towards the end of the tenth Plan.
The oil production plan for 1976-1980 is outlined in table
5.4., in which the growing importance of West Siberia is
evident.45 It is recorded that West Siberia produced some 3
million tonnes above its target for 1976, the Samotlor oilfield
accounting for some 110 million tonnes of total West Siberian
production.46 The net increase in production in 1976 compared
with 1975 was 5.9 per cent and the Plan for 1977 called for a
further increase of 5.7 per cent, this evidencing a steady
production increment and a slightly declining rate of growth, as
anticipated, towards 1980. Production in certain older fields
continued to show an expected decline.
In addition to the overfulfilment of Plan by the Tyumen'
oil and gas production association (Glavtyumenneftegaz), the
collectives in Perm, the Komi ASSR, Udmurtia and Georgia recorded
production in excess of Plan, operations in Tataria, Bashkiria,
the Kuybyshev oblastI, Groznyi, Orenburg, Stavropol and the Emba
krai performed on target for 1976: however shortfalls were
short term. The authors stress that use of condensate in
preference to crude oil derivatives for petrochemical manufac-
ture will "simplify and cheapen" existing productive processes.
Tu P Korotaev, G P Gurevich, I A Leont'ev "Dolgovremennoe
obespechenie potrebitelei kondensatnym syr'em" Gazovaya
promyshlennost' 1977 No.4. p.21.
45Note that Neftyanoe khozyaistvo 1977 No.2, p.3, records
that the 1976 oil production target was fulfilled at 100.3 per
cent, showing 511.1 million tonnes against Plan of 509.4
million. The balance is the gas condensate element.
46Mal'tsev op.cit. p.4.
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recorded in Nanf'ryshlak,Belorussia, /I.ZOV and Caspian offshore
operations,.Turkmenia, the Ukraine and the Lower Volga.47 'I'ab le
5.5. details the 1976 production of major aS80ciations.
rrABLE 5.5. 1976 Production of Oil by Fnjor Production
Association (million tonnes, inr..BR3 condensate)
Assocb.tion Production
G1avtyumenneftegaz 214.5
Tatncft' 98.9
TIashneft' 40.0
Kuybyshevneft' 31.7
Permneft' 24.7
r'1angysh1akneft' 19.5
Turkmenneft' 13.9
Orenburgneft' 12.9
Kaspmorneft' 11.4
Komineft' 10.9
Source: Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 8/1977, p.2.
During 1976· some progresa was made in developing the
utilisation of wellhead ga.s. A further 3 billion cub i,cmetres
per year of processing cnpacity was installed, fulfilling the
target set and enabling' utilis:ltion to be incre"sed by 2 billion
cubic metres. Iloweve r it is noted that waaba.re of 17 billion
b i 6 . 118cu a,cmetres in 197 vas still regarded as axcessi ve ,
47Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 8/1977, p.2.
48'b'd~
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The annual Plan for 1977 calls for an increase in production
of oil and condensate to 550 million tonnes.49 Again the major
contributor to the increase is to be \vest Siberia and one detects
little optimism for any substantial additional contribution from
other producing areas. Particularly severe problems have been
caused by delays in implementing the programme of offshore
development, notably at the Hangyshlak peninsula in the Caspian
Sea, where the prospects for bringing on stream substantial oil-
fields were thought by Soviet geologists and economists to be
attractive judging from exploratory evaluation during the ninth
Plan. 50 Despite the apparent attractiveness of Soviet offshore
oil deposits output declined during the ninth Plan.51 Soviet
planners seek to arrest this decline and to reach a production
level of 18 million tonnes in 1980. The trend in Soviet offshore
oil production is outlined in table 5.6.
The performance of the Soviet oil industry in the first
eighteen months of the tenth Plan has been on target and might be
thought to augur well for the attainment of the 1980 target of
640 million tonnes. However this depends as much on the extent
to which depletion in the Volga-Ural area leads to declining
49ibid•
50A comprehensive description of the problems faced by the
Soviet Union in developing offshore deposits of oil and gas is
given by Joseph P Riva Jr in "Soviet Offshore Oil and Gas", in
'Soviet Oceana Development' Washington DC: US Congress, National
Ocean Policy Committee 1976, pp.479-500.
51Soviet offshore output declined from 12.9 million tonnes in
1970 to 11.5 million in 1974. ibid. p.487.
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TABLE 5.6. Soviet Offshore Oil Production 1965-1980Plan
(M tonnes)
!.!!E. Production
1965 11.4
1910 12.9
1911 12.5
1912 11.8
1913 12.0
1914 11.5
1915P 11.5
1980P 18.0
Source: Joseph P Riva Jr. "Soviet Offshore Oil and Gas" in
'Soviet Oceans Development' Washington D Cl US
Congress, National Ocean Policy Committee 1916,,~.
(converted from ba;rels to tonnes at rate of 1.3
barrels per tonne)
I
production as on the capacity of West Siberia to overfulfil.
Moreover the extent to which the Construction Ministry for Oil
and Gas Enterprises fulfils its target is just as important a
factor influencing the success of the Oil Ministry as their own
efforts in exploration and production activity.
Gas Developments in the Soviet Union 1976-1980
The basic directives for the tenth Plan set the 1980 produc-
tion target for natural gas at 400-435 billion cubic metres.52
Production in West Siberia was scheduled to reach 125-155 billion
by that date.53 Subsequent discussion of these ranges of figures
52Pravda 14 December 1975. p.2.
53ibid• p.6.
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resulted in the placing of the final target at the upper end of
the scales, that is all-Union production of 435 billion cubic
metres54 and West Siberian of 155 billion,55 Table 5.7. outlines
the pattern of planned growth in gas production from 1916 to 1980.
During the ninth Plan the average annual increment in
production was 18 billion cubic metres compared with 14 billion
achieved during the eighth. However of the absolute growth in
production of 91 billion cubic metres 53 billion (58 per cent)
were obtained in the last two years.56 The problems of overall
fulfilment were caused in the first two years, and related to
the difficulties of coordinating production and transportation
rather than of the gas industry to produce.57 Depletion in the
gasfields of European Russia has been a feature of the ninth
/ Plan, and it is likely that this will be increasingly severe
during the tenth.58
The areas designated to be of prime importance in the tenth
Plan were \fest Siberia, Turkmenia, the Orenburg oblast', the
Komi ASSR and the Ukraine,59 of which West Siberia was scheduled
to provide over 30 per cent of Soviet output by 1980. West
54Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 6/1977. p.1.
55Edltorial to Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No. 11, p.2.
56S A Orudzhev "Osnovnye zadachi razvitiya gazovoi promysh-
lennosti v 1976 godu - pervom godu desyatoi pyatiletki" Gazovaya
promyshlennost' 1976 No.1, p.3.
57Jack, Lee, Lent op.cit. p.464.
58Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No.4, p.1. (editorial) "Po
puti, namechennomu 25 s"ezdom KPSS".
590rudzhev op.cit. pp.5-6.
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Siberian reserves are such that the area is expected to be the
60major gas-producer long after the end of the tenth Plan. However
the consistent Soviet record of failure to meet production targets,
with the corresponding necessity of revising them, has suggested
to one Western analyst that the 1980 output of gas will at best be
at the lower limit of the original range.61
According to a recent Soviet estimate West Siberia contains
70 per cent of Soviet gas reserves in all categories, prompting
planners to require that West Siberia should provide 85 per cent
of the total increase in production during the tenth Plan. The
immediate benefit of West Siberian gas from the point of the
production function is that the majority of reserves are concen-
trated in shallow deposits. Large-diameter wells sunk in the
Tyumen' fields are capable of yielding 1 to 1.5 billion cubio
metres of gas per 24 hours, this being 5 to 6 times the Soviet
average.63 The importance of accelerating production in the
Tyumen' oblast' can be gauged from the fact that the 1976 produc-
tion level of 43 billion cubic metres constituted a 10 billion
60B P Orlov "Perspektivy Sibirskoi promyshlennosti" Ekonomika
i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva 1976 No.5. p.42.
61Alan B Smith "Soviet Dependence on Siberian Resouroe Develop-
ment" in 'The Soviet Economy in a New Perspective' Washington
D Cs US Congress, Joint Economic Committee 1976, p.491.
62Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No.4. p.1.
63S F Gudkov "Nauchnye issledovaniya - dvizhushchaya sila
tekhnicheskogo progressa" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No.1,
hl·
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increase on the 1975 level.64 These factors are however
conditioned by the difficulties faced in providing adequate
production technology, which would enable higher output to be
achieved, since the rate of discovery of reserves of economically
extractable gas was greater than the rate of increase in produc-
tion, at least in the early part of the ninth Plan.
Though the Medvezh'e field will continue to be an important
and expanding contributor to total production, the major area of
interest is the Urengoi field, scheduled to reach full production
in 1918.65 There is still spare capacity in the Medvezh' field,
since failure to commission pipeline meant that at the end of
the nInth Plan the desired production level could not be
66achieved. The amount of capital invested in the development
of the Hedvezh'e field comprises 40 per cent to the provision of
gas-producing capacity and 60 per cent to infrastructure
developments. Capital requirement and production costs are
expected to rise in the Medvezh'e field during the tenth Plan,61
and Soviet analysis of the price production cost of Medvezh'e
gas has established that some 55 per cent is accounted for in
64Orudzhev op.cit. P.S.
65N V Petlichenko "Dobycha gaza v pervom godu desyatoi
pyatiletki" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No.2, p.5.
66P T Shmyglya "Nauka na sluzhbe osvoeniya gazovykh mesto-
rozhdenii Sibiri" Qa,zovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No.2, p.17.
67G P Sulimenkov, D A Podluzskii, V S Bulatov "Problemy
povysheniya effektivnosti osvoeniya Tyumenskikh mestorozhdenii
gaza" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No.3, p.12.
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offsetting depreciation of capital equipment. Though it is not
clear what is included in the concept of 'depreciation', the
significant fact is that this percentage is thought to be very
high, and put at twice the all-Union average.68 The major
reason for this is thought to be that all materials and equipment
have to be brought into the area: Tyumen' simply lacks an
industrial base. Deficient organisation of the supply function
has served to generate periodic shortages and to raise costs.69
The Urangoi gasfield presents a different aspect in that it
has extensive reserves of gas condensate in addition to natural
gas. Potential production of 100 billion cubic metres per year
is envisaged from this field.70 The debate on the development
of gas condensate is still in progress and the ultimate produc-
tion level is still a matter for speoulation. The field's
contribution to produotion is scheduled to oommenoe in 1978,
when the Medvezh'e field will have reached its production peak.
It is intended that the major part of the produotion increase
planned for Tyumen' in 1978 will be provided by Urengoi
operations and the oblastI is to account for 20.4 of the 23
68ibid• p.13.
69For example the forestry industry in Tyumen' was developed
before oil and gas, and hence still has substantial delivery
quotas to fulfil, directing wood to distant deficient areas. One
result is that the oil and gas construotion industry in Tyumen'
faces a paradoxical shortage of wood, which is brought from
other areas at very high oost. ibid. p.15.
70yu M Pavlov "Ekonomioheskie problemy razvitiya Sibiri i
Dal'nego Vostoka" Izvestiya AN SSSR, Seriya ekon. 1976 No.2,~.
256
billion cubic metre increase for the Soviet Union as a whole.71
Between 1977 and 1979 Tyumen' operations are scheduled to
contribute 70 to 75 per cent of the net Soviet increase in pro-
duction and by 1980 they are to provide the whole of the
increment.72 The policy of rapid development of Tyumen' gas is
intended to accelerate the process of maximum substitution of
gas for fuel oil initiated during the ninth Plan, principally in
the Volga-Ural industrial area, and to compensate for the
anticipated decline in production in older fields.73 Operations
in Turkmenia, which showed a substantial rate of expansion in
the latter part of the ninth Plan, when 47 of the 146 billion
cubic metres produced during the Plan were obtained in 1975
alone,74 were also scheduled for further expansion up to 1980.
The production target for 1976 of 57 billion cubic metres
depended for its fulfilment on the continued development of the
Shatlyk gasfield, whose 1976 production target was 31 billion
cubic metres,75 whilst the objective was to maintain production
in the Naip and Gugurtli fields, which had been exploited
71Editorial "Osnovnye napravleniya razvitiya gazovoi
promyshlennosti v iub!le!nom godu" Gazovaya promyshlennost'
1977 NO.4. pp.5-6.
,728 A Orudzhev "Osnovnye napravleniya povysheniya effektiv-
nost! proizvodstva v otrasli v svete reshenii 25 s"ezda KPSS"
Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No. 11. p.'.
7'ibid. pp.3-4.
74A A Annaliev "Turkmengazprom na novom etape razvitiya
otrasli" Gazovaya. promyshlennost' 1976 No.3. p.10.
75Sotsialisticheskaya industriya 26 AUgust 1976, p.1.
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extensively during the ninth Plan.76 By the end of May 1976
the Shatlyk field recorded a 400 million cubic metre over-
71fulfilment of Plan for the first five months of 1976. This in
its turn lifted Turkmen production to 82 million cubic metres
per 24 hours and this augurs well for the possibility of
Turkmenia's providing at least 80 billion cubic metres, or 20
per cent of Soviet production, in 1980, this being the
objective.78 Neighbouring fields in Uzbekistan, facing similar
technical and iogistic problems to those of Turkmenia, were
scheduled to provide 36 billion cubic metres in 1976, but no
increase on this level is expected between then and 1980.79
The development of the Orenburg hydrocarbon province is
one of the major commitments not only of the Soviet Union but
also of each of the other Eastern European full members of
Comecon up to 1980. The gas production target for Orenburg in
1976 was set at 30 billion cubic metres, this representing an
increase of 9.3 billion on 1975 production.SO Capacity to
to process and distribute ,0 billion oubic metres per year was
available at the end of the ninth Plan: however delays in
bringing Orenburg up to planned production have meant that spare
capacity was available at the outset of the tenth Plan.S1 These
76Annaliev 0r,cit. f.10, Orudzhev "Osnovnye zadachi •••1t
Gazovaya promysh ennost 1976 No.1, p.6.
77Izvestiya 7 July 1976, p.1.
78Editorial "Pretvoryaya v zhizn' plant Partii" Stroitel'stvo
truboprovodov 1976 No.4, p.3.
79Pravda Vostoka 23 Deoember 1975, p.2.
800rudzhev "Osnovnye zadachi •••" (1976), p.6.
81Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1976 No.4, p.2.
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delays have been particularly costly in that the province is
the most conveniently located of the major Soviet gas deposits
to centres of consumption in European Russia. The projected
production capacity in the Orenburg oblast' is 45 billion cubic
metres per year to be reached in 1911-1918 when the third stage
of the complex is completed.82 On the evidence available it
appears that this latter figure will be the likely production
level through to 1980. However, as outlined, the location and
extent of reserves in this field are such that a higher level of
production will be planned for the eighties. The planned
increase in production for Orenburg in 1976 was achieved, the
final figure being 31.8 billion cubic metres.83
The centre of interest in the Komi ASSR is the Vuktyl gas
and gas condensate field. which is located reasonably closely
to consumption centres and enjoys better transport links than
many other major gas-producing regions. During the ninth Plan
84the field produced a total of 80 billion cubic metres of gas.
However it is felt that there will be short-term problems in
maintaining production due to declining seam pressure and the
fact that some 20 per cent of extraotable reserves had been
utilised by the end of 1915.85 Gas produotion in the Timano-
82S A Orudzhev "Osnovnye zadachi razvitiya gazovoi promyshlen-
nosti v iubileinom godu" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1977 No.4. p.6.
83Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 6/1977, p.2.
84stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1976 No.4. p.2.
85G B Rassokhin et al. "Opyt proektirovaniya i uskorennogo
vvoda v razrabotku Vuktylskogo gazokondensatnogo mestorozhdeniya"
Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1976 No. 10, p.31•
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Pechora region as a whole, in which the Vuktyl field is situated,
is scheduled to rise to 22 billion cubic metres in 1980.86 It
is interesting to note that the directives for gas production in
the Komi ASSR in 1976 require merely that the 1975 level be
maintained, this being 17.8 billion cubic metres.87 The medium-
term significance of the Komi operation is its particularly
favourable ratio of exploitable reserves to production. An
estimate made in 1974 puts explored reserves at 390.9 billion
cubic metres, of which 367.1 are classified as 'industrial', that
is, readily exploitable.88
The 1976 production target for the Ukraine was set at 57.5
billion cubic metres.89 The major contributor to Ukrainian
production is the Shebelinka field, supplemented by a small,
number of new discoveries made towards the end of the ninth Plan.
Maintenance of 1915 production levels is essential in the short
term, since the area is the principal producer for export, being
the gathering ground for the trans-Comecon 'Bratstvo' gas
pipeline.
The regional performance of the gas industry in 1976
compared with 1975 is detailed in table 5.8. This distribution
probably reflects the production balance originally desired for
86Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1976 No.4, p.3.
870rudzhev "Osnovnye zadachi •••" (1976), p.6.
88Shelest op.cit. p.133.
890rudzhev "Osnovnye zadachi •••" (1976), p.6.
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TABLE 5.8. Soviet Gas Production by Area 1975 and 1916
(billion cubic metres)
1216 as ~
~ .!.212. .1.2l€ of 1275
USSR Total 289 321 111
of which:
Ukraine 68.2 68.7 101
Turkmenia 52.3 62.6 120
Tyumen' oblast' 35.5 47.8 135
Uzbekistan 37.1 36.0 97Orenburg oblasti 20.1 31.8 158
Komi ASSR 18.5 19.6 106
Sources: (i) Table 3.18.
(ii) Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 6/1976, pp.1-2.
1975. and constitutes a 11.1 per cent increase on 1975 produc-
(
tiona In order to attain the target of 435 billion cubic metres
in 1980 an average growth rate of 8.5 per cent is required.
compared with an average annual rate of growth of 7.9 per cent
actually achieved during the ninth Plan. The cumulative
performance of the gas industry in the ninth Plan evidenced a
shortfall of 71 billion oubic metres against a total planned for
the five-year period of 1290 billion, this representing a 5.5
per cent shortfall. On the basis of performance in the first
six months of 1977, totalling 110 billion cubio metres,90 a
total for the year of 345 billion oan be reasonably expected.
90Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 31/1977. p.5.
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The target for 1911 of 342 billion cubic metres constitutes
an increase of 21 billion over the 1916 performance, but is 11
billion below the actual increase achieved in 1976 over 1975.
This probably reflects an anticipated hiatus in growth prior to
the commissioning of further capacity at Urengoi and Orenburg.
The marked increase in production in 1976 over 1975 probably
stems from the fact that productive capacity in Tyumen',
available but under-utilised at the end of the ninth Plan, was
brought on stream at an early stage in the tenth, when, amongst
other things, freshly injected investment catalysed the
provision of equipment and support materials that were evidently
lacking towards the end of the ninth Plan. Consequently the
importance of the timing of development in Urengoi and Orenburg
for the capacity of the Soviet Union to provide the desired
increase in gas production is very great, since it is likely that
any "slack" within the interacting systems has by now been taken
up. However, as in the case of the oil industry, the likelihood
of the gas industry's meeting its 1980 target depends very muoh
on the ability of other ministries to fulfil their delivery
quotas of equipment and materials, and given the inoreased
demands put on Siberian operations, the difficulties of gas
supply are almost certain to increase. The gas industry, like
the oil industry, faces the prospect of increasingly taut planning.
Logistic Developments 1976-1980
As in the ninth Plan major deoisions are tied to coping with
262
the worsening geographical dislocation between production and
consumption centres. Transport problems revolve around the
installation of new pipelines and expansion of existing systems
to correspond with the increments to production planned for West
Siberian operations to 1980 and beyond. The tenth Plan calls
for the construction of 15 thousand kilometres of trunk oil
pipeline and at least a further 3500 kilometres for the transport
of refined products. Some 35 thousand kilometres of new gas
pipeline are planned for the same period.91 Apart from the
problem of the supply of materials and their technical perform-
ance construction engineers working in West Siberia have to
contend with extremes of climate and natural environment. The
most severe obstacle is that some 40 per cent of Tyumen's oil
and gas-bearing area is extremely marshy in summer and frozen
solid in winter, with the result that the construction "season"
is limited to three or four months, when heavy equipment may be
transported.92
The specific importance of the logistic development of West
Siberia was reflected in the creation in June 1973 of the
Siberian Pipeline Construction Association (Glavsibtruboprovod-
stroi).93 The principal new oil pipeline projects are those
91Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1976 No.4, p.1.
92V G Chirskov "Problemy kruglogodlichnogo stroitel'etva
truboprovodov v bolotistoi mestnosti" Stroitel'stvo trubo-
provodov 1976 No.1, p.10.
93V G Chirskov "Razvivaya truboprovodnyi transport Zapadnoi
Sibiri" Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1976 No.4, p.13.
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from Nizhnevartovsk to Kuybyshev and from Kholmogorsk to Surgut;
in the gas sector the major projects are to commission pipelines
from the Medvezh'e field via Nadym to Punga, and from Nadym via
Urengoi and Punga to join the system centered on the Vuktyl gas
and condensate field.94 The development of Siberia has important
implications for the industrialisation of Soviet Central Asia.
Whereas there is a high level of consumption there of locally
produced gas, demand for petroleum products is also increasing.
Hence towards the end of the ninth Plan construction work was
started on a major crude oil pipeline from Surgut via Omsk.
Pavlodar and Chimkent to refineries at Fergana and Chardzhou,
supplying refineries at Pavlodar and Chimkent en route.95 The
difficulties of processing o~l and gas at the wellhead under
Siberian conditions have necessitated the greater application of
technology for the transportation of gas-saturated oil to
processing centres located at some distance from producing
fields. This technique reduces the requirement for compressor
stations, since the natural pressure of the gas is utilised, and
the availability of gas in oil for further processing both
marginally reduces the requirement for gas delivery capacity and
stimulates greater usage of wellhead gas.96
94ibid•
95Editorial to Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1976 No.5, p.'.
96G I Gorechenkov "Vysokoe kachestvo proektirovaniya -
vazhnoe uslovie rosta effektivnosti stroitel'stva" Stroitel'stvo
truboprovodov 1976 No.5, p.6.
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The most important single pipeline development currently in
progress in the Soviet Union is that of the gas pipeline from
Orenburg to the Western border, on which work commenced during
the ninth Plan.97 The line will be some 2800 kilometres long
and consist for the most part of pipe of 1420 millimetres in
diameter.98 The delivery capacity of the system, when fully
operational in 1900, will be 28 billion cubic metres per year,
of which 4 billion will be used en route by the compressor
stations.99 Once the system is running at design capacity, some
two thirds of the gas will be delivered to Eastern European
countries as repayment of investment credits granted to the
Soviet Union. The balance of the available gas and gas
100condensate will be directed to consumers in European Russia.
To take into account the development of the northerly hydro-
carbon resources in the Komi ASSR a pipeline from Usinsk via
Ukhta and Taroslavl' to Moscow was completed at the end of the
ninth Plan and work commenced in 1976 on the new line from the
Punge. and Vuktyl fields to join the gathering system in the
Central region, running parallel to the existing 'Northern Lights'-
97Description of the agreement reached at the 28th Congress of
Comeoon, held in Sofiya in June 1974, concerning joint partici-
pation in the construction of the pipeline is given in Appendix
F of Jeremy Russell "Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign
Policy" Farnborough: Saxon House 1976. pp,229-231,
98Stroltel'stvo truboprovodov 1976 No.1, p.2.
99Hos~odarske noviny 47/1975, P.S, also Vneshnyaya torgovlya
SSSR 197 No.8. p.16.
100J Bethkenhagen "Die Zusammenarbei t der RG\v-Ulnder auf dem
Energiesektor" Osteuropa Wirtschaft 1977 No.2, p.71.
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. Ii 101p~pe ne. The major achievements of 1916 were the commission-
ing of the trtmk oil pipeline from Nizhnevartovsk to Kuybyshev,
of the gas pipeline from Urengoi to Ukhta and of the second
string of the gas pipeline from Ukhta to Torzhok.102
The fact of Siberia's substantial overfu~filment of the
original production target for oil during the ninth Plan
necessitated some rethinking of the forward requirement for pipe-
line capacity in the tenth Plan and beyond. In a study written
in 1972 the prominent Soviet transport economist S S Ushakov put
forward the view that in the period 1965-1985 one ought not to
expect so great a movement of industrial production into eastern
areas as to lessen the net demand for energy in European
R . 103uss~a. Therefore there would be a continuing need to expand
the oil and gas delivery systems and given the eastward shifting
resource base the economics of pipeline transport become
gradually more attractive.104 The very rate at which Siberia
has had to be developed serves only to underly Ushakov's
conclusion. It should however be borne in mind that the avail-
ability of pipeline has been a regular bottleneck in both the oil
and gas industries for a number of years,105
101Stroitel'atvo truboprovodov 1976 No.4, p.3.
102Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov 1977 No.4, p.1.
103S S Ushakov "Tekhniko-ekonomicheskie problemy transporta
topliva" Moscow Transport 1972, p.15.
104ibid. p.166.
105\vestern sources have cited this as a factor contributing
to the underfulfilment of Plan, especially in the gas industry.
See Russell .2P.cit. PP.48, 66-67, and R 1J Campbell "Trends in
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as is the fact of considerable cost escalation in pipeline
construction in West Siberia. In the period 1965-1974
development of the pipeline system accounted for some two
thirds of capital investment directed to the gas industry in
106that area. In European operations the corresponding figure
is one third.107
In order to alleviate the indigenous lag in technology and
transport capacity the Soviet Union has negotiated a number of
agreements with Western companies not only in relation to the
solution of production problems but also in the construction of
trunk pipelines, to the end that credits used for the procure-
ment of Western technology and equipment might be repaid in
deliveries of oil and gas.lOa (The impact of existing and
possible deliveries from the Soviet Union is discussed in Chapter
6.) Whatever the outcome of current negotiations it is unlikely
that large-scale development can be initiated and executed at
a rate that will make a significant impact on internal avail-
ability of oil and gas or on the export balance during the tenth
Plan.l09
Information on refining policy in the tenth Plan is sparse.
The directives for t"lePlan indicate that primary refining
capacity is to rise by 25 to 30 per cent, and that the refinery
mix should favour the output of high octane gasoline, low-sulphur
distillate fuels, aviati6h kerosene and aromatics. This policy
the Soviet Oil and Gas Industry" Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press
1976, pp.}6-37.
106V S 13ulatov "K voprosu ob udorozhanii gazoprovodnogo
stroitel'stva na Tyumenskom severe" Izvestiya SO AN SSSR, Sere
obshch. nauk 1976 No.1, p.47.
107ibid• p.49.
10Bibid• pp.49-50.
109The state of negotiations between the Soviet Union and
Western companies and governments is outlined in J D Park "Oil
and Gas in Comecon", in E de Keyser (ed.) 'The European Offshore
Oil and Gas Yearbook 1976/1977' London: Kogan Page 1976,
pp.261-262.
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necessitates a sUbstantial increase in secondary refining
capacity.110 It appears that the capital requirement for pro-
viding secondary refining capacity is 2 to 3 times more than
equivalent primary capacity. To minimise the incremental capital
requirement it is planned to expand existing secondary refining
facilities rather than to undertake construction of new units.
In response to the directive to site refining capacity close to
consumption oentres the objective is to double capacity in the
Ukraine, to secure a 50 per cent increase in Belorussia, 80 per
t i T km· d 5 f Id . . Ka akh t 111cen n ur en~a an a - 0 ~ncrease ~n z s an. The
directives on the refinery mix for the tenth Plan are broadly
similar to those set for the ninth, and reflect the trend towards
maximum production of light, non-substitutable products at the
expense of fuel oil, given the taut supply of crude oil. The
other significant factor to be discerned from the scarce informa-
tion is that the trend towards increased capacity of individual
processing units will continue, especially that of catalytic and
steam crackers, the basis for manufacture of the much-desired
light produots.112
Oil and Gas Pricing, Its Relationship to Trends in the Energy Balance
Rising produ~tion costs, incurred as the oil and gas industries
110Izvestiya 14 December 1975, p.2.
111Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 13/1976, p.4. No data on actual
capacities are divulged.
112V B Yastremskaya et al. "0rganizatsiya i planirovanie
proizvodstva v neftyanoi i gazovoi promyshlennosti" Moscow Nedra
1975, p.34.
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become increasingly dependent on operations in West Siberia,
have highlighted as a problematio issue the prioing of oil and
refined products and natural gas in relation to other fuels.
The question of orude oil prioing has been disoussed in a reoent
artiole in 'Planovoe khozyaistvo,.113 Current enterprise whole-
sale prices do not fully reflect cost and consequently a number
of producers are performing below the financial targets of
'khozraschet'. On average, oosts incurred at the exploration
and development stages are estimated to be only 60 per cent
covered by the present prioe structure, resulting in the
industry's inability to retain a level of surplus that could be
recirculated as investment funds. It appears that this problem
arose during the last two years of the ninth Plan.114 The
nature of the problem is that under the terms of the 1967 price
reform crude oil prices are determined on the basis of a
calorific 90mparison with coal.115 However oil has an alter-
native value as a raw material that bears no relation to its
value as a fuel. Therefore, the authors argue, the sole product
whose prioe should be determined in relation to coal is fuel
oil.116
11~S Levin, V Vasil'ev, N Kosinov "Tsenoobrazovanie v neftyanoi
promyshlennosti" Planovoe khozyaistvo 1976 No.7, pp.110-115.
114ibid• p.111.
115This is discussed in R W Campbell "Trends in the Soviet
Oil and Gas Indus try" o:;Ba~lt~i:;.:;.m~o:.;;r.:;;e.:.:...;J::.:o~hn=s:....:;:H.:;:.0plO:.!k:.::.:i:::.n::.::s;....::.Pr_e;;;.;s;;.;s;;;....;1,",,9..76 ;;..L!
pp.189-192•
116Levin, Vasil'ev, Kosinov op.cit. pp.111-112.
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Currently the fuel oil element of the refinery balance is 30
to 35 per cent. Consequently, it is argued, some 65 to 10 per
cent of refinery output is undervalued.111 One might also point
out that as the proportion of light crude oils in the refinery
balance increases, there is a substantial economic loss in
valuing the complement of refinery output on a calorific basis.
An additional point is that under the present system of prices
and returns it is economic to exploit only high productivity wells,
leaving many unworked and further aggravating the tight supply
Position.118
At a time when the Soviet Union was seeking the increased use
of fuel oil as boiler, furnace and power station fuel, its price
was set at a more attractive level than that of coal, except in a
number of major coal-producing regions where consumption of local
coal was favoured.119 Robert Campbell advances the highly
probable hypothesis that in the light of increasing difficulties
in the oil industry the pricing policy "may have been reversed"
in favour of coal.120 Given the general directives on fuel
consumption policy already outlined, this would be a rational
policy change on the Soviet part.
111V I Nazarov, A A II'inskii, N I Pimenov "K obosnovaniyu
predel'nykh ekonomicheskikh pokazatelei poiskov i razvedki
neftyanykh plastov." Ekonomika neftyapoi promyshlennosti 1977
No.4, P.'.,
118ibid. p.7.
119V I Torbin "Territorial'naya differentsiya tsen v tyazheloi
promyshlennosti" Moscow Ekonomika 1974, p.175.
120campbell "Trends •••" (1976), paO.
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It appears that similar problems are about to be encountered
in the gas industry. There are several gasfields where produc-
tion is falling and some smaller deposits which have not been
brought into production because of high basic costs. It is argued
that for the industry as a whole the pricing system does not
permit the desired level of financial efficiency at the enter-
prise level.121 This too has been a function of recently rising
development and production costs, bearing in mind that as late as
1974 the system as a whole was recording a satisfactory financial
122performance. However given the rate at which consumption has
grown and production has shifted, the pattern of cost and return
has changed very rapidly. Consequently, it is argued, more
123frequent re-appraisal of price relativities is needed. Though
not explicit, many of the problems surrounding the valuation of
petroleum products as feedstock rather than as fuel affect the
issue of natural gas pricing, since gas can fulfil either
function. In any event higher prices for petroleum products and
gas relative to coal would have the desired effect on consumers
of improving fuel conversion efficiency and securing a move back
towards coal in non-crltical prooesses.
Rising world prices for energy, especially for oil, have
altered the relative opportunity costs of energy raw materials in
1211\S kh iTyshlyar, A A Kevorkov "Ispol'zovanie me an zma
dogovornykh tsen na neft' dlya bolee polnoi otrabotki mesto-
rozhdenii" Gazovaya promyshlennost' 1277 No.3, p.23.
122As analysed by Campbell "Trends •••" (1976), pp.70-71•
123Tyshlyar, Kevorkov op.cit. p.24.
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the Soviet Union. It will be seen from the analysis of the
general trend in Soviet energy policy given in Chapter 3 of the
present study that the process of substitution of fuel oil b~
coal and natural gas was in progress prior to the OPEC price
rises of 1973/1974 and was influenced by the view that a gradual
increase in world energy prices could be expected, though not
on the scale that did occur. The OPEC price rises served to
compound this process.
However given the slow rate of internal adjustment that is
characteristic of the Soviet system, it appears that the
domestic pricing structure has not yet altered to correspond
with the desired direction of change in response to the OPEC
price rises. The production response was that of seeking to con-
serve energy, particularly oil, and of enhancing the relative
position of coal, natural gas and nuclear power.
The Eastern European Oil and Gas Industries 1976-1980
Eastern and Western analysts agree broadly that the prospects
for increasing production of oil and gas in Eastern Europe are
very limited. However there exists a measure of flexibility in
the energy balance oonsidered as a whole, though each member-
oountry enjoys respeotively different levels of indigenous
reserves and forward energy requirements, depending on factors
such as the share of output of energy-intensive industry within
total industrial output and relative efficiency in energy
conversion.
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Following the price rises imposed by the Soviet Union and
OPEC the energy plans of the Eastern Europe share the common
feature of stressing the maximum development of indigenous
reserves up to 1980. The Bulgarian Plan calls for a 32 per cent
rise in coal production between 1976 and 1980, by which time
this fuel would account for approximately 20 per cent of the
country's energy demand.124 However demand for oil and gas as a
fuel or as chemical feedstock showed a twelvefold rise between
1960 and 1975, and the expansion of the chemical and petro-
chemical industries is expected to continue to 1980, requiring
proportionally increasing amounts of oil and gas.125 Despite
exploratory drilling in the Black Sea there appears to be no
alternative to increasing imports in order to meet the rising
demand for hydrocarbons, and the preferred policy is that of
126joint development with fellow-members of Comecon.
Whereas the trend towards greater consumption of oil and gas
in Hungary is expected to continue, it is now expected to do so
at a lower rate than that anticipated before the oil price
rises.127 Consumption of natural gas is expected to reach 10
124I Kondov et al. "Razshiryavaneto na energiinata baza i
rastezhot na neinata efektivnost" Planovo stopanstvo 1976 No.2,
:£:ll..
125ibid. p.38. See also Cecil Rajana "The Chemical and
Petrochemical Industries of Russia and Eastern Europe 1960-1980"
London: Sussex University Press 1975, p.179.
126Kondov et al. OE.cit. p.38.
127y Zurbuchen "Die fftnfteFHnfjahrplan der Ungarischen
Yolksrepublik 1976 bis 1980" Wirtschaftswissenschaft 1916 No. 10,
p.132_4.
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billion cubic metres in 1980, of which 6.2 billion will be
produced domestically compared with 5.2 out of a total avail-
ability of 5.98 billion in 1915. It is intended to produce 2
million tonnes of oil per year to 1980, whereas coal production
is expected to decline slightly to 23.5-24.5 million tonnes in
1980 compared with 24.9 million in 1915. The net effect is
that of raising import dependency in energy from 46 per cent in
1915 to 58 per cent in 1980.128
In meeting its growth targets for 1916-1980 the GDR is
seeking to improve energy conversion efficiency by some 5 per
cent annually.129 Oil production will remain at its 1915 level,
unless the joint Soviet-GDR-Polish enterprise currently
exploring in the Baltic Sea discovers a field that can be brought
into production rapidly. 130 Domestic production of natural gas
is not expected to expand beyond 8 billion cubic metres by 1980
and the 1980 target for production of brown coal of 250-254
million tonnes represents a return to the production level
attained in 1911.131
More detailed information has been provided by the remaining
Eastern European countries who possess more extensive and
relatively more varied reserves than the aforementioned countries.
129petroleum Economist April 1976, p.137.
130S1owo powszechne 27 November 1975, p.2. records the
setting-up of this consortium.
131G Schttrer "Hauptrichtungen der weiteren Vervollkommnung
unserer materiell-technischen Basis in den Jahren 1916 bis
1980" Einheit 1976 No.9, p.1015.
274
Poland's reserves of hard coal can support considerable expansion
of production. The Plan for 1976-1980 envisages substantial
growth, within which industrial output is to rise by 48 to 50
per cent. However the rate of growth in energy availability is
to be below that of most of the other sectors of the economy,
including the energy-intensive sectors.132 The priority of the
Polish energy economy is to ensure rapid development of
indigenous coal and gas. In the case of hard coal, production
in 1975 was 170 million tonnes133 and this is expected to rise
to 200 million in 1980.134 There has been a revival of interest
in developing brown coal reserves. It is intended to raise
output from 39.9 million tonnes in 1975, a figure which had
remained roughly constant since 1972, to 80 million in 1980.136
There has been a corresponding reorientation in hydrocarbon
policy. Whereas in early 1973 the share of hard coal in the
Polish energy balance was predicted to decline from 75 per cent
in 1970 to 55 per oent by 1985 and 50 per cent by the year 2000,
by whioh time oil and gas together would account for 30 per
cent and nuclear power 12 per cent of energy demand,137 as a
result of price and supply developments in Soviet and Middle East
132J Kopytowski, Polish Deputy Minister of the Chemical
Industry in an interview with 'Petroleum Economist' Petroleum
Economist ~anuaFY 1976, p.19.
133ibid•
134ibid•
135Statistioheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV 1976, p.77.
136polish Economic Survey 1975 No.7, p.6.
137J r11trega "Die Brennstoff- und Energ1ebas1s Polens heute
und im Jahre 2000" Montan-Rundschau 1973 No. 3, p:~72.
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markets Polish planners revised their estimates to favour a lower
(undisclosed) share to be held by oil in the period to 1980.138
The forward position for Polish gas production is uncertain.
There was little growth between 1911 and 1975 there is little to
suggest any possibility of a marked increase in the 1915 produc-
tion level of just under 6 billion cubic metres before 1980.
Growth in gas consumption will depend on supply from the Soviet
Union.
There are signs also of growing tension in the Romanian
energy balance, caused in the main by stagnation in domestic oil
production. At the outset of the 1916-1980 Plan it was envisaged
that the share of domestic energy demand to be met by indigenous
production would fall from 86 per cent in 1914 to 15 per cent in
1980.139 At the same time the major change in the domestic
consumption pattern would be the rise in demand for oil both as
energy and feedstock fo~ the chemical industry, whose share of
total oil demand was to rise from 15 per cent in 1915 to 21 per
cent in 1980.140 Whereas the average annual rate of growth in
energy consumption during 1911-1915 was 1 per cent, the corres-
ponding figure for 1916-1980 was put at 6.8 per cent, and the
necessity of maximum development and utilisation of domestic
138Petroleum F~onomist January 1976, p.19.
139r V Herescu "Cre\3terea economicS. ~i consumul de energie"
Revista economica 34/1975, p.12.
140r V Herescu "Dezvoltarea bazei energetice (1)" Revista
economica 28/1916, p.1.
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resources is stressed.141 This latter element is reflected in
individual fuel production targets for 1980. Oil production is
scheduled to reach 15.5 million tonnes, showing little
difference from the 1975 level. Likewise gas production in 1980
is put at 26.8 billion cubic metres, only slightly above the
*1975 level. However the target for coal production in 1980 is
put at 52-54 million tonnes, 82 per cent of which consists of
brown coal, this being an increase of 70 to 76 per oent on 1975
levels.142 This policy for primary energy production is
complemented by targets for fuel sonoervation, particularly in
the (energy-intensive) extraotive and engineering industries.143
An additional effect of the deteriorating domestic supply
position has been that of intensifying interest in nuclear power.
However decisions concerning the oommencement of power station
construction taken during the drafting of the 1976-1980 Plan
will not alleviate the problem until the mid-eighties. Early
I
estimates look to a oontribution by nuclear power to total
141ibid. pp.1-2.
142(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Sctnteia 3 August 1974, p.2.
Petroleum Economist January 1975. p.30.
Sdtnteia 3 July 1976, pp.2-4.
143r V Herescu "Dezvoltarea bazei energetice (2)" Revista
eoonomicK 29/1976, p.1. See also V Popescu "Eoonomisirea pi
valorificarea resurselor naturale" Revista economi~ 7/1976,
hl·
*This is the figure for natural gas only. A further 6-7
billion cubic metres of wellhead gas can be expected.
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electricity generation of at least 20 per cent by 1980,144 this
giving an indication of Romania's considerable long-term commit-
ment to this form of energy. At the time of writing there is
some difficulty in assessing the effect of the major earthquake
of 4 March 1911 on the short- and medium-term energy prospects
of Romania. Information on the nature and extent of damage to
installations or on the geological effect on individual fields
has been sparse, but one authoritative Western source has
expressed the opinion that damage was relatively slight and that
it is unlikely to have any significant long-term effect.145 It
may be the case that the damage sustained by industry as a whole
will result in demand for energy falling below previously
expected levels, and that the resultant energy balance might not
differ in terms of the relative share of fuels from that
originally anticipated.
Substantial changes in energy policy in Czechoslovakia are
expected between 1916 anq 1980. Whereas from 1911 to 1915 the
entire increase in energy requirements was met by imports, the
Plan for 1916-1980 calls for greater domestic production of
fuels. One third of the increase in energy consumption between
1916 and 1980 is to be provided by domestic resources, especially
brown coal for use in electrioity generation. Consumption of
144E Rodean "Energia nuoleara ~i promovarea progresului
tehnioo-~tiinrific in yara noastra" Era socialistS. 1975 No. ,•
.l?.dQ.
145petroleum Economist April 1977, p.156.
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fuel oil in power stations will be retarded and eventually it
is intended that coal will be the sole fuel used for new
electricity generating capacity. Likewise in general boiler
and furnace use coal will be the preferred fuel even when gas is
available in increased quantities after 1918, when the pipeline
from the Orenburg field is to be commissioned.146 Production
of hard coal is relatively insignificant and its output is not
likely to be raised between 1916 and 1980. Brown coal production
is scheduled to rise from 86 million tonnes in 1915 to 100
million in 1980, operations in the Most area accounting for the
major part of this. Czechoslovakia is dependent on the USSR for
supplies of crude oil and natural gas and demand for these will
continue to grow. In the case of oil a significant change in the
pattern of demand for refined products, complementing the
relative decline in fuel oil, will be the increased demand for
naphtha to support the planned growth of the chemical and petro-
chemical industries, whose share of oil consumption is to rise
from 6 per cent in 1975 to 13 per cent in 1980.147 In an attempt
to alleviate the oil supply position Czechoslovakia has agreed
to participate in the construction of the 'Adria' pipeline, which
will deliver some 5 million tonnes of Kuwaiti oil per year after
1980.148 It is estimated by the Czechs that on the results of
exploratory work carried out during the 1911-1915 Plan domestic
I
146Hospoda~ske noviny 10 September 1976, p.3.
147ibid• Also Rude pravo 26 r.1a.y 1976, p.5, and Rajana op.cit.
p.179.
148Russell op.cit. pp.228-229.
279
production of oil and gas will not be increased between 1976 and
1980.149 Beyond 1980 the development of nuclear power is seen
to be the optimum solution to energy provision.150
Oil and Gas in Comecon 1976-1980: An Overview
Changes in the supply position in Comecon and the economic
strain imposed by price rises have given rise to a shift in
direction in energy planning in the bloc. Even when OPEC oil was
available at some 10 dollars per tonne in the late sixties the
foreign exchange cost was greater than the cost of using Soviet
supply. Despite the Soviet Union's increasing oil and gas prices
to Eastern Europe there remains the fundamental benefit of a
continued high level of supply from that source. However given
the considerable incentive for the Soviet Union to continue to
supply her Western markets and the fact that the 'Druzhba' oil
pipeline is operating at design capacity, the Soviet preference
for providing gas rather than oil to Eastern Europe seems likely
to be the major element of change between 1976 and 1980. Prior to
the commissioning of joint projects on Soviet territory and the
further development of nuclear power, the hydrocarbon supply
position in Comecon, whilst not of crisis proportions, will remain
tightly balanced.
149"Preliminary Observations on Long-Term Problem~ in the Field of
Basic Products and Energy and of Long-Term Trends iD the Czecho-
slovak Economy" Document transmitted by the Government of Czecho-
slovakia to the Economic Commission for Europe, Ref. EC.AD.(XI)L
R.4/Add. 12. 30 Janua;r 1974. p.2.
150ibid. Also V El'lrenberger "Perspektivy rozvoje palivove a
energeticke zakladny" Nova Mysl 1976 No. 7/8, pp.100-101.
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Chapter 6. Soviet Trade in Oil and Gas 1970-1980
In Comecon as a whole the level of foreign trade dependence
is low by world standards. The Soviet Union is considerably
less dependent on foreign trade in relation to net material
1product than fellow-members of Comecon. Whereas in the sixties
the rate of growth in foreign trade of the Comecon countries was
below that of Western industrialised countries, and below the
world average rate, since 1972 the position has been reversed.
\{hilst world trade expanded in 1972 by some 18 per cent, Comecon
imports rose by 22 per cent and exports by 17.9 per cent. The
member-countries enjoyed more favourable prices in hard currency
trade due to advantageous reali~~ents in Comecon currencies
opposite sterling and the US dollar.2
A major source of influence determining the recent pattern
of development of Soviet foreign trade is the low level, by world
standards, of many branches of indigenous technology. As far as
capital equipment is concerned, this "technology gap" has given
rise to the need to secure imports of Western goods and expertise
and in the early sixties, as this process gathered pace, there
1B Askanas, H Askanas, F Levcik "Structural Developments in
CMEA Foreign Trade over the Last Fifteen Years (1960-1975)"
Forschungsbericht No.23. (February 1975) t \.J'ienerInstitut rt1r
Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche p.3. (
2ibid• p.7.
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was limited scope for balancing the drain on the economy through
exports.
In the consumer goods sector of the Soviet economy the low
level of indigenous technology provides finished goods of limited
export potential. There is also evidence of rising demand for
consumer goods, including those of Western origin. It might be
thought that in order to alleviate problems in the balance of
trade and payments by using indigenous resources the Soviet Union
might direct a higher proportion of these resources to the
development of industrial capital goods and to the financing of
research to a greater extent than hitherto: however there is
doubt as to the Soviet Union's ability to do this on a sufficient
scale, since the demands on resources posed by the development of
the military sector and the possible undesirable social conse-
quences of excessive restraint on consumer demand appear to be
equally influential considerations in the overall balance.
One possibility open to the Soviet Union is that of
initiating joint-venture projects with fellow-members of Comecon
in the industrial sector as a whole. An alternative might be to
raise loans from elsewhere in Comecon, but this is limited by the
fact that these countries themselves in respect of the balance of
trade and payments, and are likewise aware of the dangers of
restraining consumer demand. The possibility of increasing
exports of a number of types of goods is fraught with difficulties:
capital goods need to be retained for domestic use, consumer
goods tend to be uncompetitive in world markets, agricultural
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exports are unlikely to expand in view of the periodic and
unpredictable shortfalls encountered in this sector. Raising
further finance through Western capital markets is limited in
scope since the Comecon currencies remain only partially con-
vertible and the level of indebtedness is already regarded as
high. Though the Soviet Union has relied for the most part on
Western credits negotiated on a state-to-state basis, more
recently loans have been raised on the Eurodollar market, since
the USA government has been cautious about extending credits.
On the other hand Western European governments and institutions
have extended substantial credit facilities. At a time of
Western economic slump credits are more readily obtainable by
Cromecon members, at a time of buoyancy more readily repayable.
Exports of raw materials, especially fuels, present a
different prospect from the aforementioned goods. The rapid rise
in prixes for energy raw materials has enabled the Soviet Union
in the short term to recoup much of the cost of financing the
import of technology and foodstuffs. In 1915 the Soviet Union
exported some 130 million tonnes of crude oil and refined
products out of a total crude oil production of 491 million. Of
this 63 million tonnes were exported to the Eastern European
full members of Comecon and 61 million to the remainder of the
world. Over the period from 1911 to 1915 the share of fuels and
and energy in total Soviet export value rose from 11.9 to 31.4
per cent.
The issues affecting the export balance in the period to
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1980, when oil production is planned to reach 640 million tonnes,
are the rates of increase in domestic consumption, in demand for
energy in Comecon, the degree of flexibility enjoyed by the
Soviet Union in meeting the increase in demand, and the capacity
of the Eastern Europeancountries to supplement deliveries from
the Soviet Union with purchases in the world markets. Such
considerations will be influenced by the Soviet Union's analysis
of her need for hard currencies and the extent to which this can
be met by expanding her direct exports to the corresponding
markets and also by enhancing her role as oil and gas broker.
The latter issue is discussed in Chapter 7: the purpose of this
Chapter is to analyse the pattern of direct Soviet export trade
in oil and gas in the 1970-1980 period, having regard for the
aforementioned factors and attempting to determine the considera-
tions that influence Soviet decisions on the development of oil
and gas trade.
As early as 1966 the Polish analyst S Albihowski advanced
the view that the Soviet Union would run into an oil supply
crisis by 1980.3 Basing his calculations on a projected rise in
per capita consumption of oil from 870 kilogrammes in 1965 to
2 tonnes in 1980, at which time he estimates that the Soviet
population would have risen to 280 million, with corresponding
figures for Eastern Europe in 1980 of 1.5 tonnes and 115 million,
3S Albinowski in Polityka, 24 September 1966. An English
translation of this article appears in R E l"bel "Communist Trade
in Oil and Gas" New York: Praeger 1970, pp.249-254. Subsequent
references relate to this translation.
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Albinowski concludes that demand for oil in the Soviet Union
will reaoh 560 million tonnes in 1980 and 110 million in Eastern
Europe. He puts Soviet production in 1980 at 630 million tonnes
and that of Eastern Europe at 33 million. Assuming that the
Soviet Union would allocate Borne20 million tonnes for export to
non-Comecon markets, leaving 50 million tonnes for Eastern
Europe, an oil defioit of 90 million tonnes in the latter area
in 1980 is predicted.4
Albinowski's extrapolation of per capita oonsumption of oil
to 1980 overlooks not only the potential for improvement in
energy conversion efficiency in general and particularly of oil
which such a trend might suggest but also the likelihood of a
declining rate of growth in population. More important, however,
is the fact that although at the time of Albinowski's estimate
the Soviet gas industry was in its infancy, the rates of growth
being reoorded had already giveh cause for confidenoe on the part
of planners, who were forecasting an increasing share for this
fuel in the energy balance, and of the Soviet foreign trade
monopoly, who had entered into preliminary negotiations on gas
export contraots.
A somewhat different analysis of Soviet trade potential was
published in 1911 by the \.festGerman analyst Werner Gurnpel.5 He
points to the existence of a very wide range of options existing
4ibid• pp.250-251.
5W Gurnpel "Sowjetunion: Erd61 und Nahostpolitik" Aussen-
politik 1971 No. 11, pp.670-681.
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at the time of his writing for alleviating supply tensions in any
of the Soviet Union's fuels industries through coordinated
planning and investment. Gumpel acknowledges an increasing
tension in oil supply and demand, and the breadth of opinion as
to the future of Soviet oil trade. He notes that an (unattested)
OEeD forecast puts 1980 oil production at 690-710 million tonnes
and demand at 613 million, this leaving a surplus of 75 to 95
million tonnes for export.6 He indicates that a prominent Soviet
energy economist N V Mel'nikov estimated in 1969 that Soviet
production in 1980 would be no more than 607 million tonnes,1 and
that a TASS bulletin of 16 May 1969 referred to projected Soviet
oil production in 1980 as reaching "more than 500 million
8tonnes". Gumpel favours acceptance of the Mel'nikov forecast,
this in his view suggesting a small domestic oil deficit of 5 or
6 million tonnes in 1980. Though Gumpel subscribes to the view
that the Soviet Union would be a net importer of crude oil by
1980~ the area of discussion being the extent of dependence, he
does make reference to the possible emergence of natural gas,
stressing the more favourable ratio of reserves to production and
increasing export potential.10 He does not however offer any
analysis of domestic and export substitution possibilities, seeing
6ibid. p.676.
1N V Melnikov "Voprosy razvitiya toplivnoi promyshlennosti"
Planovoe khozyaistvo 1969 No.1, p.12.
8Gumpel op.cit. p.677.
9ibid•
10ibid• pp.679-680.
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thO " 11~s as a m~nor ~ssue. A major point to which Gumpel alludes,
but which is left undeveloped, is that the Soviet Union might be
prepared to incur higher domestic costs in the energy sector in
order to remain independent, as far as possible, of supply from
historically so unstable an area as the Middle East.12 Albinowski
pointed out in 1966 that greater involvement on the part of
Comecon countries in the Middle East, primarily in hydrocarbon
production might afford the opportunity of influencing the
development of the latter towards socialist-type patterns, as a
counter to the spread of Western colonialism.13 However whereas
Albinowski confines his view of the Soviet Union's possible
import of Middle East oil to suggesting that the issue might
become part of a global competition for geopolitical influence,
Gumpel goes so far as to intimate the possibility of an extension
of the "Brezlmev doctrine" to include a direct Soviet military
presence in the area.14
The analysis of Robert E Ebel, completed in 1970, presents
yet obe more view. Though primarily concerned with developments
in Soviet oil and gas trade from 1917 until 1968, the work does
offer in conclusion an estimate of Soviet oil and gas trade
potential. Ebel is the sole author writing in this period to
stress the impact of the development of gas on production of and
demand for oil and petroleum products. He points to the low prime
11ibid. p.680.
12ibid. p.681.
13Albinowski, in Ebel op.cit. p.252.
14Gumpel op.cit. p.681.
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cost of producing natural gas compared with other fuels15 and
the potential of gas not only to take the place of oil as first
choice substitute for coal, in accordance with Soviet policy in
the late sixties, but also as an export fuel in its own right
in Comecon and Western markets. The rapid growth of the gas
16industry would, he argues, depress the rate of growth in
demand for oil in the bloc. Ebel estimates the figure for
Soviet oil production in 1975 at 460 million tonnes, with the
expectation that this would rise to 600-620 by 1980.17 Despite
acceptance of a lower figure than his contemporaries for 1975
(a figure which turned out to be 45 million tonnes less than the
Plan target set for 1975), Ebel sees no basis for the proposition
that the Soviet Union would be obliged to import substantial
quantities of oil from the Middle East in the period up to 1975,
suggesting rather that increased imports might be contemplated
for economic reasons only and then only on the basis of accepting
oil as the repayment element in barter trade.18 study of Ebel's
forw~d estimate of gas production and trade sheds some light on
to his view of prospects for the oil industry. The inaccuracy
of Ebel's projections is due to some extent to the difficulties
faced by Soviet planners themselves. In a short space of time
15Ebel op.cit. p.107.
16ibid• p.109.
171bid• p.111 (based on forward estimates given by the Soviet
Oil Minister, V D Shashin, in "Neftedobyvayushchaya promyshlen-
nost' SSSR za 50 let Sovetskoi vlastill Neftyanaya promyshlennost'
1967 No. 10, p.7).
18ibid• p.119.
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the production level projected for 1975 was revised from a range
of 380-400 billion cubic metres19 to 3~0-340 billion20 and even
to 280-300 billion,21 the latter estimate proving accurate i~
the event. Equally important were the Soviet estimates made at
that time of production in 1980. A projection made in 1961
forecast a likely level of 680-700 billion cubic metres:22 this
was scaled down to 640-650 billion in an estimate made at the
end of 1967,23 but these proved to be well in excess of the final
objective, limiting the rate of increase of the share of natural
gas in the energy balance and in exports. Ebel forecast a slow-
down in sales of oil to non-Comecon markets,24 counterbalanced
by rising exports of gas, especially to the expanding markets of
the Netherlands, France, west Germany and Belgium, which were
supplied at that time from the Dutch Groningen gasfield.25
However the range of Ebel's estimate of the net Soviet export
surplus of gas in 1975 of 7-9 billion cubic metres proved to be
accurate.26
19Editorial '~a blago rodiny" Stroitel'stvo truboprovodov
1968 No.5. p.7.
20Stroitel'naya gazeta 5 February 1969. p.1.
21Bakinskii rabochii 13 March 1969. p.2.
22Ebel op.cit. p.129.
23V G Vasil'ev "Gazovaya promyshlennost' - detishche
Oktyabrya" Geologiya nefti i gaza 1967 No. 12. p.1.
24Ebe1 op.cit. p.124·
25ibid. p.1~2·
26ibid• p.166.
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An analysis carried out in the early seventies stresses
that although the export of raW materials has been advantageous
for Comecon as a whole, and especially for the Soviet Union,
growth in output appears inadequate to sustain the rate of
economic growth in the industrial sector thought likely at that
time. Consequently, the authors argue, trade in such materials,
especially in coal, oil and gas, can be expected to deoline.27
They point to a deolining volume of net exports of oil and
refined products from the Soviet Union oaused by inoreasing
imports from the Middle East,28 and also that although the Soviet
Union could benefit from the rise in world prices for raw
materials, the opportunities presented by the rise in oil prioes
in particular might not be fully exploitable.29
However analysis based on historical trends overlooks the
changing role of oil and gas exports in relation to the demands
of the eoonomy as a whole. Their role as the export commodity
most likely to secure the means of acquiring much-needed
technology is the subject of a later review article by M C
Kaser.3° His view is that oil and gas form the "cornerstone" of
Soviet plans for the development of trade with the West, to the
extent that the quantity of each available for export to Eastern
27Askanas, Askanas, Levcik op.cit. p.26.
28'b'd 291 1 • P..
29ibid• PP.38-39.
~'ltC Kaser "Technology and Oil in Comecon's External
Relations" (Review Article) Journal of Common Market Studies
1975 Vol. 13, pp.161-172.
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Europe will be merely the residual after oonsideration of
domestic needs and of the level of imports from the West
necessary to support the economic Plan.31 He argues that as
long as the Soviet Union oan maintain steady growth in oil pro-
duction the volume of oil and refined products available for
export to Eastern Europe should not deoline below the 1970
level,32 but stresses that the factors determining the ultimate
level of exports of oil to Western Europe might be non-economic,
and related to the extent to which the West might be prepared to
beoome dependent on the Soviet Union for the supply of so vital
a material as oil, fearing the possibility of embargo and its
effeots.33
On a different plane, the question of the greater involve-
ment of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in world trade, and
specifically in oil, in the context of the ohanged financial
market following the massive inflow of wealth and purchasing
power to the members of OPEC after 1973 is the subject of a
further article by the same author.34 Kaser advanoes the view
that OPEC dollar surpluses might be deposited in Comecon
institutions, offering financial stability, institutional sol-
vency guaranteed by the state meohanism and an unblemished record
31ibid. pp.166-167.
32ibid. p.171.
33ibid• p.172•
3~ C Kaser "Oil and the Broader Participation of IBEC"
International Currency Review 1974 No.6, pp.25-27. 32.
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on the part of the Soviet Union in dealings with foreign
creditors and depositors. Such a course of action on the part
of OPEC would, he argues, allow OPEC to acquire goods without
investment in Western institutions, a process which would serve
merely to shore up the economic system of perceived political
adversaries.35 This overlooks the possibility that OPEC, or
rather many of the Arab members, might be equally wary of
financing the furtherance of Soviet imperialism, given the
considerable antipathy towards Soviet-type socialism existing
in many quarters of the Arab world. Direct investment by Middle
Eastern countries in Comecon has been limited and the latter
group has had to compete for a share of the petrodollar surplus
via the international banking system.
A study completed in 1975 provides a particularly detailed
analysis of Soviet trade in energy raw materials, including
substantial data on oil and gas.36 The work covers the period
from 1960 to 1980 and the most reoent data on which it is based
are for mid-1973. Bethkenhagen's projection of the supply
pattern rest on the assumption that the world price of oil could
be expected to rise to 8 dollars per barrel (in 1973 dollars) by
1980.37 Bethkenhagen's analysis contrasts with that of the
35ibid• p.25.
36J Bethkenhagen "Bedeutung und I-16glichkeiten des Ost-West-
Handels mit Energierohstoffen" (Deutsches Institut ftlr
Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft 104) Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot 1975.
37ibid• p.266.
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majority of observers of the time in that in 1980 Eastern Europe
would receive 100 million tonnes of oil and refined products
from the Soviet Union, with an upper limit of 35 million tonnes
from other sources.38 Even with an assumed forward price for
OPEC oil below that actually imposed Bethkenhagen stresses the
limited capacity of Eastern Europe to expand trade with OPEC
producers. His projections do depend on a number of (self-
admitted) assumptions that simplify considerably the forward
position. For example he assumes that there would be no import
restrictions on the part of Western Europe and no provision of
technology and know-how from the West that could make an impact
on Soviet export capacity before 1980.39 He argues that
Romania would remain independent of Soviet supply through to
198040 and that the upper limit on Soviet imports from the fUddle
F~st would be 20 million tonnes.41 He points to the substantial
export potential of gas in both Eastern and Western European
markets, estimating that on the basis of contracts concluded up
to the end of October 1913 exports of Soviet gas to Western
Europe (West Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Austria and Sweden)
would total 21 billion cubic metres in 1980.42 His short-term
estimate for oil production and exports proves to be somewhat
38ibid. pp.189. 294.
39ibid• p.298.
40ibid. p.299.
41ibid. pp.190, 295.
42ibid. p.204·
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inaccurate, underestimating Soviet production in 1975 at 475
million tonnes and total exports at 101 million, with the
supposition that there would be no increase in exports to the
West on the estimated figure for 1975 of 43.6 million tonnes.43
The short-term forecast for gas is more accurate, though again
he underestimates 1975 production slightly, putting this at 284
billion cubic metres, and overestimates imports and domestic
demand. He takes the view that imports of gas in 1980 will show
little difference on his estimated level for 1975, with expansion
in export tr~de from an estimated 22 billion cubic metres in
1975 to 50 billion in 1980.44
A similar perspective was presented at about the same time
as the Bethkenhageh analysis by the American analyst A W
Wright.45 His point of departure is that Soviet decisions con-
cerning the development of and export policy for oil and gas are
determined by rational economic criteria. Whilst admitting an
appreciation on the part of Soviet planners of potential
'political' gains resulting from trade policy (not only energy
trade policy), he notes the existence of a point at which
43ibid• p.25~.
44ibid•
45A \.[Wright "The Soviet Union in \vorld Energy Harkets", in
E W Erickson, L \vaverman (eds.) "The Energy Question: An Inter-
national Failure of Policy" Toronto: University of Toronto Press
1974. (Vol.1.), pp.85-89. (Note also the existence of an earlier
work by this author, his unpublished Ph.D. thesis entitled "The
Theory and Practice of Soviet Investment Planning with Special
Reference to the Mineral Fuels Industries" }~ssachusetts
Institute of Technology 1969.)
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incurrence of economic loss is judged excessive in relation to
perceived political gain.46 He argues that members of any 'customs
union' may in respect of certain individual products pay a price
for membership quantifiable in terms of import and export oppor-
tunities foregone, but that the overall benefit of membership may
outweigh this.47 He does however admit that in the course of the
ninth Plan the terms of trade in energy materials altered in the
Soviet Union's favour, correctly anticipating the Soviet Union's
imposing a sUbstantial price rise for fuels supplied to Eastern
Europe.49 Wright makes two important points particularly clearly.
Firstly he expresses the view that the Soviet Union is capable of
implementing fuel production and import/export policies involving
independent development of indigenous resources, but that such
decisions are required to be economically sound in relation to
domestic cost and import and export prices of fuels. He main-
tains that the resurgence of interest on the part of the Soviet
Union in joint ventures with Western associations was prompted by
uncertainty as to whether the high import prioes for energy in the
post-1973 period could be expeoted to fall, leaving the Soviet
Union with a sUbstantial oommitment to (uneoonomio) energy
developments, whereas joint investment would both spread the risk
and create a communality of interest in keeping world energy
46ibid. p.85.
47ibid• p.91•
48ibid. p.93.
49ibid• p.94.
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prices high. Secondly he makes the point that Soviet trade in
non-Comecon energy markets has been conducted on a sound
commercial basis, with no evidence of price-cutting beyond the
level required to secure a contract and that this policy is
likely to continue.50
P R Odell regards the principal feature of the Soviet energy
economy as a continuing drive for self-sufficiency, to the extent
of incurring expense in supplying certain areas with indigenously
produced fuel in preference to lower cost imports, maintaining
that the Soviet Union chooses to import oil and gas for reasons
of logistic convenience rather than of actual need.51 This
latter point appears justified in the case of gas. However in
the case of oil the position is more complicated. Whereas Soviet
foreign trade statistics show imports of crude oil and refined
products from certain Middle East and North African producers,
it has been pointed out that some of this may not in fact enter
the Soviet Union, but instead be delivered to Comecon or non-
Comecon markets on Soviet account.52 In the light of the
existing body of Western analysis of Soviet energy trade and
potential the following discussion seeks to discern the trend in
trade policy between 1971 and 1975 and to identify and assess
the possible impact of domestic and external influences on the
50ibid. p.95.
51p R Odell "Oil and \.JorldPower: Background to the Oil Crisis"
Harmondsworth: Penguin 1975 (4th edit.), pp.~7, 49.
52M I Goldman "Detente and .Dollars: Doing Business with the
Soviets" New York: Basic Books 1975, p.17.
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development of Soviet oil and gas trade.
Soviet Trade in Oil and Gas 1971-1975
The structure of imports and exports is no less regulated
a phenomenon than domestic production within the Plan. The
Soviet economy requires that the volume and composition of
imports and exports be determined in relation to the requirements
of domestic Plan fulfilment. Unlike the domestic Plan however,
the Soviet Union releases no data on the import-export Plan. It
is known that import-export agreements are usually timed to
coincide with the Plan period and that prices are fixed for the
duration of an agreement. It is important to bear in mind, as
J Wilczynski has pointed out,53 that although the export price
of a particular Soviet commodity may be lower than its domestic
counterpart, the Soviet Union does not sustain economic loss,
since the crucial factor is the net surplus to the national
production account, although the opportunity cost concept is
certainly followed by Soviet planners. The price rises imposed
by OPEC in 1973 and subsequently changed substantially previous
patterns of long-term energy trade and price relationships of
the Soviet Union with her customers and suppliers.
The role of fuels and energy within the commodity structure
of Soviet foreign trade during the ninth Plan is outlined in
table 6.1. It will be seen that not only have fuels become the
53J Wilczynski "The PoH tical Economy of East-\.festTrade"
New York: Praeger 1969, p.170.
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TABLE 6.1. Commodity Structure of Soviet Foreign Trade
1971-1975 (%)
~A2 ExI20rts
.1211 1m. .1.2.ll .1214. 1.ill.
r~chinery & Equipment 21.8 23.6 21.8 19.2 18.7
Fuel 17.9 17.7 19.2 25.4 31.4
Ores & Concentrate 18.7 19.0 17.1 14.7 14.3
Metals
Chemicals, Fertilisers 3.4 3.3 3.0 3.6 3.5
Wood Products, Cellulose 6.3 6.1 6.4 6.9 5.7
Textiles, raw and semi- 3.3 3.8 3.3 3.3 2.9
finished
Furs 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
Food Products 9.2 5.9 5.6 7.1 4.8
Consumer Goods 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.1
Total 83.9 82.9 79.9 83.4 84.6
Unspecified 16.1 17.1 20.3 16.6 15.4
Total in million rubles 12429 12734 15802 20738 24030
Of which Socialist 8116 8286 9115 11092 14584
countries
~B2 ImEorts
.121.l .1.2R lW. 1m. .1.212
V~chinery & Equipment 34.0 34.6 34.3 32.4 33.9
Fuel and Energy 2.1 3.0 3.4 3.5 4.0
Ores, Concentrates, 9.8 8.9 9.9 13.6 11.5
JlIetala
Chemicals & Fertilisers 5.4 4.9 4.3 6.3 4.1
Wood Pulp, Cellulose, 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.2
Paper
Textiles, raw and semi- 4.5 3.3 3.7 4.1 2.4
finished
Food Products 15.2 18.0 20.2 11.1 23.0
Consumer Goods 20.1 18.6 15.9 14.6 13.0
Total 93.8 93.1 93.3 93.5 94.1
Unspecified 6.2 6.9 6.7 6.5 5.3
Total in million rubles 11232 13303 15544 18834 26669
Of which Socialist 7360 8519 9216 10304 13986
Source: Narodnoe khoz~aistvo SSSRz corresEonding ~ears.
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major product group in Soviet export trade but they have also
constituted the biggest growth sector in value terms. In import
trade the measure of the Soviet Union's self-sufficiency and
flexibility in energy planning is illustrated by the maintenance
of the percentage value of fuels imports in relation to total
imports, resulting in a much-decreased volume, after the OPEC
oil price rises of 1973 and 1974. The enhanced earning power of
the export of energy raw materials is evident from the export
trends.
A major consideration of Western analysts during the ninth
Plan has been the gradual increase of Soviet and Eastern European
indebtedness to hard currency trading areas. Given the
prevalent view in Western circles that Comecon was facing a
growing energy deficit, especially in oil, the financial
capability of the bloc to sustain imports of oil became an issue
of increasing interest. The possibility of further expansion in
trade with the West is hampered by quota and tariff restrictions.
Exports of agricultural produce and foodstuffs faces the problems
of the European Common Agrioultural Policy and of the inadequaoy
of the sector itself to meet domestic demand. A reoent estimate
of likely developments in trading patterns made by R Partes
concludes that if Soviet imports remained at the level of 1976
then the Soviet Union would need to increase exports to hard
currenoy markets at the rate of 10 per cent per year in order
that her debt on hard currency account might level off by 1980.54
54R Portes "West-East Capital Flows", occasional paper,
University of London, Birkbeck College ~arch 1977, cited in
Financial Times 5 Jl'fay1977, p.32. Partes estimates an increase
in the Soviet debt to the West from 5.9 billion dollars at the
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The essential attractiveness of raw material exports from
the Western standpoint is that the products themselves are
homogenous, and meet simple, readily testable quality standards
in contrast to Soviet technological goods, whose quality and
performance are often below world standards. There has been an
incentive on the part of Western countries to become increasingly
involved in negotiations to secure the supply of Soviet oil,
refined products and gas on two counts; firstly that the
changing role of OPEC within the world petroleum market has given
rise to uncertainty over the future of oil supply ~d its price,
and secondly that the availability of Soviet gas in Western
Europe might be the most economical way of supplying the estab-
Iished market, given that production from the Dutch Groningen
gasfield is expected to peak and decline before 1980.
It has been pointed out that the bilateralism that charac-
terises Soviet foreign trade has no basis in ideology or theory,
but rather in its relevance to a country lacking reserves of hard
currency and desiring to remain relatively isolated from the
vacillations of world markets in addition to facilitating the
integration of trade into the planning process.55 The latter
point is expanded in a later study by Adam Zwass, in which he
suggests that the policy of using foreign trade solely to fill
gaps in domestic supply of essential imports was conceived when
end of 1974 to 11.4 at end-1975 and 14.4 at and-1976.
55A Nova "The Soviet Economy" London: Allen and Unwin 1969,
pp.214-215.
300
the Soviet Union felt that capitalism was a short-tenn threat
but that it would nonetheless eventually be destroyed through
its own inherent contradictions.56 Nove argues that the major
reason for the continuation of this policy is that the central
Plan is still the basis of economic activity, into which foreign
trade must be fitted in order that planners may demonstrate the
formulation of an economic strategy that is not subject to world
market forces.57
The issue of pricing is particularly pertinent to Soviet
decisions cohcerning the pattern of exports of oil and refined
products, whose supply became more restricted in relation to
demand during the seventies than in the sixties, and of gas,
where export opportunities have arguably been lost through
delays in the construction of delivery facilities. Zwass points
out that production for the home and export markets is regarded
as a single function. Enterprises manufacture under exactly
the same terms and criteria for export as for the home market,
without having to take into account economic conditions
prevailing in their particular export market.58 In fact the
Soviet foreign trade system shields the enterprise from world
market fluctuations by absorbing any short-term gains or losses
into the Budget.59
56A Zwa.ss "r·10netaryCooperation between East and West"
York: IASP 1975, p.46.
57Nove op.eit. p.217.
58Zwass OE.cit. p.50.
59ibid• PP.59-60.
New-
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The prime objective in intra-Comecon trade is that of
balancing a number of production relations in physical terms,
but which are expressed for the purpose of internal accounting
in monetary values. Zwass gives some details of the meohanism
used in determining prioes in intra-Comeoon trade,60 indioating
that in addition to the fact that prices bear no relation to
domestic cost and relative scarcity, the underlying problem is
the potential obsolescence during the time of their application
61of the prices used, and a system of exchange rate that does
not reflect the international competitiveness of the economy of
the individual country.62 The c~se of oil pricing has been
particularly interesting. During the late sixties there were a
number of monopolistic elements determining the "world price" of
oil in the form of the major oil companies operating in the
Middle East and working increasingly with OPEC to secure an
orderly rise in the price of oil. How the Soviet Union defines
a "monopolistic element" to be discounted in caloulating the
"world price" is uncertain: what is however pertinent is that
60ibid. pp.144-146. The principle is to arrive at a world
market price by eliminating seasonal, speculative and monopolistic
elements over an extended period and to fix these for the duration
of a given Five-Tear Plan. For example basic prices for the 1971-
1975 Plan were calculated on the average of those for 1965-1969.
World market prioes are then expressed in an appropriate Western
convertible currency and converted to the Comecon equivalent at
the current do11ar-to-ruble exchange rate. See also 0 I
Tarnovskii, N M ?1itrofanova "Stoimost' i tsena na mirovom
Botsialisticheskom rynke" Noscow Nauka 1968, p.84.
61Zwass op.cit. p.146.
62ibid• p.65.
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the rapid change in the market price of oil after 1973 prompted
the Soviet Union to take advantage of OPEC's monopolistic
success in that the value of Soviet energy exports was
reappraised in a very short time, enabling the Soviet Union not
only to take advantage of opportunities in hard currency trade
but also to revalue its increasingly labour-intensive oil and
gas against goods supplied in return by other members of Comecon.
However since there appeared to be some uncertainty over
Soviet capacity to maintain the rate of growth of production and
trade that had been recorded in the sixties at the same time at
which the quadrupling of prices for oil and refined products
greatly enhanced opportunities for increasing earnings of hard
currencies, the question arose whether the Soviet Union would
forego such opportunities in order to supply the increasing
requirement of Comecon, or alternatively (and additionally)
whether Soviet oil and gas would alleviate the impact of higher
prices on developing countries.
The pattern of Soviet trade in oil and refined products is
detailed in table 6.2., the major features being the steady
growth of gross and net exports, the rising trend of deliveries
to Comecon and non-EEC markets and the fluctuating but
apparently non-expanding level of trade with the EEC nine. The
OPEC price rises of 1913 and 1974 are seen to have had a marked
effect in halting the growth of Soviet imports from the Hiddle
East. As internal energy policy was readjusted to take into
account the price rises, the upward trend was resumed in 1915
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TABLE 6.2. Soviet Trade in Oil and Oil Products 1971-1975
(million tonnes)
Exports .12.ll .12E. 12ll .1.2li. .12Z.l
Comecon 44.76 48.89 55.28 58.71 63.28
EEC 9 24.52 23.67 26.63 20.96 25.03
Rest of World 35.82 34.44 36.69 36.53 42.02
Total 105.10 107.00 118.30 116.20 130.35
of which: crude oil 74.80 76.20 85.30 80.60 93.07
refined 30.30 30.80 33.20 35.60 37.28
products
Tota.l Imports 6.70 9.10 14.70 5.40 7.56
of which: crude oil 5.10 7.80 13.20 4.40 6.50
refined 1.50 1.30 1.50 1.00 1.06
products
Net Exports 98.40 97.90 103.60 110.80 122.79
Source: Vneshn~a~a. torgovl~a. SSSRa corresEonding lears.
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but at a lower level than that suggested by the trend of the
previous few years.
Table 6.3. details the corresponding pattern of Soviet trade
in natural gas, showing the gradual transition in the status of
the Soviet Union from net importer to net exporter, favouring
primarily the Comecon market for logistic as well as politico-
economic reasons. The significance of Soviet imports of gas is
twofold. Firstly deliveries of Iranian gas constitute repayment
in kind for Soviet supply of equipment and expertise used to
develop the Iranian gas industry. Soviet engineers supervised
the construction of the pipeline from Iran that joins the Soviet
system linking Central Asia with the Central and European areas.
The gas is consumed in Armenia and Georgia, whose local produc-
tion is declining and where no substantial new reserves have been
discovered recently. Similarly gas from Afghanistan serves as
repayment for a variety of Soviet machinery and technology, and
is consumed in the industrial areas of Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan,
where local fuel production, especially of hydrocarbons, is
inadequate to meet local demand. In the case of Iranian and
Afghan supply the Soviet Union has successfully negotiated to
maintain a lower import price than she is able to obtain for her
own exported gas. Secondly there is no alternative market for
either Iranian or Afghan gas. The major gas-consuming centres,
namely Western Europe and the USA, have gas available at prices
well below those at which Iranian or Afghan gas could be supplied,
and since the majority of Iranian gas is associated with oil, the
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TABLE 6.3. Soviet Trade in Natural Gas 1971-1975
(billion cubic metres)
.1211 1.2.R .!2.ll 12I4. .:!ill.
Exports
Comecon 3.13 3.44 4.07 8.56 11.29
EEC 9 0.35 2.93 5.44
Rest of World 1.43 1.63 1.62 2.55 2.60
Total Exports 4.56 5.07 6.83 14.04 19.33
Imports 8.18 11.04 11.41 11.94 12.41
Net Exports (-3.62) (-5.97) (-4.58) 2.10 6.92
Source: a SSSR correspondin ears.
the totals of the individual
countries' exports do not add to the reported national
total. The discrepancy of 740 million cubic metres
is not explained in Soviet statistics.)
alternative would be to flare it at the wellhead.
The Soviet Union committed herself to supply fellow-members
of Comecon between 1971 and 1975 with 243 million tohnes of oil
and 33 billion cubic metres of gas, compared with 138 million
tonnes and 8 billion cubic metres over the previous Plan.63 It
will be seen from tables 6.2. and 6.3. that deliveries of oil and
refined products to Comecon between 1971 and 1975 totalled 271
million tonnes and of gas 30.5 billion cubic metres. Since
Soviet and the majority of Eastern European export statistics no
longer record separate deliveries of oil and oil products by
63Zwass op.cit. p.152.
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country, it is not possible to calculate the extent of divergence
from the agreed schedule. However, given that refinery capacity
in Eastern Europe is regarded as adequate to meet domestic
demand, with a consequently minor need for refined products, the
likelihood is that the substantial part of deliveries consists
of crude oil and that the contractual obligation was broadly
honoured in spite of the increasing difficulties in oil production
and the shortfall against original Plan. Bearing in mind the
causes of the shortfall in the Soviet gas industry's production,
the delivery of 30.5 billion cubic metres to Comecon during the
ninth Plan represents a considerable commitment.
An interesting feature of the Soviet Union's pattern of trade
in petroleum products is the maintenance of similar ratios
between the product groups. Unit values for Soviet export trade
in oil and refined products reflect the price adjustments made in
non-Comecon trade in 1974 following the OPEC price rises and in
trade with Comecon from 1st January 1975. The impact of the OPEC
price rises if reflected in unit values for imported oil in
1974 and 1975 and in the drop in imports from the 1973 level.
The relatively small volume of refined products imported by the
Soviet Union originates in Romania and the unit prices in 1975
reflect the Romanian response to the re-evaluation of oil and its
derivatives.
The terms of the change in the method of determining oil
prices, effective from 1 January 1975, were that prices would be
fixed annually on the basis of average world prices for the
313
period of the immediately preceding five years, an exception
being made in the case of 1975, when they would be determined
against the average of the three-year period from 1972 to 1974.64
Though information on the effect of the Soviet oil price rise has
been somewhat fragmentary, it has proved possible to make a
number of observations on its impact on petroleum consumption
in Eastern ~ope and on Soviet trade. Prior to the Soviet
price rise events had been set in motion that were to anticipate
the further effect of such a rise. The impact of the OPEC rises
was that of bringing about an immediate programme of energy
conservation in Eastern Europe. In view of the small percentage
of oil and energy supply accounted for by OPEC oil at that time
one might reasonably conclude that the reaction related as much
to an anticipated increase in such deliveries as to the solution
of the immediate problem. For example, in Czechoslovakia the
prices of the range of refined products were doubled and
previously allocated delivery levels from refineries cut by an
average of 10 per cent.65 In Romania, where the domestic supply
of energy, and of oil in particular, was a good deal less taut
than elsewhere in Eastern Europe strict norms for improvements in
energy conversion efficiency were introduced rapidly, and were
66expected to remain in force for the 1976-1980 Plan.
64Trybuna ludu 8-9 February 1975. p.5.
65Rude pravo 30 March 1974, pp.1-2, Financial Times 2 April
1974. p.4.
66 u /Revista economica 12 1975. pp.9-10.
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The 1915 price for deliveries of Soviet oil to Eastern
Europe was set at some 130 per cent above that charged from 1911
to 1914. The benefits of this substantial step-change to the
Soviet Union were the earlier availability of higher revenues
and the catalysing of discussion in Eastern Europe over the
forward development of the energy balance of the individual
countries and the issue of fuel conversion efficiency in general.
The price rise involved an increase from an average of 16
rubles per tonne at the Soviet border to 31, with slight
differences between the countries to take into account varying
transportation costs.61 However to the price rise was added a
further problem, namely that for supply of oil above the
negotiated annual quotas for 1915 and subsequently the Soviet
68Union would require payment in hard currencies.
The price rise for Soviet 011 was imposed at a time when
Eastern Europe was faced with a mounting trade and payments
deficit with the West, and when their trade surplus with the
Soviet Union was turning into a deficit. The former deficit
was incurred as a result of the adaptation in differing degrees
on the part of the Eastern European countries of a development
strategy of import-led growth, such that the output of imported
machiner,y could eventually be used to repay the credits granted
for its procurement. Decisions had been taken in the late
sixties to initiate this process. However the upheavals in raw
67Financial Times 16 January 1975, p.6, 24 February 1975, P.S.
68Financial Times 20 March 1915. p.6.
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material prioes between 1973 and 1975 placed unantioipated
stress on the international payment oapaoity of the Eastern
European countries.
The process of import-led growth was taken to the greatest
extent by Poland. Fortunately the existence of substantial
reserves of hard coal enabled planners to reaot to the increases
in oil prioes by reorienting energy policy to favour a slower
rate of substitution of ooal by hydrooarbon fuels. The other
Eastern European oountries, with the possible continued
exoeption of Romania, will have to allooate a level of goods
for export to the Soviet Union proportionally higher than hither-
to and seek credits from the Soviet Union to offset the higher
fuel import bill if Soviet absorption oapacity proves inadequate,
espeoially since a continued rise in oil prices oan be expeoted
between 1976 and 1980 following the introduotion of the moving
average as the basis for caloulation of prioes. This is offset,
albeit to a limited extent, in that one effeot of the OPEC
prioe rises has been that of worsening the detectable decline in
the eoonomio health of the West, resulting in deoreased demand
for its products, including machinery and teohnologioal
processes, and greater efforts on the part of the West to sell
these items to Eastern Europe on oredit terms that are now
substantially more favourable than oould have been anticipated
in the late sixties and early seventies, wheh steady growth was
normal.
The Soviet Union reacted quiokly to the OPEC price rises of
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197J-1974. As an immediate measure imports of oil were cut from
13.2 million tonnes in 1973 to 4.4 million in 1974. At the
same time the Soviet Union imposed a cut in exports of oil and
refined products from 118.3 million tonnes in 1973 to 116.2
million in 1974, whilst the complex issues surrounding the
likely level of future cohesion of OPEC, its effect on pricing
policy and the extent to which high world prices for energy
could be expected to hold were debated within the context of the
options open to the Soviet Union for alternative energy policies,
including the planned change in the role of oil in relation to
gas and coal.
The availability of Soviet natural gas in Eastern Europe
dates from the latter part of the eighth Plan, when contracts
were negotiated with Poland and Czechoslovakia. By the end of
the ninth Plan Soviet gas was available to each of the member-
countries of the bloc with the exception of Romania, which
remained self-sufficient up to 1975 and even exported a small
quantity to Hungary. Comparison of unit import and export
prices shows a diverging trend in favour of the Soviet Union,
though as world prices hardened in the aftermath of the oil price
rises both Afghanistan and Iran succeeded in negotiating higher
prices for their gas delivered to the Soviet Union.69 Given the
more favourable ratio of explored reserves to production of gas
compared with oil and the lower peroentage of exports in
69Finanoial Times 11 July 1974, p.e, 19 August 1974. p.5.
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produotion, a policy of substitution of oil by gas, not only in
domestic but also in export markets, was initiated. The under-
fulfilment of targets in the ninth Plan by the gas industry
delayed this process. However the emergence of supply problems
was probably instrumental in catalysing cooperation between the
Comecon members in developing Soviet oil and gas resources, the
results of wpich will be evident towards the end of the tenth
Plan.
In contrast to the Eastern European energy markets, which
evidenced falling rates of growth in consumption, the energy
markets of the rest of the industrialised world experienced an
actual decline in energy consumed and this decline was most
marked in the case of oil. Western Europe has been the prime
market for Soviet oil since her re-emergence as an exporter in
the late fifties and was seen as an obvious market for natural gas.
In the immediate aftermath of the OPEC price rises and embargo
on Rotterdam, the principal distribution point for the Western
European oil market, the view was advanced that the Soviet Union
might ohoose to expand sales substantially even at the expense
of Eastern Europe.70
An analysis of the impact of Soviet oil on principal Western
European markets is given in table 6.4. The essential features
are a rise in the Soviet share of the total market, still small
in most cases, as total demand declined and (see table 6.2.) the
70petroleum Economist March 1974. p.99.
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TABLE 6.4. Impact of Soviet Oil and Oil Products on Principal
West European Markets 1971-1975 (million tonnes)
Country .121.1 .1.2ll .:!..2ll .1lli. 1212
France:
*Total Imports: 115.74 126.84 142.28 137.64 114.00from USSR* 4.54 3.08 5.35 1.36 3.31
\vest Germany:
Total Imports: 135.63 141.75 153.71 141.46 129.06
from USSR: 6.09 6.20 5.85 6.34 7.63
Netherlands:
Total Imports: 69.02 67.19 72.16 64.59 55.23from USSR: 1.63 2.43 3.22 2.98 3.09
Belgium:
Total Imports: 37.99 42.38 45.67 39.67 38.03from USSR: 2.04 2.52 1.61 1.75 1.23
Italy:
Total Imports: 120.24 124.39 123.63 126.25 104.84from USSR: 9.00 8.43 8.65 6.19 6.88
Great Britain:
Total Imports: 126.80 128.14 133.28 121.59 104.16
from USSR: 0.03 0.05 0.83 0.92 1.50
Irish Republic:
Total Imports: 5.81 5.62 5.06 5.81 5.57
from USSR: 0.33 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.18
Denmark:
Total Imports: 21.07 22.01 21.31 20.14 18.77from USSR: 0.86 0.77 0.63 0.70 1.18
Austria:
Total Imports: 1.39 8.01 9.22 8.36 8.56from USSR: 1.13 0.97 1.25 0.97 1.33
Spain:
Total Imports: 36.53 28.34 44.08 45.84 43.85
from USSR: 0.21 0.78 0.51 1.35 1.72
Norwa.y:
8.69Total Imports: 8.94 9.92 10.65 9.10
from USSR: 0.63 0.45 0.60 0.28 0.28
if( Note that in each country imports include crude oil and refined
products.)
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TABLE 6.4. (contd.)
Country .1lli 1.2E 1.2ll 121! .1.212
Finland:
Total Imports: 11.43 12.91 13.59 13.63 12.83from USSR: 8.51 8.63 10.03 9.11 8.11
Switzerland:
Total Imports: 13.02 13.43 14.38 13.35 12.61from USSR: 0.80 0.82 0.66 0.78 0.96
Sweden:
Total Imports: 29.15 28.66 28.64 27.39 30.88from USSR: 4.57 4.36 3.22 3.03 3.45
Sources: (i)
(ii) .;;;Eur~o;.;;s;..;t;.;;;a_t&..' .. ;En; ; . :.;:;.;er:.lg:r;w_.;;.S.;;.;ta;;.t;.;;i;.;:;s..;.ti;;.;c;.;;s~1""'97....5'-Ap.._ 1, . ,1..,;.8_-1 9 ..__16. ....3
(iii) .;;;Eur~o::-;:s;..;t-=a-=-t,~Q~ua;;;:.;r;.:t~e;.;:;r.;;.ly~En;;;.;..;:;e.;;.rgylOW-..;;S;.;.ta;;;.t.;.;;i;.;;s;..;t.;;.ic_s;......;.4J-.119'-oj7~6
...ppo;;.:.~5..;..1--'5:...5.z..!..;:b:. ;,. -...;6:;65.
Table 6.2.
(iv) OEeD Statistics of Energy 19~9-1973 passim.
19 0-1974 passim.
1973-1975 passim.
marked increase in unit prices after 1973. The absolute volume
of Soviet exports rose only slightly during this period, but
included some fluctuations. However the major change between
1971 and 1975 was the effect on the visible trade balance of the
increased price obtainable for Soviet oil after 1913. Data
illustrating the importance to the Soviet Union of trade in oil
with Western European countries are presented in table 6.5.
Finland and Sweden are the only Western European countries
in which Soviet oil and petroleum products can be said to have
made a significant contribution to supply. In the case of Finland
there has been a long history of trade with Russia and the Soviet
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TABLE 6.5. Soviet Visible Trade Balance with Principal West
European Countries 1971-1975 (million rubles)
Country .1.lli 1.27l. 1lli. .!ill. !2l5.
France:
Exports:
* 194.3 194.0 272.2 397.9 495.7Oil Exports:
* 68.3 43.4 91.0 84.2
192.6
Oil.% of Exports 35.2 22.4 33.4 21.2 38.8
Imports: 281.9 350.3 449.4 543.1 800.8
West Germany:
Exports: 254.7 255.9 453.8 834.5 857.9
Oil Exports: 94.1 88.9 214.1 423.3 475.3
Oil % of Exports: 36.9 34.8' 47.2 50.7 55.4
Imports: 411.9 571.4 756.4 1374.2 1919.4
Netherlands:
Exports: 153.6 154.6 260.6 394.3 303.8
Oil Exports: 28.9 40.2 135.6 202.0 201.0
Oil % of Exports: 18.8 26.0 58.9 51.2 66.1
Imports: 70.5 67.7 95.6 176.4 147.2
Belgium:
Exports: 97.9 108.1 194.3 297.9 243.6
Oil Exports: 30.9 35.7 68.6 116.2 79.2
Oil % of Exports: 31.5 33.1 35.3 39.0 32.5
Imports: 59.8 66.4 160.0 305.5 286.2
Italy:
Exports: 233.1 228.0 309.5 597.6 638.0
Oil Exports: 117.7 109.0 153.1 394.9 392.3
Oil % of Exports: 50.5 47.8 49.5 66.1 61.5Imports: 261.5 235.5 304.1 539.6 788.0
Great Britain:
Exports: 407.7 371.1 540.6 690.5 591.1
Oil Exports: 0.7 0.8 17.3 69.9 97.3
Oil % of Exports: 0.2 0.2 3.2 10.1 16.5
Imports: 200.0 186.7 174.6 199.6 368.2
Irish Republic:
Exports: 4.3 2.9 5.6 12.3 10.7
Oil Exports: 3.3 2.0 4.8 7.5 8.6
Oil % of Exports: 75.3 67.6 85.0 60.7 80.6
Imports: 0.3 0.5 0.6 15.9 20.4
*( In each country the category 'oil' includes crude oil and
refined products.)
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TABLE 6.5. (contd.)
Country !21.1 .1.21£ 12ll 1lli. .!ill.
Denmark:
Exports: 26.0 24.9 53.8 78.1 105.7Oil Exports: 10.4 10.2 32.5 43.1 67.8Oil % of Exports: 39.8 40.4 60.4 55.2 64.2Imports: 21.9 24.0. 26.1 41.8 40.4
Austria:
Exports: 90.9 82.7 99.6 166.0 218.5Oil Exports: 18.0 14.9 28.6 61.4 77.9Oil % of Exports: 19.7 . 18.0 28.7 37.0 35.6Imports: 81.4 80.8 84.7 173.6 226.6
Spain:
Exports: 10.0 20.9 30.0 122.0 143.6Oil Exports: 4.0 11.5 9.1 81.7 100.3
Oil % of Exports: 40.4 54.8 30.3 67.0 69.8Imports: 9.0 22.9 10.6 27.4 45.4
Norway:
Exports: 42.1 21.8 34.7 46.8 64.4Oil Exports: 11.5 6.8 11.5 20.9 18.0
Oil % of Exports: 27.3 31.1 33.1 44.7 27.9Imports: 16.0 16.1 16.5 45.1 65.9
Switzerland:
Exports: 35.9 30.7 67.9 79.5 89.5Oil Exports: 16.8 14.0 36.1 52.8 61.6Oil % of Exports: 46.7 45.6 53.1 66.4 68.9Imports: 14.1 90.5 99.8 165.1 240.8
Finland:
Exports: 322.8 297.6 415.1 931.6 918.2Oil Exports: 166.4 162.1 221.8 614.8 542.5Oil % of Exports: 51.6 54.5 53.4 65.6 59.1Imports: 246.3 304.1 362.3 602.1 837.3
Sweden:
Exports: 110.0 108.9 130.1 285.8 289.5
Oil Exports: 59.1 58.0 58.3 168.0 172.9
Oil % of Exports: 53.7 53.3 44.6 58.8 59.7Imports 85.5 79.9 101.6 149.7 255.9
Source: Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR, corresponding years.
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Union, facilitated by geographical proximity and in more recent
times by her closer inclusion in the Comecon trading system when
granted the opportunity of accounting in transferable rubles.71
Trade with Sweden, linked with the earliest barter agreement for
large-diameter pipe, has been maintained through the ninth Plan,
but showed signs of decline towards the end.
It appears from Soviet trade statistics that the Soviet
Union did not use the OPEC production cutback and eventual
embargo on deliveries to the Netherlands as an opportunity for
substantially increasing deliveries, the 1973 volume being less
than 1 million tonnes above that of 1972. However the Soviet
Union did benefit from the price rise. 72As Nove has indicated,
over half of the Soviet Union's expanded trade with the
Netherlands in 1973 consisted of oil and oil products bought at
a price some 150 per cent above the 1972 level, this suggesting
that the majority of the Dutch purchases were made after the
price rises and the imposition of the embargo.
Faoing the problems of rising oosts in the domestic oil
industry and an apparently growing need for imports from the West,
the Soviet Union's polioy on oil business in Western Europe has
been that of reaping the rewards of rising prioes and of gaining
an increased share of a deolining market, which could well be
maintained if the market began again to expand and when Western
71Zwass op.oit. p.57.
72A Nove in The Times 17 July 1974. p.21.
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Europe might view the Soviet Union as no less seoure a source of
supply than the Middle East. It seems that the Soviet Union
appreoiated the oonsequenoes of prompting OPEC to adjust its
prioing and output polioies in order to retain oontrol of the
Western European oil supply balanoe, should the Soviet Union
attempt to inorease substantially its export volume to Western
Europe for short-term gain.
As a result of the polioy of oontinued growth in deliveries
to Eastern and Western European markets the Soviet Union was
unable to oonsider the possible option of alleviating the effeot
of the OPEC prioe rises on developing oountries. However the
quantity of Soviet oil exports to developing oountries may
perhaps be less signifioant than that the periodio negotiations
for possible supply serve as a means of induoing existing
suppliers and marketers of oil and produots, often the affiliates
of the major oil oompanies, to improve their terms of trade with
oonsuming countries.73 Though there is some measure of
advantage in this praotioe (notably the case of supply to India
in the early sixties outlined in Chapter 2), the Soviet desire
to maintain the unity of Comecon and the need to secure the
supply of Western teohnology appear to have taken precedence
over the possibility of competing for politico-eoonomio influence
in the developing world, at least using indigenous oil as an
element of strategy.
73:8~sgupta "Soviet Oil and the Third World" World Develop-
ment May 1975. p.358.
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In view of the particularly severe impact of the events of
1973-1974 on Japah it might seem surprising that trade in oil
and refined products did not rise towards the end of the ninth
Plan, but in fact showed a decline. An explanation of this
trend is to be found in the emergence of China as an oil exporter,
looking at Japan as a prime market. Deliveries of Chinese crude
oil to Japan commenced in 1973 and totalled 1 million ~~nnes.
This figure rose to 4 million in 1914 and to 8 million in 1915.14
Influenced perhaps by the difficulties they were facing in
negotiating supply from the Soviet Union at that time, involving
changing commitments on the Soviet part as to quantities, price
and terms of payment, the Japanese sought and secured marginal
supplies from China on a barter basis, mainly in return for
steel and industrial prodUcts, without becoming involved in
negotiating credits and joint ventures with the Chinese.
In the aftermath of America's "oil crisis" there was some
discussion of the possibility of the Soviet Union's supplying
oil to the USA in return for grain.75 One interpretation of this
option, advanced at the outset of the 1915 Soviet-~erican
negotiations over grain supply, was that the USA had no immediate
need for Soviet oil, but that its increasing presence on the
world market might serve to bring down the price set by OPEC and
that this would contribute to Kissinger's "grand design" to
14Financial Times 26 February 1976, p.4.
75The Times 10 September 1975. p.4, 20 September 1912' p.4.
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restore economic equilibrium in the world and to "fashion a new
balance of power".16 However despite the apparent need and
desire of the Soviet Union to acquire supply of American grain
there was no great eagerness on the Soviet part to sell
domestically produced oil and refined products unless there was
a corresponding commitment on the American part to entering
into joint projects on Soviet territory, providing for the long-
term development of Soviet resources. A further obstacle was
that the USA attempted initially to negotiate for supplies at
below world prices. One analyst argues that the causes of the
apparent fall in American interest not only in short-term
purchases of spot cargoes but also in long-term cooperation were
suspicion of Soviet motives following the "grain robbery" of
1912, preoccupation with the socio-political impact of watergate
and the enthusiastic launching of "Project Independence 1980".17
There exists however a different dimension to Soviet
interest in the American oil market. Although offici&l Soviet
trade statistics record exports of small quantities of oil and
refined products to the USA in 1914 and 1915 (see table 6.2.),
such figures cannot be regarded as representative of total
business contracted between the two countries. Any Soviet oil or
refined product made available to the USA would be phased
optimally into the world logistic system of the major oil
16International Herald Tribune 2 October 1975, p.8.
71J Russell "Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy"
Farnborough: Saxon House 1976, p.178,
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companies and therefore might be represented in physical movement
to any of a number of countries. Additionally any oil made
available to the Soviet Union in return for technical assistance
or as the balance of a barter arrangement could be delivered
from a third country to the USA on Soviet account. Although the
Soviet system of import classification provides for the
inclusion of materials re-exported without entry itltothe Soviet
Union, it records only quantities authorised by the Soviet
Foreign Trade Ministry. Any "switched" oil might be ordered
through the international broking network and thus recorded as a
direct delivery. It is likely, though not statistically demon-
strable, that quantities of oil were shipped from Brazil and
Venezuela to the USA under such arrangements, and consequently
it is not possible to deduce the extent of the short-term
commitment of "Soviet" oil to the USA.
During the ninth Plan the status of the Soviet Union as a
gas trader changed from that of net importer to net exporter,
building on delivery systems constructed as elements of barter
trade during the latter part of the eighth Plan, facilitating
supply to Czechoslovakia and Austria with an extension of the
pipeline to Northern Italy, and to Poland and West Germany with
a branch supplying the chemical complexes of the Halle-Leipzig
area in East Germany.
After the oil price rises of 1973 and 1974 gas prices in
Western Europe, the Soviet Union'S prime market, began to harden.
The attractiveness of gas as an export fuel was further enhanced
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by the fact that the prices for imports of Afghan and Iranian gas
did not rise proportionally to export prices (see table 6.2.).
Export pricing of natural gas shows some interesting differences.
In deliveries to Eastern Europe prices remained at a level of 13
to 15 rubles per thousand cubic metres from 1911 through to 1914,
followed by a substantial rise, parallel to that for oil, in 1975
in each country with the exception of East Germany. The likely
explanation of the latter factor is that it had been intended to
supply East Germany at an earlier stage, but that commencement
was delayed because of underfu~filment of the production Plan by
the Soviet Union, leaving a lower quantity available for export
than anticipated. Hence when deliveries did commence, the
previously negotiated price was charged. Since deliveries to
Western countries are tied to previous supply of steel pipe and
equipment, the Soviet Union may well have decided that longer-
term interests would be better served in meeting contracted
deliveries to the West.
Pricing of deliveries to Austria and Finland shows in the
former case a marked rise in 1915 compared with 1914 and in the
latter a substantially higher price than for any other country.
In the Austrian case the higher price was negotiated under a
contract signed in 1914 following the expiry of the previous one
negotiated in 1966/1961, linking gas deliveries to the supply of
steel pipe, the price for return deliveries of gas relating to
the market conditions of the time. Decisions taken in late 1914
relating to deliveries for 1915 and beyond involved a re-evaluation
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of gas against the Austrian market price of tuel oil. Hence
subsequent Soviet gas prices reflect not only the effect of the
OPEC oil price rises but also the fact that sinoe Austria is
landlocked, the delivered cost of hydrocarbon tuels is, with
Switzerland, the highest in Western Europe.78 In the Finnish
case the high cost of Soviet gas is due to the fact that supply
is not linked to the counter-delivery of pipeline or equipment
and has been negotiated separately from general bilateral trade
agreements. The price was therefore linked to what the nearest
free market alternative would have been.79 In view of the
rising cost of OPEC oil and the absence of convenient alter-
native fuels Finland had to pay the price determined by the inter-
national market.
During the ninth Plan the development of the Soviet gas
industry was such that despite the shortfall against original
targets planners were able to forecast trends in the domestio
energy ~lance and trade structure that provided for its
increasing contribution. The impact of Soviet gas on the energy
economies of the individual countries was increasingly felt,
though it could not alleviate the tensions caused by shortcomings
in production and supply of other fuels and the increased cost
of oil imports. Nonetheless the Soviet Union has negotiated
supply contracts in Eastern and Western Europe that evidence
considerable expansion over 1975 levels.
18Financial Times 28 January 1975. p.14.
79Bethkenhagen op.cit. p.20!l:.
329
The pattern of Romanian trade in petroleum products is
outlined in table 6.6. Although crude oil production in Romania
showed little growth between 1971 and 1975 in accordance with
Plan decisions had been taken to expand refinery capacity to 25
million tonnes per year with the intention of increasing exports
of fuels and petrochemical feedstock. Despite the imposition
of economy measures in 1974 domestic consumption has grown at a
rate that has resulted in declining net exports at a time when
prices in hard currency markets were rising. Consequently
quantities of refined products that had been earmarked for export
were consumed domestically and, as outlined in Chapter 5, the
need to arrest this trend has influenced the planning of the
Romanian energy balance for 1976-1980.
Soviet Trade in Oil and Gas 1976-1980
There are considerable differences in the views of Western
analysts as to the likely level of exports of Soviet oil and gas
in 1980, and these are outlined in tables 6.1. and 6.8. The
issues are further complicated by the analysis of the Hungarian
energy economist Istvan Dobozi, published in January 1973.80 He
too estimates not only an oil and gas deficit in Comecon as a
whole by 1980, but also the likelihood of a deficit in the Soviet
Union itself. Dobozi's analysis is detailed in table 6.9.
Analysis of the likely performance of the Soviet oil and gas
80 ~ ~ ~ , /I Dobozi nAn energiahordozok a lCGSTgazdasagaban" Valosa~
1973 No.1, pp.18-27.
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TABLE 6.6. Romanian Trade in Oil and Oil Products 1971-1975
(million tOrules)
.!ill 1.2li 121l 1.21.4. .!212
Crude Oil Availa- 15651 17101 18330 18924 19675bility
Total Exports of 5143 4966 4841 6456 6057Products
including:
Gasoline 588 519 610 1106 1464Gas Oil 2620 2314 2195 2378 2024Fuel Oil 1541 1615 1715 2656 2258
Sources: (i) Table ~.21.
(ii) Statisticheskii ezheB2dnik stran-chlenov SEV
1216 E·~82·
(iii) Armuarul statistic din R S Romania 1216• E.221•
industries during the tenth Plan has been given in the preceding
chapter: in studying the possible growth trend in consumption
attention has been paid to developments during the ninth Plan
and an attempt made to evaluate the impact of policies intended
to have an effect on energy utilisation. Sinoe the Soviet Union
records no data on consumption of individual fuels, the quantity
of oil and gas available for consumption, i.e. the net of
produotion, imports and exports, has been taken as the basis for
analysis, and the trends for the period 1971 to mid-1977 are
outlined in table 6.10.
Western estimates of Soviet energy consumption made in the
early to mid-seventies tended to the view that the rate of growth
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TABLE 6.7. Western Analyses of Soviet Oil Export Potenti!'!.l
in 1980 (million tonnes)
1 2 2. .4. .5. 6
1980 Production 607 640 640 640+ 590 638
(610-
620)
Imports ? ? 17.5 ? 15 ?
Availability ? ? 657.5 640+ 605 ?
Demand 612/ 500 514 517 470 550
613
Export -5/ 110+ 143.5 123+ 135 88availability -6
Sources: 1. W Gurnpel "Sowjetunion: Erd81 und Nahostpolitik"
Aussenpolitik 1971, No.ll, p.67? Though Gurnpel
does not state a IJkely import level for 1980, he
notes that the actual import/export pattern will be
influenced by the need to maintain exports to
Comecon for "political" reasons. He does however
state clearly (p.679) that by 1980 oil will have
ceased to playa part in Soviet export trade.
2. Economist Intelligence Unit "Soviet Oil to 1980"
London: EIU 1973, p.33. The conclusion of the EIU
analysis is somewhat unclear. The author states
that official Soviet sources (unspecified) estil~late
crude oil production in the Soviet Union in 1980 to
be 610-620 million tonnes, but advances the view
that the likely level will be 640 million.
3. J Bethkenhagen "Bedeutung und li6glichkeiten des
Ost-'.v'est-Ilandelsmit Energierohstoffen" (Deutsches
Institut fftrWirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft 104)
Berlin: Duncker & IIumblot 1975, pp.6l, 131, 253.
4. J Russell "Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign
Policy" Farnborough: Saxon House 1976, p.56•
Russell does not give an estimate of imports:
however it appears from his preceding analysis that
the figure of 123 million tonnes constitutes ~
exports.
5. E E Jack, J R Lee, H IILent "Outlook for Soviet
Energy" in 'The Soviet Economy in a Ne,."Perspective'
\vashington D C: US Congress, Joint Economic
Committee 1976, p.473.
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TABLE 6.7. (contd.)
6. A F G Scanlan "The &\ergy Balance of the Comecon
Countries" in 'NATO Round Table on Exploitation
of Siberia's Natural Resources' Brussels: NATO
1974. pp.97, 105.
TABLE 6.8. Western Analyses of Soviet Gas Export Potential
in 1980 (billion cubic metres)
1 2 .l ! 2.
1980 Production 460 400 400- 390 454.5
440
Imports 13 15 15 15 ?
Availability 473 415 415- 405 ?
454
Demand 430.7 365 363.3- 346 412.5
(400) 402.3
Export Availability 42.3 50 51.7 59 42.0
Sources: 1. Economist Intelligence Unit "Soviet Natural Gas to
1985" London: EIU 1975 pp.45-47. The author of
the report admits (~, that his initial estimate
of 1980 domestic demand may only be of the order of
400 billion cubic metres, permitting export
availability to rise to 73 billion.
2. J Bethkenhagen op.cit. p.253.
3. J Russell gp.cit. pp.", 68, 70.
4. Jack, Lee, Lent opfcit. p.473.
5. Scanlan op.cit. p.97.
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in consumption, especially of oil and gas, would be greater than
the rate of growth in production,81 resulting in a decline in
exports.82 The actual trends ran counter to expectation,
evidenced in the data contained in table 6.10. There has been a
sUbstantial degree of substitution of oil by gas, despite the
latter industry's failure to fulfil the initial targets of the
ninth Plan, but the major effect has been a lower level of total
energy demand than anticipated, due to the declining rate of
growth of the economy as a whole.
The trend in consumption of oil and gas to 1980 will depend
on the improvements that can be made in energy conversion
efficiency, the rate of Soviet economic growth and the influence
on import-export policy of the balance of payments. The basic
directives for the tenth Plan emphasise the need to use cheap
solid fuel rather than oil and gas in electricity production and
set a target for reducing the amount of energy consumed in
producing 1 kilowatt-hour to 325-328 grammes of standard fuel,
81See A F G Scanlan "The Energy Balance of the Comecon
Countries" in 'Round Table on the Exploitation of Siberia's
Natural Resources' Brussels: NATO 1974. pp.83-107. He argues
(p.96) that demand for energy in the Soviet Union will rise at an
average of 6 per cent per year between 1972 and 1980, and for
oil at a rate of 8 per cent per year, reaching 550 million tonnes
of standard fuel in 1980. This rate of growth in total energy
demand is the same as that of the previous decade.
82R W Campbell states, "without trying to project specific
rates, we might still conclude that there would be some accelera-
tion of the growth of consumption in the coming period compared
to the sixties, and as the rate of growth of primary energy
production is unlikely to accelerate, the prospect is for heavy
pressure to reduce exports". "Siberian Energy Resources and the
World Energy Market" in 'NATO Round Table .•• ' (1974L p.79.
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compared with 340 grammes in 1975.83 This objective was stressed
again by Kosygin in his speech to the 30th Comecon congress,
adding that industry ought to convert rapidly to less energy-
intensive processes and that the construction of nuclear
capacity should be accelerated.84 The economy as a whole has
exhibited decreasing energy-intensity and this is planned to
continue. Planners seek to achieve a saving in the level of
energy consumed of 10 per cent (150 million tonnes of standard
fuel) of the energy consumption level derived by extrapolation
to 1980 of the energy consumption to NMP coefficient of 1975.
It is evident from table 6.10. that in 1976 the rate of
increase in the domestic availability of oil and products was
only 2.4 per cent on the previous year, whereas availability of
gas increased by 8.9 per cent. Taking into account the trends
in consumption during the ninth Plan (gas rising, oil falling),
the annual expansion in the oil sector in 1976 compared with
1975 seems low, and could evidence some de-stocking to boost
exports and domestic supply. Despite this, the trend is towards
a declining annual rate of growth in oil consumption. Assuming
that consumption increases by an average of 5.5 per cent per year
between 1976 and 1980 and that imports reach no more than 10
million tonnes, then if Soviet production in 1980 is at the lower
limit of the initial target for the tenth Plan (620 million
83Izvestiya 14 December 1975, p.2.
84A N Kosygin "Ocherednye zadachi sotsiallsticheskoi
integratsii" Planovoe khozyaistvo 1976 No.9, p.5.
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tonnes) the export surplus would be 135 million tonnes. If oil
production reaches the upper limit (640 million) the export
surplus would be 155 million. Alternatively if one supposes
from the 1911-1915 trend that a further decline of 0.5 per cent
per year in oil consumption can be expected, then, again assuming
that imports total 10 million tonnes, the export surplus would
be 110 million tonnes at 620 million tonnes' production and 190
million at 640 million tonnes.
In view of the trends in production and consumption between
1911 and 1916 it appears that the extremes of the above range
of figures are unlikely. The range of 155 to 110 million tonnes
of oil and oil products available for export in 1980 is therefore
suggested as a reasonable estimate, and the substantial growth in
export volume in 1916 could indicate that the upper limit of
the suggested range is attainable. Table 6.11. contains a
detailed analysis of Soviet exports of oil and oil products in
1916, showing changes in volume and unit price compared with
1915. The ~it price is however not strictly comparable on a
countr,y-to-country basis because of the effect of product mix
and of change in this mix over time. Nonetheless it is unlikely
that the mix has changed greatly in the major export markets
where, given that refinery capacity is generally adequate to
meet demand, the majority of purchases from the Soviet Union will
be of crude oil. In all but a few cases there has been a
continued rise in the unit price of Soviet deliveries, but unit
prices in trade with Eastern Europe have risen less than those
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TABLE 6.11. Soviet Oil Exports 1976
(Oil and Products)
Destination Volume Chan~ cf. 1276 Price Chans:e cf.
(tooo .1.21.l (R tonne) !.ill.tonnes)
Total Soviet 148514 +18163 51.7 +6.4
Exports
of which: oil 110790 +17720 46.2 +5.9
Products 37724 +443 67.7 +9.8
(i) Comecon
Bulgaria 11868 +315 37.5 +3.7
GDR 16766 +1814 32.1 +3.9
Poland 14073 +802 42.0 +2.5
Czechoslovakia 17233 +1268 34.1 +3.2
Hungary 8435 +900 44.7 +3.7
(ii) EEC 9
France 5729 +2422 65.0 +6.8
W Germany 7132 -502 80.9 +18.7
Netherlands 2674 -416 82.5 +17 .5
Belgium/Luxem- 2082 +827 66.8 +3.7
burg
Italy 11982 +5099 65.4 +8.4
Great Britain 4051 +2796 68.9 +4.2
Irish Republic 155 -21 54.5 +5.5
Denmark 1632 +454 66.6 +9.0
(iii) Rest of World
Austria 1513 +186 65.5 +6.8
Greece 1948 +60 67.0 +7.5
W Berlin 1072 +224 74.4 +3.7
Iceland 417 -21 77.3 +3.8
Spain 2002 +278 63.3 +5.7
Norway 218 -65 68.7 +5.2
Portugal 1039 -17 64.5 +5.5
Finland 9620 +912 66.4 +4.5
Switzerland 942 -18 11.6 +1.4
Sweden 2729 -721 61.2 +11.1
Yugoslavia 4858 +414 65.6 +4.3
Afghanistan 149 0 96.0 +9.4
Bangladesh 95 -72 85.3 +7.8
N Vietnam 439 +36 32.9 -2.4
India 1113 -94 88.1 +10.6
Cyprus 257 +51 51.3 +6.4
N Korea 1061 -49 41.2 +17.2
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TABLE 6.11. (contd.)
Destination Volume Chan~ cf. 1276 Price Chan~ cf.{'000 .!ill. (R tonne) .1ru.tonnes)
Mongolia 415 +51 61.8 -25.7
Nepal 17 +18 81.4 +8.9Syria 385 +383 74.9 -308.1
Japan 1173 +453 63.8 +12.6
Ghana 250 +106 64.7 -0.9
Guinea 81 +19 90.7 +15.4
Egypt 226 -5 89.8 +7.6
Liberia 24 -2.6 54.3 +2.8Morocco 665 +16 64.2 +5.3Somalia 136 +18 64.9 -7.7Brazil 1071 -404 65.6 -23.1Canada 93 -127 64.4 +4.2Cuba 8809 +149 32.7 +1.9USA 1059 +520 65.5 +3.3
Source: Vneshn~a~a torB2vl~a SSSR 12161 ;eassim.
charged to the majority of other countries. In a few cases the
unit price has dropped, but the volumes involved are small and a
slight change in product mix could account for this, since the
price levels suggest that refined products constitute the sum of
the quantities involved.
The structure of Soviet trade in gas in 1976 is outlined in
table 6.12. Total exports grew by almost 6.5 billion cubic metres,
showing increases in deliveries to each of the established markets
and the commencement of deliveries to France. As in the case of
oil prices, the Soviet Union has taken advantage of the rising
world price for gas in its trade with the 'vestand this is
reflected also in rising unit prices in trade with other Eastern
European countries. In contrast to the position in the oil
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TABLE 6.12. Soviet Gas Exports 1976
Destination Volume Change cf. 1 6 Price Chans:e cf.
(billion 1.212 (R '000 cub. 1.212
cubsm, ) m. )
Total Soviet 25780 +6447 28.45 +5.11
Exports
(i) Comecon
Bulgaria 2229 +1044 33.37 +3.98
Hungary 1.001 +0.4 33.95 +4.13
GDR 3369 +67 27.71 +12.60Poland 2549 +40 32.00 +4.00Czechoslovakia 4287 +593 34.52 +9.05
(ii) EEC 9
Italy 3720 +1378 14.00 -2.35W Germany 3916 +818 22.13 +4.90France 993 +993 25.60 n.app.
(iii) Rest of World
Austria 2185 +902 33.45 +3.12Finland 810 +151 41.26 +0.41
n.app. = not applicable.
Source: Vneshnyaya. torgovlya SSSR 1976, passim.
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industry, domestic availability of gas has shown increasing rates
of growth (table 6.10.B.). However the future export level of
Soviet gas will depend on success in meeting Plan targets and the
rate at which it is used as a domestic substitute for oil, since
there is no possibility of increasing imports from Iran and
Afghanistan, since the pipelines are currently operating near
design capacity. Considering the past performance of the gas
industry against Plan it is difficult to estimate the likelihood
of attainihg the target of 435 billion cubic metres in 1980. It
may however be indicative of Soviet confidence that the gas
target for 1980 was eventually set at the upper limit of the
original range. It may also be significant that in the early part
of 1977 annual production targets to 1900 for the coal and gas
industries were released, but none for oil.85 One possible
explanation for this is that plans for oil production may be
subject to revision in the light of any success achieved in coal
and gas production that facilitates substitution of fuel oil by
the former and of petrochemical feedstock and domestic fuels by
the latter, leaving planners the choice of scaling down the oil
production target for reasons of technical difficulty, high
operating cost or for reserve conservation. Judging from the
performance of the gas industry to mid-1911 there is a strong
possibility that the target of 435 billion cubic metres can be
85Annual targets for coal production to 1980 are given and
discussed in Ekonomicheska a zeta 1 .1-2, and for gas
production in Ekonomicheska a zeta 6 1 .1-2. However
the discussion of oil developments given in Ekonomicheskaya
gazeta 8/1977, p.2 does not detail annual production targets.
attained in 1980 and even if a shortfall similar to that
experienoed in the ninth Plan were repeated, the production
level is hardly likely to be less than 400 billion. If therefore
imports remain at 12 billion cubic metres, then, assuming that
do~estic consumption were to grow by 8.5 per cent per year
between 1976 and 1980 (this being only slightly below the rate
of increase in 1976 over 1975), then an export surplus of 31
billion oubic metres would be available in 1980 if production
then were 435 billion. If however consumption were to grow at an
average of 6 per cent per year after 1976, an export surplus of
59 billion cubio metres could be counted on. In the light of
the gas industry's performance to mid-1977 the latter figure
is oonsidered realistic.
The need to import grain and technology from the West during
the ninth Plan acoounted for the substantial grow~h in imports.
Export prospects deteriorated as the developed Western world
became increasingly affected by inflation and economio recession.
Despite this the enhanced value of fuels exports accounted
for much of the increase in the Soviet Union's non-Comeoon trade
and the greater revenues oame when they were most needed, after
the grain purchases of 1972 and 1973. As Philip Hanson has
indicated,86 the Soviet Union's trade with non-Comecon oountries
during the ninth Plan was some 50 per cent above the level
86p Hanson "USSR: Foreign Trade Implications of the 1976-
1980 Plan" (Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report No 36, 1976).
London: ETU 1976, p.3.
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implied in the original directives. Although it is likely that
there will be some deceleration in imports other than of grain
during the tenth Plan, there is still a large debt to service,
which Habson believes will grow up to 1980. Accordingly the
increased export of fuels and energy, especially of oil and gas,
may be unavoidable, to the extent that availability for domestic
and Comecon deliveries may be determined only after taking into
account the demands of the deficit on trade with the West. As
shown in the 1976 trade figures, the Soviet Union is expanding
her oil trade with the West and is developing her gas trade with
Western Europe particularly rapidly. The income from oil and
gas trade will not clear the Soviet debt: it may however serve
to keep the Soviet Union from the point at which international
institutions might call a halt to the extension of credits.
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Chapter 7. Soviet Relations with Oil and Gas Producers
It might be thought reasonable to suppose that given the
Soviet Union's self-sufficiency in energy, including oil, and
its capacity to supply the substantial majority of Eastern
Europe's energy need whilst maintaining a level of exports to
the West adequate to support essential imports and to help avoid
the risk of a balance of payments deficit such as would prompt
the industrialised West into limiting the extension of low-
interest loans facilitating such imports, there should be no
basis for any interest on the part of the Soviet Union in
negotiating for supplies of oil and gas from other producers.
However imports can serve other than domestic needs and oil trade
in particular reflects to a great extent the coalescence of
economic, political and strategic elements of Soviet relations
with the rest of the world, and particularly with the USA.
Discussion of the Soviet Union's apparently increasing need for
Middle East oil from the early seventies pointed to an impending
change in superpower relations that perceivedly declining Soviet
self-sufficiency in energy would entail. However the events of
1973-1974 necessitated considerable re-thinking of the role of
energy, especially of oil, not only in respect of the import
needs of much of the industrialised world, but also of the inter-
relationship of the major powers.
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Any nation that is dependent on unstable foreign sources
for its energy supply is in danger of having that supply inter-
rupted at any time. A country that has been dependent on OPEC
oil in the pre- and post-Yom Kippur period has been obliged to
restructure its foreign trade, generally such a nation has been
obliged to spend considerably more on the import of oil and
its terms of trade have deteriorated substantially with OPEC.
Moreover given the fear of possible further interruption of
supply a highly dependent net importer has seen its foreign
policy options, especially in the Middle East, become narrower.
In contrast the self-sufficient nation enjoying autarchy, if
necessary at a tolerable cost, can remain aloof from the
vacillations of an unstable international market and enjoy
a wider range of options in external relations, which would be
enhanced by the possession of a vital resource such as oil,
which, as long as a surplus over domestic demand were main-
tained, would afford a measure of logistic freedom, from
which would stem greater flexibility in trade strategy and
foreign policy.
The multidimensional nature of the Soviet role in the
Hiddle East, the world's major oil-producing area, is high-
lighted in two recent publications. Ian Smart stresses four
principal interacting influences that shape the policy of the
USA and the Soviet Union with regard to the Middle Eastl
firstly that the area itself is an arena of violent inter-
national conflict on frequent, though generally unpredictable
occasions, secondly that the two countries conventionally
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termed "superpowers", namely the USA and the Soviet Union,
have varied interests and influences in the area, thirdly
that each superpower is concerned with the international
energy market, though each to a different extent and in a
different way, and fourthly that the conduct of policy in the
Middle East on the part of each superpower affects their own
economic and political interactions.l Concentrating exclus-
ively on the question of the Soviet role in the KiddIe East,
Hannes Adomeit points to three major elements shaping Soviet
policy: firstly that the Soviet Union regards as illegitimate
the setting-up and continued existence of the state of Israel
in Palestine, the:major cause of conflict in the area, secondly
that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to her ability
to intervene militarily on behalf of states perceived to be
friendly, and thirdly that the Soviet Union believes she has
an ideological commitment to assist the Arab nations in free-
2ing themselves from a colonial past.
To understand the nature of the Soviet Union's interest
and involvement in Middle East oil it is necessary to look
not only at the course of Soviet policy in the area prior to
1973, but also at the process of development of Arab moves to
independenoe in oil affairs, which were oatalysed through OPEC,
rightly judging the moment at which oil could be employed as
II Smart "Oil, The Superpowers and The JvTiddleEast"
International Affairs January 1977, pp. 17-18.
2H Adomei t "Soviet Policy in the 11iddle East: Problems
of Analysis" Soviet Stunies April 1975, p. 304.
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an element of general strategy and which confirmed a funda-
mental change in international economic and political relations.
This latter point is particularly important in analysis of
Soviet, American and Arab interrelations in the post-Yom
Kippur War period.
Adomeit indicates a major analytical problem, namely
that whereas it can be said that governments act in accordance
with what they believe to be the 'national interest' this
concept is neither predetermined nor immutable.3 'National
interest" may be applied as a retrospective validation of a
resultant reaction to events that is little more than the
outcome of the uncoordinated interaction of conflicting
influences.4 Moreover'in the Soviet case one can point to
stringent efforts to increase military, political and economic
influence in the Niddle East. It is however extremely diffi-
cult to measure quantitatively or qualitatively the effects
of such influence as might be reflected in, for example,
ohanges in economic or governmental systems of those countries
in which a Soviet presence is detected.
Furthermore it is misleading to assume the existence
of an overall coordinated strategy on the part of the Soviet
Union, drawn up and directed by the Party's Politburo. The
detectable gulf between Soviet pronouncements and aotions also
serves to complicate the analytical process.5 In a study
completed very Boon after the Tom Kippur War the Amerioan
'ibid. p.302.
4ibid. p.295.
5A Nove (liOn Soviet Policy and Intentions" Survey Vo1,22,
Bp.31, (Summer/Autumn) 1976. 12.112.) highlights the fact that
Soviet reporting of its own foreign policy has not only a com-
municative funotion but also one of reinforcing official dootrine.
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analysts Kohler, Goure and Harvey draw the picture of an
aggressive Soviet Union showing "little evidence of willing-
ness to cooperate in the preservation of international stab-
ility in general or for the attainment of a settlement in
the I1iddle East in particular except on Soviet terms".6 They
do admit however that the degree to which the Soviet Union
can influence Arab states to pursue policies optimal to
Soviet interest is limited, but that opportunities exist for
disruption by the Soviet Union, rendering more difficuit any
negotiations aimed at securing a settlement. Why the Soviet
Union would wish to do this is not made clear.
In the case of the USA it has been pointed out that
popular opinion disfavoured Americ~ involve~ent in any
Arab-Israeli conflict and that in the aftermath of the 1961
six-day war the proportion of the American nation sympathetic
to the Israeli cause was declining, but that nonetheless
Congress was committed by a substantial majority to support
Israel, believing that the 'national interest' lay in counter-
ing (perceived) Soviet designs in the Middle East, despite
the opposition of a large majority of the population to the
continued supply of arms to Israel.7 Up to the 'commencement
of the Tom Kippur War few members of Congress appreciated
6F D Kohler, L GOure', M L Harvey "The Soviet Union
and the October 1913 I'<1iddleEast War: The Implications for
Detente" Washington D C: University of Miami Centre for
Advanced International Studies 1974, p.121.
I>.J?!.
1J W MoKie in 'Daedalus' Vol.104, No.4 (Fall 1975),
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the potential danger of such a policy. One American analyst,
J C Campbell, has pointed out that a fundamental error of
judgement was made in underestimating the degree of cohesion
that would be exhibited by the Arabs, acting through OPEC,
with consequent inability to gauge accurately the forces that
would determine the course of events and the scope for nego-
tiations in the aftermath of the war.S Such a policy, whilst
"containing Communism", led to a measure of economic loss
through destruction of the balance in negotiations between
the oil companies and OPEC over the future supply and price
of oil. These factors, plus the cost of failed policy in
South-East Asia have led, 'in the view of the British analyst
Douglas Evans, to acceptance by the USA of a diminished role
in world politics.9
This role is however open to influence by the home-
based oil industry, whose sphere of activity transcends
national boundaries. As a result of the growth of the multi-
national oil industry there arises the potential for a conflict
of interest between companies and governments of the home and
host country Dependent on mutual perception of the alter-•
natives open to each a range of policy options can be
determined and acting within the framework of national and
8J C Campbell "The Energy Crisis and US Policy in
the Middle East" in J S Szyliowicz, B E O'Neill (eds.) "The
Energy Crisis and US Foreign Policy" New York: Praeger 1974,
p.lll.
9Douglas Evans
of the Superstates"
"The Politics of Energy: The Emergence
London: Macmillan 1976, p.24.
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international law an oil company can formulate and put into
effect policies which are financially attractive to themselves,
but which may run counter to~e horne government's preference.
J S Nye has put forward the view that any influence possessed
by the oil companies is characterised by their playing either
a direct role in executing a privately-determined foreign
policy, or an indirect role in influencing the course of inter-
governmental relationships.IO There is evidence of the results
of the playing of either role by multinational companies, and
not only oil companies. However as far aste course of politi-
cal developments in the r':iddleEast is concerned, Walter
Laqueur has advanced the view that "in spite of their great
economic significance the oil companies have not during the
last decade acted from a position of political strength", and
that they have been able "neither to provoke wars nor prevent
wars", since "there has been a striking discrepancy between
11their economic significance and their political power".
Although the frontiers of a State define the extent of
its right to command, it is unrealistic to expect fUll imple-
mentation within the frontiers. The more a state tends towards
pluralism, the more it has to strive to ensure acceptance of
its corporate will, and vice-versa. What is distinctive about
the relationship of the oil companies and the American govern-
ment is that persistent attempts at resource allocation have
lOJ S Nye "Nultinational Corporations in World Politics"
in E VI Erickson, L Waverman (eds.) "The Energy Question: An
International Failure of Policy" Toronto: University of
Toronto Press 1974. (Vol.l.), p.2l3.
llw Laqueur "The Struggle For the l'iidd1eEast: The Soviet
Union and the Middle East 1958-68" Harmondsworth: Penguin 1972,
p.112.
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to be repeatedly revised beoause the effeot of implementation
of policy runs counter to the interest of the implementers.
Hence America became sUbstantially dependent on imported energy
in the form of OPEC oil and this dependence shows no sign of
diminishing despite the price rises and 'Project Independence
1980' •
The foregoing is complicated by the ohanging role of
the oil-producing states themselves not only in international
politics but also in the world energy market, and account must
be taken of this factor in discussing oil in relation to Soviet
policy in the Middle East and to Soviet dealings with other
powers, notably the USA. This is not to suggest that through
OPEC the producer states may be regarded as a homogenous
group, agreed amongst, members on a unified policy of economic
and social development. Indeed the very diversity of objectives
within the producer states has been internally problematic.
There are wide social, economic and political differences
which determine the preferred policy of the individual states
and whioh serve to illustrate why their aotions have often not
been unified.12 It is also worth noting that as far as the
hostilities of 1913 were concerned the oountries immediately
involved, namely Syria and Egypt, were not members of OPEC,
but were ethnically identifiable with the major oil producers.
12For example, governmental systems vary from the parlia-
mentary in Kuwait to conservative autocratic monarchies such
as Iran and Saudi Arabia and to revolutionary milit~ry govern-
ments such as Algeria and Ubya. There have been inter-Arab
disputes over a numbez of territorial questions. Z r,Jikdashi
"The OPEC Process" 'De.eda1us" Vo1.104, No.4. (Fall 1975), p.20~.
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However, as the Minister for Petroleum of the United Arab
Emirates has pointed out, the hostilities gave the oil-producing
Arab states the opportunity of enhancing the influence of Arab
interests in general.l; The war itself helped to legitimise
putting into effect a policy that had been debated within
OAPEC, of which Egypt and Syria were members, but not in OPEC
thus far.14
One can detect two major causes of tension influencing
OPEC's developing view of the world petroleum market. The
latter half of the 19609 and the early 1970s were characterised
by inflation in most of the industrialised world on which
the Arab countries depended for capital goods and technology
to raise them from a comparatively low standard of living.
In the USA, for example, the Consumer Price Index had risen
by 23 per cent between 1965 and 1970 and a further 20 per cent
between 1970 and mid-1972. Similar or greater increases were
recorded in many European countries and in Japan. \~ereas
this affected goods and services essential to the Arab
countries, the price of oil, as indicated in Chapter 1, fell
in real terms up to 1970 and only after the Libyan success
13During the 1973 war with Israel "the Arab oil-exporting
countries, although geographically distant from the front line,
could not wait in the sidelinesmd see their Arab compatriots
being deprived of their lands ••••The Arab oil-exporting countries
will not hesitate to use all the weapons they have and will con-
tinue to give every'material and moral support •••in their fight
for the restorat.ion of Right and Justice" ?vI S AI-Otaiba "OPEC
and the Petroleum Industry" (Preface to the English language
edition) London: Croom Helm 1975. P.vi.
l~kdashi OPe cit. p.204. Though of course the major pro-
ducers, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were members of OAPEC, the full
cooperation of OPEC was necessary in order to prevent a recur-
rence of the failed boycott of 1967.
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in unilaterally raising oil prices did the prospect for action
independent of the oil companies begin to appear possible. The
second influence was the intensifying desire of the Arabs for
national ownership of oil production and distribution facilities.
This was not envisaged as an element of the dialogue between the
companies and host countries pursued under the auspices of the
London Oil Policy Group, and was initially a separate issue,
as far as Arab producers were concerned, from discussions on
prices. However the two issues coalesced in the events of 1973-
1974, in the aftermath of which previous agreements relating to
the gradual relinquishing of concessions by the companies to
the host governments were abandoned, and when there commenced
rapid moves towards complete takeover by the host governments
of the management of the producing companies.15
'I'houghon the question of pricing there have appeared
signs of disagreement within OPEC, the most telling being the
negotiations leading to the price increase of December 1976,
which resulted in different percentage increases imposed by
16members, the increased financial strength of OPEC has not
been in doubt and it is appreciated in the Organisation that
there are continued benefits to be derived from solidarity and
dangers in bringing about too rapid a substitution of oil by
l5For example, the Kuwait Oil Company, jointly owned
by BP and Gulf each having an equal share of the equity, was
due to cede its concession rights to the Kuwaiti government
in 2025. By Narch 1975 it was fully nationalised. Petroleum
Economist April 1975, pp.124-125.
16Saudi Arabia insisted on a 5% price rise for Arab light
('marker') oil, supported by the UAE. Other producers opted
for a 10% rise effective from 1 In.nuary 1977 nnd a further rbe
of 5% effective from 1 July 1977. 'l'hiswas the first split in
OPEC on the issue of pricing. Petroleum Economist January 1977,
EP·2-3.
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other energy forms. The principal feature of the oil market
after 1913 is that OPEC does not need to look for additional
outlets, whether in Japan, \vestem Europe, the USA or Comecon.
Its common objective is that of retaining the means of control-
ling the development of the world petroleum market in a way
that is regarded as optimal, the concept of optimality being
conditioned by the impaot of suoh external factors as possible
American escalation of military and economic aid to Israel. In
the case of the Sovie·t Union as a potential market for Arab
oil the immediate issue is that of using the one product the
Arabs have in free supply to offset the debt arising out of
the Soviet Union's supply of arms. However the need to
deplete reserves in order todo this is falling as a result
of the ability of the Arabs to pay in hard currencies.
There exists a considerable volume of published work
on the interrelationships of the Soviet Union, the USA and
the Middle East. A critical examination of this is beyond
the soope of the present study: however the issues raised in
a number of these works are worth citation in order to outline
the mainstream of Western analysis of what has come to be
regarded as a major problem of interstate relations in the
seventies. An attempt will be made to highlight the factors
that have influenced Soviet policy towards other oil producers,
primarily those of the Middle East, and to establish what role,
if any, is played by consider~tion of future oil supply.
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Writing in 1969 Walter kcqueur expressed the view that
the Soviet Union's interest in l-li.ddleEast oil was confined to
propagandist attacks on the activities of (primarily) American
companies operating in the area and that there was little basis
for the hypothesis that the Soviet ~nionwas seeking 'control'
over oil as a potential means of denying supply to \vestern
Europe.17 He stresses the significance of the year 1966 as a
turning point in Soviet policy, following the agreement with
Iran for the supply of natural gas, the first sign of Soviet
need for a non-indigenous fuel. Whilst indicating that
political considerations may in general be an element in the
formulation of Soviet policy, Laqueur does point out that as
the cost of production in 11e Soviet Union is often BTeater than
the import cost of a product, then the purchase of ~liddle East
oil or gas in no way differs .from the import of any other
cornmodity in that the decision is justifiable on eeonomf,c
grounds alone. He regards as more significant however the
need of the Soviet Union to accept oil as the balancing element
of barter trade.lS The circumstances surrounding the possible
role of oil as an element of trade between Eastern Europe and
the r1iddle East are somewhat different in that the latter's
debt incurred in respeot of arms trade is not as high as with
the Soviet Union, and the absorbtion capacity of 1·li.ddle
Eastern countries, with for the most part small populations
and non-industrial eoonomies, in respect of goods pr~duced in
17Laqueur OPe cit. p.133.
18ibid. p.135.
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Eastern Europe relatively low. Writing in ~·969the American
analyst S Wasowski indicates that if Eastern Europe were to
attempt to satisfy its additional requirement for oil by
supply from the fuddle ~ast, goods worth between ~1 and $2
billion at 1966 prices would have to be exported,19 a figure
which Laqueur believes to be well beyond the I>1iddleEast's
absorbtion capacity.20 Though Laqueur does not offer an
analysis of supply and demand for oil~d gas in the Soviet
Union, he does note that Middle East hydrocarbon resources
were gaining importance for the Soviet Union without their
becoming a factor in shaping policy in the area, since the
country had thus far been able to afford a policy of energy
21autarchy.
In a Soviet work published at approximately the same
time as Laqueur's L Z Zevin stresses that t:leimport of !'fuddle
East oil had become in certain instances economically advan-
tageous for the Soviet Union.22 In a further work of that
period N P Shme1ev indicates that the agreements reached
between the Comecon countries.and Middle East oil pro-
ducers represented only the first steps towards further
19S Wasowski "The Fuel Situation in Eastern Europe"
Soviet Studies July 1969. p.50.
20Laqueur OPe cit. p.132.
21ibid. pp.135-l36.
22L Z Zevin in E Kamenov, G Prokhorov (eds.) "Mirovoi
sotsializm i razvivayushchiesya strany" J<oscow r:lys1t 1969,~.
Also Zevin "Novye tendentsii v ekonomicheskom sotrudnichestve
sotsialisticheskikh i razvivayushohikhsya stran" :t-!oscowNauka
1970, p,123.
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trade,23 and likewise Zevin states that cooperation in the
development of natural resources with a view to their possible
export to Comecon was in its initial stages only.24 Zevin is
however aware of the constraints on the ability of the member-
countries of Comecon to enter into such agreements with Niddle
Eastern producers, namely provision of exportqble goods adequate
to compensate for increased imports in view of taut domestic
supply.25
Bearing in mind Laqueur's analysis and the developing
Soviet view, two analyses of oil as an element of Soviet
policy in the Niddle FAst, written in the early seventies,
attempt to determine policy options based on a range of supply
and demand balances.26 W Gumpel's broad hypothesis is that
the Soviet Union's desire to maintain self-sufficiency super-
sedes all other considerations to the extent that policymakers
would on balance be prepared to sustainooonomic loss in its
pursuit, but he adds ~at if the economic cost (unspecified)
were to become excessive, then the best solution to an energy
deficit would be the import of oil from the Middle East.27
23N P Shmelev "Problemy ekonomicheskogo rosta razviva-
yushchikhsya stran" Moscow Nauka 1970, p.222.
24Zevin "Novye tendentsii ..." (1970), p.127.
25zevin in Kamenov, Prokhorov Ope cit. p.24.
26(i) W Gurnpel "Sowjetunion: ErdHl und Nahostpolitik"
Aussenpolitik 1911 No.ll, pp.67O-681•
(it) Sabine Baufeldt "Die ldfnftige Erd6lHlcke Im RGW vor
dem Hintergrund des,'sowjetischen Engagements in .ab-Mi ttel-Ost"
Osteuropa Wirtschaft June 1973. pp.35=54.
21Gurnpel Ope cit. p.681.
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In contrast Sabine Baufeldt argues that the Soviet Union's
net surplus of oil will decline for economic reasons alone
with three possible outcomes; firstly that exports to the West
will decline, the rate mpending on g"owth in domestic conaump-
tion, necessitating greater dependence on the foTiddleEast,
secondly that the Soviet Union could maintain exports to 11e
1,"estand to fellow-members of Comecon only by substantially
increasing imports from OPEC, thirdly that under the same
conditions as the second possibility Eastern Europe rather
than the Soviet Union could increase its imports.28 On the
grounds that the Soviet Union needs technology from the West
and that oil and petroleum products are a particularly useful
way of securing such goods, Baufeldt rules out the first
option. The second option, she argues, is unlikely to be
adopted on the grounds that barter arrangements could not be
stretched to cope. She regards the third option as the most
likely, stating that if the total Comeconmficit can be kept
to 40 million tonnes per year then agreements concluded up
to 1973 would be adequate.29
Concerning Soviet desire to ensure security of supply
in the (in her view'likely) event of import dependency, she
outlines three possible Soviet strategies in relations with
Middle East producers. Firstly she suggests the possibility
of direct collaboration in producing oompanies in the Middle
28Baufeldt Ope cit. p.47.
29ibid. pp.48-49.
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East, that is to say that the Soviet Union might fulfil a
broadly similar function to that of the major oil companies,
enabling the So~et Union to deliver her allocation of oil
produced to~tablished Western and Eastern European markets,
or in the case of an embargo on supplies to the West to retain
it. It is however argued that this option is likely to be
constrained by Arab unwillingness to countenance collaboration
with the Soviet Union any more readily than with American (or
any other) enterprises, and on another plane by Soviet wari-
ness of undertaking financial commitments in Arab countries
following their costly experience in Egypt, which came to a
head in 1912 with the expulsion of Soviet advisers. There
would arise, moreover, the problem of reconciling direct
Soviet involvement in production with the stand taken by the
Soviet Union supporting the right of the Arab nations to have
unfettered control of their own resources.30 The second option
is stated to be that of the Soviet use of political (unspecified)
influence to prompt producers to cut back supplies to the West,
though even at the time of writing the author stresses 'be
ability of the Arab states to take decisions independently
of either of the superpowers and that the Soviet Union might
. 31therefore be restricted to post-factum support of Arab policy.
The third option, in Baufeldt's view the most likely, is
described as "indirect influence" ('indirekte Beeinflussung'),
30ibid• pp.5l-52•
3libid. pp.5l,53.
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the possible manifestation of which would be overt support
for Arab moves towards nationalisation. This might be effect-
ive as an element of strategy in the sho~t term, since it
helps to secure a rising income for oil producers and dimini-
shes the influence of the USA in the form of the oil companies,
both these factors being in the interest of the producers and
the Soviet Union.32 This latter view contrasts somewhat with
that expressed in an earlier study by Robert Hunter.33 Accept-
ing the view that the Soviet Union was about to become an oil
importer, Hunter argues that the change :in status to net
importer may come as early as 1975.34 He rules out the possi-
bility of Soviet "colonialist" intervention in the Middle
East, stating that the Soviet Union would rather seek~pply
through normal commercial arrangements,35 and arguing that
the Soviet Union's objectives would be better served by adopt-
ing a "temperate attitude towards relations between the oil-
producing states and Westem oil companies", so asto avoid
cuts in Middle East oil revenues which would be detrimental to
the Soviet Union.36 Hunter's view of oil in relation to
Soviet policy in the Middle East is somewhat inconclusive,
32ibid• pp.53=54.
33Robert E Hunter "The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle
liiLst:Part 2, Oil and The Persian Gulf" Adelphi Paper No.69.
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies October
1969.
34ibid• p.~.
35ibid• E·l·
36ibid. E·2·
seeing the problem as an unresolved dilemma influenced by
the difficulty of making a decision when faced with the abandon-
ment of what he believes to have been a fundamental Soviet
objective since the time of the Revolution, namely self-
sufficiency in oi1.37
A further'perspective is offered by Abraham S Becker
in a paper written in 1973.38 His is the earliest analysis
to stress that the issue of whether the Soviet Union would
wish to influence events in the Middle East by aiming for
stability in the area or in promoting radical nationalist
militancy overlooks the emergence of the Hiddle East, and
especially the Arab states, through OPEC, into an independent
force in world politics.39 He shares the widely-held view of
the Soviet Union's impending oil deficit (though he does
allude to the possibility of substitution by gas40) largely on
the grounds that "the development of Siberia will take decades,
not years",4l and concludes that whereas "the net export
position of the (Comecon) group will be under no threat in
the next rew years, •••by 1980 an overall CMEA deficit is
likely".42 It is difficult to comprehend Becker's view of
37. ..', .
ibid. p.17.
38Abraham S Becker "Oil and the Persian Gulf in Soviet
Policy in the Seventies" in M Confino, S Shamir (eds.) "The
USSR and the Middle East" Jerusalem: Israel Universities'
Preas 1973, pp.173-2l4.
39ibid• pp.18G-187.
40ibid• p.11~·
41ibid. p.18~.
42ibid. p.18~.
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the likely development of Siberian energy reserves when one
bears in mind that his analysis was written when the basic
directives for the ninth Plan were available, outlining
clearly the emergent importance of the region for total
production.43 Also neglect of the changing role of natural·
gas detracts from his analysis of supply and demand for oil.
Nevertheless he does bring out one important point of discuss-
ion in stressing that the economic motivations for the Soviet
Union's possible increase in imports ~om the Middle East should
not be overdrawn, since "the classical motivations have been
political".44 Arguing that the Soviet Union "is not averse to
economic warfare in principle", he notes that "a future oil
crisis might see Noscow enthusiastically backing radical
measures undertaken by the producer states depending on the
breadth of the producer coalition and the objectives at
stake".45
The crystallisation of Becker's thoughts on the Soviet
role in the Middle East is found in a later work of his, in
which a further· dimension, that of the interaction between
Soviet policy in the Middle East and relations with the USA,
is introduced into the discussion.46 With hindsight to the
Yom Kippur w~ Becker stresses that the Soviet Union has been
43Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 22/1969, pp.12-l3.; Izvestiya,
9 December 1970, p.3, 19 December 1972, p.2.
44Becker in Confino, Shamir (eds.) Ope cit. p.190.
45ibid• p.195.
46Abraham
Energy Crisis"
S Becker "Soviet-American Relations after the
in Szyliowicz, O'Neill (eds.) Ope cit. pp.159-182.
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cautious about undertaking direct commitments to support any
one or any group of Middle East states and that pronouncements
on policy have been confined to "the safety of anti-Zionism
and anti~oi1 imperialism".47 Aware of the fierce internal
rivalries for supremacy within the Arab world, the Soviet
Union, he argues,48 has developed the skill necessary to
support, for example, Iran and Iraq simultaneously: the
rivalry between Baghdad and Tehran for supremacy in Arab
affairs has so far not occasioned the Soviet Union to take
the side of either party.
A somewhat different view of the relevance of oil to
Soviet policy in the Middle East is provided by the American
analyst Lincoln Landis.49 He argues that Soviet energy plan-
ning is characterised by the possibility of developing all
forms of energy resources domestically, increasing demand
in domestic and export markets and a deficient planning system,
unable to cope with short and long-term requirements.50 He
sees the Middle East oil as having a "compensating and correct-
iv~ function and that therefore the Soviet Union will become
increasingly involved in Middle East oil affairs in(~veloping
the role of "strategic middleman",51 importing quantities of
47ibid• p.177.
48ibid• pp.177-178.
49Lincoln Landis "Pol!tics and Oil: Moscow in the Middle
East" New York: Dunellen 1973.
50ibid. pp.95-96.
5libid. p.10l.
oil to compensate for domestic shortcomings whilst seeking to
maintain developing export business in existing markets.
However Landis extends his theory of the Soviet Union as
"strategic middleman" to postulate the ultimate objective of
a Soviet-controlled "world energy delivery system within a
world socialist planned economy", which\ould enable the Soviet
Union "according to her own choosing to continue in the use of
politics and to exert pressures upon capitalist states by
threatening their strategic interests, which include the
unhampered flow of petroleum from the Middle East". 52 Though
the extension of Landis' theory might seem exaggerated in
view of the considerable constraints that would be imposed
on such a policy not only bv the fUddle East producers them-
selves but by the \festem states and institutions who would
see their interests threatened, the concept of "strategic
middleman" is useful in looking at the Soviet role, and
sheds some light on to~e flexibility within the Soviet energy
planning process.
It is however only in a very recent study the key issue
is highlighted and discussed namely the limitations on policy
in the Middle East imposed by considerations of detente between
the Soviet Union and the USA, vulnerable in the event of a
possible military confrontation in the Middle East.53 Galia
52ibid. p.12l.
53Galia Golan "Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and
the Middle Fast Crieia" London: CUP 1977. p.lj.
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Golan argues not only that the level of cooperation between
the Soviet Union and the T1iddle East oil producers is low but
also that the major producers vary in their attitude to the
Soviet Union in general from neutrality to outright hostility. 54
Hence, she concludes, the Soviet Union is still far from able
to influence the use of the "oil weapon" in her own interest
and, equally important, she points out that the rate of expan-
sion of the Soviet share of Western oil markets scarcely
constituted competition for the Arab producers.55
The foregoing analysis of \.J'esternviews of the Soviet
Union IS role in the fUddle East is intended to highlight the
diverse factors that influence the formulation of policy.
No assumption is made that in the end behaviot~ is determined
in accordance with a fully coordinated and optimised decision-
making process. Indeed, as Hannes Adomeit has pointed out,56
the scope of international relations of the Soviet Union has
become so vast as to render impracticable any attempt at a
unified "decision theory" model, aspiring to weigh each
variable by accepted objective criteria. However given the
existence of a Soviet presence in the fUddle Fast and of the
conflicting perspectives of the nature of Soviet interest in
its hydrocarbon resources that are found in Western discussion
of the future development of Soviet energy, an attempt must
54ibid• p.15.
55ibid• p.243.
56Adomeit op cit. pp.294-295.
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be made in the context of this study to examine the involvement
of the Soviet Union as it relates to her economic dealings
with Middle East oil producers, extending this to consider
relations with other producers, bearing in mind the changing
dynamics of the world petroleum market.
In a trading relationship the imba1ance~tween one
country's need to~port and another's need to import affords
one party a measure of advantage which may be converted into
influence over matters related or unrelated to the trade agreement.
Even if the advantaged supplier or recipient ohooses not to
exercise that influence, the possibility of its so doing is
likely to affect the perceptions held by each of.the "rules"
or scope for negotiation that govern the relationship between
themselves. Specifically, whilst Soviet trade with rdddle
East countries over the period 1911-1975 constituted approx-
imately 1 per cent of her total world trade, the case of trade
with the Soviet Union from the point of view of certain Niddle
East countries is completely different. ~'orexample, in 1914
some 23 per oent of Syria's exports were destined for the
Soviet Union.51 In the case of Egypt approximately 28 per cent
of its exports were direoted to the Soviet Union between
1960 and 1974, this figure rising to almost 40 per oent if
other Eastern European oountries are included. 58 One must
bear in mind in each case that there is a considerable burden
in that exports have to be maintained in order to repay the
57Middle Fast F~onomio Digest 11 July 1975. p,26.
58The Middle Fast 10 July 1975, p.~.
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cost of development goods and expertise previously provided by
the Soviet Union, this in itself constituting a constraint on
flexibility in trade policy. In particular the burden of
Egypt's debt to the Soviet Union for arms supplies has been
such that around 50 per cent of her principal exportable com-
modity, raw cotton, has effectively been mortgaged to the
Soviet Union.59
Table 1.1. details the visible trade balance between the
Soviet Union and the principal oil producers, predominantly
Arab ?-1iddleEast states, from 1971 to 1916; the importance of
oil and gas in the total import trade of the Soviet Union is
given in table 1.2, and absolute volumes and prices in table
1.3. It will be seen that there was a substantial drop in
imports of oil in 1974 compared with 1913 following OPEC's
quadrupling of prices. This factor in itself casts some doubt
on the accuracy of previous views of the unavoidable need of
the Soviet Union to increase imports. The slight change in the
relative importance or oil in the Soviet visible trade balance
was sufficient to alter the position from surplus to~ficit.
Sustaining only a slight drop in total exports in 1~14 compared
with 1973 (see table 6.2.A.), the Soviet Union was able to
maintain growth in net exports in 1974 and to record further
gains in 1975 and 1916. It is possible of course that in 1974
some run-down of stocks took place as plans were reformulated
59G Ofer "The Economic Burden of Soviet Involvement in
the Hiddle East" Soviet Studies January 1973, p.333.
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to take into account the increased import price and the
enhanced opportunities for earning hard currency in non-
Comecon export markets afforded by OPEC's action. Another
possibility, though less likely, is that the high figure of
13.2 million tonnes for imports of crude oil from the Middle
East in 1973 reflects overbuying and stockpiling in antici-
pation 0f the price increase, resulting in lower demand for
imports in 1074 and the resumption of the upward trend in
1975 and 1976 at levels only slightly below what might have
been anticdpated. Such a hypothesis assumes that the Soviet
Union was able to anticipate correctly the extent and timing
of the price rises. Though the Soviet Union undoubtedly did
support the Arab use of the "oil weapon" in the form of a
supply embargo and likewise Arab attempts to raise prices,
culminating in 1973 and 1974,60 the problem in determining
the "Soviet view" is that of distinguishing between what the
Soviet Union felt capable of influencing and what she regarded
as inevitable.
The data in table 7.1. indicnte the Soviet Union's
reaction of cutting direct imports of OPEC oil following the
price rises of 1973 and 1974, at the same time largely main-
taining a trade balance with the two major partners, Iraq and
Iran. The position of gas imports is different. Whereas the
unit import price for Iranian and Afghan gas remained stable
60Kohler, Goure, Harvey OPe cit. pp.74-75.
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between 1969 and 1973, orices rose sharply in 1974 and 1975.61
The price rjse for Afghan gas was negotiated in June 1974 and
62made effective from the fjrst of October of that year; that
for Iranian gas was negotiated in August 1974 and became
effective retroactively from 1st January of that year.63 The
Soviet demand response to these step-chanp,es was the opposite
to th::ttfollowing the oil price rises, and in view of the
absence of an alternative market for Afghan and Iranian gas
the snccess of each might seem hard to account for.
A probable explanation of this is t:latcounterpricing of
goods imported from the Soviet Union by the gas suppliers was
adjusted in order to maintain the trade balance. Additionally,
and perhaps more significantly, is the fact that rising prices
for both oil and gas afford the Soviet Union the opportunity
of raising gas prices in intra-Comecon trade. Oil prices
have risen faster and further than gas prices since October
1973 and the effect has been to stimulate demand for gas,
which given the particular problems of the Soviet oil industry
and the relative underdevelopment of the gas industry assists
the Soviet Union in achieving the objective of expanding gas
consumption and trade. Moreover a rising world price for
61In comparing the unit prices of Iranian and Afghan gas
to the Soviet Union it must be borne in mind that Iran con-
structed and paid in hard currency for the pipeline from her
gasfields to the Soviet border, whereas in "be Afghan case the
Soviet Union undert00k to finance and build the pipeline.
62Financial Times 11 July 1974, p.S.
63Financial Times 19 August 1974, P.s.
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gas enables the Soviet Union to negotiate better terms with
consumers on the expiry of contracts (see table 6.3.). The
greater foreign exchange burden that would be imposed on
Eastern Europe in attempting to increase imports of oil or
gas has served to oblige them to provide materials and finance
for joint energy projects on Soviet territory that might not
otherwise have been undertaken.
Further benefits befall the Soviet Union as a result of
higher prices and decreasing security of supply. There arose
in the aftermath of Yom Kippur a greater level of interest
than previously in possible joint development of Soviet
hydrocarbon resources, particularly from American concerns.
From the point of view of the major oil companies, whose
operations in the Middle East are gradually coming under the
control of the host countries, the Soviet Union's status as
oil supplier may be no less reliable: from the point of view
of the American government however there may seem to be
politioal ddeadvarrtageein assisting a percei vedly hostile
superpower in maintaining self-sufficiency in energy, a
position whioh, as Ian Smart has indicated,64 affords sub-
stantial flexibility in the oonduct of foreign poli~ in the
broad sense.
There is consistenoy in the Soviet Union's supporting
the anti-Israeli and hence anti-American stand of the Arab
64Smart OPe cit. pp.30-31.
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countries whilst at the same time attempting to negotiate
joint developments with American companies and the government.
For example on the question of the Arab use of the oil embargo
an as element of strategy in October 1913 the Soviet Union
stated that "this has been no more than a necessary measure
of self-defence. The Arab countries are being condemned
because t:-lOY have t.urned oil into a political weapon ••••
Western SOlrrces are trying to ignore the important fact that
t:.eArab countries have the full sovereign right to do as
they wish with their national resources and to use them in
their national interests".65 On the same day as the fore-
going statement the view was also expressed that "the energy
crisis can be overcome ••• It depends on broad economic cooper-
ation between countries advantageous to all and with discrimin-
ation against none ••• There is at times an obsolete approach
t i t ti 1 i i' I' ,,66 Th S . to n erna ona trade n Amer ca s po lCY... • e OVle
Union did not let its commitment to the Arab callseinterfere
67with other negotiations. Again as Ian Smart has pointed out,
discussions took place in October 1973 between the USA and
the Soviet Union on possible joint development of Siberian
gas on the very day after the Yom Kippur War broke out, in
which both were heavily involved as arms suppliers.
65MosCOW Radio (in Arabic) 16 November 1973.
6~oscow Radio (in English) 16 November 1973.
67I Smart "The Superpowers and the ~7iddle East" .!.h!.
\lorldToday January 1974, p.14.
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However in dealings with the Arab countries the Soviet
Union did have to deal warily with the possible allegation
that they were taking or intended to take advantage of the
production cutbacks and embargo to expand sales of Soviet oil
68and refined products in Arab markets, primarily the Netherlands.
Examination of the data shows that whereas in 1973 and 1974
deliveries grew at a rate which would scarcely suggest that
the Soviet Union was breaking the Arab embargo or eroding
their market share by selling at below the world price, the
hard currency earnings from such trade contributed to a
substantial improvement in the Soviet trade accounts in
those years.69 Since 1973 the Soviet Union has had a larger
share of Western Europe's petroleum market due to depressed
consumption in the West rather than to aggressive marketing.
On occasions Western companies have decided to suspend
purchase of Soviet oil on the grounds that the price asked
was higher than could be obtained elsewhere.70 It seems
68The strategy adopted by the Soviet Union for avoiding
such char~)s is outlined in detail in Golan op.cit. pp.196-202.
69It should be noted that Soviet statements on export
policy made in 1974 were somewhat contradictory. The Soviet
Oil Minister, V D Shashin,is reported to have said that the
Soviet Union was unlikely to increase oil exports signifi-
cantly (Financial Times 29 May 1974, p.6.). However it is
subsequently reported that TASS refuted this statement.
(Financial Times 7 June 1974, p~).
70For example, the West German oil and petrochemical
company VEEA suspended deliveries from the Soviet Union in
f.'larch1974 when the delivered price was rtated to be the equi-
valent of 17 dollars per barrel. Financial Times 14 f1arch 1974. ,
Ed.!.
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reasonable to suppose from the inorease in deliveries to the
Netherlands in 1973 oompared with 1972 and from the unit
price charged, that the Soviet Union, bearing in mind the
oonstraints on inoreasing export volume to \"estem Europe
imposed by domestio production difficulties, sought to re-
distribute her available export quota to take advantage of the
spot prices available on the Rotterdam market. However the
volume involved did not cause any divergence from the Arab's
intended poliay. Soviet export polioy in \'lesternEurope at
this time was that of riding with the tide, a policy that was
shaped by three considerations, the degree of immediate flex-
ibility in the domestio energy balanoe, the relevance of the
Soviet Union's historical commitment to the Arab cause and
the changed role of OPEC within the world market.
Taking the energy sector as a whole the view that the
Soviet Union has an "energy crisis" seems, as Robert Campbell
has indicated, somewhat inacourate.7l This hinges on one's
definition of "crisis". It is true to say that the Soviet
Union has been largely immune to tle eoonomio problems that
have been oaused in the West partly by deteriorating relation-
ships between oil produoers and oonsumers and to the limiting
influence of energy dependenoe. In the sense that major
decisions can be taken by Soviet energy planners largely,
though not entirely, without referenoe to the possibility of
71R 'vi Campbell "Trends in the Soviet Oil and Gas Industry"
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1976. pp.86-87.
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non-indigenous supply, the Soviet Union does not face the
same "energy crisis" as does Japan or the USA. Campbell points
to the fact that the sUbstantial expansion of the role of oil
and gas from the early sixties to around 1970 was facilitated
by the relative simplicity of production and transportation,
whereas in the seventies further expansion demanded the most
advanced technology available.12 An indication of the change
in emphasis in Soviet energy policy towards the rehabilitation
of coal was given in a speech to the Soviet Academy of Sciences
in late November 1974 by V I Kirillin.73 Stressing the abund-
ance of coal reserves compared with those of oil and gas,
Kirillin outlined the need to reverse the trend towards use
of oil and gas in favour of coal, adding that this policy
should be undertaken immediately.74 Despite Soviet statements
that there exist domestic reserves of all types of conventional
f'uel, it is now acknowledged that the energy balance is taut
("napryazhennyi").75 However the essence of the issue is that
the Soviet Union does have alternatives to dependence on
outside aupply which can be put into~fect at apparently
tolerable coat, in contrast totle USA, whose "Project Independence"
72ibid_.
13V I Kirillin "Energetika: problemy i perspektivy"
Kommunist 1975 No.1, pp.43-5l.
74ibid. p.46.
75p Neporozhnyi
P1anovoe khozyaiotvo
"Perspektivy Sovetskoi energetiki"
1975 No.8, p.M.
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has already floundered.76
The Soviet Union has a long-standing commitment to the
Arab cause dating from the early fifties, well before the
formation of OPEC. Moreover the nature of superpower involve-
ment in the Middle East changed substantially between the times
of its manifestation as participation in some form in open
hostility. Ian Smart has pointed out that the emergence of the
Soviet Union as a champion of the Arab cause came about in
the early fifties in the aftermath of the failed Soviet attempt
at sponsorship of Israel and the deterioration of relations bet-
ween Egypt and the West caused by the overthrow of the monarchy.
He argues that as a result of the "Eisenhower doctrine",
launched in 1957, which promised American help to any Hidd1e
East nation "threatened" by international Communism, the Soviet
Union took her Middle East role very seriously, to the extent
that by the time of the 1967 six-day war the area was polarised
along the lines of an open superpower conflict.77
Between 1967 and the next full-scale hostilities in
1913 there were a number of significant events that ohanged
the course of international relations as reflected in policy
towards the Middle East. The po,,,erof OPEC had increased as
had American, Western European and Japanese dependence on
76a El ~allakh points to the contradictions in 'Project
Ind~pendence' in "American-Arab Relations: Conflict or
Cooperation?" Energy Policy September 1975, p.170.
77Smart "The Superpowers and the Niddle East" (1974), PIa-8.
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Hiddle East oil. However the support of each superpower for
its respective ally had not waned, despite the major setback
on the Soviet part of Sadat's expulsion from Egypt in July
1972 of the team of Soviet military and technical advisers.78
The very complexity of these relations helped to prevent an
open superpower confrontation and catalysed negotintions for
ending the war itself. Smart describes the changed dimension
of policy as "the perennial competition for influence •••
through the provision of military, political and economic
support to client states, even if the objective now seems to
be more the preservation than the extension of positions
already gained".79 Indeed the relatively unchanging territor-
ial domain of the major protagonists in the 1967 and 1973
Middle East wars lends support to Smart's analysis of policy.
IIowever the important issue is that the nature of the forces
that determine the equilibrium has altered.
The prinoipal force is that of the changed power of OPEC
and its consequent enhancement of Arab influenoe. The benefits
gained by the Soviet Union from OPEC's production and pricing
policy have come about not as a result of Soviet influence
within or upon the exeoutive of OPEC and, for reasons already
outlined, OPEC's polioy could have been put into effect in
78Galia Golan points out that in the build-up to the Yom
Kippur War the sole issue on whioh the Soviet Union and Egypt
were in agreement was that of the possible use of the "oil
weapon". Ope cit. pp.55-56.
79Smart nrrhe Superpowers and the Middle East" (1974). pp.14-15.
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spite of Soviet disapproval. Noreover it seems hardly likely
in the broader context of international political relations
that the Soviet Union would have risked the consequences of
withdrawing military support from the Arab states because of
disapproval of OPEC's oil policy. Though Arab and Soviet views
might coalesce on the subject of the legality of Israel, the
Arab states, many of them members of OPEC, OAPEC or of both,
are likely to be very wary of becoming dependent on the Soviet
Union because of communality of interest on this point. However
they are free to exploit it. 80As P H Odell has indicated,
the Arab states, acting through OPEC, might well see the
undermining of world economic systems, Capitalist or Communist,
as the prerequisite of a more appropriate economic and social
order. Accordingly, now that the degree of influence conferred
by independence is appreciated, it is not likely to be abandoned
to disguised colonialism.
Hobert Campbell has indicated that "Soviet production cost
is far above Hiddle Eastern cost and it would be advantageous
if the USSR could met its !Beds from the Middle East rather
than from domestic production", and that "the resources the
USSR is spending in expanding its own oil and gas indc;stry, if
invested in the Middle East, would give a muoh bigger payoff".8l
This depends on the acceptability of such investment to the
host country. Relating investment cost to comparative production
80P R Odell "The Western European Energy Economy" Leiden:
Stenfert Kroese 1976, 1',27.
81Campbell 01'. cit. 1'.81.
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cost the major oil companies would likewise derive a bigger
payoff from increasing investment in the ~tiddle East rather
than in Alaska or the North Sea, or, for that matter, in West
Siberia. The overriding issue is whether OPEC would counten-
ance greater development than at present and the indications
are that this is not so. The common objective of arresting
the rate of depletion of reserves was a major factor in consol-
idating the strategy of OPEC and there is no evidence in the
aftermath of their success that suggests a change in policy.
What emerges from studying this aspect of Soviet energy
policy is that it is difficult to support the view that I(dddle
East oil and gas have been the focus of Soviet interest in the
area or that participation in the world market, whether as
exporter or importer, has had any influence on broader polioy .
questions. However deteotable progress has been made by the
Soviet Union in developing what Landis termed the "strategic
middleman" role. This is p!l.rtioululy ~ll illustrated in a
recent tripartite agreement between a Western European consort-
ium, consisting of West German, French and Austrian oompanies,
the Soviet Union and Iran10r the supply of Iranian gas to
Europe via the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the agreement,
signed in Tehran on 30 November 1915, deliveries of 13.4
billion cubic metres into the Soviet Union's Central Asian
gathering system will commence in 1981. The Soviet Union
will retain 2.4 billion cubic metres for domestic use and
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will substitute 11 billion from Tyumen' or Orenburg via the
'Bratstvo' pipeline, of which West Germany will receive 5.5
billion, France 3.66 and Austria 1.84.82 It should however
be noted that the Soviet Union merely gains a transit fee,
expressed in the value of gas retained for domestic consumption,
for her part in the operation. The payment for the bulk of
the gas is in tne form of Western equipment supplied directly
to Iran from the receiving countries and negotiated independently
of the Soviet TInion. The further benefit to the Soviet Union
is that this arrangement contributes to the development of the
Western European gas market and, for reasons outlined, gas
is becoming tLe preferred Soviet export fuel.
This type of arrangement helps to dispel the view held
in a number of quarters that the objective of Soviet interest
in fUddle East hydrocarbon developments is'to weaken the \vest.83
On balanoe the Soviet Union needs a relatively strong USA
and Western Europe as willing trading partners, particularly
as suppliers of teohnologioal goods and as absorbers of raw
materials inoluding oil and gas, which the Soviet Union oan
most readily export. However that Is not to overlook the
fact that industrial depression in Western Europe, exacerbated
by the inoreased cost of importing oil, has caused many
producers to look to Comecon as an alternative to declining
82Financial Times 1 December 1975. p.5.; Petroleum
Economist January 1976, p.5.
83A view expressed by J A Berry in "Oil and Soviet Policy
in the fJIiddleEast" The Middle East Journal Vol.26, No.9.
(Spring 1972), p.149.
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domestic markets, given overcapacity in ma.:rormanufacturing
industries.
The policy of the Soviet Union towards Jltl.ddleEast
hydrocarbon developments has been characterised by opportunism
based on sound economic rationale. That is not to say however
that there have been no gains that could be desoribed as
"political". The point:is that the Soviet Union does not
appear to have sustained economio loss in matters relating to
hydrocarbon trade for "pol!tical" gain. and as Galia Golan
is at pains to point out, OPEC's polioy, though suiting the
Soviet Union, cannot be viewed as a consequence of Soviet
policy nor in itself as the means by whioh any Soviet design
84for strategic dominance in the area could be assisted.
The course of Soviet negotiations with Norway, a
major oil producer and the 'sole country operating in the
North Sea to'enjoy a current surplus of energy, has attracted
little attention. Analysis has been confined for the most
part to discussion of the periodio wranglings between
the Soviet Union and Norway over the demaroation of areas
of sovereignty in the Barents Sea and the existence or
non-existence of an individual continental shelf of the
84Golan op, cit. p.250.
388
Spitzbergen islands.85 These issues are however of less
significance than the fact that as a growing exporter of
crude oil Norway is emerging as a competitor for the Western
European market. Horeover Norway has so far declined member-
ship of the International Energy Agency and is following
an independent line in respect of the rate of development
of her oil and gas resources.
In February 1975 it was estimated that Norway had no
need of a production level in~cess of 50 million tonnes of
oil per year and 40 million tonnes of oil equivalent in
the form of gas, ~ven the availability of hydroelectricity,
the capacity of the economy to absorb estimated inco:nes from
exports of oil and gas and the Norwegian government's
objective of maintaining a diversified pattern of economic
growth, to which income from oil and gas could be expected to
86contribute for a long time.
85Background to the debate is given in Jeremy Russell
"Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy" London: D C Heath
1976. pp.185-lS6, and by P Hill in The Times 16 November 1976.
p.16. Briefly, dividi~ the Barents Sea under the terms of the
1958 Continental Shelf Act by a median line between Norway and
the Soviet Union would give Norway the greater share. The
Soviet Union favours the system adopted in the Antarctic,
namely sectoral extension radiating from the Pole, which would
give the Soviet Union the greater share. In the case of Spitz-
bergen, the 1920 Agreement gives the 41 signatory countries the
right to prospect for minerals provided they adhere to Norwegian
law. If Spitzbergen is deemed to have its own continental
shelf these countries have the right to drill offshore. Norway
has argued that Spitzbergen is an extension of her own contin-
ental shelf, in which case the Norwegian government would have
the right to control exploration.
86The background to Norwegian oil policy in the seventies is
given by B S Aamo in "Norwegian Oil Policy: Basic Objectives" in
M Saeter, I Smart (eds.) "The Political Implications of North
Sea Oil and Cas" Guildford: IPC 1975. P.SS.
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In an analysis written in July 1975 P R Odell suggests
that in view of the tensions existing between Norway and the
remaining hydrocarbon-deficient countries of Western Europe,
there is "the basis for a Soviet offer to Norway whereby
favourable consideration of her claim in the Barents Sea would
be extended in return for acceptance of Soviet protection for
Norwegian resources against all outside powers".87 Such Et
policy would, he argues , enable the Soviet Union to use
Norwegian oil, produced by Norway in the Barents Sea and
made available on Soviet account, tQ be delivered into estab-
lished Soviet markets in Western Europe, alleviating the
88economic and logistic difficulties of direct supply.
Odell extends this analysis to suggest that Soviet
interest in Norwegian oil and gas forms part of an "expansion-
ist effort to secure the adhesion of Germany and Scandinavia
to her system".89 However this analysis overlooks the fact
that despite her non-membership of the lEA Norway is committed
to NATO. Moreover it seems highly unlikely that Norway would
be prepared to assist the Soviet Union's further penetration
of the Western European market other than on terms which were
economically attractive and which left Norway in control of
resource depletion and the total rate of increase of exports.
87p R Odell "The World of Oil Power in 1975" The World
TodaY July 1975. p.278.
r.8~.
89ibid• p.28l.
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In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur \var the postt!on of
Libya in relation to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe began
to draw greater attention. The independent line taken by
Gadafi in imposing the oil price rise of 1970 outside the
framework negotiated between OPEC and the major oil companies
and in nationalising the operations of the British Petroleum
Company in November 1971 had met with Soviet approval.90 The
willingness of the Soviet Union to tolerate Gadafi's change-
able and unpredictable line in dealings with Moscow stems
from two possible considerations. In the first instance the
possibility of building up an alternative mi1itary-econom±c
base in the Southern Mediterranean seemed attractive to Noscow
given their deteriorating relations with Egypt after 1972
and the effect of Soviet moves towards some sort of alignment
with Libya was enhanced by the detectable strains that had
arisen between Gadafi and Sadat. In the second instance the
nature and location of Libyan oil made it a particularly
90In 1970 the Soviet Union delivered 200 tanks, field
guns and amphibious vehicles to Libya: in April 1972 Gadafi
withdrew the Libyan ambassador from Baghdad as a protest
against the Signing of a l5-year treaty of cooperation between
Iraq and tle Soviet Union. However after nationalising BP's
Libyan assets in November 1971 and finding that existing
customers were unwilling to purchase oil produced from the
nationalised fields - especially since BP threatened legal
action against anyone so doing - Gadafi turned again to Moscow
in May 1972 and, after reoonoiliation, negotiated an agreement
whereby Soviet technicians operated the oilfields in question
and the Soviet Union accepted a share of the oil produced.
Petroleum Press Service February 1972, pp.64-65; R M Burrell
liTheSoviet-Libyan Arms Deal" Soviet Analyst. 5 June 1975,
1'p.2-3.
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attractive import prospect for the Soviet Union.9l In January
and February 1974 Eastern European countries made spot
purchases of Libyan oil and Romania negotiated a supply
contract at this time for 3 million tonnes of Libyan oil per
year to 1977.92 There is however a more important aspect to
the Soviet Union's having access to Libyan oil, namely that
it C8n be used to supply the established market for Soviet
oil in Italy. Given the increasing difficulty and cost of
supplying the Italian market with indigenously produced oil,
Libyan oil could be delivered on Soviet account in return
for Soviet arms and technical expertise required to run the
production facilities after the withdrawal by British
Petroleum of their staff following Gadafi's nationalisation
of their affiliate.93 Such supply would decrease by a corres-
ponding amount the loading of expensive West Siberian oil
It is not possible to prove this hypothesis conclusively
from statistics. However the evidence is that direct deliveries
of crude oil and refined products from the Soviet Union to
Italy have shown a decline in the seventies. Direct Soviet
liftings of oil from Libya are recorded in 1972 and 1973 only.
It seems reasonable to suppose that further oil as repayment for arms
9lLibyan oil is of the "light" variety, i.e. suited to the
maximal output of non-substitutable products and commanding a
premium in Western European markets at that time.
92Golan OPe cit. p.199.
93Burrell OPe cit. p.3.
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supplies was made available and delivered by chartered tanker
to Italy. In~76, upon the possible expiry of the Libyan-
Soviet contract, deliveries of indigenous oil were increased,
this being reflected in the increase in recorded direct deli-
veries from the Soviet Union to Italy in~76 compared with
1975.94
There exists a similar opportunity in relations between
the Soviet Union and American oil producers, principally Vene-
zuela, Mexico and Ecuador. In return for Soviet aid such
countries could offer negotiated quantities of crude oil
which could be delivered on Soviet account to the existing
Cuban market, the cost of supplying which is rising, or to
the USA as part of the balancing element of a possible "grain
for oil" agreement. It may well be that a strong reason for
the USA's unwillingness to finance extensive Soviet oil develop-
ments is the fear that in the end the supply quantities nego-
tiated will be "switched" by the Soviet Union to deliveries
from alternative sources at their disposal, in which event
the USA would have financed the maintenance of Soviet self-
sufficienoy.
The development of relations between Eastern Europe and
non-Soviet oil producers dates from the mid-sixties. In
December 1966 it was stressed that there should be greater
interest on the part of Eastern Europe in negotiating supplies
94Analysis of this is further complicated by the decline
in total demand caused by the OPEC price rises, reflected in
falling total imports.
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of oil from the r.iddle East. 95 I n the course of the late
sixties each of the Eastern European countries did enter
into supply contracts with OPEC producers. Romania signed a
ten-year agreement with the Iranian National Oil Company which
provided for Romanian purchase of 1000 million dollars' worth
of crude oil in return for industrial equipment, primarily
for the development of the petrochemical industry. Czechoslo-
vakia concluded similar agreements with Iran, involving the
supply of general industrial machinery against the purchase of
oil over a 9 year period, and with Iraq involving the transfer
of refinery and pipeline know-how and equipment. Hungary
likewise negotiated an agreement with Iraq for the supply of
oil against deliveries of gas- and oilfield equipment, East
Germany agreed on direct purchases of Iraqi oil, and Bulgaria
to buy direct from Algeria.96
95"Close attention is now being given in almost all the
Comecon countries to the necessity of •••improving the fuel
and energy balance ••••In spite of t:le import of large quanti tie s
of oil and gas from the Soviet Union the intensified develop-
ment of the Czechoslovak economy calls also for the import of
oil from the developing countries." Rude pravo 22 December 1966,
.P.!A_.
96The first agreements between Comecon member-countries and
OPEC producers are recorded in Mlzan AUgust 1971, p.3l.
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Chapter 8
Summary Analysis and Conclusions
Though insulated from the major upheavctl experienced by the
world's major oil consumers during the seventies, the Comecon
bloc has begun to encounter a number of problems which have
slowed the rate of growth of oil within the Soviet energy balance,
altering the economic relationship of refined products to alter-
native forms of energy and feedstock and necessitating re-adjustment
of energy policy by the bloc. During the ninth Five-Year Plan
the Soviet Union's energy consumption reached 4 billion tonnes
of standard fuel, of which 2.6 billion were used in electricity
generation and industrial steam raising. Energy exports totalled
1 billion tonnes of standard fuel.l Soviet energy planners
have begun to acknowledge openly that the role of oil and gas
must be re-appraised. Current policy seeks to phase out the use
of residual fuel oil in favour of Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk
coal for powez- stations in regions to the east of the Urals and
to accelerate the programme of nuclea.r power station construction
1n the European zone.2 It is now admitted in the Soviet Union
that failure to prove new oil reserves at an adequate rate during
the ninth Plan has caused tensions in energy planning and has
brought about the rehabilitation of coal and the need to further
the development of nuclear power.3
I.
M 11 Brenner "Effektivnost' ispol'zovaniya toplivno-
energeticheskikh resursov" Voprosy ekonomiki 1977 No.6, p.38.
2ibid. p.40.
3V M Gzovskii "Perspektivnoe napravlenie razvitiya neftyanoi
promyshlennost! SSSR" Izvestiya lINSSSR Sere ekon, 1977 No.3. p.n.
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IIowever this policy cannot entirely solve the problems
faced in the Soviet and Eastern European energy sector to 1980
and beyond, since the only readily substitutable fuel product
derived from oil is residual fuel oil. nore over the process of
fuel substitution is conveniently applicable only in respect of
new installations, since in the absence of substantial admin-
istered price advantages for coal, gas or other fuels, reflected
in the final energy cost to the consumer, the incremental cost
of converting existing plant appears in the majority of cases
to outweigh the energy cost saving. Though recent Soviet analysis
openly discusses fuel substitution, it seems unlikely that the
energy supply position will be eased markedly in the period to
1980.
The grave decline in Soviet production of oil and gas
condensate considered likely by the Central Intelligence Agency
of the USA is thought to be inaccurate. There is comparatively
little technical difficulty in producing the desired 1980 level
from existing operations, though it must be a~~itted that this
could only be achieved at a cost considerably higher than antici-
pated for the tenth Planand'with severe long-term loss. It should
be stressed that on the basis of information published up to
mid-1977, the most recent on which this study is based, the oil
industry's performance is on target and this augurs well for
1980. Rates of increase in prod~ction are declining: this is
desired by Plqnners. IIowever if sufficient new reserves are
not dincovered rlurine the tenth Plan, the point at which Soviet
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energy planners are faced with the problem of optimising the
energy balance to an oil production level that has reached ito
peak may come in the mid-eighties. Nonetheless available Soviet
mater.ial gives no indication that planners and energy analysts
foresee this eventuality in spite of their acknowledgement of
the problems that the industry faces.
Given the problems of forecasting and planning for the
gas industry and its consistent failure to meet targets in the
past, it might be thought reasonable to regard the Plan for
1980 as wishful thinking. However certain features should be
stressed. Firstly in the latter years of the ninth Plan the
increases in production were as originally intended and this has
continued in the first eighteen months of the tenth Plan.
Secondly the major new discoveries are geographically close to
one another, this easing the logistic problems provided that the
delivery systems are completed near schedule. Substantial
assistance from Eastern Europe has been obtained and labour
transferred from other seotors of the eoonomy to bolster the oil
and gas industries' labour force. The administrative meohanism
of the ga~.industry has been modified somewhat, with the
objective of improving communications by reducing the number of
administrative levels.4
4The reform involved a reduction in the number of deoision-
making levels from five or six to two or three. This is discus~ed
in some detail in Appendix C of J Huasell "Energy as a li'actor
in Soviet Foreign Policy" Farnborough: Saxon House 1976, pp.223-226.
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A leading Soviet specialist on the gas industry admits
that prior to 1972 annual plans were over-amibitious in relation
to reSOl~es available, this being conditioned by the fact that
initial discoveries were particularly large. He argues that
the period since 1972 has~en characterised by more realistic
annual plans, though admittedly evidencing a considerably reduced
rate of growth for the ninth Plan as a whole.5 The gas industry
has recorded an auspicious first eighteen months of the tenth
Plan and in terms of volume the industry needs to record an
annual increase in production of 28.5 billion cubic metres in
order to reach the 1980 target of 435 billion cubic metre:,.
Such increments are only slightly above those recorded during
the period which Smirnov regards as having been more realistically
planned.
The Soviet Union has undertaken to supply fellow-members
of Comecon in the course of the tenth Plan with 364 million
6tonnes of oil and 90 billion cubic metres of natural gas.
It should be noted that the former figure relates to crude oil
only and that both include deliveries to Cuba and ~1ongolia but
exclude those to Yugoslavia, an associate member of Comecon~
Comparison of these figures with the corresponding commitment
and deliveries during the ninth Plan illustrates the importance
now attached to natural Gas as the incremental hydrocarbon
fuel in Eastern Europe.
5V A Smirnov "Gazovaya promyshlennoGt' II Ekonomika i organ-
izatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva 1975 No.5. p.49.
6I Ivanov, A Loshchakov "Sotrudnichestvo stran SEV i
vyravnivanie urovnei ikh razvitiyn." Voprony ekonomiki 1977
No.6. p.12.
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A range of estimates of the 1980 Soviet energy balance is
presented in table 8.1. The major factors detenning the final
balance are the planned decrease in energy intensity in the
economy as a whole and in particular in electricity generation,
where it is felt that there is still scope for further improvement.
The rate of increase in the automobile park has begun to decline
and the conversion of the railroads to oil power is well advanced.
Hence the Soviet estimate that the share of oil in the domestic
energy balance is not now expected to rise (see p.241) and plans
for refinery expansion appear to indicate that a greater share of
oil production will be_.directed to the petrochemical industry and
for export. If therefore one puts the 1980 share the energy
balance held by oil at the 1975 level, namely 42 per cent, and
assumes that for reasons of energy efficiency fuels such as
shale and peat will not show an increased share and that nuclear
power is unlikely to make an impact by 1980, then approximately
50 per cent of the Soviet energy balance will be met by coal and
gas. Given the greater exportability of gas in comparison with
coal it is likely that Soviet planners would favour relying on
coal for domestic consumption. Accordingly it is concluded that
coal is likely to account for 27 per cent and natural gas 23 per
cent of the 1980 Soviet energy balanoe.
Corresponding estimates for the energy balance of the Eastern
European member countries are given in table 8.2. Remarkable
consistency can be disoerned in the estimates, the noteworthy
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TABLE 8.1. Estimates of Sov:iet Energy Balance in 1980 (~:)
Estimate ~ Oil ~ratural Gas Other Total-
Bethkenhagen 31.4 43.1 25.5 100
Russell 28.5 38.7 24.7 8.1 100
Hanson 26.0 42.0 23.0 10.0 100
Scanlan 32.1 31.9 28.4 1.6 100
Author 27.0 42.0 23.0 8.0 100
Sources: A. J Bethkenhagen "Bedeutung und H6glichkei ten des Ost-'/Iest-
Handels mit Energierohstoffen" (Deutsches Institut fUr
Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft 104) Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot 1975, p.148. Bethkenhaffen simply divides his
classification of 'primary energy' between coal, oil and
gas, ignoring the contribution of the minor fuels and
hydroelectricity.
B. J Russell "Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy"
Farnborough: Saxon House 1976, p.33.
C. P Hanson "The Soviet Energy Balance" Nature, 5 May 1976,
~
D. A F G Scanlan "The Energy Balance of the Comecon Countries"
in '1Xp1oitation of Siberia's Natural Resources' Brussels:
NATO 1974. p.97. Note that the category 'other' includes
only hydroelectric and nuclear power and that t:1e fieure
given here for coal includes other solid fuel. For the
purpose of this study the important fact is that the
categories 'oil' and 'natural gas' should be comparable.
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exception being Russell's estilate for llomrulia,which assigns
a particularly high share to coal. In the absence of liuase Ll.!s
attesting the sources for his table or the basis for his calcul-
ations it is not possible to account for this discrepancy:
however one should note its inconsistency with \.Jesternand
Pastern estimates. The author's estLnate takes into account +he
most recent primary source material available and, as outlined
in the analysis contained in chapters 3 and 4, evidences the
rehabilitation of coal and the emergence of natural gas, given
restrictions in the availability of oil. It is likely that
energy consumption in 1980 will be at the Lower end of the
ranges indicated in table 4.1. and certain that attempts will
be made to consume less ene"!'gy,particularly oil, which could
even lead to a lower share for this fuel than indicated in
table 8.2.
Apart from restrictions in the form of the delivery
quota stipulated by the Soviet Union and the difficulties of
purchasing significant quantities of oil from opse, the effect
of the new pricing formula for Soviet 011 is likely to brLng
about a measure of oil conservation. The cost of a given
quantity of oil imported by an Eastern European country from
the Soviet Union in 1977 will be some 40 per cent above that
for 1975. lrices for 1978 and beyond depend on the policy of
OPEC, and should rise markedly once the pre-Yom Kippur prices
arc not incorporated into the five-year moving average. Even
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without oil quota restrictions this would tend to increase demand
for gas, the price of which has not risen as dramatically as
that of oil.
It was estimated in chapter 6 that the Sovi.et Union is
likely to have between 150 and 170 million tonnes of oil and
refined products available for export in 1980. The estimate
of 1980 energy demand for the Comecon countries given in table
4.1, of the enerB'Y balance of the individual countries outlined
in table 8.2., of the likely upper limit of 30 million tonnes
of oil imported from OPBC producers and of Eastern European
(primarily Romanian) production of 18 million tonnes imply a
requirement of approximately 75 million tonnes from the Soviet
Union, this leaving a maximum of 97 million tonnes for export
to the rest of the world, and a minimum of 75 million.
Nore detailed information is available on Soviet natural
gas export commitments than for oil and these are detailed in
table 8.3. It was suggested in chapter 6 that Soviet export
availabili ty of natural gas was likely to be of the order of
59 billion cubic metres. The possible excess of a few billion
cubic metres over commitment would enable the Soviet Union
either to enter further export contracts provided that product-
ion were on target towards the end of the tenth Plan or to
accelerate the process of substitution of fuel by gas in the
domestic energy balance.
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The foregoing analysis suggests that the Soviet Union
will oontinue to play the role of concerned observer in her
dealings with members of OPEC. The involvement of the Soviet
Union is likely to be aimed at enhancing the opportunities of
building on her position in the international oil broking
system and in this sense could become increasingly 'dependent'
on the supply of oil from opm, should she supply established
markets with 'switched' oil.
Despi te the need of '''esterncountries to diversify not
only the structure of their energy balance but their source
of supply of oil the Soviet Union will remain only a marginal
supplier. It is misleading to talk in terms of the Soviet
Union's 'loss of opportunity' of increasing her hard currency
earnings by supplying Comecon rather than the West. On the
one hand the greater flexibility in pricing and output strategy
enjoyed by OPEC in its major export market would be a.dequate
to counter such an attempt on the Soviet part, which might
reduoe the economic and politioal influence that the Organisation
now exeroises. On the other hand the oil oompanies, having
committed themselves to high-cost exploration in the North
Sea and elsewhere have an interest in the maintenance of a high
price and, as far as possible, balanced supply and demand for
oil in Western l!.'urope.
Recognising the desirability of acquiring \{estern
technology to develop her hydrocarbon resources the Soviet
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'l'able8.3. Soviet Natural Gas Export Commitments, 1980
(Billion cubic metres)
A. Comecon
Bulgaria
Hungary
GDR
Poland
Romania
Czechoslovakia
B. Comecon Associated
Yugoslavia
Sub-Total
C. i.JesternEurone
Finland
Italy
Austria
France
West Germany
Sub-Total
Total Export Commitment
Volume
6.3
4.0
5.0
4.5
2.8
6.0
3.0
31.4
8.5
Sources: Russell OPe cit. p.70.
Petroleum Economist, Hay 1977. p.200.
Union was able to support OPEC's politico-economic strategy
towards ~'lestern companies and governments, since increasing
oil prices and uncertainty of future supply from OPEC served
to make joint projects somewhat more attrnctive to the major
companies. Though it can hardly be said th '.tthe Soviet Union
catalyse~ the price rises and production cutbacks she benefited
from them. The Soviet Union was able to increase substantially
her hard currency earnings through hydrocarbon exports to
Western Europe and to negotiate substantial price increases
for exports to fellow members of Comecon. This latter outcome
brought Eastern Europe closer to the Soviet Union in that
provision of capital, material and human resources for the
'.development of Soviet hydrocarbon reserves h'1S become the
opti''lalsolution of Eastern Euro~)e's energy problem in the
medium tel~. This not only ties the members of Comecon more
closely together, but also contributes to the maintenance::of
self-sufficiency in energy, most importantly in hydrocarbons,
of the bloc's principal economic and political power.
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APPENDIX A
Joint Ventures in the Development of Soviet Oil and Gas nesources
Information on joint projects in the development of the Soviet
oil and gas industries has been incorporated in a number of
recent studies. For the sake of completeness of information
the current status (1977) of these projects is included here.
For a fuller history of the negotiations of joint projects
the reader is referred to the following works:
Robert E Ebel "Communist Trade in Oil and Gas" New York:
Praeger 1970. Chapters 8 (oil) and 9 (gas) outline the course
of negotiations commenced in the mid-sixties.
Jeremy Russell "Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy"
FarnborOugh: Saxon House 1976. Post-1970 developments are
outlined in a series of chapters comprising part 2 of the book,
giving a country-by-country analysis.
This appendix is based on the author's article in E de Keyser
(ed.) "The European Offshore Oil and Gas Yearbook 1916/1977"
London: KOgan Page 1976, updated where necessary to include
the most recent information available.
1. Soviet-American-Japanese DeveloT)ment of East Siberia.
This scheme is concerned with the~velopment of the gas
reserves of Yakutia. Negotiations involve cooperation between
the American Occidental Oil Company, El Paso Natural Gas
Company and the engineering company Beohtel, in oonjuction
with the Japanese companies Tokyo Electrio Power and Tokyo
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Gas. Preliminary inconclusive discussions had been in progress
since the mid sixties, but in the aftermath of 1973-1974 they
commenced movement towards a possible conclusion. Early in
1974 the tripartite talks brought agreement on the basis of
the provision of a 83400 million loan to be provided equally
by the USA and Japan. It was intended that this loan would be
used by the Soviet Union for the purchase of equipment to con-
struct a 3220 kilometre pipeline to the port of Nakhodka, where
a liquefaction plant would be sited, and that deliveries of
30 billion cubic metres of gas per year would commence in
1980, to be divided equally between the Soviet Union, the USA
and Japan over a 25-year period. The American negotiators
anticipate that El Paso would receive 75 per cent and Occidental
25 per cent of the American allocation, with the provision
that Occidental would accept increased quantities if reserves
and production proved greater than anticipated.
2. Soviet-Jap!pese Development of West Siberia (Tyumen')
Discussions between the Soviet Union and Japan concerning the
possibility of joint development of oil and gas in West Siberia
commenced in 1966. Originally the Soviet Union was prepared
to supply 40 million tonnes of oil per year, but in the light
of problems encountered nationally in maintaining oil production
this figure was reduced to a maximum of 25 million in 1973.
At the same time the Soviet Union indicated that as a result
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of Western inflation and changes in~change rates that worked
to the disadvnntage of the Soviet Union, considerably higher
credits than originally envisaged would be required. Japan
indicated at first that these new terms were still of interest:
however in the early part of 1974 insistence on the Soviet
part that the oil would be supplied to Japan at the current
world price, indicating that the future price would be linked
to the l1iddle East price, plus the Soviet Union's expressed
wish to use part of the loan to finance the construction of a
second trans-Siberian railway in preference to a pipeline,
evoked a negative response from Japan, who seemed unwilling
to become involved in developing the means by which the Soviet
Union could improve its military logistic system close to
the Chinese border. At the time of writing negotiations are
still at stalemate.
3. Soviet-American Development of North-West Siberian Gas
Reserves
This soheme involves a consortium of thre~ Amerioan companies,
Tenneco Petroleum, Texas Eastern Gas and the engineers Brown
and Root. Negotiations have centered on the construction of
a pipeline from Urengoi to Murmansk, where liquefaction
facilities would be sited. The envisaged cost is of the order
of S7.6 billion, of which the Soviet Union agreed to raise
Sl.5 billion, the rest to be raised by the American consortium.
Deliveries of gas would oommence in 1980.
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Schemes involving American participation experienced a strong
setback in December 1974, when Congress decreed that the lending
authority of the Export-Import Bank would be limited toa
maximum of S25 billion over a 4-year perlod,wltha subcei1ing
of 840 million on loans in the energy sector. In addition it
was stipulated that 25 legislative days' notice should be given
for energy project proposals involving loans of 825 million or
above. Subsequent attempts have been made to raise finance
from sources other than the Export-Import Bank: however there
are currently only two projects under discussion, the Yakutia
gas project and a proposal torevelop offshore oil reserves in
Sakhalin. A revised agreement for the former project was
signed in April 1976 providing initial credits of some 850
million, of which 825 million would be provided by the Bank of
America, 820 million by the Japanese Export-Import Bank and
S5 million from private Japanese sources. In the case of
Sakhalin an agreement was signed by Japan, the USA and the
Soviet Union in January 1975 covering oil and gas developments.
Initial credits of S600 million were to be provided by the
Japanese Export-Import Bank and private industry.
4. Anglo-Soviet Development of Offshore Oil Reserves (Caspian).
In April 1976 an~eement was reached between Britain and the
Soviet Union concerning the provision of British technology,
proved in the North Sea, for use in the development of offshore
reserves in the Caspian Sea. The companies most closely
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involved in this project are BP and Highland Fabricators Ltd.,
the engineering company operated jointly by \o/impeyand Brown
and Root. The agreement provides for the supply of drilling
equipment and expertise.
5. Smaller Scale Joint Projects.
A number of smaller-scale joint projects involving Western
countries in the development of oil and gas reserves in Comecon
have been initiated. In r~arch 1974 the governments of Sweden
and Finland signed a ten-year agreement with the Polish
government covering joint exploration of the continental
shelf of the Baltic Sea, following a Polish oil strike. The
government of '.,restGermany has had preliminary discussions
with the Soviet Government on the possibility of joint explor-
ation in the Barents Sea, though it seems more likely that
negotiations with the Norwegian government will prove fruitful.
Bulgaria and Romania, recognising the possibility of using
proven offshore technology, have invited interested Western
companies for preliminary discussions.
6. The 'Adria' Pipeline
The history of the joint partioipa Hon of Hungary, Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia with Kuwait in the construction of a pipeline
from the island of Krk near Rijeka to Zagreb, with branches to
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, is given as Appendix E to [russell's
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(1976) study (pp.228-229). The Hungarian branch is intended
to link with the trans-Comecon 'Druzhba' pipeline at Szazhalom-
batta for forward transmission to Bratislava, the Yugoslav
branch is to~tend to the north and north-east of the country
to feed refineries at Bosanski Brod, Novi Sad and Pancevo.
Russell estimates the total cost of the project at S500 million.
The section from Krk to Zagreb was due to be operational by
early 1977: however in mld-1977 construction work to~~d
port facilities had just commenced. (See Petroleum Economist
July 1977, p.285.)
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APPENDIX B
Utilisation of Natural Gas in the Soviet Union 1971-1975.
The information contained in this appendix is~rived from a
single source, n D Margu1ov, E K Selikhovaand I Ta Furman
"Razvitie gazovoi promysh1ennosti i analiz tekhniko-ekonomi-
cheskikh pokazate1ei (nauchno-ekonomicheskii obaor }" r·,;oscow:
l'Tinisterstvogazovoi promysh1ennosti 1976.
During the time in which natural gas has made an increasing
contribution to the Soviet energy balance, essentially the post-
1960 period, there have been substantial changes not only in the
geography of production but also of consumption. During 1961-
1965 the growth in consumption in European Russia was accompanied
by a corresponding rate of growth in production. HOHever during
1966-1970 the substantial part of European production was
provided by operations in the North of the area, whereas the
prime growth areas for consumption wer= the Ukraine, Volga,
Transcaucasia, the Centre, the North-'~!estand the South-\~est,
as shown in the following table: (billion cubic metres).
Production Region 1960 1965 1970 m.l- Prelim.
Total USSR 45.1 129.0 197.9 274.3
incl. RSFSR 23.9 75.6 ll7.3 160.5
North-West 1.8 6.6 9.5 13.4
Central 6.5 22.5 32.0 38.5
8flntral 0.9 2.7 4.6 5.6ernozem
Volga 8.8 18.0 22.9 36.5
North 4.4 11.2 15.3 18.2Caucasus
Ural 0.5 10.2 26.2 38.7
Ukraine 14.6 34.6 49.6 58.3
Belorussia 2.3 2.9 4.0
~ran8caucaBia 5.9 7.8 9.3 16.7G~8r§ia, fzer-i )aa z an, rmen a
Source: °E· cit. E·8.
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Gas consumption increased by 40 per cent during the ninth Plan.
The greatest increases in individual sectors were recorded by
the chemical indust:tty(80%), ferrous metalluxgy (30}6), engineering
and metalworking (3~fo) and the non-ferrous metallurgical industry
showed an increase of 150 per cent. In 1975 gas accounted for
79 ·per cent of fuel used in the:production of 8.mmonia (the base for
fertiliser), 64 per cent of fuel in cement production and 35
per cent of fuel in copper production. A total of 126 billion
cubic metres of gas was consumed in energy conversion (electricity
and steam raising). The following table details the consumption
of gas by sector of the economy, 1975 compared with 1970:
Consumption Sector 121Q" 1l7..2. l2Z:2as ~~of 1970
Total Soviet 190.8 264.5 139Consumption
Communal Use 25,3 34.0 134
Industrial Use 108.1 154.4 143
inc. Ferrous Metall- 28.0 35.4 126urgy
Non-Ferrous 2.3 5.7 248f'letallurgy
Ehfineering and 19.1 24.2 127~lealworking
constEi~tion 18.3 24.8 135Mater a s
Oil and Gas 10.6 20.5 193
Fisheries 6.1 8.2 134 .
Light Industry 2.5 3.8 152
Other Industrial 8.3 9.0 108
Electricity Generation 52.7 67.8 129
Construction 1.0 1.7 170..
Transport 0.7 1.3 186
Agriculture 0.7 1.9 271
Other 2.3 3.4 148
Sourcs: ibid. ~.l~.
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From 1971 to 1975 gas consumption in the North-West, the Baltio
states and Belorussia increased by 6.4 billion oubic metres,
in the Central region by 8.9 billion in the Volga area by 13.6
billion, in the Urals by 12.0 billion and in the Ukraine by
8.7 billion. However concurrently with growth in consumption
in European Russia there has been a decline in produotion in the
Ukraine and the North Caucasus which during the eighth Plan not
only provided for demand in European Russia and the Central
regions but also in the North-West, the Baltio states and Be10-
russia. In the course of the ninth Plan this decline totalled
57 billion cubic metres, ~spite the installation of new productive
capacity to offset depletion. The ~llowing table details the
changes in gas consumption by region, 1915 compared with 1970:
Gas
Economic Res:ion Consum;etion Growth
1975 as %
1970 1975 Absolute increase onIncrease !21..Q.
North-West 9.5 13.4 3.9 41.1
Centre 32.0 38.5 6.5 20.3
Central Chernozem 4.6 5.6 1.0 21.7
Volga-Vyatskii 4.7 6.1 1.4 29.8
Volga 22.9 36.5 13.6 59.4
North Caucasus 15.3 18.2 2.9 19.0
Urals 26.2 38.7 12.5 47.7
Baltic states 2.8 4.2 1.4 50.0
Belorussia 2.9 4.0 1.1 37.9
Ukraine 49.6 58.3 8.7 17.5
Transoaucasia 9.3 16.7 1.4 79.6
Kazakhstan 3.3 7.6 4.3 130.3
Central Asia 13.4 23.9 10.5 78.4
Other Regions 1.4 8.7 7.3 521.0
TOTAL 197.9 280.4 82.6 41.1
Souroe: ibid. E·~2. (NB figures include transportation loss.)
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APPENDIX C
The Soviet System of Reserve Classification
Soviet reserve classifications for oil and gas do not readily
correspond with those used in the \vest. Recent Western works
1have included details of the Soviet system: for ease of
reference the terms of the classification~e included here.
The information contained in this appendix is derived from a
single source, this being the presentation by 1-i Sh Modelevsky
of the Laboratory of the Geology of Foreign Countries, ~10scow,
and V F Pominov of the Institute of World Economics and Inter-
national Relations, r·Toscow,to the Conference on Energy
Resources held in Laxenburg, Austria, in ~ay 1975 under the
auspices of the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA). The system of classification given by
Modelevsky md Pominov is stated to be used in most of the other
socialist countries.
The classification divides known reserves intowo main groups,
those recoverable under present technical and economic condit-
ions and those unrecoverable under the same conditions. The
group termed "explored" ('razvedannye') reserves comprises
classifications A, B and Cl.
l(a)I F Elliot "The Soviet Energy Balance" London:
Praeger 1974, p.l9.
(b)J Bethkenhagen "Bedeutung and M6glichkeiten des
Ost-iVest-Handels mit Energierohstoffen" (neutsches Instltut
ftlrWirtschaftsforschung, Sond.erheft 104) Berlin -:Duncker &
Humblot 1975, pp. 29-30.
(c)J Russell "Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign
Policy" Farnborough: Saxon House.1976, pp.22l-222.
411
Category A reserves are calculated only during the time in
which a given field isming exploited and when the factors
influencing commercial production are known, such~ total
oil in place, its chemical composition', seam pressure and the
degree of gas saturation.
Category B comprises reserves in wells that have been extens-
ively drilled and indicate estimated levels of production by
tested flows from at least two wells. Knowledge of the chemical
composition of the oil or gas and an estimate of the total
exploitability of the field, adequate to justify the decision
to develop, are required.
Catego;y Cl comprises reserves in known fields, which have
already a number of wells proven tobe commercial. Such reserves
are normally found adjacent to&posits already classified in
the A and B category, and where primar,y logging data indicates
the likelihood of such reserves becoming commercially exploitable.
It is noted that the range of accuracy experienced in~timating
reserve levels is 10, 25 and 50 per cent for categories A, B
and Cl respectively.
category 02 relates to "prospective" ('perspektivnye') reserves,
found mainly in new exploration areas and are calculated on the
basis of logging data and geological proximity to fields contain-
ing reserves in the higher categories.
It is pointed out that reserves in new fields are usually
reckoned in categories Cl and C2, and only occasionally in
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category B, immediately after drilling and testing of the
first well to flow. Depending on the rate of success of
development drilling, reclassification of reserves in category
Cl is possible in a relatively short time.
Category D comprises "predicted" ('prognoznye') reserves. In
category Dl are found reserves in deposits at depths already
reached in development drilling and whose extent can be
gauged from primary seismic data. No measure of the techno-
commeroial potential is assumed. Category D2 accounts for
reserves that are believed to exist in regions with proven
potential but where drilling has not been carried out or where
the depth of the likely deposit has not been reached in explor-
2atory drilling carried out in~isting hydrocarbon-bearing areas.
It is stressed that the Soviet approach to reserve classifi-
cation is primarily geological and that "rather high" recovery
factors, based on the ready availability of the most advanced
technology, have been used. The economic factors, have rarely
been considered adequately. However Modelevsky and Pominov
do stress that there has recently been a shift in emphasis on
the Soviet part to a "more commercially oriented" system of
classification, including setting limits to the degree of
exploration regarded as sufficient to justify themcision to
develop a given field, so as towoid what is implied to be
2Note also that there is data on the content of reserve
eategories At Band C in L M Umanskii, M ?vI Umanskii "Ekonomika
neftyanoi i gazovoi promyshlennostl" Moscow: Nedra 1974, p.255.
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excessive drilling cost incurred during the exploratory phase.
On the question of comparability with Western classification
systems, the authors stress the equal importance given in the
West tomonomic considerations and ncte that such an approach
gives rise to underestimation by Soviet standards of ultimate
explored reserves. The following tables, taken from the
Modelevsky and Pominov paper, summarise the Soviet classifi-
cation system (table A), and compare this system with others
currently in use elsewhere in the hydrocarbon-producing world
(table B).
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APPENDIX D
Issues for Further Research
(i) Labour Supply in the Development of Siberian Reserves
The provision of adequate labour for the development of West
Siberian oil and gas resources and for exploratory work in
East Siberia has become a major constraint on the development
of the Soviet energy balance and merits further study. Recent
Western analyses of Soviet energy development allude to factors
such~ high labour turnover despite sUbstantial wage and other
benefits: however th2 nature and extent of the influence of this
on energy planning remains unresearched.
Of the available Soviet material on this question the work of
K I Misevich and V I Chudnova ("Nase1enie rainov sovremennogo
promysh1ennogo osvoeniya severa Zapadnoi Sibiri" Novosibirsk
Nauka 1973)is the most directly related to hydrocarbon devaLopment ,
It is essentially a study of the emergence of the Tyumen'
oblast' and the Northern Db' area following the decree on their
rapid development adopted by the 24th Party Congress on 11
December 1969. Part of Chapter 5 (pp.123-136) deals with oil
and gas questions, outlining the geographical factors influencing
demand for labour, but providing no factual data on population
flows. The book contains an extensive bibliography of works
on this issue, most of which were published in the Soviet Union
after 1960. The Soviet demographer V I Perevedentsev wrote
a number of works on labour economics in the late sixties
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and early seventies, one of which cppears in translation ("Popu-
lation Movement and Labour Supply in Siberia" Soviet Sociology,
Fall .1972, pp.107-125. A survey of the work of this analyst
is likely to provide useful basic material. (See also S G Prociuk
"The 11anpower Problem in Siberia" Soviet Studies, October
1967. pp.190-210.
(ii) Location of Energy-Intensive Industry.
The Eastward-shifting energy resource base ha~ neoessitated some
rethinking on the part of Soviet planners as to the optimal
location of power stations and energy-intensive industrial
processes. Elliot devotes some space to this question (liThe
Soviet Energy Balance" New York: Praeger 1974. pp.246-251),
presenting some data on the comparative delivered cost of
fuels in the major industrial zones. At the theoretical level
S A Nikolaev ("Mezhraionnyi i vnutrirayonnyi analiz razmeshch-
eniya proiz'VOditel'nykh sil" Moscow Nauka 1971) outlines the
factors taken into consideration by Soviet planners in reaching
decisions on industrial location. V I Shelest ("Regional'nye
energo-ekonomicheskie problemy SSSR" J>1oscowNauka 1975) devotes
a section (part 4 - pp.162-215) to the issue, giving some
details of aggregate energy consumption in industrial processes.
The Nikolaev work contains a short bibliography. The proceed-
ings of a conference on industrial location and general develop-
ment (published as "Problemy razvitiya vostochnykh raionov
SSSR" Moscow Nedra 1911) include a number of useful papers
relevant to this issue.
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APPENDIX E
Recently Published lTaterial
(i) Arthur Jay Klinghoffer "The Soviet Union and International
Oil Politics" New York: Columbia University Press 1977.
During the typing of the final script of this thesis the above
work was published. Its objective is to study Soviet oil trade
policy "from the vantage point of political science, rather
than economics or petroleum geology" (p.2.). Kling-hoffer's
analysis complements the present study in that he attempts,
unlike Russell ("Energy as a Factor •••" 1976), to relate Soviet
trade to the theoretical framework and operational reality of
Soviet foreign policy, outlining the Soviet view of the economic
and political role of trade. He gives a particularly detailed
analysis of the Soviet role in the Middle East in the build-up
to and aftermath of the Tom Tippur war, linking the Soviet Union's
diplomatic moves in the area with day-to-day developments in
international oil trade. Klinghoffer's perspective on Soviet
involvement in discussions with Norway on development of the
Barents Sea is particularly detailed and adds substantially
to the analysis given 1n this thesis. Extensive footnotes
reveal the painstaking preparation of the work.*
(ii) Z A B Zeman, J Zoubek "Comecon Oil and Gas within the
Overall Energy Context", a business report published by
The Financial Times Ltd, }k~y 1977.
This is a short (131 PP.) reference work intended for the non-
specialist businessman. The approach of the authors is
(*Note that the work is to be reviewed by this author in
Soviet Studies in 1978.)
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descriptive and historical, and the majority of the data relate
to the Soviet Union. Specific examples of changes in energy
consumption (e.g. Czech attempts at energy conservation pp.60-63,
and trends in Soviet motorisation pp.72-75) are given. Project-
ions of Soviet oil and gas export patterns concur broadly with
the conclusions reached in this thesis. Though sources of
statistical data are attested, the study is written without
references, and its value to the researcher is therefore limited.
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